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06e1a81c48
- Performance tweaks for efifb earlycon by Andy - Preparatory refactoring and cleanup work in the efivar layer by Johan, which is needed to accommodate the Snapdragon arm64 laptops that expose their EFI variable store via a TEE secure world API. - Enhancements to the EFI memory map handling so that Xen dom0 can safely access EFI configuration tables (Demi Marie) - Wire up the newly introduced IBT/BTI flag in the EFI memory attributes table, so that firmware that is generated with ENDBR/BTI landing pads will be mapped with enforcement enabled. - Clean up how we check and print the EFI revision exposed by the firmware. - Incorporate EFI memory attributes protocol definition contributed by Evgeniy and wire it up in the EFI zboot code. This ensures that these images can execute under new and stricter rules regarding the default memory permissions for EFI page allocations. (More work is in progress here) - CPER header cleanup by Dan Williams - Use a raw spinlock to protect the EFI runtime services stack on arm64 to ensure the correct semantics under -rt. (Pierre) - EFI framebuffer quirk for Lenovo Ideapad by Darrell. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGzBAABCgAdFiEE+9lifEBpyUIVN1cpw08iOZLZjyQFAmPzuwsACgkQw08iOZLZ jyS7dwwAm95DlDxFIQi4FmTm2mqJws9PyDrkfaAK1CoyqCgeOLQT2FkVolgr8jne pwpwCTXtYP8y0BZvdQEIjpAq/BHKaD3GJSPfl7lo+pnUu68PpsFWaV6EdT33KKfj QeF0MnUvrqUeTFI77D+S0ZW2zxdo9eCcahF3TPA52/bEiiDHWBF8Qm9VHeQGklik zoXA15ft3mgITybgjEA0ncGrVZiBMZrYoMvbdkeoedfw02GN/eaQn8d2iHBtTDEh 3XNlo7ONX0v50cjt0yvwFEA0AKo0o7R1cj+ziKH/bc4KjzIiCbINhy7blroSq+5K YMlnPHuj8Nhv3I+MBdmn/nxRCQeQsE4RfRru04hfNfdcqjAuqwcBvRXvVnjWKZHl CmUYs+p/oqxrQ4BjiHfw0JKbXRsgbFI6o3FeeLH9kzI9IDUPpqu3Ma814FVok9Ai zbOCrJf5tEtg5tIavcUESEMBuHjEafqzh8c7j7AAqbaNjlihsqosDy9aYoarEi5M f/tLec86 =+pOz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel: "A healthy mix of EFI contributions this time: - Performance tweaks for efifb earlycon (Andy) - Preparatory refactoring and cleanup work in the efivar layer, which is needed to accommodate the Snapdragon arm64 laptops that expose their EFI variable store via a TEE secure world API (Johan) - Enhancements to the EFI memory map handling so that Xen dom0 can safely access EFI configuration tables (Demi Marie) - Wire up the newly introduced IBT/BTI flag in the EFI memory attributes table, so that firmware that is generated with ENDBR/BTI landing pads will be mapped with enforcement enabled - Clean up how we check and print the EFI revision exposed by the firmware - Incorporate EFI memory attributes protocol definition and wire it up in the EFI zboot code (Evgeniy) This ensures that these images can execute under new and stricter rules regarding the default memory permissions for EFI page allocations (More work is in progress here) - CPER header cleanup (Dan Williams) - Use a raw spinlock to protect the EFI runtime services stack on arm64 to ensure the correct semantics under -rt (Pierre) - EFI framebuffer quirk for Lenovo Ideapad (Darrell)" * tag 'efi-next-for-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: (24 commits) firmware/efi sysfb_efi: Add quirk for Lenovo IdeaPad Duet 3 arm64: efi: Make efi_rt_lock a raw_spinlock efi: Add mixed-mode thunk recipe for GetMemoryAttributes efi: x86: Wire up IBT annotation in memory attributes table efi: arm64: Wire up BTI annotation in memory attributes table efi: Discover BTI support in runtime services regions efi/cper, cxl: Remove cxl_err.h efi: Use standard format for printing the EFI revision efi: Drop minimum EFI version check at boot efi: zboot: Use EFI protocol to remap code/data with the right attributes efi/libstub: Add memory attribute protocol definitions efi: efivars: prevent double registration efi: verify that variable services are supported efivarfs: always register filesystem efi: efivars: add efivars printk prefix efi: Warn if trying to reserve memory under Xen efi: Actually enable the ESRT under Xen efi: Apply allowlist to EFI configuration tables when running under Xen efi: xen: Implement memory descriptor lookup based on hypercall efi: memmap: Disregard bogus entries instead of returning them ...
209 lines
5.8 KiB
C
209 lines
5.8 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Extensible Firmware Interface
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*
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* Based on Extensible Firmware Interface Specification version 2.4
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Linaro Ltd.
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*/
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <asm/efi.h>
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#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
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static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)
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{
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if (PAGE_SIZE == EFI_PAGE_SIZE)
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return false;
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return !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
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!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
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}
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/*
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* Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
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* executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
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* set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
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*/
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static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
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{
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u64 attr = md->attribute;
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u32 type = md->type;
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if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
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return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
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if (region_is_misaligned(md)) {
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static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;
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/*
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* Regions that are not aligned to the OS page size cannot be
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* mapped with strict permissions, as those might interfere
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* with the permissions that are needed by the adjacent
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* region's mapping. However, if we haven't encountered any
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* misaligned runtime code regions so far, we can safely use
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* non-executable permissions for non-code regions.
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*/
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code_is_misaligned |= (type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE);
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return code_is_misaligned ? pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
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: pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
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}
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/* R-- */
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if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
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(EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
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/* R-X */
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if (attr & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
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/* RW- */
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if (((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_RP | EFI_MEMORY_WP | EFI_MEMORY_XP)) ==
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EFI_MEMORY_XP) ||
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type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
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/* RWX */
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
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}
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/* we will fill this structure from the stub, so don't put it in .bss */
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struct screen_info screen_info __section(".data");
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(screen_info);
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int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
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{
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pteval_t prot_val = create_mapping_protection(md);
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bool page_mappings_only = (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
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md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
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/*
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* If this region is not aligned to the page size used by the OS, the
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* mapping will be rounded outwards, and may end up sharing a page
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* frame with an adjacent runtime memory region. Given that the page
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* table descriptor covering the shared page will be rewritten when the
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* adjacent region gets mapped, we must avoid block mappings here so we
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* don't have to worry about splitting them when that happens.
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*/
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if (region_is_misaligned(md))
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page_mappings_only = true;
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create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
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md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
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__pgprot(prot_val | PTE_NG), page_mappings_only);
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return 0;
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}
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struct set_perm_data {
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const efi_memory_desc_t *md;
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bool has_bti;
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};
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static int __init set_permissions(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data)
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{
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struct set_perm_data *spd = data;
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const efi_memory_desc_t *md = spd->md;
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pte_t pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
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if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
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pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY));
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if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
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pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_PXN));
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else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL) &&
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system_supports_bti() && spd->has_bti)
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pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_GP));
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set_pte(ptep, pte);
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return 0;
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}
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int __init efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
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efi_memory_desc_t *md,
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bool has_bti)
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{
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struct set_perm_data data = { md, has_bti };
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BUG_ON(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE &&
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md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
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if (region_is_misaligned(md))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Calling apply_to_page_range() is only safe on regions that are
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* guaranteed to be mapped down to pages. Since we are only called
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* for regions that have been mapped using efi_create_mapping() above
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* (and this is checked by the generic Memory Attributes table parsing
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* routines), there is no need to check that again here.
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*/
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return apply_to_page_range(mm, md->virt_addr,
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md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
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set_permissions, &data);
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}
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/*
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* UpdateCapsule() depends on the system being shutdown via
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* ResetSystem().
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*/
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bool efi_poweroff_required(void)
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{
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return efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES);
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}
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asmlinkage efi_status_t efi_handle_corrupted_x18(efi_status_t s, const char *f)
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{
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pr_err_ratelimited(FW_BUG "register x18 corrupted by EFI %s\n", f);
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return s;
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}
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DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(efi_rt_lock);
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asmlinkage u64 *efi_rt_stack_top __ro_after_init;
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asmlinkage efi_status_t __efi_rt_asm_recover(void);
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bool efi_runtime_fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg)
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{
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/* Check whether the exception occurred while running the firmware */
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if (!current_in_efi() || regs->pc >= TASK_SIZE_64)
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return false;
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pr_err(FW_BUG "Unable to handle %s in EFI runtime service\n", msg);
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add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
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clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
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regs->regs[0] = EFI_ABORTED;
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regs->regs[30] = efi_rt_stack_top[-1];
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regs->pc = (u64)__efi_rt_asm_recover;
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK))
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regs->regs[18] = efi_rt_stack_top[-2];
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return true;
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}
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/* EFI requires 8 KiB of stack space for runtime services */
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static_assert(THREAD_SIZE >= SZ_8K);
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static int __init arm64_efi_rt_init(void)
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{
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void *p;
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if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
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return 0;
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p = __vmalloc_node(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL,
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NUMA_NO_NODE, &&l);
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l: if (!p) {
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pr_warn("Failed to allocate EFI runtime stack\n");
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clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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efi_rt_stack_top = p + THREAD_SIZE;
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return 0;
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}
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core_initcall(arm64_efi_rt_init);
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