linux/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
Mark Rutland e30e8d46cf arm64: fix compat syscall return truncation
Due to inconsistencies in the way we manipulate compat GPRs, we have a
few issues today:

* For audit and tracing, where error codes are handled as a (native)
  long, negative error codes are expected to be sign-extended to the
  native 64-bits, or they may fail to be matched correctly. Thus a
  syscall which fails with an error may erroneously be identified as
  failing.

* For ptrace, *all* compat return values should be sign-extended for
  consistency with 32-bit arm, but we currently only do this for
  negative return codes.

* As we may transiently set the upper 32 bits of some compat GPRs while
  in the kernel, these can be sampled by perf, which is somewhat
  confusing. This means that where a syscall returns a pointer above 2G,
  this will be sign-extended, but will not be mistaken for an error as
  error codes are constrained to the inclusive range [-4096, -1] where
  no user pointer can exist.

To fix all of these, we must consistently use helpers to get/set the
compat GPRs, ensuring that we never write the upper 32 bits of the
return code, and always sign-extend when reading the return code.  This
patch does so, with the following changes:

* We re-organise syscall_get_return_value() to always sign-extend for
  compat tasks, and reimplement syscall_get_error() atop. We update
  syscall_trace_exit() to use syscall_get_return_value().

* We consistently use syscall_set_return_value() to set the return
  value, ensureing the upper 32 bits are never set unexpectedly.

* As the core audit code currently uses regs_return_value() rather than
  syscall_get_return_value(), we special-case this for
  compat_user_mode(regs) such that this will do the right thing. Going
  forward, we should try to move the core audit code over to
  syscall_get_return_value().

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Reported-by: weiyuchen <weiyuchen3@huawei.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802104200.21390-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2021-08-03 10:35:03 +01:00

191 lines
5.4 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/daifflags.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/exception.h>
#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
long compat_arm_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno);
long sys_ni_syscall(void);
static long do_ni_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
long ret;
if (is_compat_task()) {
ret = compat_arm_syscall(regs, scno);
if (ret != -ENOSYS)
return ret;
}
#endif
return sys_ni_syscall();
}
static long __invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, syscall_fn_t syscall_fn)
{
return syscall_fn(regs);
}
static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
unsigned int sc_nr,
const syscall_fn_t syscall_table[])
{
long ret;
add_random_kstack_offset();
if (scno < sc_nr) {
syscall_fn_t syscall_fn;
syscall_fn = syscall_table[array_index_nospec(scno, sc_nr)];
ret = __invoke_syscall(regs, syscall_fn);
} else {
ret = do_ni_syscall(regs, scno);
}
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, 0, ret);
/*
* Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
* but not enough for arm64 stack utilization comfort. To keep
* reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 9 bits.
*
* The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
* applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
* 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned SP at function boundaries.
*
* The resulting 5 bits of entropy is seen in SP[8:4].
*/
choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_int() & 0x1FF);
}
static inline bool has_syscall_work(unsigned long flags)
{
return unlikely(flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK);
}
int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs);
static void el0_svc_common(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno, int sc_nr,
const syscall_fn_t syscall_table[])
{
unsigned long flags = current_thread_info()->flags;
regs->orig_x0 = regs->regs[0];
regs->syscallno = scno;
/*
* BTI note:
* The architecture does not guarantee that SPSR.BTYPE is zero
* on taking an SVC, so we could return to userspace with a
* non-zero BTYPE after the syscall.
*
* This shouldn't matter except when userspace is explicitly
* doing something stupid, such as setting PROT_BTI on a page
* that lacks conforming BTI/PACIxSP instructions, falling
* through from one executable page to another with differing
* PROT_BTI, or messing with BTYPE via ptrace: in such cases,
* userspace should not be surprised if a SIGILL occurs on
* syscall return.
*
* So, don't touch regs->pstate & PSR_BTYPE_MASK here.
* (Similarly for HVC and SMC elsewhere.)
*/
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
if (flags & _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) {
/*
* Process the asynchronous tag check fault before the actual
* syscall. do_notify_resume() will send a signal to userspace
* before the syscall is restarted.
*/
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ERESTARTNOINTR, 0);
return;
}
if (has_syscall_work(flags)) {
/*
* The de-facto standard way to skip a system call using ptrace
* is to set the system call to -1 (NO_SYSCALL) and set x0 to a
* suitable error code for consumption by userspace. However,
* this cannot be distinguished from a user-issued syscall(-1)
* and so we must set x0 to -ENOSYS here in case the tracer doesn't
* issue the skip and we fall into trace_exit with x0 preserved.
*
* This is slightly odd because it also means that if a tracer
* sets the system call number to -1 but does not initialise x0,
* then x0 will be preserved for all system calls apart from a
* user-issued syscall(-1). However, requesting a skip and not
* setting the return value is unlikely to do anything sensible
* anyway.
*/
if (scno == NO_SYSCALL)
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ENOSYS, 0);
scno = syscall_trace_enter(regs);
if (scno == NO_SYSCALL)
goto trace_exit;
}
invoke_syscall(regs, scno, sc_nr, syscall_table);
/*
* The tracing status may have changed under our feet, so we have to
* check again. However, if we were tracing entry, then we always trace
* exit regardless, as the old entry assembly did.
*/
if (!has_syscall_work(flags) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RSEQ)) {
local_daif_mask();
flags = current_thread_info()->flags;
if (!has_syscall_work(flags) && !(flags & _TIF_SINGLESTEP))
return;
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
}
trace_exit:
syscall_trace_exit(regs);
}
static inline void sve_user_discard(void)
{
if (!system_supports_sve())
return;
clear_thread_flag(TIF_SVE);
/*
* task_fpsimd_load() won't be called to update CPACR_EL1 in
* ret_to_user unless TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is still set, which only
* happens if a context switch or kernel_neon_begin() or context
* modification (sigreturn, ptrace) intervenes.
* So, ensure that CPACR_EL1 is already correct for the fast-path case.
*/
sve_user_disable();
}
void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
sve_user_discard();
el0_svc_common(regs, regs->regs[8], __NR_syscalls, sys_call_table);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
el0_svc_common(regs, regs->regs[7], __NR_compat_syscalls,
compat_sys_call_table);
}
#endif