linux/fs/verity/verify.c
Eric Biggers 8fcd94add6 fsverity: use shash API instead of ahash API
The "ahash" API, like the other scatterlist-based crypto APIs such as
"skcipher", comes with some well-known limitations.  First, it can't
easily be used with vmalloc addresses.  Second, the request struct can't
be allocated on the stack.  This adds complexity and a possible failure
point that needs to be worked around, e.g. using a mempool.

The only benefit of ahash over "shash" is that ahash is needed to access
traditional memory-to-memory crypto accelerators, i.e. drivers/crypto/.
However, this style of crypto acceleration has largely fallen out of
favor and been superseded by CPU-based acceleration or inline crypto
engines.  Also, ahash needs to be used asynchronously to take full
advantage of such hardware, but fs/verity/ has never done this.

On all systems that aren't actually using one of these ahash-only crypto
accelerators, ahash just adds unnecessary overhead as it sits between
the user and the underlying shash algorithms.

Also, XFS is planned to cache fsverity Merkle tree blocks in the
existing XFS buffer cache.  As a result, it will be possible for a
single Merkle tree block to be split across discontiguous pages
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405233753.GU3223426@dread.disaster.area).
This data will need to be hashed.  It is easiest to work with a vmapped
address in this case.  However, ahash is incompatible with this.

Therefore, let's convert fs/verity/ from ahash to shash.  This
simplifies the code, and it should also slightly improve performance for
everyone who wasn't actually using one of these ahash-only crypto
accelerators, i.e. almost everyone (or maybe even everyone)!

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230516052306.99600-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-06-04 05:54:28 -07:00

385 lines
12 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Data verification functions, i.e. hooks for ->readahead()
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/bio.h>
static struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue;
static inline int cmp_hashes(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const u8 *want_hash, const u8 *real_hash,
u64 data_pos, int level)
{
const unsigned int hsize = vi->tree_params.digest_size;
if (memcmp(want_hash, real_hash, hsize) == 0)
return 0;
fsverity_err(vi->inode,
"FILE CORRUPTED! pos=%llu, level=%d, want_hash=%s:%*phN, real_hash=%s:%*phN",
data_pos, level,
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash,
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, real_hash);
return -EBADMSG;
}
/*
* Returns true if the hash block with index @hblock_idx in the tree, located in
* @hpage, has already been verified.
*/
static bool is_hash_block_verified(struct fsverity_info *vi, struct page *hpage,
unsigned long hblock_idx)
{
bool verified;
unsigned int blocks_per_page;
unsigned int i;
/*
* When the Merkle tree block size and page size are the same, then the
* ->hash_block_verified bitmap isn't allocated, and we use PG_checked
* to directly indicate whether the page's block has been verified.
*
* Using PG_checked also guarantees that we re-verify hash pages that
* get evicted and re-instantiated from the backing storage, as new
* pages always start out with PG_checked cleared.
*/
if (!vi->hash_block_verified)
return PageChecked(hpage);
/*
* When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use a bitmap
* to indicate whether each hash block has been verified.
*
* However, we still need to ensure that hash pages that get evicted and
* re-instantiated from the backing storage are re-verified. To do
* this, we use PG_checked again, but now it doesn't really mean
* "checked". Instead, now it just serves as an indicator for whether
* the hash page is newly instantiated or not.
*
* The first thread that sees PG_checked=0 must clear the corresponding
* bitmap bits, then set PG_checked=1. This requires a spinlock. To
* avoid having to take this spinlock in the common case of
* PG_checked=1, we start with an opportunistic lockless read.
*/
if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
/*
* A read memory barrier is needed here to give ACQUIRE
* semantics to the above PageChecked() test.
*/
smp_rmb();
return test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
}
spin_lock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
verified = test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
} else {
blocks_per_page = vi->tree_params.blocks_per_page;
hblock_idx = round_down(hblock_idx, blocks_per_page);
for (i = 0; i < blocks_per_page; i++)
clear_bit(hblock_idx + i, vi->hash_block_verified);
/*
* A write memory barrier is needed here to give RELEASE
* semantics to the below SetPageChecked() operation.
*/
smp_wmb();
SetPageChecked(hpage);
verified = false;
}
spin_unlock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
return verified;
}
/*
* Verify a single data block against the file's Merkle tree.
*
* In principle, we need to verify the entire path to the root node. However,
* for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash blocks. Therefore we need
* only ascend the tree until an already-verified hash block is seen, and then
* verify the path to that block.
*
* Return: %true if the data block is valid, else %false.
*/
static bool
verify_data_block(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi,
const void *data, u64 data_pos, unsigned long max_ra_pages)
{
const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params;
const unsigned int hsize = params->digest_size;
int level;
u8 _want_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
const u8 *want_hash;
u8 real_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
/* The hash blocks that are traversed, indexed by level */
struct {
/* Page containing the hash block */
struct page *page;
/* Mapped address of the hash block (will be within @page) */
const void *addr;
/* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
unsigned long index;
/* Byte offset of the wanted hash relative to @addr */
unsigned int hoffset;
} hblocks[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
/*
* The index of the previous level's block within that level; also the
* index of that block's hash within the current level.
*/
u64 hidx = data_pos >> params->log_blocksize;
int err;
/* Up to 1 + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS pages may be mapped at once */
BUILD_BUG_ON(1 + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS > KM_MAX_IDX);
if (unlikely(data_pos >= inode->i_size)) {
/*
* This can happen in the data page spanning EOF when the Merkle
* tree block size is less than the page size. The Merkle tree
* doesn't cover data blocks fully past EOF. But the entire
* page spanning EOF can be visible to userspace via a mmap, and
* any part past EOF should be all zeroes. Therefore, we need
* to verify that any data blocks fully past EOF are all zeroes.
*/
if (memchr_inv(data, 0, params->block_size)) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"FILE CORRUPTED! Data past EOF is not zeroed");
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash blocks along
* the way until we find a hash block that has already been verified, or
* until we reach the root.
*/
for (level = 0; level < params->num_levels; level++) {
unsigned long next_hidx;
unsigned long hblock_idx;
pgoff_t hpage_idx;
unsigned int hblock_offset_in_page;
unsigned int hoffset;
struct page *hpage;
const void *haddr;
/*
* The index of the block in the current level; also the index
* of that block's hash within the next level.
*/
next_hidx = hidx >> params->log_arity;
/* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
hblock_idx = params->level_start[level] + next_hidx;
/* Index of the hash page in the tree overall */
hpage_idx = hblock_idx >> params->log_blocks_per_page;
/* Byte offset of the hash block within the page */
hblock_offset_in_page =
(hblock_idx << params->log_blocksize) & ~PAGE_MASK;
/* Byte offset of the hash within the block */
hoffset = (hidx << params->log_digestsize) &
(params->block_size - 1);
hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
hpage_idx, level == 0 ? min(max_ra_pages,
params->tree_pages - hpage_idx) : 0);
if (IS_ERR(hpage)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hpage);
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %lu",
err, hpage_idx);
goto out;
}
haddr = kmap_local_page(hpage) + hblock_offset_in_page;
if (is_hash_block_verified(vi, hpage, hblock_idx)) {
memcpy(_want_hash, haddr + hoffset, hsize);
want_hash = _want_hash;
kunmap_local(haddr);
put_page(hpage);
goto descend;
}
hblocks[level].page = hpage;
hblocks[level].addr = haddr;
hblocks[level].index = hblock_idx;
hblocks[level].hoffset = hoffset;
hidx = next_hidx;
}
want_hash = vi->root_hash;
descend:
/* Descend the tree verifying hash blocks. */
for (; level > 0; level--) {
struct page *hpage = hblocks[level - 1].page;
const void *haddr = hblocks[level - 1].addr;
unsigned long hblock_idx = hblocks[level - 1].index;
unsigned int hoffset = hblocks[level - 1].hoffset;
err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, haddr, real_hash);
if (err)
goto out;
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, data_pos, level - 1);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Mark the hash block as verified. This must be atomic and
* idempotent, as the same hash block might be verified by
* multiple threads concurrently.
*/
if (vi->hash_block_verified)
set_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
else
SetPageChecked(hpage);
memcpy(_want_hash, haddr + hoffset, hsize);
want_hash = _want_hash;
kunmap_local(haddr);
put_page(hpage);
}
/* Finally, verify the data block. */
err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, data, real_hash);
if (err)
goto out;
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, data_pos, -1);
out:
for (; level > 0; level--) {
kunmap_local(hblocks[level - 1].addr);
put_page(hblocks[level - 1].page);
}
return err == 0;
}
static bool
verify_data_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct folio *data_folio,
size_t len, size_t offset, unsigned long max_ra_pages)
{
struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
const unsigned int block_size = vi->tree_params.block_size;
u64 pos = (u64)data_folio->index << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offset, block_size)))
return false;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!folio_test_locked(data_folio) ||
folio_test_uptodate(data_folio)))
return false;
do {
void *data;
bool valid;
data = kmap_local_folio(data_folio, offset);
valid = verify_data_block(inode, vi, data, pos + offset,
max_ra_pages);
kunmap_local(data);
if (!valid)
return false;
offset += block_size;
len -= block_size;
} while (len);
return true;
}
/**
* fsverity_verify_blocks() - verify data in a folio
* @folio: the folio containing the data to verify
* @len: the length of the data to verify in the folio
* @offset: the offset of the data to verify in the folio
*
* Verify data that has just been read from a verity file. The data must be
* located in a pagecache folio that is still locked and not yet uptodate. The
* length and offset of the data must be Merkle tree block size aligned.
*
* Return: %true if the data is valid, else %false.
*/
bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, size_t offset)
{
return verify_data_blocks(folio->mapping->host, folio, len, offset, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_blocks);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
/**
* fsverity_verify_bio() - verify a 'read' bio that has just completed
* @bio: the bio to verify
*
* Verify the bio's data against the file's Merkle tree. All bio data segments
* must be aligned to the file's Merkle tree block size. If any data fails
* verification, then bio->bi_status is set to an error status.
*
* This is a helper function for use by the ->readahead() method of filesystems
* that issue bios to read data directly into the page cache. Filesystems that
* populate the page cache without issuing bios (e.g. non block-based
* filesystems) must instead call fsverity_verify_page() directly on each page.
* All filesystems must also call fsverity_verify_page() on holes.
*/
void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
struct inode *inode = bio_first_page_all(bio)->mapping->host;
struct folio_iter fi;
unsigned long max_ra_pages = 0;
if (bio->bi_opf & REQ_RAHEAD) {
/*
* If this bio is for data readahead, then we also do readahead
* of the first (largest) level of the Merkle tree. Namely,
* when a Merkle tree page is read, we also try to piggy-back on
* some additional pages -- up to 1/4 the number of data pages.
*
* This improves sequential read performance, as it greatly
* reduces the number of I/O requests made to the Merkle tree.
*/
max_ra_pages = bio->bi_iter.bi_size >> (PAGE_SHIFT + 2);
}
bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, bio) {
if (!verify_data_blocks(inode, fi.folio, fi.length, fi.offset,
max_ra_pages)) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
break;
}
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_bio);
#endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */
/**
* fsverity_enqueue_verify_work() - enqueue work on the fs-verity workqueue
* @work: the work to enqueue
*
* Enqueue verification work for asynchronous processing.
*/
void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
queue_work(fsverity_read_workqueue, work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_enqueue_verify_work);
int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void)
{
/*
* Use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work, which
* blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks.
*
* For performance reasons, don't use an unbound workqueue. Using an
* unbound workqueue for crypto operations causes excessive scheduler
* latency on ARM64.
*/
fsverity_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fsverity_read_queue",
WQ_HIGHPRI,
num_online_cpus());
if (!fsverity_read_workqueue)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
void __init fsverity_exit_workqueue(void)
{
destroy_workqueue(fsverity_read_workqueue);
fsverity_read_workqueue = NULL;
}