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5b11888471
Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
246 lines
6.0 KiB
C
246 lines
6.0 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/quotaops.h>
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#include <linux/uuid.h>
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#include "ext4.h"
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#include "xattr.h"
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#include "ext4_jbd2.h"
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static void ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(struct ext4_filename *dst,
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const struct fscrypt_name *src)
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{
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memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst));
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dst->usr_fname = src->usr_fname;
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dst->disk_name = src->disk_name;
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dst->hinfo.hash = src->hash;
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dst->hinfo.minor_hash = src->minor_hash;
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dst->crypto_buf = src->crypto_buf;
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}
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int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
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int lookup, struct ext4_filename *fname)
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{
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struct fscrypt_name name;
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int err;
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err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, iname, lookup, &name);
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if (err)
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return err;
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ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name);
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
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err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, fname);
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if (err)
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ext4_fname_free_filename(fname);
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#endif
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return err;
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}
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int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct ext4_filename *fname)
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{
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struct fscrypt_name name;
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int err;
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err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, &name);
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if (err)
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return err;
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ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name);
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
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err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, fname);
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if (err)
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ext4_fname_free_filename(fname);
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#endif
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return err;
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}
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void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname)
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{
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struct fscrypt_name name;
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name.crypto_buf = fname->crypto_buf;
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fscrypt_free_filename(&name);
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fname->crypto_buf.name = NULL;
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fname->usr_fname = NULL;
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fname->disk_name.name = NULL;
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
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kfree(fname->cf_name.name);
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fname->cf_name.name = NULL;
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#endif
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}
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static bool uuid_is_zero(__u8 u[16])
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
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if (u[i])
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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int ext4_ioctl_get_encryption_pwsalt(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
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{
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struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
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struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
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int err, err2;
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handle_t *handle;
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if (!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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if (uuid_is_zero(sbi->s_es->s_encrypt_pw_salt)) {
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err = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
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if (err)
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return err;
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handle = ext4_journal_start_sb(sb, EXT4_HT_MISC, 1);
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if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(handle);
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goto pwsalt_err_exit;
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}
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err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sb, sbi->s_sbh,
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EXT4_JTR_NONE);
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if (err)
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goto pwsalt_err_journal;
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lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh);
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generate_random_uuid(sbi->s_es->s_encrypt_pw_salt);
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ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb);
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unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh);
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err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, sbi->s_sbh);
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pwsalt_err_journal:
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err2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
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if (err2 && !err)
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err = err2;
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pwsalt_err_exit:
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mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
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if (err)
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return err;
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}
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if (copy_to_user(arg, sbi->s_es->s_encrypt_pw_salt, 16))
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return -EFAULT;
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return 0;
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}
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static int ext4_get_context(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, size_t len)
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{
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return ext4_xattr_get(inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
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EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT, ctx, len);
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}
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static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
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void *fs_data)
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{
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handle_t *handle = fs_data;
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int res, res2, credits, retries = 0;
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/*
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* Encrypting the root directory is not allowed because e2fsck expects
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* lost+found to exist and be unencrypted, and encrypting the root
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* directory would imply encrypting the lost+found directory as well as
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* the filename "lost+found" itself.
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*/
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if (inode->i_ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO)
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return -EPERM;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode) && i_size_read(inode)))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_DAX))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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res = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode);
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if (res)
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return res;
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/*
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* If a journal handle was specified, then the encryption context is
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* being set on a new inode via inheritance and is part of a larger
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* transaction to create the inode. Otherwise the encryption context is
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* being set on an existing inode in its own transaction. Only in the
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* latter case should the "retry on ENOSPC" logic be used.
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*/
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if (handle) {
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res = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode,
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EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
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EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
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ctx, len, 0);
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if (!res) {
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ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
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ext4_clear_inode_state(inode,
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EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA);
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/*
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* Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
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* S_DAX may be disabled
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*/
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ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
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}
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return res;
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}
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res = dquot_initialize(inode);
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if (res)
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return res;
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retry:
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res = ext4_xattr_set_credits(inode, len, false /* is_create */,
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&credits);
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if (res)
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return res;
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handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MISC, credits);
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if (IS_ERR(handle))
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return PTR_ERR(handle);
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res = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
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EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
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ctx, len, 0);
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if (!res) {
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ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
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/*
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* Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
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* S_DAX may be disabled
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*/
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ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
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res = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
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if (res)
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EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "Failed to mark inode dirty");
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}
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res2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
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if (res == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
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goto retry;
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if (!res)
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res = res2;
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return res;
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}
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static const union fscrypt_policy *ext4_get_dummy_policy(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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return EXT4_SB(sb)->s_dummy_enc_policy.policy;
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}
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static bool ext4_has_stable_inodes(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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return ext4_has_feature_stable_inodes(sb);
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}
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const struct fscrypt_operations ext4_cryptops = {
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.needs_bounce_pages = 1,
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.has_32bit_inodes = 1,
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.supports_subblock_data_units = 1,
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.legacy_key_prefix = "ext4:",
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.get_context = ext4_get_context,
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.set_context = ext4_set_context,
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.get_dummy_policy = ext4_get_dummy_policy,
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.empty_dir = ext4_empty_dir,
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.has_stable_inodes = ext4_has_stable_inodes,
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};
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