mirror of
https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git
synced 2024-12-02 16:44:10 +08:00
bd2ad885e3
When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(), and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason, the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with preemption disabled. Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel. So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
394 lines
9.5 KiB
C
394 lines
9.5 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* aes-ccm-glue.c - AES-CCM transform for ARMv8 with Crypto Extensions
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2013 - 2017 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
|
|
*
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
|
|
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <asm/neon.h>
|
|
#include <asm/simd.h>
|
|
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
|
|
#include <crypto/aes.h>
|
|
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
|
|
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
|
|
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "aes-ce-setkey.h"
|
|
|
|
static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* # of rounds specified by AES:
|
|
* 128 bit key 10 rounds
|
|
* 192 bit key 12 rounds
|
|
* 256 bit key 14 rounds
|
|
* => n byte key => 6 + (n/4) rounds
|
|
*/
|
|
return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
|
|
u32 *macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds);
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes,
|
|
u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[],
|
|
u8 ctr[]);
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes,
|
|
u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[],
|
|
u8 ctr[]);
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_final(u8 mac[], u8 const ctr[], u32 const rk[],
|
|
u32 rounds);
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void __aes_arm64_encrypt(u32 *rk, u8 *out, const u8 *in, int rounds);
|
|
|
|
static int ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
|
|
unsigned int key_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = ce_aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len);
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
tfm->base.crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((authsize & 1) || authsize < 4)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
__be32 *n = (__be32 *)&maciv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 8];
|
|
u32 l = req->iv[0] + 1;
|
|
|
|
/* verify that CCM dimension 'L' is set correctly in the IV */
|
|
if (l < 2 || l > 8)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* verify that msglen can in fact be represented in L bytes */
|
|
if (l < 4 && msglen >> (8 * l))
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Even if the CCM spec allows L values of up to 8, the Linux cryptoapi
|
|
* uses a u32 type to represent msglen so the top 4 bytes are always 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
n[0] = 0;
|
|
n[1] = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(maciv, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Meaning of byte 0 according to CCM spec (RFC 3610/NIST 800-38C)
|
|
* - bits 0..2 : max # of bytes required to represent msglen, minus 1
|
|
* (already set by caller)
|
|
* - bits 3..5 : size of auth tag (1 => 4 bytes, 2 => 6 bytes, etc)
|
|
* - bit 6 : indicates presence of authenticate-only data
|
|
*/
|
|
maciv[0] |= (crypto_aead_authsize(aead) - 2) << 2;
|
|
if (req->assoclen)
|
|
maciv[0] |= 0x40;
|
|
|
|
memset(&req->iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l], 0, l);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[],
|
|
u32 abytes, u32 *macp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (may_use_simd()) {
|
|
kernel_neon_begin();
|
|
ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc,
|
|
num_rounds(key));
|
|
kernel_neon_end();
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (*macp > 0 && *macp < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
int added = min(abytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - *macp);
|
|
|
|
crypto_xor(&mac[*macp], in, added);
|
|
|
|
*macp += added;
|
|
in += added;
|
|
abytes -= added;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (abytes > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
__aes_arm64_encrypt(key->key_enc, mac, mac,
|
|
num_rounds(key));
|
|
crypto_xor(mac, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
abytes -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (abytes > 0) {
|
|
__aes_arm64_encrypt(key->key_enc, mac, mac,
|
|
num_rounds(key));
|
|
crypto_xor(mac, in, abytes);
|
|
*macp = abytes;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*macp = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
|
|
struct __packed { __be16 l; __be32 h; u16 len; } ltag;
|
|
struct scatter_walk walk;
|
|
u32 len = req->assoclen;
|
|
u32 macp = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* prepend the AAD with a length tag */
|
|
if (len < 0xff00) {
|
|
ltag.l = cpu_to_be16(len);
|
|
ltag.len = 2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ltag.l = cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
|
|
put_unaligned_be32(len, <ag.h);
|
|
ltag.len = 6;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp);
|
|
scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src);
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
u32 n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
|
|
u8 *p;
|
|
|
|
if (!n) {
|
|
scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg_next(walk.sg));
|
|
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
|
|
}
|
|
p = scatterwalk_map(&walk);
|
|
ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp);
|
|
len -= n;
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_unmap(p);
|
|
scatterwalk_advance(&walk, n);
|
|
scatterwalk_done(&walk, 0, len);
|
|
} while (len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ccm_crypt_fallback(struct skcipher_walk *walk, u8 mac[], u8 iv0[],
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, bool enc)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (walk->nbytes) {
|
|
int blocks = walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
u32 tail = walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
u8 *dst = walk->dst.virt.addr;
|
|
u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr;
|
|
u32 nbytes = walk->nbytes;
|
|
|
|
if (nbytes == walk->total && tail > 0) {
|
|
blocks++;
|
|
tail = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
u32 bsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|
|
bsize = nbytes;
|
|
|
|
crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
__aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->key_enc, buf, walk->iv,
|
|
num_rounds(ctx));
|
|
__aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->key_enc, mac, mac,
|
|
num_rounds(ctx));
|
|
if (enc)
|
|
crypto_xor(mac, src, bsize);
|
|
crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, bsize);
|
|
if (!enc)
|
|
crypto_xor(mac, dst, bsize);
|
|
dst += bsize;
|
|
src += bsize;
|
|
nbytes -= bsize;
|
|
} while (--blocks);
|
|
|
|
err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, tail);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!err) {
|
|
__aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->key_enc, buf, iv0, num_rounds(ctx));
|
|
__aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->key_enc, mac, mac, num_rounds(ctx));
|
|
crypto_xor(mac, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
|
|
struct skcipher_walk walk;
|
|
u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
u32 len = req->cryptlen;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
if (req->assoclen)
|
|
ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
|
|
|
|
/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
|
|
memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, true);
|
|
|
|
if (may_use_simd()) {
|
|
while (walk.nbytes) {
|
|
u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
|
|
tail = 0;
|
|
|
|
kernel_neon_begin();
|
|
ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr,
|
|
walk.src.virt.addr,
|
|
walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
|
|
num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
|
|
kernel_neon_end();
|
|
|
|
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!err) {
|
|
kernel_neon_begin();
|
|
ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc,
|
|
num_rounds(ctx));
|
|
kernel_neon_end();
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, true);
|
|
}
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
/* copy authtag to end of dst */
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(mac, req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
|
|
crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
|
|
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
|
|
struct skcipher_walk walk;
|
|
u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
u32 len = req->cryptlen - authsize;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
if (req->assoclen)
|
|
ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
|
|
|
|
/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
|
|
memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, true);
|
|
|
|
if (may_use_simd()) {
|
|
while (walk.nbytes) {
|
|
u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
|
|
tail = 0;
|
|
|
|
kernel_neon_begin();
|
|
ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr,
|
|
walk.src.virt.addr,
|
|
walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
|
|
num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
|
|
kernel_neon_end();
|
|
|
|
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!err) {
|
|
kernel_neon_begin();
|
|
ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc,
|
|
num_rounds(ctx));
|
|
kernel_neon_end();
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
/* compare calculated auth tag with the stored one */
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->src,
|
|
req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - authsize,
|
|
authsize, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(mac, buf, authsize))
|
|
return -EBADMSG;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct aead_alg ccm_aes_alg = {
|
|
.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "ccm(aes)",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "ccm-aes-ce",
|
|
.cra_priority = 300,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = 1,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
},
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = ccm_setkey,
|
|
.setauthsize = ccm_setauthsize,
|
|
.encrypt = ccm_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = ccm_decrypt,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int __init aes_mod_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_AES))
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
return crypto_register_aead(&ccm_aes_alg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void __exit aes_mod_exit(void)
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_unregister_aead(&ccm_aes_alg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
module_init(aes_mod_init);
|
|
module_exit(aes_mod_exit);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Synchronous AES in CCM mode using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
|
|
MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|
|
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm(aes)");
|