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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
- With commit 099f26f22f ("integrity: machine keyring CA
configuration") certificates may be loaded onto the IMA keyring,
directly or indirectly signed by keys on either the "builtin" or the
"machine" keyrings.
With the ability for the system/machine owner to sign the IMA policy
itself without needing to recompile the kernel, update the IMA
architecture specific policy rules to require the IMA policy itself
be signed.
[ As commit 099f26f22f was upstreamed in linux-6.4, updating the
IMA architecture specific policy now to require signed IMA policies
may break userspace expectations. ]
- IMA only checked the file data hash was not on the system blacklist
keyring for files with an appended signature (e.g. kernel modules,
Power kernel image).
Check all file data hashes regardless of how it was signed
- Code cleanup, and a kernel-doc update
* tag 'integrity-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two comments
ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled
integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal
ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig