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c269497d24
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmI473AUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXPaMBAAuxb+RBG0Wqlt0ktUYHF0ZxDVJOTK YGGmaDp657YJ349+c0U3mrhm7Wj8Mn7Eoz3tAYUWRQ5xPziJQRX7PfxFzT/qpPUz XYLRppwCWpLSB5NdpNzK3RdGNv+/9BzZ6gmjTj2wfsUCOA8cfpB1pYwyIWm6M9B+ FXMTZ7WOqiuJ3wJa5nD1PPM1z+99nPkYiE6/iKsDidbQgSl8NX6mJY/yUsVxcZ6A c45n0Pf6Fj9w1XKdVDPfiRY4nekmPCwqbrn7QVtiuCYyC54JcZNmuCQnoN8dy5XY s/j2M2DBxT6M9rjOqQznL5jGdNKFCWydCAso06JO/13pfakvPpSS6v95Iltqkbtw 1oHf3j5URIirAhyqcyPGoQz+g5c6krgx/Z2GOpvDs9r/AQ80GlpOBYhN3x61lVT5 MLYq0ylV1Vfosnv7a6+AQZ9lJAkmIqws1WtG28adn7/zMPyD/hWwQ7736k/50CMl oC6zi3G6jCZueWdHZviqf96bjW20ZmNL2DQRy0n8ZSQQGgrsQnFgYMpXtB1Zv8+m XaDOPo20Ne68rzmTsEp2gVgcnXFc5/KQBDvaUta9etrbTEWqQqqTWiP8mA2QiGme JwKMgprV0uVDd6s9TC/O0as02xoKrWuGaL7czhlFxuL45k0nYDmk7ea/gz9MrcWV Y5pzAxs4LVMwVzs= =5E1v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got a number of SELinux patches queued up, the highlights are: - Fixup the security_fs_context_parse_param() LSM hook so it executes all of the LSM hook implementations unless a serious error occurs. We also correct the SELinux hook implementation so that it returns zero on success. - In addition to a few SELinux mount option parsing fixes, we simplified the parsing by moving it earlier in the process. The logic was that it was unlikely an admin/user would use the new mount API and not have the policy loaded before passing the SELinux options. - Properly fixed the LSM/SELinux/SCTP hooks with the addition of the security_sctp_assoc_established() hook. This work was done in conjunction with the netdev folks and should complete the move of the SCTP labeling from the endpoints to the associations. - Fixed a variety of sparse warnings caused by changes in the "__rcu" markings of some core kernel structures. - Ensure we access the superblock's LSM security blob using the stacking-safe accessors. - Added the ability for the kernel to always allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX if the "ioctl_skip_cloexec" policy capability is specified. - Various constifications improvements, type casting improvements, additional return value checks, and dead code/parameter removal. - Documentation fixes" * tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (23 commits) selinux: shorten the policy capability enum names docs: fix 'make htmldocs' warning in SCTP.rst selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability selinux: use correct type for context length selinux: drop return statement at end of void functions security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux security: add sctp_assoc_established hook selinux: parse contexts for mount options early selinux: various sparse fixes selinux: try to use preparsed sid before calling parse_sid() selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat() LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param selinux: fix a type cast problem in cred_init_security() selinux: drop unused macro selinux: simplify cred_init_security selinux: do not discard const qualifier in cast selinux: drop unused parameter of avtab_insert_node selinux: drop cast to same type selinux: enclose macro arguments in parenthesis selinux: declare name parameter of hash_eval const ...
126 lines
2.9 KiB
C
126 lines
2.9 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2021 Microsoft Corporation
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*
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* Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
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*
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* Measure critical data structures maintainted by SELinux
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* using IMA subsystem.
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*/
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include "security.h"
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#include "ima.h"
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/*
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* selinux_ima_collect_state - Read selinux configuration settings
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*
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* @state: selinux_state
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*
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* On success returns the configuration settings string.
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* On error, returns NULL.
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*/
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static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(struct selinux_state *state)
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{
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const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
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char *buf;
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int buf_len, len, i, rc;
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buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
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len = strlen(on);
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for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++)
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buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + len;
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buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buf)
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return NULL;
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rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc < 0);
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rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
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rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
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rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
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rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
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rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
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for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) {
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rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
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rc = strlcat(buf, state->policycap[i] ? on : off, buf_len);
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WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
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}
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return buf;
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}
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/*
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* selinux_ima_measure_state_locked - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
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*
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* @state: selinux state struct
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*/
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void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
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{
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char *state_str = NULL;
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void *policy = NULL;
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size_t policy_len;
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int rc = 0;
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lockdep_assert_held(&state->policy_mutex);
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state_str = selinux_ima_collect_state(state);
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if (!state_str) {
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pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read state.\n", __func__);
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return;
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}
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ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
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state_str, strlen(state_str), false,
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NULL, 0);
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kfree(state_str);
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/*
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* Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed.
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*/
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if (!selinux_initialized(state))
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return;
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rc = security_read_state_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len);
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if (rc) {
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pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n", __func__, rc);
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return;
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}
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ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-policy-hash",
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policy, policy_len, true,
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NULL, 0);
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vfree(policy);
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}
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/*
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* selinux_ima_measure_state - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
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*
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* @state: selinux state struct
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*/
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void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state)
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{
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lockdep_assert_not_held(&state->policy_mutex);
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mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex);
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selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(state);
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mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex);
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}
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