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082af5ec50
Support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack in the kernel (Sami Tolvanen and Will Deacon) * for-next/scs: arm64: entry-ftrace.S: Update comment to indicate that x18 is live scs: Move DEFINE_SCS macro into core code scs: Remove references to asm/scs.h from core code scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture code arm64: scs: Use 'scs_sp' register alias for x18 scs: Move accounting into alloc/free functions arm64: scs: Store absolute SCS stack pointer value in thread_info efi/libstub: Disable Shadow Call Stack arm64: scs: Add shadow stacks for SDEI arm64: Implement Shadow Call Stack arm64: Disable SCS for hypervisor code arm64: vdso: Disable Shadow Call Stack arm64: efi: Restore register x18 if it was corrupted arm64: Preserve register x18 when CPU is suspended arm64: Reserve register x18 from general allocation with SCS scs: Disable when function graph tracing is enabled scs: Add support for stack usage debugging scs: Add page accounting for shadow call stack allocations scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
48 lines
1.1 KiB
ArmAsm
48 lines
1.1 KiB
ArmAsm
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2018 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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*/
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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SYM_FUNC_START(__efi_rt_asm_wrapper)
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stp x29, x30, [sp, #-32]!
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mov x29, sp
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/*
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* Register x18 is designated as the 'platform' register by the AAPCS,
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* which means firmware running at the same exception level as the OS
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* (such as UEFI) should never touch it.
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*/
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stp x1, x18, [sp, #16]
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/*
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* We are lucky enough that no EFI runtime services take more than
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* 5 arguments, so all are passed in registers rather than via the
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* stack.
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*/
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mov x8, x0
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mov x0, x2
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mov x1, x3
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mov x2, x4
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mov x3, x5
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mov x4, x6
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blr x8
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ldp x1, x2, [sp, #16]
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cmp x2, x18
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ldp x29, x30, [sp], #32
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b.ne 0f
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ret
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0:
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/*
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* With CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, the kernel uses x18 to store a
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* shadow stack pointer, which we need to restore before returning to
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* potentially instrumented code. This is safe because the wrapper is
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* called with preemption disabled and a separate shadow stack is used
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* for interrupts.
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*/
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mov x18, x2
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b efi_handle_corrupted_x18 // tail call
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SYM_FUNC_END(__efi_rt_asm_wrapper)
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