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The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
886 lines
22 KiB
C
886 lines
22 KiB
C
/*
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* Common NFSv4 ACL handling code.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Marius Aamodt Eriksen <marius@umich.edu>
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* Jeff Sedlak <jsedlak@umich.edu>
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* J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
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* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
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* from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
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* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
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* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
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* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
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* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
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#include "nfsfh.h"
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#include "nfsd.h"
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#include "acl.h"
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#include "vfs.h"
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#define NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT 0x01
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#define NFS4_ACL_DIR 0x02
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#define NFS4_ACL_OWNER 0x04
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/* mode bit translations: */
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#define NFS4_READ_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_DATA)
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#define NFS4_WRITE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_DATA | NFS4_ACE_APPEND_DATA)
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#define NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE NFS4_ACE_EXECUTE
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#define NFS4_ANYONE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL | NFS4_ACE_SYNCHRONIZE)
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#define NFS4_OWNER_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL)
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/* flags used to simulate posix default ACLs */
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#define NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS (NFS4_ACE_FILE_INHERIT_ACE \
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| NFS4_ACE_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE)
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#define NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS (NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS \
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| NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE \
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| NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP)
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static u32
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mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, unsigned int flags)
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{
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int mask = NFS4_ANYONE_MODE;
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if (flags & NFS4_ACL_OWNER)
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mask |= NFS4_OWNER_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_READ)
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mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_WRITE)
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mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
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mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
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mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE;
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return mask;
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}
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static u32
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deny_mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, u32 flags)
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{
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u32 mask = 0;
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if (perm & ACL_READ)
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mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_WRITE)
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mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
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mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
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mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE;
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return mask;
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}
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/* XXX: modify functions to return NFS errors; they're only ever
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* used by nfs code, after all.... */
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/* We only map from NFSv4 to POSIX ACLs when setting ACLs, when we err on the
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* side of being more restrictive, so the mode bit mapping below is
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* pessimistic. An optimistic version would be needed to handle DENY's,
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* but we expect to coalesce all ALLOWs and DENYs before mapping to mode
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* bits. */
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static void
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low_mode_from_nfs4(u32 perm, unsigned short *mode, unsigned int flags)
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{
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u32 write_mode = NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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if (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)
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write_mode |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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*mode = 0;
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if ((perm & NFS4_READ_MODE) == NFS4_READ_MODE)
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*mode |= ACL_READ;
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if ((perm & write_mode) == write_mode)
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*mode |= ACL_WRITE;
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if ((perm & NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE) == NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE)
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*mode |= ACL_EXECUTE;
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}
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static short ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *);
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static void _posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *, struct nfs4_acl *,
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unsigned int);
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int
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nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct nfs4_acl **acl)
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{
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struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
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int error = 0;
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struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL;
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unsigned int flags = 0;
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int size = 0;
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pacl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
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if (!pacl)
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pacl = posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (IS_ERR(pacl))
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return PTR_ERR(pacl);
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/* allocate for worst case: one (deny, allow) pair each: */
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size += 2 * pacl->a_count;
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if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
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flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR;
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dpacl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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if (IS_ERR(dpacl)) {
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error = PTR_ERR(dpacl);
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goto rel_pacl;
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}
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if (dpacl)
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size += 2 * dpacl->a_count;
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}
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*acl = kmalloc(nfs4_acl_bytes(size), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (*acl == NULL) {
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error = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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(*acl)->naces = 0;
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_posix_to_nfsv4_one(pacl, *acl, flags & ~NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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if (dpacl)
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_posix_to_nfsv4_one(dpacl, *acl, flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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out:
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posix_acl_release(dpacl);
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rel_pacl:
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posix_acl_release(pacl);
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return error;
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}
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struct posix_acl_summary {
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unsigned short owner;
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unsigned short users;
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unsigned short group;
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unsigned short groups;
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unsigned short other;
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unsigned short mask;
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};
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static void
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summarize_posix_acl(struct posix_acl *acl, struct posix_acl_summary *pas)
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{
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struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
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/*
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* Only pas.users and pas.groups need initialization; previous
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* posix_acl_valid() calls ensure that the other fields will be
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* initialized in the following loop. But, just to placate gcc:
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*/
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memset(pas, 0, sizeof(*pas));
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pas->mask = 07;
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pe = acl->a_entries + acl->a_count;
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FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
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switch (pa->e_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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pas->owner = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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pas->group = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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pas->users |= pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP:
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pas->groups |= pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_OTHER:
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pas->other = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_MASK:
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pas->mask = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* We'll only care about effective permissions: */
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pas->users &= pas->mask;
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pas->group &= pas->mask;
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pas->groups &= pas->mask;
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}
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/* We assume the acl has been verified with posix_acl_valid. */
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static void
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_posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *pacl, struct nfs4_acl *acl,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *group_owner_entry;
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struct nfs4_ace *ace;
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struct posix_acl_summary pas;
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unsigned short deny;
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int eflag = ((flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) ?
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NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS | NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE : 0);
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BUG_ON(pacl->a_count < 3);
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summarize_posix_acl(pacl, &pas);
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pa = pacl->a_entries;
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ace = acl->aces + acl->naces;
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/* We could deny everything not granted by the owner: */
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deny = ~pas.owner;
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/*
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* but it is equivalent (and simpler) to deny only what is not
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* granted by later entries:
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*/
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deny &= pas.users | pas.group | pas.groups | pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags | NFS4_ACL_OWNER);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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while (pa->e_tag == ACL_USER) {
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deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask);
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deny &= pas.groups | pas.group | pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_uid = pa->e_uid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask,
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flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_uid = pa->e_uid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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}
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/* In the case of groups, we apply allow ACEs first, then deny ACEs,
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* since a user can be in more than one group. */
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/* allow ACEs */
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group_owner_entry = pa;
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pas.group, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask,
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flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_gid = pa->e_gid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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}
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/* deny ACEs */
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pa = group_owner_entry;
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deny = ~pas.group & pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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pa++;
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while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) {
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deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask);
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deny &= pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_gid = pa->e_gid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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pa++;
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}
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if (pa->e_tag == ACL_MASK)
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pa++;
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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static bool
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pace_gt(struct posix_acl_entry *pace1, struct posix_acl_entry *pace2)
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{
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if (pace1->e_tag != pace2->e_tag)
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return pace1->e_tag > pace2->e_tag;
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if (pace1->e_tag == ACL_USER)
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return uid_gt(pace1->e_uid, pace2->e_uid);
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if (pace1->e_tag == ACL_GROUP)
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return gid_gt(pace1->e_gid, pace2->e_gid);
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return false;
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}
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static void
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sort_pacl_range(struct posix_acl *pacl, int start, int end) {
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int sorted = 0, i;
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/* We just do a bubble sort; easy to do in place, and we're not
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* expecting acl's to be long enough to justify anything more. */
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while (!sorted) {
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sorted = 1;
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for (i = start; i < end; i++) {
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if (pace_gt(&pacl->a_entries[i],
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&pacl->a_entries[i+1])) {
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sorted = 0;
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swap(pacl->a_entries[i],
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pacl->a_entries[i + 1]);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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static void
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sort_pacl(struct posix_acl *pacl)
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{
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/* posix_acl_valid requires that users and groups be in order
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* by uid/gid. */
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int i, j;
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/* no users or groups */
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if (!pacl || pacl->a_count <= 4)
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return;
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i = 1;
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while (pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag == ACL_USER)
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i++;
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sort_pacl_range(pacl, 1, i-1);
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BUG_ON(pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag != ACL_GROUP_OBJ);
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j = ++i;
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while (pacl->a_entries[j].e_tag == ACL_GROUP)
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j++;
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sort_pacl_range(pacl, i, j-1);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains bitmasks representing
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* which permission bits have been allowed and which denied to a given
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* entity: */
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struct posix_ace_state {
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u32 allow;
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u32 deny;
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};
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struct posix_user_ace_state {
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union {
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kuid_t uid;
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kgid_t gid;
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};
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struct posix_ace_state perms;
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};
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struct posix_ace_state_array {
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int n;
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struct posix_user_ace_state aces[];
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};
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/*
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* While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains the partial permissions
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* calculated so far: */
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struct posix_acl_state {
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int empty;
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struct posix_ace_state owner;
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struct posix_ace_state group;
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struct posix_ace_state other;
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struct posix_ace_state everyone;
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struct posix_ace_state mask; /* Deny unused in this case */
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struct posix_ace_state_array *users;
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struct posix_ace_state_array *groups;
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};
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static int
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init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
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{
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int alloc;
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memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
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state->empty = 1;
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/*
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* In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
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* named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
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* enough space for either:
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*/
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alloc = sizeof(struct posix_ace_state_array)
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+ cnt*sizeof(struct posix_user_ace_state);
|
|
state->users = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!state->users)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
state->groups = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!state->groups) {
|
|
kfree(state->users);
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
free_state(struct posix_acl_state *state) {
|
|
kfree(state->users);
|
|
kfree(state->groups);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void add_to_mask(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct posix_ace_state *astate)
|
|
{
|
|
state->mask.allow |= astate->allow;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct posix_acl *
|
|
posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl_entry *pace;
|
|
struct posix_acl *pacl;
|
|
int nace;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ACLs with no ACEs are treated differently in the inheritable
|
|
* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
|
|
* calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When there are no effective ACEs, the following will end
|
|
* up setting a 3-element effective posix ACL with all
|
|
* permissions zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!state->users->n && !state->groups->n)
|
|
nace = 3;
|
|
else /* Note we also include a MASK ACE in this case: */
|
|
nace = 4 + state->users->n + state->groups->n;
|
|
pacl = posix_acl_alloc(nace, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!pacl)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
pace = pacl->a_entries;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->owner.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < state->users->n; i++) {
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->users->aces[i].perms.allow,
|
|
&pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
pace->e_uid = state->users->aces[i].uid;
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->users->aces[i].perms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->group.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->group);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < state->groups->n; i++) {
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->groups->aces[i].perms.allow,
|
|
&pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
pace->e_gid = state->groups->aces[i].gid;
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->groups->aces[i].perms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (state->users->n || state->groups->n) {
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_MASK;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->mask.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_OTHER;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->other.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
return pacl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void allow_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Allow all bits in the mask not already denied: */
|
|
astate->allow |= mask & ~astate->deny;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void deny_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Deny all bits in the mask not already allowed: */
|
|
astate->deny |= mask & ~astate->allow;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int find_uid(struct posix_acl_state *state, kuid_t uid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_ace_state_array *a = state->users;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
if (uid_eq(a->aces[i].uid, uid))
|
|
return i;
|
|
/* Not found: */
|
|
a->n++;
|
|
a->aces[i].uid = uid;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny;
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int find_gid(struct posix_acl_state *state, kgid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_ace_state_array *a = state->groups;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
if (gid_eq(a->aces[i].gid, gid))
|
|
return i;
|
|
/* Not found: */
|
|
a->n++;
|
|
a->aces[i].gid = gid;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny;
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void deny_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
deny_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void allow_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
allow_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
state->empty = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (ace2type(ace)) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
i = find_uid(state, ace->who_uid);
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
mask = state->users->aces[i].perms.deny;
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
mask = state->group.deny;
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
i = find_gid(state, ace->who_gid);
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
mask = state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny;
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
allow_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
allow_bits(&state->other, mask);
|
|
allow_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
allow_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
allow_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->other, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
|
|
struct posix_acl **pacl, struct posix_acl **dpacl,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl_state effective_acl_state, default_acl_state;
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = init_state(&effective_acl_state, acl->naces);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = init_state(&default_acl_state, acl->naces);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_estate;
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
for (ace = acl->aces; ace < acl->aces + acl->naces; ace++) {
|
|
if (ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE &&
|
|
ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE)
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
if (ace->flag & ~NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS)
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
if ((ace->flag & NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS) == 0) {
|
|
process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that when only one of FILE_INHERIT or DIRECTORY_INHERIT
|
|
* is set, we're effectively turning on the other. That's OK,
|
|
* according to rfc 3530.
|
|
*/
|
|
process_one_v4_ace(&default_acl_state, ace);
|
|
|
|
if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
|
|
process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
|
|
}
|
|
*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
|
|
*pacl = NULL;
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
}
|
|
*dpacl = posix_state_to_acl(&default_acl_state,
|
|
flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(*dpacl)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(*dpacl);
|
|
*dpacl = NULL;
|
|
posix_acl_release(*pacl);
|
|
*pacl = NULL;
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
}
|
|
sort_pacl(*pacl);
|
|
sort_pacl(*dpacl);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
out_dstate:
|
|
free_state(&default_acl_state);
|
|
out_estate:
|
|
free_state(&effective_acl_state);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__be32
|
|
nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
|
|
struct nfs4_acl *acl)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 error;
|
|
int host_error;
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Get inode */
|
|
error = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_SATTR);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
|
|
inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR;
|
|
|
|
host_error = nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(acl, &pacl, &dpacl, flags);
|
|
if (host_error == -EINVAL)
|
|
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
|
|
if (host_error < 0)
|
|
goto out_nfserr;
|
|
|
|
fh_lock(fhp);
|
|
|
|
host_error = set_posix_acl(&init_user_ns, inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, pacl);
|
|
if (host_error < 0)
|
|
goto out_drop_lock;
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
host_error = set_posix_acl(&init_user_ns, inode,
|
|
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, dpacl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out_drop_lock:
|
|
fh_unlock(fhp);
|
|
|
|
posix_acl_release(pacl);
|
|
posix_acl_release(dpacl);
|
|
out_nfserr:
|
|
if (host_error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
|
|
else
|
|
return nfserrno(host_error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static short
|
|
ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *ace)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ace->whotype) {
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED:
|
|
return (ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP ?
|
|
ACL_GROUP : ACL_USER);
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER:
|
|
return ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP:
|
|
return ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE:
|
|
return ACL_OTHER;
|
|
}
|
|
BUG();
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* return the size of the struct nfs4_acl required to represent an acl
|
|
* with @entries entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
int nfs4_acl_bytes(int entries)
|
|
{
|
|
return sizeof(struct nfs4_acl) + entries * sizeof(struct nfs4_ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
char *string;
|
|
int stringlen;
|
|
int type;
|
|
} s2t_map[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.string = "OWNER@",
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("OWNER@") - 1,
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.string = "GROUP@",
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("GROUP@") - 1,
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.string = "EVERYONE@",
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("EVERYONE@") - 1,
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
nfs4_acl_get_whotype(char *p, u32 len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) {
|
|
if (s2t_map[i].stringlen == len &&
|
|
0 == memcmp(s2t_map[i].string, p, len))
|
|
return s2t_map[i].type;
|
|
}
|
|
return NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__be32 nfs4_acl_write_who(struct xdr_stream *xdr, int who)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) {
|
|
if (s2t_map[i].type != who)
|
|
continue;
|
|
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, s2t_map[i].stringlen + 4);
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
return nfserr_resource;
|
|
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, s2t_map[i].string,
|
|
s2t_map[i].stringlen);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
return nfserr_serverfault;
|
|
}
|