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Drop the doubled word "the". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200703214325.31036-6-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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735 lines
33 KiB
ReStructuredText
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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.. _fsverity:
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=======================================================
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fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
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=======================================================
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Introduction
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============
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fs-verity (``fs/verity/``) is a support layer that filesystems can
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hook into to support transparent integrity and authenticity protection
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of read-only files. Currently, it is supported by the ext4 and f2fs
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filesystems. Like fscrypt, not too much filesystem-specific code is
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needed to support fs-verity.
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fs-verity is similar to `dm-verity
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<https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt>`_
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but works on files rather than block devices. On regular files on
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filesystems supporting fs-verity, userspace can execute an ioctl that
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causes the filesystem to build a Merkle tree for the file and persist
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it to a filesystem-specific location associated with the file.
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After this, the file is made readonly, and all reads from the file are
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automatically verified against the file's Merkle tree. Reads of any
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corrupted data, including mmap reads, will fail.
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Userspace can use another ioctl to retrieve the root hash (actually
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the "file measurement", which is a hash that includes the root hash)
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that fs-verity is enforcing for the file. This ioctl executes in
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constant time, regardless of the file size.
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fs-verity is essentially a way to hash a file in constant time,
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subject to the caveat that reads which would violate the hash will
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fail at runtime.
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Use cases
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=========
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By itself, the base fs-verity feature only provides integrity
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protection, i.e. detection of accidental (non-malicious) corruption.
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However, because fs-verity makes retrieving the file hash extremely
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efficient, it's primarily meant to be used as a tool to support
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authentication (detection of malicious modifications) or auditing
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(logging file hashes before use).
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Trusted userspace code (e.g. operating system code running on a
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read-only partition that is itself authenticated by dm-verity) can
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authenticate the contents of an fs-verity file by using the
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`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_ ioctl to retrieve its hash, then verifying a
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digital signature of it.
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A standard file hash could be used instead of fs-verity. However,
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this is inefficient if the file is large and only a small portion may
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be accessed. This is often the case for Android application package
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(APK) files, for example. These typically contain many translations,
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classes, and other resources that are infrequently or even never
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accessed on a particular device. It would be slow and wasteful to
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read and hash the entire file before starting the application.
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Unlike an ahead-of-time hash, fs-verity also re-verifies data each
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time it's paged in. This ensures that malicious disk firmware can't
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undetectably change the contents of the file at runtime.
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fs-verity does not replace or obsolete dm-verity. dm-verity should
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still be used on read-only filesystems. fs-verity is for files that
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must live on a read-write filesystem because they are independently
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updated and potentially user-installed, so dm-verity cannot be used.
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The base fs-verity feature is a hashing mechanism only; actually
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authenticating the files is up to userspace. However, to meet some
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users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature
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verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require
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that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see
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`Built-in signature verification`_. Support for fs-verity file hashes
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in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned.
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User API
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========
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FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY
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--------------------
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The FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl enables fs-verity on a file. It takes
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in a pointer to a :c:type:`struct fsverity_enable_arg`, defined as
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follows::
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struct fsverity_enable_arg {
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__u32 version;
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__u32 hash_algorithm;
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__u32 block_size;
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__u32 salt_size;
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__u64 salt_ptr;
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__u32 sig_size;
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__u32 __reserved1;
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__u64 sig_ptr;
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__u64 __reserved2[11];
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};
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This structure contains the parameters of the Merkle tree to build for
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the file, and optionally contains a signature. It must be initialized
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as follows:
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- ``version`` must be 1.
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- ``hash_algorithm`` must be the identifier for the hash algorithm to
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use for the Merkle tree, such as FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256. See
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``include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h`` for the list of possible values.
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- ``block_size`` must be the Merkle tree block size. Currently, this
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must be equal to the system page size, which is usually 4096 bytes.
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Other sizes may be supported in the future. This value is not
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necessarily the same as the filesystem block size.
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- ``salt_size`` is the size of the salt in bytes, or 0 if no salt is
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provided. The salt is a value that is prepended to every hashed
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block; it can be used to personalize the hashing for a particular
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file or device. Currently the maximum salt size is 32 bytes.
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- ``salt_ptr`` is the pointer to the salt, or NULL if no salt is
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provided.
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- ``sig_size`` is the size of the signature in bytes, or 0 if no
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signature is provided. Currently the signature is (somewhat
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arbitrarily) limited to 16128 bytes. See `Built-in signature
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verification`_ for more information.
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- ``sig_ptr`` is the pointer to the signature, or NULL if no
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signature is provided.
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- All reserved fields must be zeroed.
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FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY causes the filesystem to build a Merkle tree for
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the file and persist it to a filesystem-specific location associated
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with the file, then mark the file as a verity file. This ioctl may
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take a long time to execute on large files, and it is interruptible by
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fatal signals.
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FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY checks for write access to the inode. However,
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it must be executed on an O_RDONLY file descriptor and no processes
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can have the file open for writing. Attempts to open the file for
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writing while this ioctl is executing will fail with ETXTBSY. (This
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is necessary to guarantee that no writable file descriptors will exist
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after verity is enabled, and to guarantee that the file's contents are
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stable while the Merkle tree is being built over it.)
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On success, FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY returns 0, and the file becomes a
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verity file. On failure (including the case of interruption by a
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fatal signal), no changes are made to the file.
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FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
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- ``EACCES``: the process does not have write access to the file
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- ``EBADMSG``: the signature is malformed
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- ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file
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- ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled
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- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
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- ``EINTR``: the operation was interrupted by a fatal signal
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- ``EINVAL``: unsupported version, hash algorithm, or block size; or
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reserved bits are set; or the file descriptor refers to neither a
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regular file nor a directory.
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- ``EISDIR``: the file descriptor refers to a directory
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- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the signature doesn't match the file
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- ``EMSGSIZE``: the salt or signature is too long
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- ``ENOKEY``: the fs-verity keyring doesn't contain the certificate
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needed to verify the signature
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- ``ENOPKG``: fs-verity recognizes the hash algorithm, but it's not
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available in the kernel's crypto API as currently configured (e.g.
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for SHA-512, missing CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512).
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- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity
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- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity
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support; or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity'
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feature enabled on it; or the filesystem does not support fs-verity
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on this file. (See `Filesystem support`_.)
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- ``EPERM``: the file is append-only; or, a signature is required and
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one was not provided.
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- ``EROFS``: the filesystem is read-only
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- ``ETXTBSY``: someone has the file open for writing. This can be the
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caller's file descriptor, another open file descriptor, or the file
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reference held by a writable memory map.
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FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
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---------------------
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The FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl retrieves the measurement of a verity
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file. The file measurement is a digest that cryptographically
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identifies the file contents that are being enforced on reads.
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This ioctl takes in a pointer to a variable-length structure::
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struct fsverity_digest {
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__u16 digest_algorithm;
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__u16 digest_size; /* input/output */
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__u8 digest[];
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};
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``digest_size`` is an input/output field. On input, it must be
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initialized to the number of bytes allocated for the variable-length
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``digest`` field.
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On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the structure as
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follows:
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- ``digest_algorithm`` will be the hash algorithm used for the file
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measurement. It will match ``fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm``.
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- ``digest_size`` will be the size of the digest in bytes, e.g. 32
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for SHA-256. (This can be redundant with ``digest_algorithm``.)
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- ``digest`` will be the actual bytes of the digest.
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FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY is guaranteed to execute in constant time,
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regardless of the size of the file.
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FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
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- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
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- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file
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- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity
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- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity
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support, or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity'
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feature enabled on it. (See `Filesystem support`_.)
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- ``EOVERFLOW``: the digest is longer than the specified
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``digest_size`` bytes. Try providing a larger buffer.
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FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
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---------------
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The existing ioctl FS_IOC_GETFLAGS (which isn't specific to fs-verity)
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can also be used to check whether a file has fs-verity enabled or not.
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To do so, check for FS_VERITY_FL (0x00100000) in the returned flags.
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The verity flag is not settable via FS_IOC_SETFLAGS. You must use
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FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY instead, since parameters must be provided.
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statx
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-----
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Since Linux v5.5, the statx() system call sets STATX_ATTR_VERITY if
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the file has fs-verity enabled. This can perform better than
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FS_IOC_GETFLAGS and FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY because it doesn't require
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opening the file, and opening verity files can be expensive.
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Accessing verity files
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======================
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Applications can transparently access a verity file just like a
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non-verity one, with the following exceptions:
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- Verity files are readonly. They cannot be opened for writing or
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truncate()d, even if the file mode bits allow it. Attempts to do
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one of these things will fail with EPERM. However, changes to
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metadata such as owner, mode, timestamps, and xattrs are still
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allowed, since these are not measured by fs-verity. Verity files
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can also still be renamed, deleted, and linked to.
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- Direct I/O is not supported on verity files. Attempts to use direct
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I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O.
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- DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on verity files, because this
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would circumvent the data verification.
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- Reads of data that doesn't match the verity Merkle tree will fail
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with EIO (for read()) or SIGBUS (for mmap() reads).
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- If the sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is set to 1 and the
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file's verity measurement is not signed by a key in the fs-verity
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keyring, then opening the file will fail. See `Built-in signature
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verification`_.
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Direct access to the Merkle tree is not supported. Therefore, if a
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verity file is copied, or is backed up and restored, then it will lose
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its "verity"-ness. fs-verity is primarily meant for files like
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executables that are managed by a package manager.
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File measurement computation
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============================
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This section describes how fs-verity hashes the file contents using a
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Merkle tree to produce the "file measurement" which cryptographically
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identifies the file contents. This algorithm is the same for all
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filesystems that support fs-verity.
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Userspace only needs to be aware of this algorithm if it needs to
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compute the file measurement itself, e.g. in order to sign the file.
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.. _fsverity_merkle_tree:
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Merkle tree
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-----------
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The file contents is divided into blocks, where the block size is
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configurable but is usually 4096 bytes. The end of the last block is
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zero-padded if needed. Each block is then hashed, producing the first
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level of hashes. Then, the hashes in this first level are grouped
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into 'blocksize'-byte blocks (zero-padding the ends as needed) and
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these blocks are hashed, producing the second level of hashes. This
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proceeds up the tree until only a single block remains. The hash of
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this block is the "Merkle tree root hash".
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If the file fits in one block and is nonempty, then the "Merkle tree
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root hash" is simply the hash of the single data block. If the file
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is empty, then the "Merkle tree root hash" is all zeroes.
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The "blocks" here are not necessarily the same as "filesystem blocks".
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If a salt was specified, then it's zero-padded to the closest multiple
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of the input size of the hash algorithm's compression function, e.g.
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64 bytes for SHA-256 or 128 bytes for SHA-512. The padded salt is
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prepended to every data or Merkle tree block that is hashed.
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The purpose of the block padding is to cause every hash to be taken
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over the same amount of data, which simplifies the implementation and
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keeps open more possibilities for hardware acceleration. The purpose
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of the salt padding is to make the salting "free" when the salted hash
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state is precomputed, then imported for each hash.
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Example: in the recommended configuration of SHA-256 and 4K blocks,
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128 hash values fit in each block. Thus, each level of the Merkle
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tree is approximately 128 times smaller than the previous, and for
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large files the Merkle tree's size converges to approximately 1/127 of
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the original file size. However, for small files, the padding is
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significant, making the space overhead proportionally more.
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.. _fsverity_descriptor:
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fs-verity descriptor
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--------------------
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By itself, the Merkle tree root hash is ambiguous. For example, it
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can't a distinguish a large file from a small second file whose data
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is exactly the top-level hash block of the first file. Ambiguities
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also arise from the convention of padding to the next block boundary.
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To solve this problem, the verity file measurement is actually
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computed as a hash of the following structure, which contains the
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Merkle tree root hash as well as other fields such as the file size::
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struct fsverity_descriptor {
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__u8 version; /* must be 1 */
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__u8 hash_algorithm; /* Merkle tree hash algorithm */
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__u8 log_blocksize; /* log2 of size of data and tree blocks */
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__u8 salt_size; /* size of salt in bytes; 0 if none */
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__le32 sig_size; /* must be 0 */
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__le64 data_size; /* size of file the Merkle tree is built over */
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__u8 root_hash[64]; /* Merkle tree root hash */
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__u8 salt[32]; /* salt prepended to each hashed block */
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__u8 __reserved[144]; /* must be 0's */
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};
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Note that the ``sig_size`` field must be set to 0 for the purpose of
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computing the file measurement, even if a signature was provided (or
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will be provided) to `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_.
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Built-in signature verification
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===============================
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With CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y, fs-verity supports putting
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a portion of an authentication policy (see `Use cases`_) in the
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kernel. Specifically, it adds support for:
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1. At fs-verity module initialization time, a keyring ".fs-verity" is
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created. The root user can add trusted X.509 certificates to this
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keyring using the add_key() system call, then (when done)
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optionally use keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent additional
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certificates from being added.
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2. `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_ accepts a pointer to a PKCS#7 formatted
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detached signature in DER format of the file measurement. On
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success, this signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree.
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Then, any time the file is opened, the kernel will verify the
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file's actual measurement against this signature, using the
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certificates in the ".fs-verity" keyring.
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3. A new sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is made available.
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When set to 1, the kernel requires that all verity files have a
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correctly signed file measurement as described in (2).
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File measurements must be signed in the following format, which is
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similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
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struct fsverity_signed_digest {
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char magic[8]; /* must be "FSVerity" */
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__le16 digest_algorithm;
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__le16 digest_size;
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__u8 digest[];
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};
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fs-verity's built-in signature verification support is meant as a
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relatively simple mechanism that can be used to provide some level of
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authenticity protection for verity files, as an alternative to doing
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the signature verification in userspace or using IMA-appraisal.
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However, with this mechanism, userspace programs still need to check
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that the verity bit is set, and there is no protection against verity
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files being swapped around.
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Filesystem support
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==================
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fs-verity is currently supported by the ext4 and f2fs filesystems.
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The CONFIG_FS_VERITY kconfig option must be enabled to use fs-verity
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on either filesystem.
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``include/linux/fsverity.h`` declares the interface between the
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``fs/verity/`` support layer and filesystems. Briefly, filesystems
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must provide an ``fsverity_operations`` structure that provides
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methods to read and write the verity metadata to a filesystem-specific
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location, including the Merkle tree blocks and
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``fsverity_descriptor``. Filesystems must also call functions in
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``fs/verity/`` at certain times, such as when a file is opened or when
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pages have been read into the pagecache. (See `Verifying data`_.)
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ext4
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----
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ext4 supports fs-verity since Linux v5.4 and e2fsprogs v1.45.2.
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To create verity files on an ext4 filesystem, the filesystem must have
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been formatted with ``-O verity`` or had ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on
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it. "verity" is an RO_COMPAT filesystem feature, so once set, old
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kernels will only be able to mount the filesystem readonly, and old
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versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem. Moreover,
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currently ext4 only supports mounting a filesystem with the "verity"
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feature when its block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
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ext4 sets the EXT4_VERITY_FL on-disk inode flag on verity files. It
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can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared.
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ext4 also supports encryption, which can be used simultaneously with
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fs-verity. In this case, the plaintext data is verified rather than
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the ciphertext. This is necessary in order to make the file
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measurement meaningful, since every file is encrypted differently.
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ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor)
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past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond
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i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly,
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and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can
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be read/written internally by ext4 with only some relatively small
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changes to ext4. This approach avoids having to depend on the
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EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing ext4's xattr support to
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support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support
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encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted
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|
when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
|
|
|
|
Currently, ext4 verity only supports the case where the Merkle tree
|
|
block size, filesystem block size, and page size are all the same. It
|
|
also only supports extent-based files.
|
|
|
|
f2fs
|
|
----
|
|
|
|
f2fs supports fs-verity since Linux v5.4 and f2fs-tools v1.11.0.
|
|
|
|
To create verity files on an f2fs filesystem, the filesystem must have
|
|
been formatted with ``-O verity``.
|
|
|
|
f2fs sets the FADVISE_VERITY_BIT on-disk inode flag on verity files.
|
|
It can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be
|
|
cleared.
|
|
|
|
Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
|
|
fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first
|
|
64K boundary beyond i_size. See explanation for ext4 above.
|
|
Moreover, f2fs supports at most 4096 bytes of xattr entries per inode
|
|
which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block.
|
|
|
|
Currently, f2fs verity only supports a Merkle tree block size of 4096.
|
|
Also, f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently
|
|
have atomic or volatile writes pending.
|
|
|
|
Implementation details
|
|
======================
|
|
|
|
Verifying data
|
|
--------------
|
|
|
|
fs-verity ensures that all reads of a verity file's data are verified,
|
|
regardless of which syscall is used to do the read (e.g. mmap(),
|
|
read(), pread()) and regardless of whether it's the first read or a
|
|
later read (unless the later read can return cached data that was
|
|
already verified). Below, we describe how filesystems implement this.
|
|
|
|
Pagecache
|
|
~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
For filesystems using Linux's pagecache, the ``->readpage()`` and
|
|
``->readpages()`` methods must be modified to verify pages before they
|
|
are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be
|
|
insufficient, since ``->read_iter()`` is not used for memory maps.
|
|
|
|
Therefore, fs/verity/ provides a function fsverity_verify_page() which
|
|
verifies a page that has been read into the pagecache of a verity
|
|
inode, but is still locked and not Uptodate, so it's not yet readable
|
|
by userspace. As needed to do the verification,
|
|
fsverity_verify_page() will call back into the filesystem to read
|
|
Merkle tree pages via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page().
|
|
|
|
fsverity_verify_page() returns false if verification failed; in this
|
|
case, the filesystem must not set the page Uptodate. Following this,
|
|
as per the usual Linux pagecache behavior, attempts by userspace to
|
|
read() from the part of the file containing the page will fail with
|
|
EIO, and accesses to the page within a memory map will raise SIGBUS.
|
|
|
|
fsverity_verify_page() currently only supports the case where the
|
|
Merkle tree block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
|
|
|
|
In principle, fsverity_verify_page() verifies the entire path in the
|
|
Merkle tree from the data page to the root hash. However, for
|
|
efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore,
|
|
fsverity_verify_page() only ascends the tree reading hash pages until
|
|
an already-verified hash page is seen, as indicated by the PageChecked
|
|
bit being set. It then verifies the path to that page.
|
|
|
|
This optimization, which is also used by dm-verity, results in
|
|
excellent sequential read performance. This is because usually (e.g.
|
|
127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash page from the
|
|
bottom level of the tree will already be cached and checked from
|
|
reading a previous data page. However, random reads perform worse.
|
|
|
|
Block device based filesystems
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
Block device based filesystems (e.g. ext4 and f2fs) in Linux also use
|
|
the pagecache, so the above subsection applies too. However, they
|
|
also usually read many pages from a file at once, grouped into a
|
|
structure called a "bio". To make it easier for these types of
|
|
filesystems to support fs-verity, fs/verity/ also provides a function
|
|
fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all pages in a bio.
|
|
|
|
ext4 and f2fs also support encryption. If a verity file is also
|
|
encrypted, the pages must be decrypted before being verified. To
|
|
support this, these filesystems allocate a "post-read context" for
|
|
each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``::
|
|
|
|
struct bio_post_read_ctx {
|
|
struct bio *bio;
|
|
struct work_struct work;
|
|
unsigned int cur_step;
|
|
unsigned int enabled_steps;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
``enabled_steps`` is a bitmask that specifies whether decryption,
|
|
verity, or both is enabled. After the bio completes, for each needed
|
|
postprocessing step the filesystem enqueues the bio_post_read_ctx on a
|
|
workqueue, and then the workqueue work does the decryption or
|
|
verification. Finally, pages where no decryption or verity error
|
|
occurred are marked Uptodate, and the pages are unlocked.
|
|
|
|
Files on ext4 and f2fs may contain holes. Normally, ``->readpages()``
|
|
simply zeroes holes and sets the corresponding pages Uptodate; no bios
|
|
are issued. To prevent this case from bypassing fs-verity, these
|
|
filesystems use fsverity_verify_page() to verify hole pages.
|
|
|
|
ext4 and f2fs disable direct I/O on verity files, since otherwise
|
|
direct I/O would bypass fs-verity. (They also do the same for
|
|
encrypted files.)
|
|
|
|
Userspace utility
|
|
=================
|
|
|
|
This document focuses on the kernel, but a userspace utility for
|
|
fs-verity can be found at:
|
|
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git
|
|
|
|
See the README.md file in the fsverity-utils source tree for details,
|
|
including examples of setting up fs-verity protected files.
|
|
|
|
Tests
|
|
=====
|
|
|
|
To test fs-verity, use xfstests. For example, using `kvm-xfstests
|
|
<https://github.com/tytso/xfstests-bld/blob/master/Documentation/kvm-quickstart.md>`_::
|
|
|
|
kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g verity
|
|
|
|
FAQ
|
|
===
|
|
|
|
This section answers frequently asked questions about fs-verity that
|
|
weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Why isn't fs-verity part of IMA?
|
|
:A: fs-verity and IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) have
|
|
different focuses. fs-verity is a filesystem-level mechanism for
|
|
hashing individual files using a Merkle tree. In contrast, IMA
|
|
specifies a system-wide policy that specifies which files are
|
|
hashed and what to do with those hashes, such as log them,
|
|
authenticate them, or add them to a measurement list.
|
|
|
|
IMA is planned to support the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an
|
|
alternative to doing full file hashes, for people who want the
|
|
performance and security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.
|
|
But it doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be
|
|
through IMA. As a standalone filesystem feature, fs-verity
|
|
already meets many users' needs, and it's testable like other
|
|
filesystem features e.g. with xfstests.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the
|
|
hashes in the Merkle tree, which is stored on-disk?
|
|
:A: To verify the authenticity of an fs-verity file you must verify
|
|
the authenticity of the "file measurement", which is basically the
|
|
root hash of the Merkle tree. See `Use cases`_.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just replace a
|
|
verity file with a non-verity one?
|
|
:A: See `Use cases`_. In the initial use case, it's really trusted
|
|
userspace code that authenticates the files; fs-verity is just a
|
|
tool to do this job efficiently and securely. The trusted
|
|
userspace code will consider non-verity files to be inauthentic.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Why does the Merkle tree need to be stored on-disk? Couldn't you
|
|
store just the root hash?
|
|
:A: If the Merkle tree wasn't stored on-disk, then you'd have to
|
|
compute the entire tree when the file is first accessed, even if
|
|
just one byte is being read. This is a fundamental consequence of
|
|
how Merkle tree hashing works. To verify a leaf node, you need to
|
|
verify the whole path to the root hash, including the root node
|
|
(the thing which the root hash is a hash of). But if the root
|
|
node isn't stored on-disk, you have to compute it by hashing its
|
|
children, and so on until you've actually hashed the entire file.
|
|
|
|
That defeats most of the point of doing a Merkle tree-based hash,
|
|
since if you have to hash the whole file ahead of time anyway,
|
|
then you could simply do sha256(file) instead. That would be much
|
|
simpler, and a bit faster too.
|
|
|
|
It's true that an in-memory Merkle tree could still provide the
|
|
advantage of verification on every read rather than just on the
|
|
first read. However, it would be inefficient because every time a
|
|
hash page gets evicted (you can't pin the entire Merkle tree into
|
|
memory, since it may be very large), in order to restore it you
|
|
again need to hash everything below it in the tree. This again
|
|
defeats most of the point of doing a Merkle tree-based hash, since
|
|
a single block read could trigger re-hashing gigabytes of data.
|
|
|
|
:Q: But couldn't you store just the leaf nodes and compute the rest?
|
|
:A: See previous answer; this really just moves up one level, since
|
|
one could alternatively interpret the data blocks as being the
|
|
leaf nodes of the Merkle tree. It's true that the tree can be
|
|
computed much faster if the leaf level is stored rather than just
|
|
the data, but that's only because each level is less than 1% the
|
|
size of the level below (assuming the recommended settings of
|
|
SHA-256 and 4K blocks). For the exact same reason, by storing
|
|
"just the leaf nodes" you'd already be storing over 99% of the
|
|
tree, so you might as well simply store the whole tree.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Can the Merkle tree be built ahead of time, e.g. distributed as
|
|
part of a package that is installed to many computers?
|
|
:A: This isn't currently supported. It was part of the original
|
|
design, but was removed to simplify the kernel UAPI and because it
|
|
wasn't a critical use case. Files are usually installed once and
|
|
used many times, and cryptographic hashing is somewhat fast on
|
|
most modern processors.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Why doesn't fs-verity support writes?
|
|
:A: Write support would be very difficult and would require a
|
|
completely different design, so it's well outside the scope of
|
|
fs-verity. Write support would require:
|
|
|
|
- A way to maintain consistency between the data and hashes,
|
|
including all levels of hashes, since corruption after a crash
|
|
(especially of potentially the entire file!) is unacceptable.
|
|
The main options for solving this are data journalling,
|
|
copy-on-write, and log-structured volume. But it's very hard to
|
|
retrofit existing filesystems with new consistency mechanisms.
|
|
Data journalling is available on ext4, but is very slow.
|
|
|
|
- Rebuilding the Merkle tree after every write, which would be
|
|
extremely inefficient. Alternatively, a different authenticated
|
|
dictionary structure such as an "authenticated skiplist" could
|
|
be used. However, this would be far more complex.
|
|
|
|
Compare it to dm-verity vs. dm-integrity. dm-verity is very
|
|
simple: the kernel just verifies read-only data against a
|
|
read-only Merkle tree. In contrast, dm-integrity supports writes
|
|
but is slow, is much more complex, and doesn't actually support
|
|
full-device authentication since it authenticates each sector
|
|
independently, i.e. there is no "root hash". It doesn't really
|
|
make sense for the same device-mapper target to support these two
|
|
very different cases; the same applies to fs-verity.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Since verity files are immutable, why isn't the immutable bit set?
|
|
:A: The existing "immutable" bit (FS_IMMUTABLE_FL) already has a
|
|
specific set of semantics which not only make the file contents
|
|
read-only, but also prevent the file from being deleted, renamed,
|
|
linked to, or having its owner or mode changed. These extra
|
|
properties are unwanted for fs-verity, so reusing the immutable
|
|
bit isn't appropriate.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Why does the API use ioctls instead of setxattr() and getxattr()?
|
|
:A: Abusing the xattr interface for basically arbitrary syscalls is
|
|
heavily frowned upon by most of the Linux filesystem developers.
|
|
An xattr should really just be an xattr on-disk, not an API to
|
|
e.g. magically trigger construction of a Merkle tree.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Does fs-verity support remote filesystems?
|
|
:A: Only ext4 and f2fs support is implemented currently, but in
|
|
principle any filesystem that can store per-file verity metadata
|
|
can support fs-verity, regardless of whether it's local or remote.
|
|
Some filesystems may have fewer options of where to store the
|
|
verity metadata; one possibility is to store it past the end of
|
|
the file and "hide" it from userspace by manipulating i_size. The
|
|
data verification functions provided by ``fs/verity/`` also assume
|
|
that the filesystem uses the Linux pagecache, but both local and
|
|
remote filesystems normally do so.
|
|
|
|
:Q: Why is anything filesystem-specific at all? Shouldn't fs-verity
|
|
be implemented entirely at the VFS level?
|
|
:A: There are many reasons why this is not possible or would be very
|
|
difficult, including the following:
|
|
|
|
- To prevent bypassing verification, pages must not be marked
|
|
Uptodate until they've been verified. Currently, each
|
|
filesystem is responsible for marking pages Uptodate via
|
|
``->readpages()``. Therefore, currently it's not possible for
|
|
the VFS to do the verification on its own. Changing this would
|
|
require significant changes to the VFS and all filesystems.
|
|
|
|
- It would require defining a filesystem-independent way to store
|
|
the verity metadata. Extended attributes don't work for this
|
|
because (a) the Merkle tree may be gigabytes, but many
|
|
filesystems assume that all xattrs fit into a single 4K
|
|
filesystem block, and (b) ext4 and f2fs encryption doesn't
|
|
encrypt xattrs, yet the Merkle tree *must* be encrypted when the
|
|
file contents are, because it stores hashes of the plaintext
|
|
file contents.
|
|
|
|
So the verity metadata would have to be stored in an actual
|
|
file. Using a separate file would be very ugly, since the
|
|
metadata is fundamentally part of the file to be protected, and
|
|
it could cause problems where users could delete the real file
|
|
but not the metadata file or vice versa. On the other hand,
|
|
having it be in the same file would break applications unless
|
|
filesystems' notion of i_size were divorced from the VFS's,
|
|
which would be complex and require changes to all filesystems.
|
|
|
|
- It's desirable that FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY uses the filesystem's
|
|
transaction mechanism so that either the file ends up with
|
|
verity enabled, or no changes were made. Allowing intermediate
|
|
states to occur after a crash may cause problems.
|