linux/security/apparmor/net.c
Casey Schaufler 2aff9d20d5 lsm: infrastructure management of the sock security
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-07-29 16:54:50 -04:00

267 lines
5.8 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor network mediation
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
*/
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/secid.h"
#include "net_names.h"
struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
{ }
};
static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
"unknown",
"send",
"receive",
"unknown",
"create",
"shutdown",
"connect",
"unknown",
"setattr",
"getattr",
"setcred",
"getcred",
"chmod",
"chown",
"chgrp",
"lock",
"mmap",
"mprot",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"accept",
"bind",
"listen",
"unknown",
"setopt",
"getopt",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
};
/* audit callback for net specific fields */
void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
else
audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
sa->u.net->family);
if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type])
audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
sock_type_names[ad->net.type]);
else
audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
ad->net.type);
audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol);
if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0,
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0,
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
}
}
if (ad->peer) {
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
}
/* Generic af perm */
int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family,
int type)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms perms = { };
aa_state_t state;
__be16 buffer[2];
AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
if (profile_unconfined(profile))
return 0;
state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
if (!state)
return 0;
buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
4);
perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
}
int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family,
type));
}
static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
struct aa_label *label,
const char *op, u32 request,
struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
int error = 0;
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sk);
if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk));
}
return error;
}
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error;
AA_BUG(!sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
{
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
{
struct aa_label *label;
if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
return 0;
}
label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
secmark->secid = label->secid;
return 0;
}
static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
int i, ret;
struct aa_perms perms = { };
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) {
if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) {
ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&rules->secmark[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (rules->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
rules->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
if (rules->secmark[i].deny)
perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
else
perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
if (rules->secmark[i].audit)
perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
}
}
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
}
int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
&ad));
}
#endif