Hyp now has its own nominal context for saving and restoring its state
when switching to and from a guest. Update the related comments and
utilities to match the new name.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-10-ascull@google.com
We currently decide to execute the PtrAuth save/restore code based
on a set of branches that evaluate as (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ||
ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF). This can be easily replaced by
a much simpler test as the ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH capability is
exactly this expression.
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
When save/restoring PtrAuth registers between host and guest, it is
pretty useless to fetch the in-memory state, while we have the right
state in the HCR_EL2 system register. Use that instead.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it.
This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with
a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state.
Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built
in the kernel and present in the CPU implementation so only VHE code
paths are modified.
When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer
authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are
disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest
trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly
context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the
vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again. However the host key save is
optimized and implemented inside ptrauth instruction/register access
trap.
Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic
authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for
either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden
from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature
framework in the host.
Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot
be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap
covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot
prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature
which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which
supports the relevant feature). Hence, this patch expects both type of
authentication to be present in a cpu.
This switch of key is done from guest enter/exit assembly as preparation
for the upcoming in-kernel pointer authentication support. Hence, these
key switching routines are not implemented in C code as they may cause
pointer authentication key signing error in some situations.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
[Only VHE, key switch in full assembly, vcpu_has_ptrauth checks
, save host key in ptrauth exception trap]
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
[maz: various fixups]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
