Currently lookup for /proc/$PID first goes through spinlock and whole list
of misc /proc entries only to confirm that, yes, /proc/42 can not possibly
match random proc entry.
List is is several dozens entries long (52 entries on my setup).
None of this is necessary.
Try to convert dentry name to integer first.
If it works, it must be /proc/$PID.
If it doesn't, it must be random proc entry.
Based on patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* remove proc_create(NULL, ...) check, let it oops
* warn about proc_create("", ...) and proc_create("very very long name", ...)
proc code keeps length as u8, no 256+ name length possible
* warn about proc_create("123", ...)
/proc/$PID and /proc/misc namespaces are separate things,
but dumb module might create funky a-la $PID entry.
* remove post mortem strchr('/') check
Triggering it implies either strchr() is buggy or memory corruption.
It should be VFS check anyway.
In reality, none of these checks will ever trigger,
it is preparation for the next patch.
Based on patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
proc_uid_seq_operations, proc_gid_seq_operations and
proc_projid_seq_operations are only called in proc_id_map_open with
seq_open as const struct seq_operations so we can constify the 3
structures and update proc_id_map_open prototype.
text data bss dec hex filename
6817 404 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-before
6913 308 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-after
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris.
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range
audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly
AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header
kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c
sched: declare pid_alive as inline
audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations
syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call
audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages
audit: include subject in login records
audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages
audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace
audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.
pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns
audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context()
audit: Add generic compat syscall support
audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
...
/proc/self/make-it-fail is a boolean, but accepts any number, including
negative ones. Change variable to unsigned, and cap upper bound at 1.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: don't make make_it_fail unsigned]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The /proc/*/pagemap contain sensitive information and currently its mode
is 0444. Change this to 0400, so the VFS will prevent unprivileged
processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary privileged
/proc/*/pagemap files.
This reduces the scope of address space leaking and bypasses by protecting
already running processes.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
These procfs files contain sensitive information and currently their
mode is 0444. Change this to 0400, so the VFS will be able to block
unprivileged processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary
privileged /proc/*/{stack,syscall,personality} files.
This reduces the scope of ASLR leaking and bypasses by protecting already
running processes.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Re-factor proc_pid_cmdline() to use get_cmdline() helper
from mm.h.
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The expected logic of proc_map_files_get_link() is either to return 0
and initialize 'path' or return an error and leave 'path' uninitialized.
By the time dname_to_vma_addr() returns 0 the corresponding vma may have
already be gone. In this case the path is not initialized but the
return value is still 0. This results in 'general protection fault'
inside d_path().
Steps to reproduce:
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y
fd = open(...);
while (1) {
mmap(fd, ...);
munmap(fd, ...);
}
ls -la /proc/$PID/map_files
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68991
Signed-off-by: Artem Fetishev <artem_fetishev@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Terekhov <aleksandr_terekhov@epam.com>
Reported-by: <wiebittewas@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. proc_task_readdir()->first_tid() path truncates f_pos to int, this
is wrong even on 64bit.
We could check that f_pos < PID_MAX or even INT_MAX in
proc_task_readdir(), but this patch simply checks the potential
overflow in first_tid(), this check is nop on 64bit. We do not care if
it was negative and the new unsigned value is huge, all we need to
ensure is that we never wrongly return !NULL.
2. Remove the 2nd "nr != 0" check before get_nr_threads(),
nr_threads == 0 is not distinguishable from !pid_task() above.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
proc_task_readdir() does not really need "leader", first_tid() has to
revalidate it anyway. Just pass proc_pid(inode) to first_tid() instead,
it can do pid_task(PIDTYPE_PID) itself and read ->group_leader only if
necessary.
The patch also extracts the "inode is dead" code from
pid_delete_dentry(dentry) into the new trivial helper,
proc_inode_is_dead(inode), proc_task_readdir() uses it to return -ENOENT
if this dir was removed.
This is a bit racy, but the race is very inlikely and the getdents() after
openndir() can see the empty "." + ".." dir only once.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rerwrite the main loop to use while_each_thread() instead of
next_thread(). We are going to fix or replace while_each_thread(),
next_thread() should be avoided whenever possible.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
proc_task_readdir() verifies that the result of get_proc_task() is
pid_alive() and thus its ->group_leader is fine too. However this is not
necessarily true after rcu_read_unlock(), we need to recheck this again
after first_tid() does rcu_read_lock(). Otherwise
leader->thread_group.next (used by next_thread()) can be invalid if the
rcu grace period expires in between.
The race is subtle and unlikely, but still it is possible afaics. To
simplify lets ignore the "likely" case when tid != 0, f_version can be
cleared by proc_task_operations->llseek().
Suppose we have a main thread M and its subthread T. Suppose that f_pos
== 3, iow first_tid() should return T. Now suppose that the following
happens between rcu_read_unlock() and rcu_read_lock():
1. T execs and becomes the new leader. This removes M from
->thread_group but next_thread(M) is still T.
2. T creates another thread X which does exec as well, T
goes away.
3. X creates another subthread, this increments nr_threads.
4. first_tid() does next_thread(M) and returns the already
dead T.
Note also that we need 2. and 3. only because of get_nr_threads() check,
and this check was supposed to be optimization only.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid.
This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Thus when launching a new login daemon, a
priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the
daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Expand information about posix-timers in /proc/<pid>/timers by adding
info about clock, with which the timer was created. I.e. in the forth
line of timer info after "notify:" line go "ClockID: <clock_id>".
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <snorcht@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368742323-46949-2-git-send-email-snorcht@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Pull VFS updates from Al Viro,
Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch
create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated
create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and
seq_file etc).
7kloc removed.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits)
don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables
proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h
proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs
proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE
take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c
ppc: Clean up scanlog
ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat
hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name
drm: Constify drm_proc_list[]
zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug
reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show()
proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent
airo: Use remove_proc_subtree()
rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE
rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/
proc: Add proc_mkdir_data()
proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h}
proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c
...
Uninline pid_delete_dentry() as it's only used by three function pointers.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, a write to a procfs file will return the number of bytes
successfully written. If the actual string is longer than this, the
remainder of the string will not be be written and userspace will
complete the operation by issuing additional write()s.
Hence
$ echo -n "abcdefghijklmnopqrs" > /proc/self/comm
results in
$ cat /proc/$$/comm
pqrs
since the final four bytes were written with a second write() since
TASK_COMM_LEN == 16. This is obviously an undesired result and not
equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_NAME). The implementation should not need to
know the definition of TASK_COMM_LEN.
This patch truncates the string to the first TASK_COMM_LEN bytes and
returns the bytes written as the length of the string written so the
second write() is suppressed.
$ cat /proc/$$/comm
abcdefghijklmno
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Previous patch added proc file to list posix timers created by task.
Expand the information provided in this file by adding info about
notification method, with which timers were created. I.e. after
the "ID:" line there go
1. "signal:" line, that shows signal number and sigval bits;
2. "notify:" line, that shows the timer notification method.
Thus the timer entry would looke like this:
ID: 123
signal: 14/0000000000b005d0
notify: signal/pid.732
This information is enough to understand how timer_create() was called
for each particular timer.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/513DA024.80404@parallels.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Currently kernel doesn't provide any API for getting info about what
posix timers are configured by processes. It's implied, that a process
which configured some timers, knows what it did. However, for external
tools it's impossible to get this information. In particular, this is
critical for checkpoint-restore project to have this info.
Introduce a per-pid proc file with information about posix
timers. Since these timers are shared between threads, this file is
present on tgid level only, no such thing in tid subdirs.
The file format is expected to be the "/proc/<pid>/smaps"-like,
i.e. each timer will occupy seveal lines to allow for future
extending.
Each new timer entry starts with the
ID: <number>
line which is added by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/513DA00D.6070009@parallels.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
- use pr_foo() throughout
- remove a couple of duplicated KERN_WARNINGs, via WARN(KERN_WARNING "...")
- nuke a few warnings which I've never seen happen, ever.
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
According to SUSv3:
[EACCES] Permission denied. An attempt was made to access a file in a way
forbidden by its file access permissions.
[EPERM] Operation not permitted. An attempt was made to perform an operation
limited to processes with appropriate privileges or to the owner of a file
or other resource.
So -EPERM should be returned if capability checks fails.
Strictly speaking this is an API change since the error code user sees is
altered.
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* calling conventions change - ERR_PTR() is returned on ->d_hash() errors;
NULL is just for dcache miss now.
* exported, open-coded instances in ncpfs and cifs converted.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to
containers in general and user namespaces in particular. The user
space interface is now complete.
This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user
namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces.
The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from
using cool new kernel features is broken.
This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for
the pid, user, mount namespaces.
This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace
cleanups/simplifications. Of particular significance is the rework of
the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out
tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation. At
least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup.
The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been converted from regular files
to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS,
ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is
currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission
checks are always applied.
The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers
so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same
namespaces.
Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the
permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user
namespace root to usefully use the networking stack. Similar changes
for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my
tree.
Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn
in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the
/proc/<pid>/ns/ files in this tree.
Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs,
ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the
Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from
being built when any of those filesystems are enabled.
Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial
user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits)
proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.
proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.
proc: Generalize proc inode allocation
userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs
userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file
procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file
userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
userns: Implent proc namespace operations
userns: Kill task_user_ns
userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter
userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.
userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces
userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid.
userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation
userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces.
userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped
userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure
vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.
vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces
vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace
...
The maximum oom_score_adj is 1000 and the minimum oom_score_adj is -1000,
so this range can be represented by the signed short type with no
functional change. The extra space this frees up in struct signal_struct
will be used for per-thread oom kill flags in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 7b540d0646 ("proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with
grabbing files") switched proc_map_files_readdir() to use @f_mode
directly instead of grabbing @file reference, but same time the test for
@vm_file presence was lost leading to nil dereference. The patch brings
the test back.
The all proc_map_files feature is CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE wrapped
(which is set to 'n' by default) so the bug doesn't affect regular
kernels.
The regression is 3.7-rc1 only as far as I can tell.
[gorcunov@openvz.org: provided changelog]
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.
Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.
Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.
Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.
In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that we have s_fs_info pointing to our pid namespace
the original reason for the proc root inode having a struct
pid is gone.
Caching a pid in the root inode has led to some complicated
code. Now that we don't need the struct pid, just remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
I had visions at one point of splitting proc into two filesystems. If
that had happened proc/self being the the part of proc that actually deals
with pids would have been a nice cleanup. As it is proc/self requires
a lot of unnecessary infrastructure for a single file.
The only user visible change is that a mounted /proc for a pid namespace
that is dead now shows a broken proc symlink, instead of being completely
invisible. I don't think anyone will notice or care.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This is mostly a revert of 01dc52ebdf ("oom: remove deprecated oom_adj")
from Davidlohr Bueso.
It reintroduces /proc/pid/oom_adj for backwards compatibility with earlier
kernels. It simply scales the value linearly when /proc/pid/oom_score_adj
is written.
The major difference is that its scheduled removal is no longer included
in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt. We do warn users with a
single printk, though, to suggest the more powerful and supported
/proc/pid/oom_score_adj interface.
Reported-by: Artem S. Tashkinov <t.artem@lycos.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
