kvm_cpuid_check_equal() checks for the (full) equality of the supplied
CPUID data so .flags need to be checked too.
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fixes: c6617c61e8 ("KVM: x86: Partially allow KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220126131804.2839410-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
With the help of xstate_get_guest_group_perm(), KVM can exclude unpermitted
xfeatures in cpuid.0xd.0.eax, in which case the corresponding xfeatures
sizes should also be matched to the permitted xfeatures.
To fix this inconsistency, the permitted_xcr0 and permitted_xss are defined
consistently, which implies 'supported' plus certain permissions for this
task, and it also fixes cpuid.0xd.1.ebx and later leaf-by-leaf queries.
Fixes: 445ecdf79b ("kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220125115223.33707-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Full equality check of CPUID data on update (kvm_cpuid_check_equal()) may
fail for SGX enabled CPUs as CPUID.(EAX=0x12,ECX=1) is currently being
mangled in kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(). Move it to
__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() and split off cpuid_get_supported_xcr0()
helper as 'vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0' update needs (logically)
to stay in kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: feb627e8d6 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220124103606.2630588-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
According to Intel extended feature disable (XFD) spec, the sub-function i
(i > 1) of CPUID function 0DH enumerates "details for state component i.
ECX[2] enumerates support for XFD support for this state component."
If KVM does not report F(XFD) feature (e.g. due to CONFIG_X86_64),
then the corresponding XFD support for any state component i
should also be removed. Translate this dependency into KVM terms.
Fixes: 690a757d61 ("kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220117074531.76925-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The new module parameter to control PMU virtualization should apply
to Intel as well as AMD, for situations where userspace is not trusted.
If the module parameter allows PMU virtualization, there could be a
new KVM_CAP or guest CPUID bits whereby userspace can enable/disable
PMU virtualization on a per-VM basis.
If the module parameter does not allow PMU virtualization, there
should be no userspace override, since we have no precedent for
authorizing that kind of override. If it's false, other counter-based
profiling features (such as LBR including the associated CPUID bits
if any) will not be exposed.
Change its name from "pmu" to "enable_pmu" as we have temporary
variables with the same name in our code like "struct kvm_pmu *pmu".
Fixes: b1d66dad65 ("KVM: x86/svm: Add module param to control PMU virtualization")
Suggested-by : Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220111073823.21885-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit feb627e8d6 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
forbade changing CPUID altogether but unfortunately this is not fully
compatible with existing VMMs. In particular, QEMU reuses vCPU fds for
CPU hotplug after unplug and it calls KVM_SET_CPUID2. Instead of full ban,
check whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what was previously set.
Reported-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Fixes: feb627e8d6 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220117150542.2176196-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[Do not call kvm_find_cpuid_entry repeatedly. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() mangles CPUID data coming from userspace
VMM after updating 'vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries', this makes it
impossible to compare an update with what was previously
supplied. Introduce __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() version which can be
used to tweak the input before it goes to 'vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries'
so the upcoming update check can compare tweaked data.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220117150542.2176196-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
With KVM_CAP_XSAVE, userspace uses a hardcoded 4KB buffer to get/set
xstate data from/to KVM. This doesn't work when dynamic xfeatures
(e.g. AMX) are exposed to the guest as they require a larger buffer
size.
Introduce a new capability (KVM_CAP_XSAVE2). Userspace VMM gets the
required xstate buffer size via KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2).
KVM_SET_XSAVE is extended to work with both legacy and new capabilities
by doing properly-sized memdup_user() based on the guest fpu container.
KVM_GET_XSAVE is kept for backward-compatible reason. Instead,
KVM_GET_XSAVE2 is introduced under KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 as the preferred
interface for getting xstate buffer (4KB or larger size) from KVM
(Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/12/15/510)
Also, update the api doc with the new KVM_GET_XSAVE2 ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Guang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-19-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Extend CPUID emulation to support XFD, AMX_TILE, AMX_INT8 and
AMX_BF16. Adding those bits into kvm_cpu_caps finally activates all
previous logics in this series.
Hide XFD on 32bit host kernels. Otherwise it leads to a weird situation
where KVM tells userspace to migrate MSR_IA32_XFD and then rejects
attempts to read/write the MSR.
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-17-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM can request fpstate expansion in two approaches:
1) When intercepting guest updates to XCR0 and XFD MSR;
2) Before vcpu runs (e.g. at KVM_SET_CPUID2);
The first option doesn't waste memory for legacy guest if it doesn't
support XFD. However doing so introduces more complexity and also
imposes an order requirement in the restoring path, i.e. XCR0/XFD
must be restored before XSTATE.
Given that the agreement is to do the static approach. This is
considered a better tradeoff though it does waste 8K memory for
legacy guest if its CPUID includes dynamically-enabled xfeatures.
Successful fpstate expansion requires userspace VMM to acquire
guest xstate permissions before calling KVM_SET_CPUID2.
Also take the chance to adjust the indent in kvm_set_cpuid().
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-9-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should not include any dynamic xstates in
CPUID[0xD] if they have not been requested with prctl. Otherwise
a process which directly passes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to
KVM_SET_CPUID2 would now fail even if it doesn't intend to use a
dynamically enabled feature. Userspace must know that prctl is
required and allocate >4K xstate buffer before setting any dynamic
bit.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-5-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CPUID.0xD.1.EBX enumerates the size of the XSAVE area (in compacted
format) required by XSAVES. If CPUID.0xD.i.ECX[1] is set for a state
component (i), this state component should be located on the next
64-bytes boundary following the preceding state component in the
compacted layout.
Fix xstate_required_size() to follow the alignment rule. AMX is the
first state component with 64-bytes alignment to catch this bug.
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-4-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For Intel, the guest PMU can be disabled via clearing the PMU CPUID.
For AMD, all hw implementations support the base set of four
performance counters, with current mainstream hardware indicating
the presence of two additional counters via X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE.
In the virtualized world, the AMD guest driver may detect
the presence of at least one counter MSR. Most hypervisor
vendors would introduce a module param (like lbrv for svm)
to disable PMU for all guests.
Another control proposal per-VM is to pass PMU disable information
via MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES or one bit in CPUID Fn4000_00[FF:00].
Both of methods require some guest-side changes, so a module
parameter may not be sufficiently granular, but practical enough.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20211117080304.38989-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The lack a static declaration currently results in:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:128:26: warning: no previous prototype for function 'kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features'
when compiling with "W=1".
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 760849b147 ("KVM: x86: Make sure KVM_CPUID_FEATURES really are KVM_CPUID_FEATURES")
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20211115144131.5943-1-pdurrant@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently when kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() runs, it assumes that the
KVM_CPUID_FEATURES leaf is located at 0x40000001. This is not true,
however, if Hyper-V support is enabled. In this case the KVM leaves will
be offset.
This patch introdues as new 'kvm_cpuid_base' field into struct
kvm_vcpu_arch to track the location of the KVM leaves and function
kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base() (called from kvm_set_cpuid()) to locate the
leaves using the 'KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0' signature (which is now given a
definition in kvm_para.h). Adjustment of KVM_CPUID_FEATURES will hence now
target the correct leaf.
NOTE: A new for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base() macro is intoduced
into processor.h to avoid having duplicate code for the iteration
over possible hypervisor base leaves.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20211105095101.5384-3-pdurrant@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move the core logic of SET_CPUID and SET_CPUID2 to a common helper, the
only difference between the two ioctls() is the format of the userspace
struct. A future fix will add yet more code to the core logic.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211105095101.5384-2-pdurrant@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Predictive Store Forwarding: AMD Zen3 processors feature a new
technology called Predictive Store Forwarding (PSF).
PSF is a hardware-based micro-architectural optimization designed
to improve the performance of code execution by predicting address
dependencies between loads and stores.
How PSF works:
It is very common for a CPU to execute a load instruction to an address
that was recently written by a store. Modern CPUs implement a technique
known as Store-To-Load-Forwarding (STLF) to improve performance in such
cases. With STLF, data from the store is forwarded directly to the load
without having to wait for it to be written to memory. In a typical CPU,
STLF occurs after the address of both the load and store are calculated
and determined to match.
PSF expands on this by speculating on the relationship between loads and
stores without waiting for the address calculation to complete. With PSF,
the CPU learns over time the relationship between loads and stores. If
STLF typically occurs between a particular store and load, the CPU will
remember this.
In typical code, PSF provides a performance benefit by speculating on
the load result and allowing later instructions to begin execution
sooner than they otherwise would be able to.
The details of security analysis of AMD predictive store forwarding is
documented here.
https://www.amd.com/system/files/documents/security-analysis-predictive-store-forwarding.pdf
Predictive Store Forwarding controls:
There are two hardware control bits which influence the PSF feature:
- MSR 48h bit 2 – Speculative Store Bypass (SSBD)
- MSR 48h bit 7 – Predictive Store Forwarding Disable (PSFD)
The PSF feature is disabled if either of these bits are set. These bits
are controllable on a per-thread basis in an SMT system. By default, both
SSBD and PSFD are 0 meaning that the speculation features are enabled.
While the SSBD bit disables PSF and speculative store bypass, PSFD only
disables PSF.
PSFD may be desirable for software which is concerned with the
speculative behavior of PSF but desires a smaller performance impact than
setting SSBD.
Support for PSFD is indicated in CPUID Fn8000_0008 EBX[28].
All processors that support PSF will also support PSFD.
Linux kernel does not have the interface to enable/disable PSFD yet. Plan
here is to expose the PSFD technology to KVM so that the guest kernel can
make use of it if they wish to.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <163244601049.30292.5855870305350227855.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
[Keep feature private to KVM, as requested by Borislav Petkov. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Check whether a CPUID entry's index is significant before checking for a
matching index to hack-a-fix an undefined behavior bug due to consuming
uninitialized data. RESET/INIT emulation uses kvm_cpuid() to retrieve
CPUID.0x1, which does _not_ have a significant index, and fails to
initialize the dummy variable that doubles as EBX/ECX/EDX output _and_
ECX, a.k.a. index, input.
Practically speaking, it's _extremely_ unlikely any compiler will yield
code that causes problems, as the compiler would need to inline the
kvm_cpuid() call to detect the uninitialized data, and intentionally hose
the kernel, e.g. insert ud2, instead of simply ignoring the result of
the index comparison.
Although the sketchy "dummy" pattern was introduced in SVM by commit
66f7b72e11 ("KVM: x86: Make register state after reset conform to
specification"), it wasn't actually broken until commit 7ff6c03503
("KVM: x86: Remove stateful CPUID handling") arbitrarily swapped the
order of operations such that "index" was checked before the significant
flag.
Avoid consuming uninitialized data by reverting to checking the flag
before the index purely so that the fix can be easily backported; the
offending RESET/INIT code has been refactored, moved, and consolidated
from vendor code to common x86 since the bug was introduced. A future
patch will directly address the bad RESET/INIT behavior.
The undefined behavior was detected by syzbot + KernelMemorySanitizer.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cpuid_entry2_find arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:68
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in kvm_find_cpuid_entry arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:1103
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in kvm_cpuid+0x456/0x28f0 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:1183
cpuid_entry2_find arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:68 [inline]
kvm_find_cpuid_entry arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:1103 [inline]
kvm_cpuid+0x456/0x28f0 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:1183
kvm_vcpu_reset+0x13fb/0x1c20 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10885
kvm_apic_accept_events+0x58f/0x8c0 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:2923
vcpu_enter_guest+0xfd2/0x6d80 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9534
vcpu_run+0x7f5/0x18d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9788
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x245b/0x2d10 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10020
Local variable ----dummy@kvm_vcpu_reset created at:
kvm_vcpu_reset+0x1fb/0x1c20 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10812
kvm_apic_accept_events+0x58f/0x8c0 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:2923
Reported-by: syzbot+f3985126b746b3d59c9d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: 2a24be79b6 ("KVM: VMX: Set EDX at INIT with CPUID.0x1, Family-Model-Stepping")
Fixes: 7ff6c03503 ("KVM: x86: Remove stateful CPUID handling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210929222426.1855730-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Remove an ancient restriction that disallowed exposing EFER.NX to the
guest if EFER.NX=0 on the host, even if NX is fully supported by the CPU.
The motivation of the check, added by commit 2cc51560ae ("KVM: VMX:
Avoid saving and restoring msr_efer on lightweight vmexit"), was to rule
out the case of host.EFER.NX=0 and guest.EFER.NX=1 so that KVM could run
the guest with the host's EFER.NX and thus avoid context switching EFER
if the only divergence was the NX bit.
Fast forward to today, and KVM has long since stopped running the guest
with the host's EFER.NX. Not only does KVM context switch EFER if
host.EFER.NX=1 && guest.EFER.NX=0, KVM also forces host.EFER.NX=0 &&
guest.EFER.NX=1 when using shadow paging (to emulate SMEP). Furthermore,
the entire motivation for the restriction was made obsolete over a decade
ago when Intel added dedicated host and guest EFER fields in the VMCS
(Nehalem timeframe), which reduced the overhead of context switching EFER
from 400+ cycles (2 * WRMSR + 1 * RDMSR) to a mere ~2 cycles.
In practice, the removed restriction only affects non-PAE 32-bit kernels,
as EFER.NX is set during boot if NX is supported and the kernel will use
PAE paging (32-bit or 64-bit), regardless of whether or not the kernel
will actually use NX itself (mark PTEs non-executable).
Alternatively and/or complementarily, startup_32_smp() in head_32.S could
be modified to set EFER.NX=1 regardless of paging mode, thus eliminating
the scenario where NX is supported but not enabled. However, that runs
the risk of breaking non-KVM non-PAE kernels (though the risk is very,
very low as there are no known EFER.NX errata), and also eliminates an
easy-to-use mechanism for stressing KVM's handling of guest vs. host EFER
across nested virtualization transitions.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210805183804.1221554-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The AMD platform does not support the functions Ah CPUID leaf. The returned
results for this entry should all remain zero just like the native does:
AMD host:
0x0000000a 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x00000000 ecx=0x00000000 edx=0x00000000
(uncanny) AMD guest:
0x0000000a 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x00000000 ecx=0x00000000 edx=0x00008000
Fixes: cadbaa039b ("perf/x86/intel: Make anythread filter support conditional")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20210628074354.33848-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits instead of the raw CPUID information to
enumerate the MAXPHYADDR for KVM guests when TDP is disabled (the guest
version is only relevant to NPT/TDP).
When using shadow paging, any reductions to the host's MAXPHYADDR apply
to KVM and its guests as well, i.e. using the raw CPUID info will cause
KVM to misreport the number of PA bits available to the guest.
Unconditionally zero out the "Physical Address bit reduction" entry.
For !TDP, the adjustment is already done, and for TDP enumerating the
host's reduction is wrong as the reduction does not apply to GPAs.
Fixes: 9af9b94068 ("x86/cpu/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210623230552.4027702-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Ignore the guest MAXPHYADDR reported by CPUID.0x8000_0008 if TDP, i.e.
NPT, is disabled, and instead use the host's MAXPHYADDR. Per AMD'S APM:
Maximum guest physical address size in bits. This number applies only
to guests using nested paging. When this field is zero, refer to the
PhysAddrSize field for the maximum guest physical address size.
Fixes: 24c82e576b ("KVM: Sanitize cpuid")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210623230552.4027702-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Invalidate all MMUs' roles after a CPUID update to force reinitizliation
of the MMU context/helpers. Despite the efforts of commit de3ccd26fa
("KVM: MMU: record maximum physical address width in kvm_mmu_extended_role"),
there are still a handful of CPUID-based properties that affect MMU
behavior but are not incorporated into mmu_role. E.g. 1gb hugepage
support, AMD vs. Intel handling of bit 8, and SEV's C-Bit location all
factor into the guest's reserved PTE bits.
The obvious alternative would be to add all such properties to mmu_role,
but doing so provides no benefit over simply forcing a reinitialization
on every CPUID update, as setting guest CPUID is a rare operation.
Note, reinitializing all MMUs after a CPUID update does not fix all of
KVM's woes. Specifically, kvm_mmu_page_role doesn't track the CPUID
properties, which means that a vCPU can reuse shadow pages that should
not exist for the new vCPU model, e.g. that map GPAs that are now illegal
(due to MAXPHYADDR changes) or that set bits that are now reserved
(PAGE_SIZE for 1gb pages), etc...
Tracking the relevant CPUID properties in kvm_mmu_page_role would address
the majority of problems, but fully tracking that much state in the
shadow page role comes with an unpalatable cost as it would require a
non-trivial increase in KVM's memory footprint. The GBPAGES case is even
worse, as neither Intel nor AMD provides a way to disable 1gb hugepage
support in the hardware page walker, i.e. it's a virtualization hole that
can't be closed when using TDP.
In other words, resetting the MMU after a CPUID update is largely a
superficial fix. But, it will allow reverting the tracking of MAXPHYADDR
in the mmu_role, and that case in particular needs to mostly work because
KVM's shadow_root_level depends on guest MAXPHYADDR when 5-level paging
is supported. For cases where KVM botches guest behavior, the damage is
limited to that guest. But for the shadow_root_level, a misconfigured
MMU can cause KVM to incorrectly access memory, e.g. due to walking off
the end of its shadow page tables.
Fixes: 7dcd575520 ("x86/kvm/mmu: check if tdp/shadow MMU reconfiguration is needed")
Cc: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210622175739.3610207-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a couple
of warnings by explicitly adding break statements instead of just letting
the code fall through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20210528200756.GA39320@embeddedor>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Bus lock debug exception is an ability to notify the kernel by an #DB
trap after the instruction acquires a bus lock and is executed when
CPL>0. This allows the kernel to enforce user application throttling or
mitigations.
Existence of bus lock debug exception is enumerated via
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0).ECX[24]. Software can enable these exceptions by
setting bit 2 of the MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTL. Expose the CPUID to guest and
emulate the MSR handling when guest enables it.
Support for this feature was originally developed by Xiaoyao Li and
Chenyi Qiang, but code has since changed enough that this patch has
nothing in common with theirs, except for this commit message.
Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210202090433.13441-4-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If probing MSR_TSC_AUX failed, hide RDTSCP and RDPID, and WARN if either
feature was reported as supported. In theory, such a scenario should
never happen as both Intel and AMD state that MSR_TSC_AUX is available if
RDTSCP or RDPID is supported. But, KVM injects #GP on MSR_TSC_AUX
accesses if probing failed, faults on WRMSR(MSR_TSC_AUX) may be fatal to
the guest (because they happen during early CPU bringup), and KVM itself
has effectively misreported RDPID support in the past.
Note, this also has the happy side effect of omitting MSR_TSC_AUX from
the list of MSRs that are exposed to userspace if probing the MSR fails.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210504171734.1434054-16-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Do not advertise emulation support for RDPID if RDTSCP is unsupported.
RDPID emulation subtly relies on MSR_TSC_AUX to exist in hardware, as
both vmx_get_msr() and svm_get_msr() will return an error if the MSR is
unsupported, i.e. ctxt->ops->get_msr() will fail and the emulator will
inject a #UD.
Note, RDPID emulation also relies on RDTSCP being enabled in the guest,
but this is a KVM bug and will eventually be fixed.
Fixes: fb6d4d340e ("KVM: x86: emulate RDPID")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210504171734.1434054-3-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
- Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected mode
- Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode
- Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode
- ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1
- nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces
- Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver
- Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler
x86:
- Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code
- AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL
- Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation,
zap under read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under
read lock
- /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon)
- support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context
- support SGX in virtual machines
- add a few more statistics
- improved directed yield heuristics
- Lots and lots of cleanups
Generic:
- Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing
the architecture-specific code
- Some selftests improvements
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"This is a large update by KVM standards, including AMD PSP (Platform
Security Processor, aka "AMD Secure Technology") and ARM CoreSight
(debug and trace) changes.
ARM:
- CoreSight: Add support for ETE and TRBE
- Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected
mode
- Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode
- Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode
- ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1
- nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces
- Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver
- Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler
x86:
- AMD PSP driver changes
- Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code
- AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL
- Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation, zap under
read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under read lock
- /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon)
- support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context
- support SGX in virtual machines
- add a few more statistics
- improved directed yield heuristics
- Lots and lots of cleanups
Generic:
- Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing the
architecture-specific code
- a handful of "Get rid of oprofile leftovers" patches
- Some selftests improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (379 commits)
KVM: selftests: Speed up set_memory_region_test
selftests: kvm: Fix the check of return value
KVM: x86: Take advantage of kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt()
KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables
KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features
KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Disable SEV/SEV-ES if NPT is disabled
KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
KVM: x86: Move reverse CPUID helpers to separate header file
KVM: x86: Rename GPR accessors to make mode-aware variants the defaults
...
Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX,
and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace.
Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g.
without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP
support to userspace.
Clear SEV/SEV-ES if their corresponding module parameters are disabled,
and clear the memory encryption leaf completely if SEV is not fully
supported in KVM. Advertise SME_COHERENT in addition to SEV and SEV-ES,
as the guest can use SME_COHERENT to avoid CLFLUSH operations.
Explicitly omit SME and VM_PAGE_FLUSH from the reporting. These features
are used by KVM, but are not exposed to the guest, e.g. guest access to
related MSRs will fault.
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210422021125.3417167-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Take "enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs" in scattered specific CPUID helpers
(which is obvious in hindsight), and use "unsigned int" for leafs that
can be the kernel's standard "enum cpuid_leaf" or the aforementioned
KVM-only variant. Loss of the enum params is a bit disapponting, but
gcc obviously isn't providing any extra sanity checks, and the various
BUILD_BUG_ON() assertions ensure the input is in range.
This fixes implicit enum conversions that are detected by clang-11:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:499:29: warning: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs' to different enumeration type 'enum cpuid_leafs' [-Wenum-conversion]
kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered(CPUID_12_EAX,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:837:31: warning: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs' to different enumeration type 'enum cpuid_leafs' [-Wenum-conversion]
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~
2 warnings generated.
Fixes: 4e66c0cb79 ("KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features")
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210421010850.3009718-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace
to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a
file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.
The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to
provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent
malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running
inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.
To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an
enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by
default.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <0b099d65e933e068e3ea934b0523bab070cb8cea.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed
to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU
model exposed to the guest. Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an
admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel.
When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX
LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on
the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an
SGX-enabled guest. With the exception of the provision key, all SGX
attribute bits may be exposed to the guest. Guest access to the
provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a
future patch.
Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <a99e9c23310c79f2f4175c1af4c4cbcef913c3e5.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Introduce a scheme that allows KVM's CPUID magic to support features
that are scattered in the kernel's feature words. To advertise and/or
query guest support for CPUID-based features, KVM requires the bit
number of an X86_FEATURE_* to match the bit number in its associated
CPUID entry. For scattered features, this does not hold true.
Add a framework to allow defining KVM-only words, stored in
kvm_cpu_caps after the shared kernel caps, that can be used to gather
the scattered feature bits by translating X86_FEATURE_* flags into their
KVM-defined feature.
Note, because reverse_cpuid_check() effectively forces kvm_cpu_caps
lookups to be resolved at compile time, there is no runtime cost for
translating from kernel-defined to kvm-defined features.
More details here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X/jxCOLG+HUO4QlZ@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <16cad8d00475f67867fb36701fc7fb7c1ec86ce1.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fix ~144 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments.
Doing this in a single commit should reduce the churn.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Advertise INVPCID by default (if supported by the host kernel) instead
of having both SVM and VMX opt in. INVPCID was opt in when it was a
VMX only feature so that KVM wouldn't prematurely advertise support
if/when it showed up in the kernel on AMD hardware.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210212003411.1102677-3-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Hyper-V emulation is enabled in KVM unconditionally. This is bad at least
from security standpoint as it is an extra attack surface. Ideally, there
should be a per-VM capability explicitly enabled by VMM but currently it
is not the case and we can't mandate one without breaking backwards
compatibility. We can, however, check guest visible CPUIDs and only enable
Hyper-V emulation when "Hv#1" interface was exposed in
HYPERV_CPUID_INTERFACE.
Note, VMMs are free to act in any sequence they like, e.g. they can try
to set MSRs first and CPUIDs later so we still need to allow the host
to read/write Hyper-V specific MSRs unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210126134816.1880136-14-vkuznets@redhat.com>
[Add selftest vcpu_set_hv_cpuid API to avoid breaking xen_vmcall_test. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a helper to generate the mask of reserved GPA bits _without_ any
adjustments for repurposed bits, and use it to replace a variety of
open coded variants in the MTRR and APIC_BASE flows.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-11-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use reserved_gpa_bits, which accounts for exceptions to the maxphyaddr
rule, e.g. SEV's C-bit, for the page {table,directory,etc...} entry (PxE)
reserved bits checks. For SEV, the C-bit is ignored by hardware when
walking pages tables, e.g. the APM states:
Note that while the guest may choose to set the C-bit explicitly on
instruction pages and page table addresses, the value of this bit is a
don't-care in such situations as hardware always performs these as
private accesses.
Such behavior is expected to hold true for other features that repurpose
GPA bits, e.g. KVM could theoretically emulate SME or MKTME, which both
allow non-zero repurposed bits in the page tables. Conceptually, KVM
should apply reserved GPA checks universally, and any features that do
not adhere to the basic rule should be explicitly handled, i.e. if a GPA
bit is repurposed but not allowed in page tables for whatever reason.
Refactor __reset_rsvds_bits_mask() to take the pre-generated reserved
bits mask, and opportunistically clean up its code, e.g. to align lines
and comments.
Practically speaking, this is change is a likely a glorified nop given
the current KVM code base. SEV's C-bit is the only repurposed GPA bit,
and KVM doesn't support shadowing encrypted page tables (which is
theoretically possible via SEV debug APIs).
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Rename cr3_lm_rsvd_bits to reserved_gpa_bits, and use it for all GPA
legality checks. AMD's APM states:
If the C-bit is an address bit, this bit is masked from the guest
physical address when it is translated through the nested page tables.
Thus, any access that can conceivably be run through NPT should ignore
the C-bit when checking for validity.
For features that KVM emulates in software, e.g. MTRRs, there is no
clear direction in the APM for how the C-bit should be handled. For
such cases, follow the SME behavior inasmuch as possible, since SEV is
is essentially a VM-specific variant of SME. For SME, the APM states:
In this case the upper physical address bits are treated as reserved
when the feature is enabled except where otherwise indicated.
Collecting the various relavant SME snippets in the APM and cross-
referencing the omissions with Linux kernel code, this leaves MTTRs and
APIC_BASE as the only flows that KVM emulates that should _not_ ignore
the C-bit.
Note, this means the reserved bit checks in the page tables are
technically broken. This will be remedied in a future patch.
Although the page table checks are technically broken, in practice, it's
all but guaranteed to be irrelevant. NPT is required for SEV, i.e.
shadowing page tables isn't needed in the common case. Theoretically,
the checks could be in play for nested NPT, but it's extremely unlikely
that anyone is running nested VMs on SEV, as doing so would require L1
to expose sensitive data to L0, e.g. the entire VMCB. And if anyone is
running nested VMs, L0 can't read the guest's encrypted memory, i.e. L1
would need to put its NPT in shared memory, in which case the C-bit will
never be set. Or, L1 could use shadow paging, but again, if L0 needs to
read page tables, e.g. to load PDPTRs, the memory can't be encrypted if
L1 has any expectation of L0 doing the right thing.
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Convert kvm_x86_ops to use static calls. Note that all kvm_x86_ops are
covered here except for 'pmu_ops and 'nested ops'.
Here are some numbers running cpuid in a loop of 1 million calls averaged
over 5 runs, measured in the vm (lower is better).
Intel Xeon 3000MHz:
|default |mitigations=off
-------------------------------------
vanilla |.671s |.486s
static call|.573s(-15%)|.458s(-6%)
AMD EPYC 2500MHz:
|default |mitigations=off
-------------------------------------
vanilla |.710s |.609s
static call|.664s(-6%) |.609s(0%)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Message-Id: <e057bf1b8a7ad15652df6eeba3f907ae758d3399.1610680941.git.jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Expose AVX (VEX-encoded) versions of the Vector Neural Network
Instructions to guest.
The bit definition:
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 4] AVX_VNNI
The following instructions are available when this feature is
present in the guest.
1. VPDPBUS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes
2. VPDPBUSDS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes with Saturation
3. VPDPWSSD: Multiply and Add Signed Word Integers
4. VPDPWSSDS: Multiply and Add Signed Integers with Saturation
This instruction is currently documented in the latest "extensions"
manual (ISE). It will appear in the "main" manual (SDM) in the future.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210105004909.42000-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Recent commit 255cbecfe0 modified struct kvm_vcpu_arch to make
'cpuid_entries' a pointer to an array of kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries
rather than embedding the array in the struct. KVM_SET_CPUID and
KVM_SET_CPUID2 were updated accordingly, but KVM_GET_CPUID2 was missed.
As a result, KVM_GET_CPUID2 currently returns random fields from struct
kvm_vcpu_arch to userspace rather than the expected CPUID values. Fix
this by treating 'cpuid_entries' as a pointer when copying its
contents to userspace buffer.
Fixes: 255cbecfe0 ("KVM: x86: allocate vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries dynamically")
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com.com>
Message-Id: <20210128024451.1816770-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
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Merge tag 'kvmarm-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 updates for Linux 5.11
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
AVX512_FP16 is supported by Intel processors, like Sapphire Rapids.
It could gain better performance for it's faster compared to FP32
if the precision or magnitude requirements are met. It's availability
is indicated by CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 23].
Expose it in KVM supported CPUID, then guest could make use of it; no
new registers are used, only new instructions.
Signed-off-by: Cathy Zhang <cathy.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyung Min Park <kyung.min.park@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201208033441.28207-3-kyung.min.park@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
without two-dimensional paging (EPT/NPT).
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"Fixes for ARM and x86, the latter especially for old processors
without two-dimensional paging (EPT/NPT)"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
kvm: mmu: fix is_tdp_mmu_check when the TDP MMU is not in use
KVM: SVM: Update cr3_lm_rsvd_bits for AMD SEV guests
KVM: x86: Introduce cr3_lm_rsvd_bits in kvm_vcpu_arch
KVM: x86: clflushopt should be treated as a no-op by emulation
KVM: arm64: Handle SCXTNUM_ELx traps
KVM: arm64: Unify trap handlers injecting an UNDEF
KVM: arm64: Allow setting of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2 from userspace
- A set of commits which reduce the stack usage of various perf event
handling functions which allocated large data structs on stack causing
stack overflows in the worst case.
- Use the proper mechanism for detecting soft interrupts in the recursion
protection.
- Make the resursion protection simpler and more robust.
- Simplify the scheduling of event groups to make the code more robust and
prepare for fixing the issues vs. scheduling of exclusive event groups.
- Prevent event multiplexing and rotation for exclusive event groups
- Correct the perf event attribute exclusive semantics to take pinned
events, e.g. the PMU watchdog, into account
- Make the anythread filtering conditional for Intel's generic PMU
counters as it is not longer guaranteed to be supported on newer
CPUs. Check the corresponding CPUID leaf to make sure.
- Fixup a duplicate initialization in an array which was probably cause by
the usual copy & paste - forgot to edit mishap.
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Merge tag 'perf-urgent-2020-11-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of fixes for perf:
- A set of commits which reduce the stack usage of various perf
event handling functions which allocated large data structs on
stack causing stack overflows in the worst case
- Use the proper mechanism for detecting soft interrupts in the
recursion protection
- Make the resursion protection simpler and more robust
- Simplify the scheduling of event groups to make the code more
robust and prepare for fixing the issues vs. scheduling of
exclusive event groups
- Prevent event multiplexing and rotation for exclusive event groups
- Correct the perf event attribute exclusive semantics to take
pinned events, e.g. the PMU watchdog, into account
- Make the anythread filtering conditional for Intel's generic PMU
counters as it is not longer guaranteed to be supported on newer
CPUs. Check the corresponding CPUID leaf to make sure
- Fixup a duplicate initialization in an array which was probably
caused by the usual 'copy & paste - forgot to edit' mishap"
* tag 'perf-urgent-2020-11-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix Add BW copypasta
perf/x86/intel: Make anythread filter support conditional
perf: Tweak perf_event_attr::exclusive semantics
perf: Fix event multiplexing for exclusive groups
perf: Simplify group_sched_in()
perf: Simplify group_sched_out()
perf/x86: Make dummy_iregs static
perf/arch: Remove perf_sample_data::regs_user_copy
perf: Optimize get_recursion_context()
perf: Fix get_recursion_context()
perf/x86: Reduce stack usage for x86_pmu::drain_pebs()
perf: Reduce stack usage of perf_output_begin()
On emulated VM-entry and VM-exit, update the CPUID bits that reflect
CR4.OSXSAVE and CR4.PKE.
This fixes a bug where the CPUID bits could continue to reflect L2 CR4
values after emulated VM-exit to L1. It also fixes a related bug where
the CPUID bits could continue to reflect L1 CR4 values after emulated
VM-entry to L2. The latter bug is mainly relevant to SVM, wherein
CPUID is not a required intercept. However, it could also be relevant
to VMX, because the code to conditionally update these CPUID bits
assumes that the guest CPUID and the guest CR4 are always in sync.
Fixes: 8eb3f87d90 ("KVM: nVMX: fix guest CR4 loading when emulating L2 to L1 exit")
Fixes: 2acf923e38 ("KVM: VMX: Enable XSAVE/XRSTOR for guest")
Fixes: b9baba8614 ("KVM, pkeys: expose CPUID/CR4 to guest")
Reported-by: Abhiroop Dabral <adabral@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Cc: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@intel.com>
Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201029170648.483210-1-jmattson@google.com>
SEV guests fail to boot on a system that supports the PCID feature.
While emulating the RSM instruction, KVM reads the guest CR3
and calls kvm_set_cr3(). If the vCPU is in the long mode,
kvm_set_cr3() does a sanity check for the CR3 value. In this case,
it validates whether the value has any reserved bits set. The
reserved bit range is 63:cpuid_maxphysaddr(). When AMD memory
encryption is enabled, the memory encryption bit is set in the CR3
value. The memory encryption bit may fall within the KVM reserved
bit range, causing the KVM emulation failure.
Introduce a new field cr3_lm_rsvd_bits in kvm_vcpu_arch which will
cache the reserved bits in the CR3 value. This will be initialized
to rsvd_bits(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), 63).
If the architecture has any special bits(like AMD SEV encryption bit)
that needs to be masked from the reserved bits, should be cleared
in vendor specific kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_after_set_cpuid handler.
Fixes: a780a3ea62 ("KVM: X86: Fix reserved bits check for MOV to CR3")
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <160521947657.32054.3264016688005356563.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Starting with Arch Perfmon v5, the anythread filter on generic counters may be
deprecated. The current kernel was exporting the any filter without checking.
On Icelake, it means you could do cpu/event=0x3c,any/ even though the filter
does not exist. This patch corrects the problem by relying on the CPUID 0xa leaf
function to determine if anythread is supported or not as described in the
Intel SDM Vol3b 18.2.5.1 AnyThread Deprecation section.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201028194247.3160610-1-eranian@google.com
Make the paravirtual cpuid enforcement mechanism idempotent to ioctl()
ordering by updating pv_cpuid.features whenever userspace requests the
capability. Extract this update out of kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() into a
new helper function and move its other call site into
kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() where it more likely belongs.
Fixes: 66570e966d ("kvm: x86: only provide PV features if enabled in guest's CPUID")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201027231044.655110-5-oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
