When a drive is marked write-mostly it should only be the
target of reads if there is no other option.
This behaviour was broken by
commit 9dedf60313
md/raid1: read balance chooses idlest disk for SSD
which causes a write-mostly device to be *preferred* is some cases.
Restore correct behaviour by checking and setting
best_dist_disk and best_pending_disk rather than best_disk.
We only need to test one of these as they are both changed
from -1 or >=0 at the same time.
As we leave min_pending and best_dist unchanged, any non-write-mostly
device will appear better than the write-mostly device.
Reported-by: Tomáš Hodek <tomas.hodek@volny.cz>
Reported-by: Dark Penguin <darkpenguin@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-raid&m=135982797322422
Fixes: 9dedf60313
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.6+)
Algorithm:
1. Node 1 issues mdadm --manage /dev/mdX --add /dev/sdYY which issues
ioctl(ADD_NEW_DISC with disc.state set to MD_DISK_CLUSTER_ADD)
2. Node 1 sends NEWDISK with uuid and slot number
3. Other nodes issue kobject_uevent_env with uuid and slot number
(Steps 4,5 could be a udev rule)
4. In userspace, the node searches for the disk, perhaps
using blkid -t SUB_UUID=""
5. Other nodes issue either of the following depending on whether the disk
was found:
ioctl(ADD_NEW_DISK with disc.state set to MD_DISK_CANDIDATE and
disc.number set to slot number)
ioctl(CLUSTERED_DISK_NACK)
6. Other nodes drop lock on no-new-devs (CR) if device is found
7. Node 1 attempts EX lock on no-new-devs
8. If node 1 gets the lock, it sends METADATA_UPDATED after unmarking the disk
as SpareLocal
9. If not (get no-new-dev lock), it fails the operation and sends METADATA_UPDATED
10. Other nodes understand if the device is added or not by reading the superblock again after receiving the METADATA_UPDATED message.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Zhong <lzhong@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
set choose_first true for cluster read in read balance when the area
is resyncing.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Zhong <lzhong@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
If there is a resync going on, all nodes must suspend writes to the
range. This is recorded in the suspend_info/suspend_list.
If there is an I/O within the ranges of any of the suspend_info,
should_suspend will return 1.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
This modifies raid1's narrow_write_error to round up block_sectors to the
device's logical block size.
This prevents sd complaining about "Bad block number requested" for non-512-byte
sector disks.
Signed-off-by: Nate Dailey <nate.dailey@stratus.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Now that the ->stop function only frees the private data,
rename is accordingly.
Also pass in the private pointer as an arg rather than using
mddev->private. This flexibility will be useful in level_store().
Finally, don't clear ->private. It doesn't make sense to clear
it seeing that isn't what we free, and it is no longer necessary
to clear ->private (it was some time ago before ->to_remove was
introduced).
Setting ->to_remove in ->free() is a bit of a wart, but not a
big problem at the moment.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Each md personality has a 'stop' operation which does two
things:
1/ it finalizes some aspects of the array to ensure nothing
is accessing the ->private data
2/ it frees the ->private data.
All the steps in '1' can apply to all arrays and so can be
performed in common code.
This is useful as in the case where we change the personality which
manages an array (in level_store()), it would be helpful to do
step 1 early, and step 2 later.
So split the 'step 1' functionality out into a new mddev_detach().
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
There is no locking around calls to merge_bvec_fn(), so
it is possible that calls which coincide with a level (or personality)
change could go wrong.
So create a central dispatch point for these functions and use
rcu_read_lock().
If the array is suspended, reject any merge that can be rejected.
If not, we know it is safe to call the function.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
There is currently no locking around calls to the 'congested'
bdi function. If called at an awkward time while an array is
being converted from one level (or personality) to another, there
is a tiny chance of running code in an unreferenced module etc.
So add a 'congested' function to the md_personality operations
structure, and call it with appropriate locking from a central
'mddev_congested'.
When the array personality is changing the array will be 'suspended'
so no IO is processed.
If mddev_congested detects this, it simply reports that the
array is congested, which is a safe guess.
As mddev_suspend calls synchronize_rcu(), mddev_congested can
avoid races by included the whole call inside an rcu_read_lock()
region.
This require that the congested functions for all subordinate devices
can be run under rcu_lock. Fortunately this is the case.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.
If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices. So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.
It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices. So fix it.
This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered. It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.
Fixes: da8840a747
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.5+)
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Both normal IO and resync IO can be retried with reschedule_retry()
and so be counted into ->nr_queued, but only normal IO gets counted in
->nr_pending.
Before the recent improvement to RAID1 resync there could only
possibly have been one or the other on the queue. When handling a
read failure it could only be normal IO. So when handle_read_error()
called freeze_array() the fact that freeze_array only compares
->nr_queued against ->nr_pending was safe.
But now that these two types can interleave, we can have both normal
and resync IO requests queued, so we need to count them both in
nr_pending.
This error can lead to freeze_array() hanging if there is a read
error, so it is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
raise_barrier() uses next_resync as part of its calculations, so it
really should be updated first, instead of afterwards.
next_resync is always used under resync_lock so update it under
resync lock to, just before it is used. That is safest.
This could cause normal IO and resync IO to interact badly so
it suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
next_resync is (approximately) the location for the next resync request.
However it does *not* reliably determine the earliest location
at which resync might be happening.
This is because resync requests can complete out of order, and
we only limit the number of current requests, not the distance
from the earliest pending request to the latest.
mddev->curr_resync_completed is a reliable indicator of the earliest
position at which resync could be happening. It is updated less
frequently, but is actually reliable which is more important.
So use it to determine if a write request is before the region
being resynced and so safe from conflict.
This error can allow resync IO to interfere with normal IO which
could lead to data corruption. Hence: stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
The resync/recovery process for raid1 was recently changed
so that writes could happen in parallel with resync providing
they were in different regions of the device.
There is a problem though: While a write request will always
wait for conflicting resync to complete, a resync request
will *not* always wait for conflicting writes to complete.
Two changes are needed to fix this:
1/ raise_barrier (which waits until it is safe to do resync)
must wait until current_window_requests is zero
2/ wait_battier (which waits at the start of a new write request)
must update current_window_requests if the request could
possible conflict with a concurrent resync.
As concurrent writes and resync can lead to data loss,
this patch is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Cc: majianpeng <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
If there are outstanding writes when close_sync is called,
the change to ->start_next_window might cause them to
decrement the wrong counter when they complete. Fix this
by merging the two counters into the one that will be decremented.
Having an incorrect value in a counter can cause raise_barrier()
to hangs, so this is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
commit 79ef3a8aa1 made
it possible for reads to happen concurrently with resync.
This means that we need to be more careful where read_balancing
is allowed during resync - we can no longer be sure that any
resync that has already started will definitely finish.
So keep read_balancing to before recovery_cp, which is conservative
but safe.
This bug makes it possible to read from a device that doesn't
have up-to-date data, so it can cause data corruption.
So it is suitable for any kernel since 3.11.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
r1_bio->start_next_window is not initialised in the READ
case, so allow_barrier may incorrectly decrement
conf->current_window_requests
which can cause raise_barrier() to block forever.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error
to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to
recovery IO).
This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the
recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent
sectors (as it never writes to failed devices). In this case
the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't.
The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added
(after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure),
the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of,
so some of the device will not be recovered properly.
If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled
(bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried.
As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for
-stable. For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c
which will require care.
Original-from: jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn>
Reported-and-tested-by: jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When performing a user-request check/repair (MD_RECOVERY_REQUEST is set)
on a raid1, we allocate multiple bios each with their own set of pages.
If the page allocations for one bio fails, we currently do *not* free
the pages allocated for the previous bios, nor do we free the bio itself.
This patch frees all the already-allocate pages, and makes sure that
all the bios are freed as well.
This bug can cause a memory leak which can ultimately OOM a machine.
It was introduced in 3.10-rc1.
Fixes: a07876064a
Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.10+)
Reported-by: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
commit 30bc9b5387
md/raid1: fix bio handling problems in process_checks()
Move the bio_reset() to a point before where BIO_UPTODATE is checked,
so that check now always report that the bio is uptodate, even if it is not.
This causes process_check() to sometimes treat read-errors as
successful matches so the good data isn't written out.
This patch preserves the flag until it is needed.
Bug was introduced in 3.11, but backported to 3.10-stable (as it fixed
an even worse bug). So suitable for any -stable since 3.10.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.10+)
Fixed: 30bc9b5387
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Pull core block IO changes from Jens Axboe:
"The major piece in here is the immutable bio_ve series from Kent, the
rest is fairly minor. It was supposed to go in last round, but
various issues pushed it to this release instead. The pull request
contains:
- Various smaller blk-mq fixes from different folks. Nothing major
here, just minor fixes and cleanups.
- Fix for a memory leak in the error path in the block ioctl code
from Christian Engelmayer.
- Header export fix from CaiZhiyong.
- Finally the immutable biovec changes from Kent Overstreet. This
enables some nice future work on making arbitrarily sized bios
possible, and splitting more efficient. Related fixes to immutable
bio_vecs:
- dm-cache immutable fixup from Mike Snitzer.
- btrfs immutable fixup from Muthu Kumar.
- bio-integrity fix from Nic Bellinger, which is also going to stable"
* 'for-3.14/core' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (44 commits)
xtensa: fixup simdisk driver to work with immutable bio_vecs
block/blk-mq-cpu.c: use hotcpu_notifier()
blk-mq: for_each_* macro correctness
block: Fix memory leak in rw_copy_check_uvector() handling
bio-integrity: Fix bio_integrity_verify segment start bug
block: remove unrelated header files and export symbol
blk-mq: uses page->list incorrectly
blk-mq: use __smp_call_function_single directly
btrfs: fix missing increment of bi_remaining
Revert "block: Warn and free bio if bi_end_io is not set"
block: Warn and free bio if bi_end_io is not set
blk-mq: fix initializing request's start time
block: blk-mq: don't export blk_mq_free_queue()
block: blk-mq: make blk_sync_queue support mq
block: blk-mq: support draining mq queue
dm cache: increment bi_remaining when bi_end_io is restored
block: fixup for generic bio chaining
block: Really silence spurious compiler warnings
block: Silence spurious compiler warnings
block: Kill bio_pair_split()
...
The new iobarrier implementation in raid1 (which keeps normal writes
and resync activity separate) counts every request what is not before
the current resync point in either next_window_requests or
current_window_requests.
It flags that the request is counted by setting ->start_next_window.
allow_barrier follows this model exactly and decrements one of the
*_window_requests if and only if ->start_next_window is set.
However wait_barrier(), which increments *_window_requests uses a
slightly different test for setting -.start_next_window (which is set
from the return value of this function).
So there is a possibility of the counts getting out of sync, and this
leads to the resync hanging.
So change wait_barrier() to return a non-zero value in exactly the
same cases that it increments *_window_requests.
But was introduced in 3.13-rc1.
Reported-by: Bruno Wolff III <bruno@wolff.to>
URL: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68061
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Cc: majianpeng <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Mostly optimisations and obscure bug fixes.
- raid5 gets less lock contention
- raid1 gets less contention between normal-io and resync-io
during resync.
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Merge tag 'md/3.13' of git://neil.brown.name/md
Pull md update from Neil Brown:
"Mostly optimisations and obscure bug fixes.
- raid5 gets less lock contention
- raid1 gets less contention between normal-io and resync-io during
resync"
* tag 'md/3.13' of git://neil.brown.name/md:
md/raid5: Use conf->device_lock protect changing of multi-thread resources.
md/raid5: Before freeing old multi-thread worker, it should flush them.
md/raid5: For stripe with R5_ReadNoMerge, we replace REQ_FLUSH with REQ_NOMERGE.
UAPI: include <asm/byteorder.h> in linux/raid/md_p.h
raid1: Rewrite the implementation of iobarrier.
raid1: Add some macros to make code clearly.
raid1: Replace raise_barrier/lower_barrier with freeze_array/unfreeze_array when reconfiguring the array.
raid1: Add a field array_frozen to indicate whether raid in freeze state.
md: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
md/raid5: avoid deadlock when raid5 array has unack badblocks during md_stop_writes.
md: use MD_RECOVERY_INTR instead of kthread_should_stop in resync thread.
md: fix some places where mddev_lock return value is not checked.
raid5: Retry R5_ReadNoMerge flag when hit a read error.
raid5: relieve lock contention in get_active_stripe()
raid5: relieve lock contention in get_active_stripe()
wait: add wait_event_cmd()
md/raid5.c: add proper locking to error path of raid5_start_reshape.
md: fix calculation of stacking limits on level change.
raid5: Use slow_path to release stripe when mddev->thread is null
There is an iobarrier in raid1 because of contention between normal IO and
resync IO. It suspends all normal IO when resync/recovery happens.
However if normal IO is out side the resync window, there is no contention.
So this patch changes the barrier mechanism to only block IO that
could contend with the resync that is currently happening.
We partition the whole space into five parts.
|---------|-----------|------------|----------------|-------|
start next_resync start_next_window end_window
start + RESYNC_WINDOW = next_resync
next_resync + NEXT_NORMALIO_DISTANCE = start_next_window
start_next_window + NEXT_NORMALIO_DISTANCE = end_window
Firstly we introduce some concepts:
1 - RESYNC_WINDOW: For resync, there are 32 resync requests at most at the
same time. A sync request is RESYNC_BLOCK_SIZE(64*1024).
So the RESYNC_WINDOW is 32 * RESYNC_BLOCK_SIZE, that is 2MB.
2 - NEXT_NORMALIO_DISTANCE: the distance between next_resync
and start_next_window. It also indicates the distance between
start_next_window and end_window.
It is currently 3 * RESYNC_WINDOW_SIZE but could be tuned if
this turned out not to be optimal.
3 - next_resync: the next sector at which we will do sync IO.
4 - start: a position which is at most RESYNC_WINDOW before
next_resync.
5 - start_next_window: a position which is NEXT_NORMALIO_DISTANCE
beyond next_resync. Normal-io after this position doesn't need to
wait for resync-io to complete.
6 - end_window: a position which is 2 * NEXT_NORMALIO_DISTANCE beyond
next_resync. This also doesn't need to wait, but is counted
differently.
7 - current_window_requests: the count of normalIO between
start_next_window and end_window.
8 - next_window_requests: the count of normalIO after end_window.
NormalIO will be partitioned into four types:
NormIO1: the end sector of bio is smaller or equal the start
NormIO2: the start sector of bio larger or equal to end_window
NormIO3: the start sector of bio larger or equal to
start_next_window.
NormIO4: the location between start_next_window and end_window
|--------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|
| start | next_resync | start_next_window | end_window |
NormIO1 NormIO4 NormIO4 NormIO3 NormIO2
For NormIO1, we don't need any io barrier.
For NormIO4, we used a similar approach to the original iobarrier
mechanism. The normalIO and resyncIO must be kept separate.
For NormIO2/3, we add two fields to struct r1conf: "current_window_requests"
and "next_window_requests". They indicate the count of active
requests in the two window.
For these, we don't wait for resync io to complete.
For resync action, if there are NormIO4s, we must wait for it.
If not, we can proceed.
But if resync action reaches start_next_window and
current_window_requests > 0 (that is there are NormIO3s), we must
wait until the current_window_requests becomes zero.
When current_window_requests becomes zero, start_next_window also
moves forward. Then current_window_requests will replaced by
next_window_requests.
There is a problem which when and how to change from NormIO2 to
NormIO3. Only then can sync action progress.
We add a field in struct r1conf "start_next_window".
A: if start_next_window == MaxSector, it means there are no NormIO2/3.
So start_next_window = next_resync + NEXT_NORMALIO_DISTANCE
B: if current_window_requests == 0 && next_window_requests != 0, it
means start_next_window move to end_window
There is another problem which how to differentiate between
old NormIO2(now it is NormIO3) and NormIO2.
For example, there are many bios which are NormIO2 and a bio which is
NormIO3. NormIO3 firstly completed, so the bios of NormIO2 became NormIO3.
We add a field in struct r1bio "start_next_window".
This is used to record the position conf->start_next_window when the call
to wait_barrier() is made in make_request().
In allow_barrier(), we check the conf->start_next_window.
If r1bio->stat_next_window == conf->start_next_window, it means
there is no transition between NormIO2 and NormIO3.
If r1bio->start_next_window != conf->start_next_window, it mean
there was a transition between NormIO2 and NormIO3. There can only
have been one transition. So it only means the bio is old NormIO2.
For one bio, there may be many r1bio's. So we make sure
all the r1bio->start_next_window are the same value.
If we met blocked_dev in make_request(), it must call allow_barrier
and wait_barrier. So the former and the later value of
conf->start_next_window will be change.
If there are many r1bio's with differnet start_next_window,
for the relevant bio, it depend on the last value of r1bio.
It will cause error. To avoid this, we must wait for previous r1bios
to complete.
Signed-off-by: Jianpeng Ma <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
In a subsequent patch, we'll use some const parameters.
Using macros will make the code clearly.
Signed-off-by: Jianpeng Ma <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
We used to use raise_barrier to suspend normal IO while we reconfigure
the array. However raise_barrier will soon only suspend some normal
IO, not all. So we need something else.
Change it to use freeze_array.
But freeze_array not only suspends normal io, it also suspends
resync io.
For the place where call raise_barrier for reconfigure, it isn't a
problem.
Signed-off-by: Jianpeng Ma <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Because the following patch will rewrite the content between normal IO
and resync IO. So we used a parameter to indicate whether raid is in freeze
array.
Signed-off-by: Jianpeng Ma <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Someone cut and pasted md's md_trim_bio() into xen-blkfront.c. Come on,
we should know better than this.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Since:
commit 7ceb17e87b
md: Allow devices to be re-added to a read-only array.
spares are activated on a read-only array. In case of raid1 and raid10
personalities it causes that not-in-sync devices are marked in-sync
without checking if recovery has been finished.
If a read-only array is degraded and one of its devices is not in-sync
(because the array has been only partially recovered) recovery will be skipped.
This patch adds checking if recovery has been finished before marking a device
in-sync for raid1 and raid10 personalities. In case of raid5 personality
such condition is already present (at raid5.c:6029).
Bug was introduced in 3.10 and causes data corruption.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pawel Baldysiak <pawel.baldysiak@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Dorau <lukasz.dorau@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Recent change to use bio_copy_data() in raid1 when repairing
an array is faulty.
The underlying may have changed the bio in various ways using
bio_advance and these need to be undone not just for the 'sbio' which
is being copied to, but also the 'pbio' (primary) which is being
copied from.
So perform the reset on all bios that were read from and do it early.
This also ensure that the sbio->bi_io_vec[j].bv_len passed to
memcmp is correct.
This fixes a crash during a 'check' of a RAID1 array. The crash was
introduced in 3.10 so this is suitable for 3.10-stable.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.10)
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@stratus.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
DM RAID: Add ability to restore transiently failed devices on resume
This patch adds code to the resume function to check over the devices
in the RAID array. If any are found to be marked as failed and their
superblocks can be read, an attempt is made to reintegrate them into
the array. This allows the user to refresh the array with a simple
suspend and resume of the array - rather than having to load a
completely new table, allocate and initialize all the structures and
throw away the old instantiation.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Brassow <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Some tagged for -stable.
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Merge tag 'md-3.10-fixes' of git://neil.brown.name/md
Pull md bugfixes from Neil Brown:
"A few bugfixes for md
Some tagged for -stable"
* tag 'md-3.10-fixes' of git://neil.brown.name/md:
md/raid1,5,10: Disable WRITE SAME until a recovery strategy is in place
md/raid1,raid10: use freeze_array in place of raise_barrier in various places.
md/raid1: consider WRITE as successful only if at least one non-Faulty and non-rebuilding drive completed it.
md: md_stop_writes() should always freeze recovery.
There are cases where the kernel will believe that the WRITE SAME
command is supported by a block device which does not, in fact,
support WRITE SAME. This currently happens for SATA drivers behind a
SAS controller, but there are probably a hundred other ways that can
happen, including drive firmware bugs.
After receiving an error for WRITE SAME the block layer will retry the
request as a plain write of zeroes, but mdraid will consider the
failure as fatal and consider the drive failed. This has the effect
that all the mirrors containing a specific set of data are each
offlined in very rapid succession resulting in data loss.
However, just bouncing the request back up to the block layer isn't
ideal either, because the whole initial request-retry sequence should
be inside the write bitmap fence, which probably means that md needs
to do its own conversion of WRITE SAME to write zero.
Until the failure scenario has been sorted out, disable WRITE SAME for
raid1, raid5, and raid10.
[neilb: added raid5]
This patch is appropriate for any -stable since 3.7 when write_same
support was added.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Various places in raid1 and raid10 are calling raise_barrier when they
really should call freeze_array.
The former is only intended to be called from "make_request".
The later has extra checks for 'nr_queued' and makes a call to
flush_pending_writes(), so it is safe to call it from within the
management thread.
Using raise_barrier will sometimes deadlock. Using freeze_array
should not.
As 'freeze_array' currently expects one request to be pending (in
handle_read_error - the only previous caller), we need to pass
it the number of pending requests (extra) to ignore.
The deadlock was made particularly noticeable by commits
050b66152f (raid10) and 6b740b8d79 (raid1) which
appeared in 3.4, so the fix is appropriate for any -stable
kernel since then.
This patch probably won't apply directly to some early kernels and
will need to be applied by hand.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Without that fix, the following scenario could happen:
- RAID1 with drives A and B; drive B was freshly-added and is rebuilding
- Drive A fails
- WRITE request arrives to the array. It is failed by drive A, so
r1_bio is marked as R1BIO_WriteError, but the rebuilding drive B
succeeds in writing it, so the same r1_bio is marked as
R1BIO_Uptodate.
- r1_bio arrives to handle_write_finished, badblocks are disabled,
md_error()->error() does nothing because we don't fail the last drive
of raid1
- raid_end_bio_io() calls call_bio_endio()
- As a result, in call_bio_endio():
if (!test_bit(R1BIO_Uptodate, &r1_bio->state))
clear_bit(BIO_UPTODATE, &bio->bi_flags);
this code doesn't clear the BIO_UPTODATE flag, and the whole master
WRITE succeeds, back to the upper layer.
So we returned success to the upper layer, even though we had written
the data onto the rebuilding drive only. But when we want to read the
data back, we would not read from the rebuilding drive, so this data
is lost.
[neilb - applied identical change to raid10 as well]
This bug can result in lost data, so it is suitable for any
-stable kernel.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex@zadarastorage.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Pull block core updates from Jens Axboe:
- Major bit is Kents prep work for immutable bio vecs.
- Stable candidate fix for a scheduling-while-atomic in the queue
bypass operation.
- Fix for the hang on exceeded rq->datalen 32-bit unsigned when merging
discard bios.
- Tejuns changes to convert the writeback thread pool to the generic
workqueue mechanism.
- Runtime PM framework, SCSI patches exists on top of these in James'
tree.
- A few random fixes.
* 'for-3.10/core' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (40 commits)
relay: move remove_buf_file inside relay_close_buf
partitions/efi.c: replace useless kzalloc's by kmalloc's
fs/block_dev.c: fix iov_shorten() criteria in blkdev_aio_read()
block: fix max discard sectors limit
blkcg: fix "scheduling while atomic" in blk_queue_bypass_start
Documentation: cfq-iosched: update documentation help for cfq tunables
writeback: expose the bdi_wq workqueue
writeback: replace custom worker pool implementation with unbound workqueue
writeback: remove unused bdi_pending_list
aoe: Fix unitialized var usage
bio-integrity: Add explicit field for owner of bip_buf
block: Add an explicit bio flag for bios that own their bvec
block: Add bio_alloc_pages()
block: Convert some code to bio_for_each_segment_all()
block: Add bio_for_each_segment_all()
bounce: Refactor __blk_queue_bounce to not use bi_io_vec
raid1: use bio_copy_data()
pktcdvd: Use bio_reset() in disabled code to kill bi_idx usage
pktcdvd: use bio_copy_data()
block: Add bio_copy_data()
...
In SSD/hard disk hybid storage, discard request should be ignored for hard
disk. We used to be doing this way, but the unplug path forgets it.
This is suitable for stable tree since v3.6.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: Markus <M4rkusXXL@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Hi.
Raid1 and raid10 devices leak memory every time they stop.
This is a patch for linux-3.9.0-rc7 to fix this problem.
Thanks,
Hirokazu Takahashi.
Signed-off-by: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
More prep work for immutable bvecs:
A few places in the code were either open coding or using the wrong
version - fix.
After we introduce the bvec iter, it'll no longer be possible to modify
the biovec through bio_for_each_segment_all() - it doesn't increment a
pointer to the current bvec, you pass in a struct bio_vec (not a
pointer) which is updated with what the current biovec would be (taking
into account bi_bvec_done and bi_size).
So because of that it's more worthwhile to be consistent about
bio_for_each_segment()/bio_for_each_segment_all() usage.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
CC: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CC: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
CC: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
CC: dm-devel@redhat.com
CC: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
__bio_for_each_segment() iterates bvecs from the specified index
instead of bio->bv_idx. Currently, the only usage is to walk all the
bvecs after the bio has been advanced by specifying 0 index.
For immutable bvecs, we need to split these apart;
bio_for_each_segment() is going to have a different implementation.
This will also help document the intent of code that's using it -
bio_for_each_segment_all() is only legal to use for code that owns the
bio.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
CC: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CC: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
CC: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
This doesn't really delete any code _yet_, but once immutable bvecs are
done we can just delete the rest of the code in that loop.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
CC: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CC: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
More bi_idx removal. This code was just open coding bio_clone(). This
could probably be further improved by using bio_advance() instead of
skipping over null pages, but that'd be a larger rework.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
CC: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CC: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
