Pick up the driver cleanups identified in preparation for CXL "type-2"
(accelerator) device support. The major change here from a conflict
generation perspective is the split of 'struct cxl_memdev_state' from
the core 'struct cxl_dev_state'. Since an accelerator may not care about
all the optional features that are standard on a CXL "type-3" (host-only
memory expander) device.
A silent conflict also occurs with the move of the endpoint port to be a
formal property of a 'struct cxl_memdev' rather than drvdata.
Add a read-only sysfs file to display the security state
of a device (currently only pmem):
/sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/state
This introduces a cxl_security_state structure that is
to be the placeholder for common CXL security features.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Fan Ni <fan.ni@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612181038.14421-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
'struct cxl_dev_state' makes too many assumptions about the capabilities
of a CXL device. In particular it assumes a CXL device has a mailbox and
all of the infrastructure and state that comes along with that.
In preparation for supporting accelerator / Type-2 devices that may not
have a mailbox and in general maintain a minimal core context structure,
make mailbox functionality a super-set of 'struct cxl_dev_state' with
'struct cxl_memdev_state'.
With this reorganization it allows for CXL devices that support HDM
decoder mapping, but not other general-expander / Type-3 capabilities,
to only enable that subset without the rest of the mailbox
infrastructure coming along for the ride.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/168679260240.3436160.15520641540463704524.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Internally cxl_mbox_send_cmd() converts all passed-in parameters to a
'struct cxl_mbox_cmd' instance and sends that to cxlds->mbox_send(). It
then teases the possibilty that the caller can validate the output size.
However, they cannot since the resulting output size is not conveyed to
the called. Fix that by making the caller pass in a constructed 'struct
cxl_mbox_cmd'. This prepares for a future patch to add output size
validation on a per-command basis.
Given the change in signature, also change the name to differentiate it
from the user command submission path that performs more validation
before generating the 'struct cxl_mbox_cmd' instance to execute.
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167030055370.4044561.17788093375112783036.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Multi-byte integer values in CXL mailbox payloads are little endian. Add
a definition of the Get Security State output payload and convert the
value before testing flags.
Fixes: 3282811555 ("cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation")
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167030054822.4044561.4917796262037689553.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
A "DPA invalidation event" is any scenario where the contents of a DPA
(Device Physical Address) is modified in a way that is incoherent with
CPU caches, or if the HPA (Host Physical Address) to DPA association
changes due to a remapping event.
PMEM security events like Unlock and Passphrase Secure Erase already
manage caches through LIBNVDIMM, so that leaves HPA to DPA remap events
that need cache management by the CXL core. Those only happen when the
boot time CXL configuration has changed. That event occurs when
userspace attaches an endpoint decoder to a region configuration, and
that region is subsequently activated.
The implications of not invalidating caches between remap events is that
reads from the region at different points in time may return different
results due to stale cached data from the previous HPA to DPA mapping.
Without a guarantee that the region contents after cxl_region_probe()
are written before being read (a layering-violation assumption that
cxl_region_probe() can not make) the CXL subsystem needs to ensure that
reads that precede writes see consistent results.
A CONFIG_CXL_REGION_INVALIDATION_TEST option is added to support debug
and unit testing of the CXL implementation in QEMU or other environments
where cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion() returns false. This may prove
too restrictive for QEMU where the HDM decoders are emulated, but in
that case the CXL subsystem needs some new mechanism / indication that
the HDM decoder is emulated and not a passthrough of real hardware.
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166993222098.1995348.16604163596374520890.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
The original nvdimm_security_ops ->disable() only supports user passphrase
for security disable. The CXL spec introduced the disabling of master
passphrase. Add a ->disable_master() callback to support this new operation
and leaving the old ->disable() mechanism alone. A "disable_master" command
is added for the sysfs attribute in order to allow command to be issued
from userspace. ndctl will need enabling in order to utilize this new
operation.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983616454.2734609.14204031148234398086.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->erase()
callback. Translate the operation to send "Passphrase Secure Erase"
security command for CXL memory device.
When the mem device is secure erased, cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() is
called in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access
the mem device again.
See CXL 3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.6 for reference.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983615293.2734609.10358657600295932156.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->unlock()
callback. Translate the operation to send "Unlock" security command for CXL
mem device.
When the mem device is unlocked, cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() is called
in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access the mem
device.
See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.4 for reference.
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983614167.2734609.15124543712487741176.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->freeze()
callback. Translate the operation to send "Freeze Security State" security
command for CXL memory device.
See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.5 for reference.
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983613019.2734609.10645754779802492122.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops ->disable()
callback. Translate the operation to send "Disable Passphrase" security
command for CXL memory device. The operation supports disabling a
passphrase for the CXL persistent memory device. In the original
implementation of nvdimm_security_ops, this operation only supports
disabling of the user passphrase. This is due to the NFIT version of
disable passphrase only supported disabling of user passphrase. The CXL
spec allows disabling of the master passphrase as well which
nvidmm_security_ops does not support yet. In this commit, the callback
function will only support user passphrase.
See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.3 for reference.
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983611878.2734609.10602135274526390127.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops ->change_key()
callback. Translate the operation to send "Set Passphrase" security command
for CXL memory device. The operation supports setting a passphrase for the
CXL persistent memory device. It also supports the changing of the
currently set passphrase. The operation allows manipulation of a user
passphrase or a master passphrase.
See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.2 for reference.
However, the spec leaves a gap WRT master passphrase usages. The spec does
not define any ways to retrieve the status of if the support of master
passphrase is available for the device, nor does the commands that utilize
master passphrase will return a specific error that indicates master
passphrase is not supported. If using a device does not support master
passphrase and a command is issued with a master passphrase, the error
message returned by the device will be ambiguous.
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983610751.2734609.4445075071552032091.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Add nvdimm_security_ops support for CXL memory device with the introduction
of the ->get_flags() callback function. This is part of the "Persistent
Memory Data-at-rest Security" command set for CXL memory device support.
The ->get_flags() function provides the security state of the persistent
memory device defined by the CXL 3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.1.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983609611.2734609.13231854299523325319.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
