The public builtin keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the
restriction on the IMA/EVM trusted keyrings ensures that a key can be
loaded only if it is signed with a key on the builtin or secondary
keyrings.
However, when evm_load_x509() is called, appraisal is already enabled and
a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification.
Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM trusted keyrings, it
is safe to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch
calls evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is
enabled, which crosses the normal IMA and EVM boundary.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a
key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as
public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.
Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a
possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to
switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should
have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.
More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the
kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a
legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error
when no HMAC key has been loaded.
This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with
a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.
Fixes: 26ddabfe96 ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned
int.
Fixes: f00d797507 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin
keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well.
Also six trivial changes and bug fixes"
* tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments.
ima: Fix function name error in comment.
ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
keys: cleanup build time module signing keys
ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value
ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
- Refactoring powerpc and arm64 kexec DT handling to common code. This
enables IMA on arm64.
- Add kbuild support for applying DT overlays at build time. The first
user are the DT unittests.
- Fix kerneldoc formatting and W=1 warnings in drivers/of/
- Fix handling 64-bit flag on PCI resources
- Bump dtschema version required to v2021.2.1
- Enable undocumented compatible checks for dtbs_check. This allows
tracking of missing binding schemas.
- DT docs improvements. Regroup the DT docs and add the example schema
and DT kernel ABI docs to the doc build.
- Convert Broadcom Bluetooth and video-mux bindings to schema
- Add QCom sm8250 Venus video codec binding schema
- Add vendor prefixes for AESOP, YIC System Co., Ltd, and Siliconfile
Technologies Inc.
- Cleanup of DT schema type references on common properties and
standard unit properties
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Merge tag 'devicetree-for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux
Pull devicetree updates from Rob Herring:
- Refactor powerpc and arm64 kexec DT handling to common code. This
enables IMA on arm64.
- Add kbuild support for applying DT overlays at build time. The first
user are the DT unittests.
- Fix kerneldoc formatting and W=1 warnings in drivers/of/
- Fix handling 64-bit flag on PCI resources
- Bump dtschema version required to v2021.2.1
- Enable undocumented compatible checks for dtbs_check. This allows
tracking of missing binding schemas.
- DT docs improvements. Regroup the DT docs and add the example schema
and DT kernel ABI docs to the doc build.
- Convert Broadcom Bluetooth and video-mux bindings to schema
- Add QCom sm8250 Venus video codec binding schema
- Add vendor prefixes for AESOP, YIC System Co., Ltd, and Siliconfile
Technologies Inc.
- Cleanup of DT schema type references on common properties and
standard unit properties
* tag 'devicetree-for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux: (64 commits)
powerpc: If kexec_build_elf_info() fails return immediately from elf64_load()
powerpc: Free fdt on error in elf64_load()
of: overlay: Fix kerneldoc warning in of_overlay_remove()
of: linux/of.h: fix kernel-doc warnings
of/pci: Add IORESOURCE_MEM_64 to resource flags for 64-bit memory addresses
dt-bindings: bcm4329-fmac: add optional brcm,ccode-map
docs: dt: update writing-schema.rst references
dt-bindings: media: venus: Add sm8250 dt schema
of: base: Fix spelling issue with function param 'prop'
docs: dt: Add DT API documentation
of: Add missing 'Return' section in kerneldoc comments
of: Fix kerneldoc output formatting
docs: dt: Group DT docs into relevant sub-sections
docs: dt: Make 'Devicetree' wording more consistent
docs: dt: writing-schema: Include the example schema in the doc build
docs: dt: writing-schema: Remove spurious indentation
dt-bindings: Fix reference in submitting-patches.rst to the DT ABI doc
dt-bindings: ddr: Add optional manufacturer and revision ID to LPDDR3
dt-bindings: media: video-interfaces: Drop the example
devicetree: bindings: clock: Minor typo fix in the file armada3700-tbg-clock.txt
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities
using IMA.
- A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one
mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the
patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more
flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts.
- Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM
credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy
attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John
is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of
patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This
change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/.
- Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission
list for two SELinux object classes.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions
smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock
nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super()
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: measure state and policy capabilities
selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- crypto_destroy_tfm now ignores errors as well as NULL pointers
Algorithms:
- Add explicit curve IDs in ECDH algorithm names
- Add NIST P384 curve parameters
- Add ECDSA
Drivers:
- Add support for Green Sardine in ccp
- Add ecdh/curve25519 to hisilicon/hpre
- Add support for AM64 in sa2ul"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (184 commits)
fsverity: relax build time dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256
fscrypt: relax Kconfig dependencies for crypto API algorithms
crypto: camellia - drop duplicate "depends on CRYPTO"
crypto: s5p-sss - consistently use local 'dev' variable in probe()
crypto: s5p-sss - remove unneeded local variable initialization
crypto: s5p-sss - simplify getting of_device_id match data
ccp: ccp - add support for Green Sardine
crypto: ccp - Make ccp_dev_suspend and ccp_dev_resume void functions
crypto: octeontx2 - add support for OcteonTX2 98xx CPT block.
crypto: chelsio/chcr - Remove useless MODULE_VERSION
crypto: ux500/cryp - Remove duplicate argument
crypto: chelsio - remove unused function
crypto: sa2ul - Add support for AM64
crypto: sa2ul - Support for per channel coherency
dt-bindings: crypto: ti,sa2ul: Add new compatible for AM64
crypto: hisilicon - enable new error types for QM
crypto: hisilicon - add new error type for SEC
crypto: hisilicon - support new error types for ZIP
crypto: hisilicon - dynamic configuration 'err_info'
crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c
...
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Merge tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull x509 dbx/mokx UEFI support from David Howells:
"Here's a set of patches from Eric Snowberg[1] that add support for
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries in the dbx and mokx UEFI tables (such
entries cause matching certificates to be rejected).
These are currently ignored and only the hash entries are made use of.
Additionally Eric included his patches to allow such certificates to
be preloaded.
These patches deal with CVE-2020-26541.
To quote Eric:
'This is the fifth patch series for adding support for
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries [2]. It has been expanded to not only
include dbx entries but also entries in the mokx. Additionally
my series to preload these certificate [3] has also been
included'"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com [1]
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/patch/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1315485/ [3]
* tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring
certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs
certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function
certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix multiple
warnings by explicitly adding multiple break statements instead of just
letting the code fall through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
init_once is a callback to kmem_cache_create. The parameter
type of this function is void *, so it's better to give a
explicit cast here.
Signed-off-by: Jiele Zhao <unclexiaole@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The original function name was ima_path_check(). The policy parsing
still supports PATH_CHECK. Commit 9bbb6cad01 ("ima: rename
ima_path_check to ima_file_check") renamed the function to
ima_file_check(), but missed modifying the function name in the
comment.
Fixes: 9bbb6cad01 ("ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check").
Signed-off-by: Jiele Zhao <unclexiaole@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kernel currently only loads the kernel module signing key onto the
builtin trusted keyring. Load the module signing key onto the IMA keyring
as well.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Add support for IMA signature verification for EC keys. Since SHA type
of hashes can be used by RSA and ECDSA signature schemes we need to
look at the key and derive from the key which signature scheme to use.
Since this can be applied to all types of keys, we change the selection
of the encoding type to be driven by the key's signature scheme rather
than by the hash type.
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a
buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value.
Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr
value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32
before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value.
Fixes: 47fdee60b4 ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers")
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The functions defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" handle setting up
and freeing the resources required to carry over the IMA measurement
list from the current kernel to the next kernel across kexec system call.
These functions do not have architecture specific code, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
Move remove_ima_buffer() and setup_ima_buffer() calls into
of_kexec_alloc_and_setup_fdt() defined in "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Move the remaining architecture independent functions from
"arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" to "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Delete "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" and "arch/powerpc/include/asm/ima.h".
Remove references to the deleted files and functions in powerpc and
in ima.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-11-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
The fields ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in "struct kimage_arch"
for powerpc are used to carry forward the IMA measurement list across
kexec system call. These fields are not architecture specific, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
arch_ima_add_kexec_buffer() defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c"
sets ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size for the kexec system call.
This function does not have architecture specific code, but is
currently limited to powerpc.
Move ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size to "struct kimage".
Set ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in ima_add_kexec_buffer()
in security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-9-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
The sparse tool complains as follows:
security/integrity/digsig.c:146:12: warning:
symbol 'integrity_add_key' was not declared. Should it be static?
This function is not used outside of digsig.c, so this
commit marks it static.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 60740accf7 ("integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.
Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. In error code paths this memory
is not freed resulting in memory leak.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.
Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().
We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.
Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.
Fixes: 734114f878 ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring
early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy
is loaded.
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document
the new critical data builtin policy.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to
specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data
measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label
in the IMA policy.
Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing
the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can
be used to limit the measurements based on the label.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Integrity critical data may belong to a single subsystem or it may
arise from cross subsystem interaction. Currently there is no mechanism
to group or limit the data based on certain label. Limiting and
grouping critical data based on a label would make it flexible and
configurable to measure.
Define "label:=", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATA to allow grouping and limiting measurement of integrity
critical data.
Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"label:=". If "label:=" is not provided with
the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure all the input integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for
measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer
would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The
policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.)
for integrity critical buffer data measurements.
Add policy rule support for measuring integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA provides capabilities to measure file and buffer data. However,
various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory
also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems
contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help
protect the integrity of the system. Currently, IMA does not provide a
generic function for measuring kernel integrity critical data.
Define ima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to measure kernel
integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot
command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data
sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash,
not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring
buffer data hash.
Introduce a boolean parameter to support measuring buffer data hash,
which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(),
ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently,
these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data.
This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication.
Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and
reusable in other measurement scenarios.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
tmp_tfm is allocated, but not freed on subsequent kmalloc failure, which
leads to a memory leak. Free tmp_tfm.
Fixes: d46eb36995 ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: formatted/reworded patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
- Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor
- Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode
- Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64
- Some fixes for the capsule loader
- Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module
- Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM
+ followup fixes:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM
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Merge tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Borislav Petkov:
"These got delayed due to a last minute ia64 build issue which got
fixed in the meantime.
EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel:
- Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor
- Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode
- Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64
- Some fixes for the capsule loader
- Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module
- Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM
with a few followup fixes:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader
changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM"
* tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi: arm: force use of unsigned type for EFI_PHYS_ALIGN
efi: ia64: disable the capsule loader
efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr()
efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported
efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel
efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache
efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings
efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper
arm64/ima: add ima_arch support
ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures
efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot
efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes
efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel()
efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just three patches here. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed
via EFI (defines a common EFI secure and trusted boot IMA policy) and
BPF LSM (exporting the IMA file cache hash info based on inode).
The three patches included here:
- bug fix: fail calculating the file hash, when a file not opened for
read and the attempt to re-open it for read fails.
- defer processing the "ima_appraise" boot command line option to
avoid enabling different modes (e.g. fix, log) to when the secure
boot flag is available on arm.
- defines "ima-buf" as the default IMA buffer measurement template in
preparation for the builtin integrity "critical data" policy"
* tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
ima: select ima-buf template for buffer measurement
ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time
Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer softirq
for some time expecting applications to periodically busy poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering
the adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or unaligned
reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined in
IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which
also allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to
a central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer
softirq for some time expecting applications to periodically busy
poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering the
adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or
unaligned reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller
messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use
bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined
in IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver
internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej
Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which also
allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to a
central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support"
* tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1922 commits)
net: hns3: fix expression that is currently always true
net: fix proc_fs init handling in af_packet and tls
nfc: pn533: convert comma to semicolon
af_vsock: Assign the vsock transport considering the vsock address flags
af_vsock: Set VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag on the receive path
vsock_addr: Check for supported flag values
vm_sockets: Add VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST vsock flag
vm_sockets: Add flags field in the vsock address data structure
net: Disable NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX when HW_CSUM is disabled
tcp: Add logic to check for SYN w/ data in tcp_simple_retransmit
net: mscc: ocelot: install MAC addresses in .ndo_set_rx_mode from process context
nfc: s3fwrn5: Release the nfc firmware
net: vxget: clean up sparse warnings
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Use eXtended mezzanine to offload IPv4 router
mlxsw: spectrum: Set KVH XLT cache mode for Spectrum2/3
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Introduce basic XM cache flushing
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache Enable Register
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache ML Delete Register
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Implement L-value tracking for M-index
mlxsw: reg: Add XM Router M Table Register
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add speed testing on 1420-byte blocks for networking
Algorithms:
- Improve performance of chacha on ARM for network packets
- Improve performance of aegis128 on ARM for network packets
Drivers:
- Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
- Add support for QAT 4xxx devices
- Enable crypto-engine retry mechanism in caam
- Enable support for crypto engine on sdm845 in qce
- Add HiSilicon PRNG driver support"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (161 commits)
crypto: qat - add capability detection logic in qat_4xxx
crypto: qat - add AES-XTS support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: qat - add AES-CTR support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: atmel-i2c - select CONFIG_BITREVERSE
crypto: hisilicon/trng - replace atomic_add_return()
crypto: keembay - Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
dt-bindings: Add Keem Bay OCS AES bindings
crypto: aegis128 - avoid spurious references crypto_aegis128_update_simd
crypto: seed - remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: x86/sha512 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: cpt - Fix sparse warnings in cptpf
hwrng: ks-sa - Add dependency on IOMEM and OF
crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
crypto: arm/aes-ce - work around Cortex-A57/A72 silion errata
crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()
crypto: ccree - rework cache parameters handling
crypto: cavium - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
...
Commit a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the
original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the
existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which
is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges
to open a new one.
Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to
do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes
the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file
when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8 ima: Set file->f_mode
Fixes: 2fe5d6def1 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This is in preparation to add a helper for BPF LSM programs to use
IMA hashes when attached to LSM hooks. There are LSM hooks like
inode_unlink which do not have a struct file * argument and cannot
use the existing ima_file_hash API.
An inode based API is, therefore, useful in LSM based detections like an
executable trying to delete itself which rely on the inode_unlink LSM
hook.
Moreover, the ima_file_hash function does nothing with the struct file
pointer apart from calling file_inode on it and converting it to an
inode.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124151210.1081188-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
The default IMA template used for all policy rules is the value set
for CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE if the policy rule does not specify
a template. The default IMA template for buffer measurements should be
'ima-buf' - so that the measured buffer is correctly included in the IMA
measurement log entry.
With the default template format, buffer measurements are added to
the measurement list, but do not include the buffer data, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to validate. Including 'ima-buf'
template records in the measurement list by default, should not impact
existing attestation servers without 'ima-buf' template support.
Initialize a global 'ima-buf' template and select that template,
by default, for buffer measurements.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the x86 IMA arch code into security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c,
so that we will be able to wire it up for arm64 in a future patch.
Co-developed-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
is called much earlier by the IMA framework.
However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.
So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.
Cc: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200904072905.25332-2-clin@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [missing core_param()]
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: included linux/module.h]
Tested-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for
measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error
messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug
fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and
NULL pointer checking)"
* tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash
evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()
ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy
integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request
ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
ima: add check for enforced appraise option
integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message()
ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable
ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule
Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits)
binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list
docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text
misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency
LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype
misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB
firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup
w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static
binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap
test_firmware: Test partial read support
firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf()
firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv
fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
IMA: Add support for file reads without contents
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Allow DRBG testing through user-space af_alg
- Add tcrypt speed testing support for keyed hashes
- Add type-safe init/exit hooks for ahash
Algorithms:
- Mark arc4 as obsolete and pending for future removal
- Mark anubis, khazad, sead and tea as obsolete
- Improve boot-time xor benchmark
- Add OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm and use it for integrity
Drivers:
- Fixes and enhancement for XTS in caam
- Add support for XIP8001B hwrng in xiphera-trng
- Add RNG and hash support in sun8i-ce/sun8i-ss
- Allow imx-rngc to be used by kernel entropy pool
- Use crypto engine in omap-sham
- Add support for Ingenic X1830 with ingenic"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (205 commits)
X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2
crypto: xor - Remove unused variable count in do_xor_speed
X.509: fix error return value on the failed path
crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey
crypto: qat - drop input parameter from adf_enable_aer()
crypto: qat - fix function parameters descriptions
crypto: atmel-tdes - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: drivers - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: mxc-rnga - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: stm32 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking
crypto: xor - defer load time benchmark to a later time
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uninitalized 'curr_qm_qp_num'
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the return value when device is busy
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix zero length input in GZIP decompress
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uncleared debug registers
lib/mpi: Fix unused variable warnings
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect
hwrng: npcm - modify readl to readb
...
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config table
rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot#### variable
contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we can
identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available but
returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI changes from Ingo Molnar:
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the
RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config
table rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot####
variable contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we
can identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available
but returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
* tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
efi: mokvar: add missing include of asm/early_ioremap.h
efi: efivars: limit availability to X86 builds
efi: remove some false dependencies on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: gsmi: fix false dependency on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: efivars: un-export efivars_sysfs_init()
efi: pstore: move workqueue handling out of efivars
efi: pstore: disentangle from deprecated efivars module
efi: mokvar-table: fix some issues in new code
efi/arm64: libstub: Deal gracefully with EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL failure
efivarfs: Replace invalid slashes with exclamation marks in dentries.
efi: Delete deprecated parameter comments
efi/libstub: Fix missing-prototypes in string.c
efi: Add definition of EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO and ability to report it
cper,edac,efi: Memory Error Record: bank group/address and chip id
edac,ghes,cper: Add Row Extension to Memory Error Record
efi/x86: Add a quirk to support command line arguments on Dell EFI firmware
efi/libstub: Add efi_warn and *_once logging helpers
integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
efi: Support for MOK variable config table
...
To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a
non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset"
argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to
fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call.
Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been
read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA
can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When
such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead
of forcing a double read here.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-13-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for adding partial read support, add an optional output
argument to kernel_read_file*() that reports the file size so callers
can reason more easily about their reading progress.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-8-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-7-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
"size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
INT_MAX.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559b ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ff ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ima_file_hash can be called when there is no iint->ima_hash available
even though the inode exists in the integrity cache. It is fairly
common for a file to not have a hash. (e.g. an mknodat, prior to the
file being closed).
Another example where this can happen (suggested by Jann Horn):
Process A does:
while(1) {
unlink("/tmp/imafoo");
fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0700);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("open");
continue;
}
write(fd, "A", 1);
close(fd);
}
and Process B does:
while (1) {
int fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
char *mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
if (mapping != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(mapping, 0x1000);
close(fd);
}
Due to the race to get the iint->mutex between ima_file_hash and
process_measurement iint->ima_hash could still be NULL.
Fixes: 6beea7afcc ("ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.
An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.
This patch adds the support to load certs from the MokListRT
entry in the MOK variable configuration table, if it's present.
The pre-existing support to load certs from the MokListRT EFI
variable remains and is used if the EFI MOK configuration table
isn't present or can't be successfully used.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-4-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate
routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality.
There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch.
Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs,
they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys
on their respective key rings is the same.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-3-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183 ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch removes the unnecessary semicolon at the end of
ima_get_binary_runtime_size().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d158847ae8 ("ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921 ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Depending on the IMA policy rule a key may be searched for in multiple
keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly not found. This patch
improves feedback by including the keyring "description" (name) in the
error message.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode
to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel
paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the
parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher
checking on the options being passed by the user.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys is currently only supported for asymmetric keys. In the
future, this might change.
For now, the "func=KEY_CHECK" and "keyrings=" options are only
appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
these policy language constructs are supported.
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Suggested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The ima_keyrings buffer was used as a work buffer for strsep()-based
parsing of the "keyrings=" option of an IMA policy rule. This parsing
was re-performed each time an asymmetric key was added to a kernel
keyring for each loaded policy rule that contained a "keyrings=" option.
An example rule specifying this option is:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=a|b|c
The rule says to measure asymmetric keys added to any of the kernel
keyrings named "a", "b", or "c". The size of the buffer size was
equal to the size of the largest "keyrings=" value seen in a previously
loaded rule (5 + 1 for the NUL-terminator in the previous example) and
the buffer was pre-allocated at the time of policy load.
The pre-allocated buffer approach suffered from a couple bugs:
1) There was no locking around the use of the buffer so concurrent key
add operations, to two different keyrings, would result in the
strsep() loop of ima_match_keyring() to modify the buffer at the same
time. This resulted in unexpected results from ima_match_keyring()
and, therefore, could cause unintended keys to be measured or keys to
not be measured when IMA policy intended for them to be measured.
2) If the kstrdup() that initialized entry->keyrings in ima_parse_rule()
failed, the ima_keyrings buffer was freed and set to NULL even when a
valid KEY_CHECK rule was previously loaded. The next KEY_CHECK event
would trigger a call to strcpy() with a NULL destination pointer and
crash the kernel.
Remove the need for a pre-allocated global buffer by parsing the list of
keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at the time of policy load. The
ima_rule_entry will contain an array of string pointers which point to
the name of each keyring specified in the rule. No string processing
needs to happen at the time of asymmetric key add so iterating through
the list and doing a string comparison is all that's required at the
time of policy check.
In the process of changing how the "keyrings=" policy option is handled,
a couple additional bugs were fixed:
1) The rule parser accepted rules containing invalid "keyrings=" values
such as "a|b||c", "a|b|", or simply "|".
2) The /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy file did not display the entire
"keyrings=" value if the list of keyrings was longer than what could
fit in the fixed size tbuf buffer in ima_policy_show().
Fixes: 5c7bac9fb2 ("IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A couple of minor documentation updates only for this release"
* tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments
Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
If not .svg:
For each line:
If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
return 200 OK and serve the same content:
Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The nicest change is the IMA policy rule checking. The other changes
include allowing the kexec boot cmdline line measure policy rules to
be defined in terms of the inode associated with the kexec kernel
image, making the IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM, which governs the IMA
appraise mode (log, fix, enforce), a runtime decision based on the
secure boot mode of the system, and including errno in the audit log"
* tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
integrity: Add errno field in audit message
The variable ret is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value. The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.
Fixes: eb5798f2e2 ("integrity: convert digsig to akcipher api")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the
filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
appraise modes be disabled.
This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
Test results as follows:
-> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
[ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
-> powerpc with secure boot disabled
[ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
-> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
filesystem labeling:
type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
uid=root auid=root ses=2
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
res=no
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d958083a8f ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
AppArmor meets all the requirements for IMA in terms of audit rules
since commit e79c26d040 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule
filtering"). Update IMA's Kconfig section for CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES to
reflect this.
Fixes: e79c26d040 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Rename IMA's internal filter rule functions from security_filter_rule_*()
to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace,
which is typically reserved for general security subsystem
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reword using the term "filter", not "audit"]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
this:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE
The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
measure or not
Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
full list of conditional comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make broader use of ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond() to check if a given
rule contains an LSM conditional. This is a code cleanup and has no
user-facing change.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Use ima_validate_rule(), at the end of the token parsing stage, to
verify combinations of actions, hooks, and flags. This is useful to
increase readability by consolidating such checks into a single function
and also because rule conditionals can be specified in arbitrary order
making it difficult to do comprehensive rule validation until the entire
rule has been parsed.
This allows for the check that ties together the "keyrings" conditional
with the KEY_CHECK function hook to be moved into the final rule
validation.
The modsig check no longer needs to compiled conditionally because the
token parser will ensure that modsig support is enabled before accepting
"imasig|modsig" appraise type values. The final rule validation will
ensure that appraise_type and appraise_flag options are only present in
appraise rules.
Finally, this allows for the check that ties together the "pcr"
conditional with the measure action to be moved into the final rule
validation.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make args_p be of the char pointer type rather than have it be a void
pointer that gets casted to char pointer when it is used. It is a simple
NUL-terminated string as returned by match_strdup().
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by
ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in
ima_rule_entry structs.
There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in
ima_lsm_copy_rule().
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Verifying that a file hash is not blacklisted is currently only
supported for files with appended signatures (modsig). In the future,
this might change.
For now, the "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise
actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is
only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present.
Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume
that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.
Fixes: 273df864cf ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reivewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
don't assume that other conditionals are supported.
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.
Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.
An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.
Fixes: b0935123a1 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Buffer based hook functions, such as KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK, can
only measure. The process_buffer_measurement() function quietly ignores
all actions except measure so make this behavior clear at the time of
policy load.
The parsing of the keyrings conditional had a check to ensure that it
was only specified with measure actions but the check should be on the
hook function and not the keyrings conditional since
"appraise func=KEY_CHECK" is not a valid rule.
Fixes: b0935123a1 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry
members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered
during rule parsing.
Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of
ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice.
This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an
additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an
invalid conditional:
# echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
# echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8):
comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5 tmpfs.k.
backtrace:
[<00000000abab7413>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
[<00000000f11ede32>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
[<00000000f883dd7a>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
[<00000000b17cf753>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
[<00000000b8ddfdea>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
[<00000000b8e21e87>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
[<0000000089ea7b98>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: f1b08bbcbd ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Create a function, ima_free_rule(), to free all memory associated with
an ima_rule_entry. Use the new function to fix memory leaks of allocated
ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when deleting a
list of rules.
Make the existing ima_lsm_free_rule() function specific to the LSM
audit rule array of an ima_rule_entry and require that callers make an
additional call to kfree to free the ima_rule_entry itself.
This fixes a memory leak seen when loading by a valid rule that contains
an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by
an invalid rule that triggers a policy load failure:
# echo -e "dont_measure fsname=securityfs\nbad syntax" > \
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
# echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff9bab67ca12c0 (size 16):
comm "bash", pid 684, jiffies 4295212803 (age 252.344s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66 73 00 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 securityfs.kkkk.
backtrace:
[<00000000adc80b1b>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
[<00000000d504cb0d>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
[<00000000444825ac>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
[<000000002b7f0d6c>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
[<0000000096feedcf>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
[<0000000052b544a2>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
[<000000007ead1ba7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: f1b08bbcbd ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Ask the LSM to free its audit rule rather than directly calling kfree().
Both AppArmor and SELinux do additional work in their audit_rule_free()
hooks. Fix memory leaks by allowing the LSMs to perform necessary work.
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Error code is not included in the audit messages logged by
the integrity subsystem.
Define a new function integrity_audit_message() that takes error code
in the "errno" parameter. Add "errno" field in the audit messages logged
by the integrity subsystem and set the value passed in the "errno"
parameter.
[ 6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12
[ 7.987647] audit: type=1802 audit(1592506283.312:9): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=policy_update cause=completed comm="systemd" res=1 errno=0
[ 8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Registers 8-9 are used to store measurements of the kernel and its
command line (e.g., grub2 bootloader with tpm module enabled). IMA
should include them in the boot aggregate. Registers 8-9 should be
only included in non-SHA1 digests to avoid ambiguity.
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Drocco <maurizio.drocco@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com> (TPM 1.2, TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Make sure IMA is enabled before checking mprotect change. Addresses
report of a 3.7% regression of boot-time.dhcp.
Fixes: 8eb613c0b8 ("ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Xing Zhengjun <zhengjun.xing@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Commit 6cc7c266e5 ("ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in
ima_eventdigest_init()") added a call to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() so that
the digest can be recalculated for the boot_aggregate measurement entry if
the 'd' template field has been requested. For the 'd' field, only SHA1 and
MD5 digests are accepted.
Given that ima_eventdigest_init() does not have the __init annotation, all
functions called should not have it. This patch removes __init from
ima_pcrread().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6cc7c266e5 ("ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The main changes are extending the TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank
specific file hashes, calculating the "boot_aggregate" based on other
TPM PCR banks, using the default IMA hash algorithm, instead of SHA1,
as the basis for the cache hash table key, and preventing the mprotect
syscall to circumvent an IMA mmap appraise policy rule.
- In preparation for extending TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank specific
digests, commit 0b6cf6b97b ("tpm: pass an array of
tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") modified
tpm_pcr_extend(). The original SHA1 file digests were
padded/truncated, before being extended into the other TPM PCR
banks. This pull request calculates and extends the TPM PCR banks
with bank specific file hashes completing the above change.
- The "boot_aggregate", the first IMA measurement list record, is the
"trusted boot" link between the pre-boot environment and the
running OS. With TPM 2.0, the "boot_aggregate" record is not
limited to being based on the SHA1 TPM PCR bank, but can be
calculated based on any enabled bank, assuming the hash algorithm
is also enabled in the kernel.
Other changes include the following and five other bug fixes/code
clean up:
- supporting both a SHA1 and a larger "boot_aggregate" digest in a
custom template format containing both the the SHA1 ('d') and
larger digests ('d-ng') fields.
- Initial hash table key fix, but additional changes would be good"
* tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Directly free *entry in ima_alloc_init_template() if digests is NULL
ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()
ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules
ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy
evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()
ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable
ima: Remove redundant policy rule set in add_rules()
ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation
ima: Use ima_hash_algo for collision detection in the measurement list
ima: Calculate and extend PCR with digests in ima_template_entry
ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank
ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests
ima: Store template digest directly in ima_template_entry
ima: Evaluate error in init_ima()
ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate
To support multiple template digests, the static array entry->digest has
been replaced with a dynamically allocated array in commit aa724fe18a
("ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests"). The
array is allocated in ima_alloc_init_template() and if the returned pointer
is NULL, ima_free_template_entry() is called.
However, (*entry)->template_desc is not yet initialized while it is used by
ima_free_template_entry(). This patch fixes the issue by directly freeing
*entry without calling ima_free_template_entry().
Fixes: aa724fe18a ("ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests")
Reported-by: syzbot+223310b454ba6b75974e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If the template field 'd' is chosen and the digest to be added to the
measurement entry was not calculated with SHA1 or MD5, it is
recalculated with SHA1, by using the passed file descriptor. However, this
cannot be done for boot_aggregate, because there is no file descriptor.
This patch adds a call to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in
ima_eventdigest_init(), so that the digest can be recalculated also for the
boot_aggregate entry.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13.x
Fixes: 3ce1217d6c ("ima: define template fields library and new helpers")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch prevents the following oops:
[ 10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000
[...]
[ 10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80
[...]
[ 10.798576] Call Trace:
[ 10.798993] ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0
[ 10.799753] ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 10.800484] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0
[ 10.801592] ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0
[ 10.802313] ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0
[ 10.803167] ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70
[ 10.804004] ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80
[ 10.804800] do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0
It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and
ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy()
but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning
the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This
wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end
of ima_init_policy().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Fixes: 07f6a79415 ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
IMA's mmap appraise policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
would be taken prior to i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
this point. Eliminate this integrity gap, by denying the mprotect
PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IS_ERR_OR_NULL() function has two conditions and if we got really
unlucky we could hit a race where "ptr" started as an error pointer and
then was set to NULL. Both conditions would be false even though the
pointer at the end was NULL.
This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that "*tfm" can only be NULL
or valid. I have introduced a "tmp_tfm" variable to make that work. I
also reversed a condition and pulled the code in one tab.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Fixes: 53de3b080d ("evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().
Fixes: 50b977481f ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
After adding the new add_rule() function in commit c52657d93b
("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()"), all appraisal flags are added to the
temp_ima_appraise variable. Revert to the previous behavior instead of
removing build_ima_appraise, to benefit from the protection offered by
__ro_after_init.
The mentioned commit introduced a bug, as it makes all the flags
modifiable, while build_ima_appraise flags can be protected with
__ro_after_init.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Fixes: c52657d93b ("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Function ima_appraise_flag() returns the flag to be set in
temp_ima_appraise depending on the hook identifier passed as an argument.
It is not necessary to set the flag again for the POLICY_CHECK hook.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte
is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable.
Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to
using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus
calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots.
Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921 ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch fixes the following warning and few other instances of
traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
[ 32.848432] =============================
[ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[ 32.849308] -----------------------------
[ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted, use
list_for_each_entry_lockless() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu for
traversing the list. Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to
indicate this fact.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> (RCU viewpoint)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch fixes the return value of ima_write_policy() when a new policy
is directly passed to IMA and the current policy requires appraisal of the
file containing the policy. Currently, if appraisal is not in ENFORCE mode,
ima_write_policy() returns 0 and leads user space applications to an
endless loop. Fix this issue by denying the operation regardless of the
appraisal mode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10.x
Fixes: 19f8a84713 ("ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by
crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that
require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of
the following race condition:
Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() <= error pointer
Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) <= *tfm is not NULL, use it
Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) <= panic
Task A: *tfm = NULL
This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new
crypto context must be created.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d46eb36995 ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Commit a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") tries to create a new file descriptor to calculate a file
digest if the file has not been opened with O_RDONLY flag. However, if a
new file descriptor cannot be obtained, it sets the FMODE_READ flag to
file->f_flags instead of file->f_mode.
This patch fixes this issue by replacing f_flags with f_mode as it was
before that commit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20.x
Fixes: a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Before calculating a digest for each PCR bank, collisions were detected
with a SHA1 digest. This patch includes ima_hash_algo among the algorithms
used to calculate the template digest and checks collisions on that digest.
The position in the measurement entry array of the template digest
calculated with the IMA default hash algorithm is stored in the
ima_hash_algo_idx global variable and is determined at IMA initialization
time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch modifies ima_calc_field_array_hash() to calculate a template
digest for each allocated PCR bank and SHA1. It also passes the tpm_digest
array of the template entry to ima_pcr_extend() or in case of a violation,
the pre-initialized digests array filled with 0xff.
Padding with zeros is still done if the mapping between TPM algorithm ID
and crypto ID is unknown.
This patch calculates again the template digest when a measurement list is
restored. Copying only the SHA1 digest (due to the limitation of the
current measurement list format) is not sufficient, as hash collision
detection will be done on the digest calculated with the IMA default hash
algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch creates a crypto_shash structure for each allocated PCR bank and
for SHA1 if a bank with that algorithm is not currently allocated.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch dynamically allocates the array of tpm_digest structures in
ima_alloc_init_template() and ima_restore_template_data(). The size of the
array is equal to the number of PCR banks plus ima_extra_slots, to make
room for SHA1 and the IMA default hash algorithm, when PCR banks with those
algorithms are not allocated.
Calculating the SHA1 digest is mandatory, as SHA1 still remains the default
hash algorithm for the measurement list. When IMA will support the Crypto
Agile format, remaining digests will be also provided.
The position in the measurement entry array of the SHA1 digest is stored in
the ima_sha1_idx global variable and is determined at IMA initialization
time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
In preparation for the patch that calculates a digest for each allocated
PCR bank, this patch passes to ima_calc_field_array_hash() the
ima_template_entry structure, so that digests can be directly stored in
that structure instead of ima_digest_data.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Evaluate error in init_ima() before register_blocking_lsm_notifier() and
return if not zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3.x
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
boot_aggregate is the first entry of IMA measurement list. Its purpose is
to link pre-boot measurements to IMA measurements. As IMA was designed to
work with a TPM 1.2, the SHA1 PCR bank was always selected even if a
TPM 2.0 with support for stronger hash algorithms is available.
This patch first tries to find a PCR bank with the IMA default hash
algorithm. If it does not find it, it selects the SHA256 PCR bank for
TPM 2.0 and SHA1 for TPM 1.2. Ultimately, it selects SHA1 also for TPM 2.0
if the SHA256 PCR bank is not found.
If none of the PCR banks above can be found, boot_aggregate file digest is
filled with zeros, as for TPM bypass, making it impossible to perform a
remote attestation of the system.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1.x
Fixes: 879b589210 ("tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read")
Reported-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just a couple of updates for linux-5.7:
- A new Kconfig option to enable IMA architecture specific runtime
policy rules needed for secure and/or trusted boot, as requested.
- Some message cleanup (eg. pr_fmt, additional error messages)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies
integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions
IMA: Add log statements for failure conditions
IMA: Update KBUILD_MODNAME for IMA files to ima
Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific
functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA
include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch
defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing
the different architectures to select it.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> (s390)
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the
files under security/integrity.
This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and
removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under
security/integrity.
With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed
with 'integrity'.
security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
security/integrity/iint.c
e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n"
And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'.
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n"
For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no
change in the message format.
Suggested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
process_buffer_measurement() does not have log messages for failure
conditions.
This change adds a log statement in the above function.
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kbuild Makefile specifies object files for vmlinux in the $(obj-y)
lists. These lists depend on the kernel configuration[1].
The kbuild Makefile for IMA combines the object files for IMA into a
single object file namely ima.o. All the object files for IMA should be
combined into ima.o. But certain object files are being added to their
own $(obj-y). This results in the log messages from those modules getting
prefixed with their respective base file name, instead of "ima". This is
inconsistent with the log messages from the IMA modules that are combined
into ima.o.
This change fixes the above issue.
[1] Documentation\kbuild\makefiles.rst
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:
- Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
making drastic changes,
- After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
(which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
Summary of changes:
- Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
via a configuration table.
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
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Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel:
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:
- Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
making drastic changes,
- After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
(which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
Summary of changes:
- Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
via a configuration table.
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Testing the value of the efi.get_variable function pointer is not
the right way to establish whether the platform supports EFI
variables at runtime. Instead, use the newly added granular check
that can test for the presence of each EFI runtime service
individually.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
sm3 has been supported by the ima hash algorithm, but it is not
yet in the Kconfig configuration list. After adding, both ima and tpm2
can support sm3 well.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
is used.
So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
[ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
[ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Two new features - measuring certificates and querying IMA for a file
hash - and three bug fixes:
- Measuring certificates is like the rest of IMA, based on policy,
but requires loading a custom policy. Certificates loaded onto a
keyring, for example during early boot, before a custom policy has
been loaded, are queued and only processed after loading the custom
policy.
- IMA calculates and caches files hashes. Other kernel subsystems,
and possibly kernel modules, are interested in accessing these
cached file hashes.
The bug fixes prevent classifying a file short read (e.g. shutdown) as
an invalid file signature, add a missing blank when displaying the
securityfs policy rules containing LSM labels, and, lastly, fix the
handling of the IMA policy information for unknown LSM labels"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
IMA: Defined delayed workqueue to free the queued keys
IMA: Call workqueue functions to measure queued keys
IMA: Define workqueue for early boot key measurements
IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string
ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes
ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file
ima: Add a space after printing LSM rules for readability
IMA: fix measuring asymmetric keys Kconfig
IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy
IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys
KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys
IMA: Check IMA policy flag
ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt
Keys queued for measurement should be freed if a custom IMA policy
was not loaded. Otherwise, the keys will remain queued forever
consuming kernel memory.
This patch defines a delayed workqueue to handle the above scenario.
The workqueue handler is setup to execute 5 minutes after IMA
initialization is completed.
If a custom IMA policy is loaded before the workqueue handler is
scheduled to execute, the workqueue task is cancelled and any queued keys
are processed for measurement. But if a custom policy was not loaded then
the queued keys are just freed when the delayed workqueue handler is run.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> # sleeping
function called from invalid context
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # redefinition of
ima_init_key_queue() function.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys should
be queued for measurement if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded.
Keys queued for measurement, if any, should be processed when a custom
policy is loaded.
This patch updates the IMA hook function ima_post_key_create_or_update()
to queue the key if a custom IMA policy has not yet been loaded. And,
ima_update_policy() function, which is called when a custom IMA policy
is loaded, is updated to process queued keys.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys created
or updated before a custom IMA policy is loaded should be queued and
will be processed after a custom policy is loaded.
This patch defines a workqueue for queuing keys when a custom IMA policy
has not yet been loaded. An intermediate Kconfig boolean option namely
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS is used to declare the workqueue functions.
A flag namely ima_process_keys is used to check if the key should be
queued or should be processed immediately.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
ima_match_keyring() is called while holding rcu read lock. Since this
function executes in atomic context, it should not call any function
that can sleep (such as kstrdup()).
This patch pre-allocates a buffer to hold the keyrings string read from
the IMA policy and uses that to match the given keyring.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: e9085e0ad3 ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
policy load. However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
policy rules to a custom IMA policy.
Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
some prints a bit more human readable.
Changelog:
v4:
- Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
v3:
- Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
v2:
- Fix log prints
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM allowing
system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the hash
of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache.
It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in the
audit logs or in /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements,
but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every
subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has been up
for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago.
It should be kept in mind that this function gives access to cached
entries which can be removed, for instance on security_inode_free().
This is based on Peter Moody's patch:
https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When reading ima_policy from securityfs, there is a missing
space between output string of LSM rules and the remaining
rules.
Signed-off-by: Clay Chang <clayc@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
As a result of the asymmetric public keys subtype Kconfig option being
defined as tristate, with the existing IMA Makefile, ima_asymmetric_keys.c
could be built as a kernel module. To prevent this from happening, this
patch defines and uses an intermediate Kconfig boolean option named
IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: James.Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # ima_asymmetric_keys.c
is built as a kernel module.
Fixes: 88e70da170 ("IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys")
Fixes: cb1aa3823c ("KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys")
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Read "keyrings=" option, if specified in the IMA policy, and store in
the list of IMA rules when the configured IMA policy is read.
This patch defines a new policy token enum namely Opt_keyrings
and an option flag IMA_KEYRINGS for reading "keyrings=" option
from the IMA policy.
Updated ima_parse_rule() to parse "keyrings=" option in the policy.
Updated ima_policy_show() to display "keyrings=" option.
The following example illustrates how key measurement can be verified.
Sample "key" measurement rule in the IMA policy:
measure func=KEY_CHECK uid=0 keyrings=.ima|.evm template=ima-buf
Display "key" measurement in the IMA measurement list:
cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
10 faf3...e702 ima-buf sha256:27c915b8ddb9fae7214cf0a8a7043cc3eeeaa7539bcb136f8427067b5f6c3b7b .ima 308202863082...4aee
Verify "key" measurement data for a key added to ".ima" keyring:
cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | grep -m 1 "\.ima" | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p |tee ima-cert.der | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f 1
The output of the above command should match the template hash
of the first "key" measurement entry in the IMA measurement list for
the key added to ".ima" keyring.
The file namely "ima-cert.der" generated by the above command
should be a valid x509 certificate (in DER format) and should match
the one that was used to import the key to the ".ima" keyring.
The certificate file can be verified using openssl tool.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Limit measuring keys to those keys being loaded onto a given set of
keyrings only and when the user id (uid) matches if uid is specified
in the policy.
This patch defines a new IMA policy option namely "keyrings=" that
can be used to specify a set of keyrings. If this option is specified
in the policy for "measure func=KEY_CHECK" then only the keys
loaded onto a keyring given in the "keyrings=" option are measured.
If uid is specified in the policy then the key is measured only if
the current user id matches the one specified in the policy.
Added a new parameter namely "keyring" (name of the keyring) to
process_buffer_measurement(). The keyring name is passed to
ima_get_action() to determine the required action.
ima_match_rules() is updated to check keyring in the policy, if
specified, for KEY_CHECK function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measure asymmetric keys used for verifying file signatures,
certificates, etc.
This patch defines a new IMA hook namely ima_post_key_create_or_update()
to measure the payload used to create a new asymmetric key or
update an existing asymmetric key.
Asymmetric key structure is defined only when
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE is defined. Since the IMA hook
measures asymmetric keys, the IMA hook is defined in a new file namely
ima_asymmetric_keys.c which is built only if
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE is defined.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
