Commit Graph

27 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kees Cook
69d6302b65 libceph: Remove VLA usage of skcipher
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:07 +08:00
Chengguang Xu
57a35dfb52 libceph, ceph: add __init attribution to init funcitons
Add __init attribution to the functions which are called only once
during initiating/registering operations and deleting unnecessary
symbol exports.

Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2018-04-02 10:12:48 +02:00
Eric Biggers
b11270853f libceph: don't WARN() if user tries to add invalid key
The WARN_ON(!key->len) in set_secret() in net/ceph/crypto.c is hit if a
user tries to add a key of type "ceph" with an invalid payload as
follows (assuming CONFIG_CEPH_LIB=y):

    echo -e -n '\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' \
	| keyctl padd ceph desc @s

This can be hit by fuzzers.  As this is merely bad input and not a
kernel bug, replace the WARN_ON() with return -EINVAL.

Fixes: 7af3ea189a ("libceph: stop allocating a new cipher on every crypto request")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2017-11-13 12:12:44 +01:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
5b3cc15aff sched/headers: Prepare to move the memalloc_noio_*() APIs to <linux/sched/mm.h>
Update the .c files that depend on these APIs.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:33 +01:00
Ilya Dryomov
7fea24c6d4 libceph: include linux/sched.h into crypto.c directly
Currently crypto.c gets linux/sched.h indirectly through linux/slab.h
from linux/kasan.h.  Include it directly for memalloc_noio_*() inlines.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2017-02-20 12:16:06 +01:00
Ilya Dryomov
124f930b8c libceph: make sure ceph_aes_crypt() IV is aligned
... otherwise the crypto stack will align it for us with a GFP_ATOMIC
allocation and a memcpy() -- see skcipher_walk_first().

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2017-01-18 17:58:45 +01:00
Ilya Dryomov
7af3ea189a libceph: stop allocating a new cipher on every crypto request
This is useless and more importantly not allowed on the writeback path,
because crypto_alloc_skcipher() allocates memory with GFP_KERNEL, which
can recurse back into the filesystem:

    kworker/9:3     D ffff92303f318180     0 20732      2 0x00000080
    Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
     ffff923035dd4480 ffff923038f8a0c0 0000000000000001 000000009eb27318
     ffff92269eb28000 ffff92269eb27338 ffff923036b145ac ffff923035dd4480
     00000000ffffffff ffff923036b145b0 ffffffff951eb4e1 ffff923036b145a8
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff951eb4e1>] ? schedule+0x31/0x80
     [<ffffffff951eb77a>] ? schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
     [<ffffffff951ed1f4>] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0xb4/0x130
     [<ffffffff951ed28b>] ? mutex_lock+0x1b/0x30
     [<ffffffffc0a974b3>] ? xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x233/0x2d0 [xfs]
     [<ffffffff94d92ba5>] ? move_active_pages_to_lru+0x125/0x270
     [<ffffffff94f2b985>] ? radix_tree_gang_lookup_tag+0xc5/0x1c0
     [<ffffffff94dad0f3>] ? __list_lru_walk_one.isra.3+0x33/0x120
     [<ffffffffc0a98331>] ? xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x31/0x40 [xfs]
     [<ffffffff94e05bfe>] ? super_cache_scan+0x17e/0x190
     [<ffffffff94d919f3>] ? shrink_slab.part.38+0x1e3/0x3d0
     [<ffffffff94d9616a>] ? shrink_node+0x10a/0x320
     [<ffffffff94d96474>] ? do_try_to_free_pages+0xf4/0x350
     [<ffffffff94d967ba>] ? try_to_free_pages+0xea/0x1b0
     [<ffffffff94d863bd>] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x61d/0xe60
     [<ffffffff94ddf42d>] ? cache_grow_begin+0x9d/0x560
     [<ffffffff94ddfb88>] ? fallback_alloc+0x148/0x1c0
     [<ffffffff94ed84e7>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x37/0x130
     [<ffffffff94de09db>] ? __kmalloc+0x1eb/0x580
     [<ffffffffc09fe2db>] ? crush_choose_firstn+0x3eb/0x470 [libceph]
     [<ffffffff94ed84e7>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x37/0x130
     [<ffffffff94ed9c19>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x39/0x60
     [<ffffffffc08b30a3>] ? crypto_cbc_init_tfm+0x23/0x40 [cbc]
     [<ffffffff94ed857c>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0xcc/0x130
     [<ffffffff94edcc23>] ? crypto_skcipher_init_tfm+0x113/0x180
     [<ffffffff94ed7cc3>] ? crypto_create_tfm+0x43/0xb0
     [<ffffffff94ed83b0>] ? crypto_larval_lookup+0x150/0x150
     [<ffffffff94ed7da2>] ? crypto_alloc_tfm+0x72/0x120
     [<ffffffffc0a01dd7>] ? ceph_aes_encrypt2+0x67/0x400 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc09fd264>] ? ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds+0x84/0x5b0 [libceph]
     [<ffffffff950d40a0>] ? release_sock+0x40/0x90
     [<ffffffff95139f94>] ? tcp_recvmsg+0x4b4/0xae0
     [<ffffffffc0a02714>] ? ceph_encrypt2+0x54/0xc0 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc0a02b4d>] ? ceph_x_encrypt+0x5d/0x90 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc0a02bdf>] ? calcu_signature+0x5f/0x90 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc0a02ef5>] ? ceph_x_sign_message+0x35/0x50 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc09e948c>] ? prepare_write_message_footer+0x5c/0xa0 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc09ecd18>] ? ceph_con_workfn+0x2258/0x2dd0 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc09e9903>] ? queue_con_delay+0x33/0xd0 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc09f68ed>] ? __submit_request+0x20d/0x2f0 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc09f6ef8>] ? ceph_osdc_start_request+0x28/0x30 [libceph]
     [<ffffffffc0b52603>] ? rbd_queue_workfn+0x2f3/0x350 [rbd]
     [<ffffffff94c94ec0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x410
     [<ffffffff94c951bd>] ? worker_thread+0x4d/0x480
     [<ffffffff94c95170>] ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
     [<ffffffff94c9af8d>] ? kthread+0xcd/0xf0
     [<ffffffff951efb2f>] ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
     [<ffffffff94c9aec0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190

Allocating the cipher along with the key fixes the issue - as long the
key doesn't change, a single cipher context can be used concurrently in
multiple requests.

We still can't take that GFP_KERNEL allocation though.  Both
ceph_crypto_key_clone() and ceph_crypto_key_decode() are called from
GFP_NOFS context, so resort to memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() here.

Reported-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-12 23:09:20 +01:00
Ilya Dryomov
6db2304aab libceph: uninline ceph_crypto_key_destroy()
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-12 23:09:20 +01:00
Ilya Dryomov
2b1e1a7cd0 libceph: remove now unused ceph_*{en,de}crypt*() functions
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-12 23:09:20 +01:00
Ilya Dryomov
a45f795c65 libceph: introduce ceph_crypt() for in-place en/decryption
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not
guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
option is enabled by default on x86.  This makes it invalid to use
on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf()
expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses.

There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch
net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting
updated to accommodate this use case.  Allocating a new header and
padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption
in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap
buffer.  This is explicitly supported by the crypto API:

    "... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the
     plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher
     operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data
     in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption."

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-12 23:09:19 +01:00
Ilya Dryomov
e9f6452e0e libceph: Remove unnecessary ivsize variables
This patch removes the unnecessary ivsize variabls as they always
have the value of AES_BLOCK_SIZE.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-01-27 20:36:25 +08:00
Herbert Xu
e59dd982d3 libceph: Use skcipher
This patch replaces uses of blkcipher with skcipher.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-01-27 20:36:05 +08:00
David Howells
146aa8b145 KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
Nicholas Krause
b79b23682a libceph: remove the unused macro AES_KEY_SIZE
This removes the no longer used macro AES_KEY_SIZE as no functions use
this macro anymore and thus this macro can be removed due it no longer
being required.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Krause <xerofoify@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2015-09-08 23:14:28 +03:00
Ilya Dryomov
aaef31703a libceph: do not crash on large auth tickets
Large (greater than 32k, the value of PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER) auth
tickets will have their buffers vmalloc'ed, which leads to the
following crash in crypto:

[   28.685082] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffeb04000032c0
[   28.686032] IP: [<ffffffff81392b42>] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80
[   28.686032] PGD 0
[   28.688088] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   28.688088] Modules linked in:
[   28.688088] CPU: 0 PID: 878 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.17.0-vm+ #305
[   28.688088] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[   28.688088] Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work
[   28.688088] task: ffff88011a7f9030 ti: ffff8800d903c000 task.ti: ffff8800d903c000
[   28.688088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81392b42>]  [<ffffffff81392b42>] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80
[   28.688088] RSP: 0018:ffff8800d903f688  EFLAGS: 00010286
[   28.688088] RAX: ffffeb04000032c0 RBX: ffff8800d903f718 RCX: ffffeb04000032c0
[   28.688088] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800d903f750
[   28.688088] RBP: ffff8800d903f688 R08: 00000000000007de R09: ffff8800d903f880
[   28.688088] R10: 18df467c72d6257b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
[   28.688088] R13: ffff8800d903f750 R14: ffff8800d903f8a0 R15: 0000000000000000
[   28.688088] FS:  00007f50a41c7700(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   28.688088] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[   28.688088] CR2: ffffeb04000032c0 CR3: 00000000da3f3000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   28.688088] Stack:
[   28.688088]  ffff8800d903f698 ffffffff81392ca8 ffff8800d903f6e8 ffffffff81395d32
[   28.688088]  ffff8800dac96000 ffff880000000000 ffff8800d903f980 ffff880119b7e020
[   28.688088]  ffff880119b7e010 0000000000000000 0000000000000010 0000000000000010
[   28.688088] Call Trace:
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81392ca8>] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81392ca8>] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81395d32>] blkcipher_walk_done+0x182/0x220
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff813990bf>] crypto_cbc_encrypt+0x15f/0x180
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81399780>] ? crypto_aes_set_key+0x30/0x30
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156c40c>] ceph_aes_encrypt2+0x29c/0x2e0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156d2a3>] ceph_encrypt2+0x93/0xb0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156d7da>] ceph_x_encrypt+0x4a/0x60
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8155b39d>] ? ceph_buffer_new+0x5d/0xf0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156e837>] ceph_x_build_authorizer.isra.6+0x297/0x360
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8112089b>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11b/0x1c0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156b496>] ? ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x36/0x80
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156ed83>] ceph_x_create_authorizer+0x63/0xd0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156b4b4>] ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x54/0x80
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8155f7c0>] get_authorizer+0x80/0xd0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81555a8b>] prepare_write_connect+0x18b/0x2b0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81559289>] try_read+0x1e59/0x1f10

This is because we set up crypto scatterlists as if all buffers were
kmalloc'ed.  Fix it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2014-11-13 22:21:12 +03:00
David Howells
c06cfb08b8 KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type.  This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.

The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16 17:36:06 +01:00
David Howells
7c3bec0a1f KEYS: Ceph: Use user_match()
Ceph can use user_match() instead of defining its own identical function.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
cc: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com>
2014-07-22 21:46:30 +01:00
David Howells
efa64c0978 KEYS: Ceph: Use key preparsing
Make use of key preparsing in Ceph so that quota size determination can take
place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
cc: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com>
2014-07-22 21:46:23 +01:00
Alex Elder
1541716789 libceph: eliminate sparse warnings
Eliminate most of the problems in the libceph code that cause sparse
to issue warnings.
    - Convert functions that are never referenced externally to have
      static scope.
    - Pass NULL rather than 0 for a pointer argument in one spot in
      ceph_monc_delete_snapid()

This partially resolves:
    http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4184

Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
2013-02-25 15:37:18 -06:00
David Howells
cf7f601c06 KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
instantiation and update routines being called.  This is done with the
provision of two new key type operations:

	int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
	void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);

If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
instantiate cases).  The second operation is called to clean up if the first
was called.

preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:

	struct key_preparsed_payload {
		char		*description;
		void		*type_data[2];
		void		*payload;
		const void	*data;
		size_t		datalen;
		size_t		quotalen;
	};

Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.

The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
ops.

The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
string to the description field.  This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
function.  This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
to tell the upcall about the key to be created.

This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.

The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:

	int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
	int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);

and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-08 13:49:48 +10:30
Sylvain Munaut
f0666b1ac8 libceph: fix crypto key null deref, memory leak
Avoid crashing if the crypto key payload was NULL, as when it was not correctly
allocated and initialized.  Also, avoid leaking it.

Signed-off-by: Sylvain Munaut <tnt@246tNt.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
2012-08-02 09:19:20 -07:00
Thomas Meyer
186482560f ceph: Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation
Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation

The semantic patch that makes this change is available
in scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
2012-01-10 08:56:54 -08:00
Joe Perches
ea11073387 net: Remove casts of void *
Unnecessary casts of void * clutter the code.

These are the remainder casts after several specific
patches to remove netdev_priv and dev_priv.

Done via coccinelle script:

$ cat cast_void_pointer.cocci
@@
type T;
T *pt;
void *pv;
@@

- pt = (T *)pv;
+ pt = pv;

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@conan.davemloft.net>
2011-06-16 23:19:27 -04:00
Tommi Virtanen
4b2a58abd1 libceph: Create a new key type "ceph".
This allows us to use existence of the key type as a feature test,
from userspace.

Signed-off-by: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
2011-03-29 12:11:24 -07:00
Tommi Virtanen
8323c3aa74 ceph: Move secret key parsing earlier.
This makes the base64 logic be contained in mount option parsing,
and prepares us for replacing the homebew key management with the
kernel key retention service.

Signed-off-by: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
2011-03-29 12:11:16 -07:00
Yehuda Sadeh
3d14c5d2b6 ceph: factor out libceph from Ceph file system
This factors out protocol and low-level storage parts of ceph into a
separate libceph module living in net/ceph and include/linux/ceph.  This
is mostly a matter of moving files around.  However, a few key pieces
of the interface change as well:

 - ceph_client becomes ceph_fs_client and ceph_client, where the latter
   captures the mon and osd clients, and the fs_client gets the mds client
   and file system specific pieces.
 - Mount option parsing and debugfs setup is correspondingly broken into
   two pieces.
 - The mon client gets a generic handler callback for otherwise unknown
   messages (mds map, in this case).
 - The basic supported/required feature bits can be expanded (and are by
   ceph_fs_client).

No functional change, aside from some subtle error handling cases that got
cleaned up in the refactoring process.

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
2010-10-20 15:37:28 -07:00