Since last patch, sctp doesn't need to alloc memory for asoc->stream any
more. sctp_stream_new and sctp_stream_init both are used to alloc memory
for stream.in or stream.out, and their names are also confusing.
This patch is to merge them into sctp_stream_init, and only pass stream
and streamcnt parameters into it, instead of the whole asoc.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As Marcelo's suggestion, stream is a fixed size member of asoc and would
not grow with more streams. To avoid an allocation for it, this patch is
to define it as an object instead of pointer and update the places using
it, also create sctp_stream_update() called in sctp_assoc_update() to
migrate the stream info from one stream to another.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since commit 3dbcc105d5 ("sctp: alloc stream info when initializing
asoc"), stream and stream.out info are always alloced when creating
an asoc.
So it's not correct to check !asoc->stream before updating stream
info when processing dupcookie, but would be better to check asoc
state instead.
Fixes: 3dbcc105d5 ("sctp: alloc stream info when initializing asoc")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is almost to revert commit 02f3d4ce9e ("sctp: Adjust PMTU
updates to accomodate route invalidation."). As t->asoc can't be NULL
in sctp_transport_update_pmtu, it could get sk from asoc, and no need
to pass sk into that function.
It is also to remove some duplicated codes from that function.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When sending a msg without asoc established, sctp will send INIT packet
first and then enqueue chunks.
Before receiving INIT_ACK, stream info is not yet alloced. But enqueuing
chunks needs to access stream info, like out stream state and out stream
cnt.
This patch is to fix it by allocing out stream info when initializing an
asoc, allocing in stream and re-allocing out stream when processing init.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to remove the unnecessary temporary variable 'err' from
sctp_association_init.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add new transport flag to allow sockets to confirm neighbour.
When same struct dst_entry can be used for many different
neighbours we can not use it for pending confirmations.
The flag is propagated from transport to every packet.
It is reset when cached dst is reset.
Reported-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5110effee8 ("net: Do delayed neigh confirmation.")
Fixes: f2bb4bedf3 ("ipv4: Cache output routes in fib_info nexthops.")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to add sockopt SCTP_ENABLE_STREAM_RESET to get/set
strreset_enable to indicate which reconf request type it supports,
which is described in rfc6525 section 6.3.1.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to add reconf_enable field in all of asoc ep and netns
to indicate if they support stream reset.
When initializing, asoc reconf_enable get the default value from ep
reconf_enable which is from netns netns reconf_enable by default.
It is also to add reconf_capable in asoc peer part to know if peer
supports reconf_enable, the value is set if ext params have reconf
chunk support when processing init chunk, just as rfc6525 section
5.1.1 demands.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to add a per transport timer based on sctp timer frame
for stream reconf chunk retransmission. It would start after sending
a reconf request chunk, and stop after receiving the response chunk.
If the timer expires, besides retransmitting the reconf request chunk,
it would also do the same thing with data RTO timer. like to increase
the appropriate error counts, and perform threshold management, possibly
destroying the asoc if sctp retransmission thresholds are exceeded, just
as section 5.1.1 describes.
This patch is also to add asoc strreset_chunk, it is used to save the
reconf request chunk, so that it can be retransmitted, and to check if
the response is really for this request by comparing the information
inside with the response chunk as well.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to add asoc strreset_outseq and strreset_inseq for
saving the reconf request sequence, initialize them when create
assoc and process init, and also to define Incoming and Outgoing
SSN Reset Request Parameter described in rfc6525 section 4.1 and
4.2, As they can be in one same chunk as section rfc6525 3.1-3
describes, it makes them in one function.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
sctp stream reconf, described in RFC 6525, needs a structure to
save per stream information in assoc, like stream state.
In the future, sctp stream scheduler also needs it to save some
stream scheduler params and queues.
This patchset is to prepare the stream array in assoc for stream
reconf. It defines sctp_stream that includes stream arrays inside
to replace ssnmap.
Note that we use different structures for IN and OUT streams, as
the members in per OUT stream will get more and more different
from per IN stream.
v1->v2:
- put these patches into a smaller group.
v2->v3:
- define sctp_stream to contain stream arrays, and create stream.c
to put stream-related functions.
- merge 3 patches into 1, as new sctp_stream has the same name
with before.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It's possible that we receive a packet that is larger than current
window. If it's the first packet in this way, it will cause it to
increase rwnd_over. Then, if we receive another data chunk (specially as
SCTP allows you to have one data chunk in flight even during 0 window),
rwnd_over will be overwritten instead of added to.
In the long run, this could cause the window to grow bigger than its
initial size, as rwnd_over would be charged only for the last received
data chunk while the code will try open the window for all packets that
were received and had its value in rwnd_over overwritten. This, then,
can lead to the worsening of payload/buffer ratio and cause rwnd_press
to kick in more often.
The fix is to sum it too, same as is done for rwnd_press, so that if we
receive 3 chunks after closing the window, we still have to release that
same amount before re-opening it.
Log snippet from sctp_test exhibiting the issue:
[ 146.209232] sctp: sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease: asoc:ffff88013928e000
rwnd decreased by 1 to (0, 1, 114221)
[ 146.209232] sctp: sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease:
association:ffff88013928e000 has asoc->rwnd:0, asoc->rwnd_over:1!
[ 146.209232] sctp: sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease: asoc:ffff88013928e000
rwnd decreased by 1 to (0, 1, 114221)
[ 146.209232] sctp: sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease:
association:ffff88013928e000 has asoc->rwnd:0, asoc->rwnd_over:1!
[ 146.209232] sctp: sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease: asoc:ffff88013928e000
rwnd decreased by 1 to (0, 1, 114221)
[ 146.209232] sctp: sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease:
association:ffff88013928e000 has asoc->rwnd:0, asoc->rwnd_over:1!
[ 146.209232] sctp: sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease: asoc:ffff88013928e000
rwnd decreased by 1 to (0, 1, 114221)
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now sctp transport rhashtable uses hash(lport, dport, daddr) as the key
to hash a node to one chain. If in one host thousands of assocs connect
to one server with the same lport and different laddrs (although it's
not a normal case), all the transports would be hashed into the same
chain.
It may cause to keep returning -EBUSY when inserting a new node, as the
chain is too long and sctp inserts a transport node in a loop, which
could even lead to system hangs there.
The new rhlist interface works for this case that there are many nodes
with the same key in one chain. It puts them into a list then makes this
list be as a node of the chain.
This patch is to replace rhashtable_ interface with rhltable_ interface.
Since a chain would not be too long and it would not return -EBUSY with
this fix when inserting a node, the reinsert loop is also removed here.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To something more meaningful these days, specially because this is
working on packet headers or lengths and which are not tied to any CPU
arch but to the protocol itself.
So, WORD_TRUNC becomes SCTP_TRUNC4 and WORD_ROUND becomes SCTP_PAD4.
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Reported-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
According to section 4.5 of rfc7496, prsctp_enable should be per asoc.
We will add prsctp_enable to both asoc and ep, and replace the places
where it used net.sctp->prsctp_enable with asoc->prsctp_enable.
ep->prsctp_enable will be initialized with net.sctp->prsctp_enable, and
asoc->prsctp_enable will be initialized with ep->prsctp_enable. We can
also modify it's value through sockopt SCTP_PR_SUPPORTED.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
SCTP is a protocol that is aligned to a word (4 bytes). Thus using bare
MTU can sometimes return values that are not aligned, like for loopback,
which is 65536 but ipv4_mtu() limits that to 65535. This mis-alignment
will cause the last non-aligned bytes to never be used and can cause
issues with congestion control.
So it's better to just consider a lower MTU and keep congestion control
calcs saner as they are based on PMTU.
Same applies to icmp frag needed messages, which is also fixed by this
patch.
One other effect of this is the inability to send MTU-sized packet
without queueing or fragmentation and without hitting Nagle. As the
check performed at sctp_packet_can_append_data():
if (chunk->skb->len + q->out_qlen >= transport->pathmtu - packet->overhead)
/* Enough data queued to fill a packet */
return SCTP_XMIT_OK;
with the above example of MTU, if there are no other messages queued,
one cannot send a packet that just fits one packet (65532 bytes) and
without causing DATA chunk fragmentation or a delay.
v2:
- Added WORD_TRUNC macro
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently sctp_sendmsg() triggers some calls that will allocate memory
with GFP_ATOMIC even when not necessary. In the case of
sctp_packet_transmit it will allocate a linear skb that will be used to
construct the packet and this may cause sends to fail due to ENOMEM more
often than anticipated specially with big MTUs.
This patch thus allows it to inherit gfp flags from upper calls so that
it can use GFP_KERNEL if it was triggered by a sctp_sendmsg call or
similar. All others, like retransmits or flushes started from BH, are
still allocated using GFP_ATOMIC.
In netperf tests this didn't result in any performance drawbacks when
memory is not too fragmented and made it trigger ENOMEM way less often.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
prior to this patch, at the beginning if we have two paths in one assoc,
they may have the same params other than the last_time_heard, it will try
the paths like this:
1st cycle
try trans1 fail.
then trans2 is selected.(cause it's last_time_heard is after trans1).
2nd cycle:
try trans2 fail
then trans2 is selected.(cause it's last_time_heard is after trans1).
3rd cycle:
try trans2 fail
then trans2 is selected.(cause it's last_time_heard is after trans1).
....
trans1 will never have change to be selected, which is not what we expect.
we should keeping round robin all the paths if they are just added at the
beginning.
So at first every tranport's last_time_heard should be initialized 0, so
that we ensure they have the same value at the beginning, only by this,
all the transports could get equal chance to be selected.
Then for sctp_trans_elect_best, it should return the trans_next one when
*trans == *trans_next, so that we can try next if it fails, but now it
always return trans. so we can fix it by exchanging these two params when
we calls sctp_trans_elect_tie().
Fixes: 4c47af4d5e ('net: sctp: rework multihoming retransmission path selection to rfc4960')
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
apply lookup apis to two functions, for __sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc
and __sctp_lookup_association, it's invoked in the protection of sock
lock, it will be safe, but sctp_lookup_association need to call
rcu_read_lock() and to detect the t->dead to protect it.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
__GFP_WAIT has been used to identify atomic context in callers that hold
spinlocks or are in interrupts. They are expected to be high priority and
have access one of two watermarks lower than "min" which can be referred
to as the "atomic reserve". __GFP_HIGH users get access to the first
lower watermark and can be called the "high priority reserve".
Over time, callers had a requirement to not block when fallback options
were available. Some have abused __GFP_WAIT leading to a situation where
an optimisitic allocation with a fallback option can access atomic
reserves.
This patch uses __GFP_ATOMIC to identify callers that are truely atomic,
cannot sleep and have no alternative. High priority users continue to use
__GFP_HIGH. __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM identifies callers that can sleep and
are willing to enter direct reclaim. __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM to identify
callers that want to wake kswapd for background reclaim. __GFP_WAIT is
redefined as a caller that is willing to enter direct reclaim and wake
kswapd for background reclaim.
This patch then converts a number of sites
o __GFP_ATOMIC is used by callers that are high priority and have memory
pools for those requests. GFP_ATOMIC uses this flag.
o Callers that have a limited mempool to guarantee forward progress clear
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM but keep __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM. bio allocations fall
into this category where kswapd will still be woken but atomic reserves
are not used as there is a one-entry mempool to guarantee progress.
o Callers that are checking if they are non-blocking should use the
helper gfpflags_allow_blocking() where possible. This is because
checking for __GFP_WAIT as was done historically now can trigger false
positives. Some exceptions like dm-crypt.c exist where the code intent
is clearer if __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM is used instead of the helper due to
flag manipulations.
o Callers that built their own GFP flags instead of starting with GFP_KERNEL
and friends now also need to specify __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM.
The first key hazard to watch out for is callers that removed __GFP_WAIT
and was depending on access to atomic reserves for inconspicuous reasons.
In some cases it may be appropriate for them to use __GFP_HIGH.
The second key hazard is callers that assembled their own combination of
GFP flags instead of starting with something like GFP_KERNEL. They may
now wish to specify __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM. It's almost certainly harmless
if it's missed in most cases as other activity will wake kswapd.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Seemingly innocuous sctp_trans_state_to_prio_map[] array
is way bigger than it looks, since
"[SCTP_UNKNOWN] = 2" expands into "[0xffff] = 2" !
This patch replaces it with switch() statement.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The kfree() function tests whether its argument is NULL and then
returns immediately. Thus the test around the call is not needed.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-By: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c6 ("net: sctp: inherit
auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c6 ...
[ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
[ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
[ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
[ 534.939704] Call Trace:
[ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
[ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
[ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
[ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
[ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
... or depending on the the application, for example this one:
[ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
[ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
[ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
[ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
[ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
[ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:
[ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten
[ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
[ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
[ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
[ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
[ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
[ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
[ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230
[ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40
[ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
[ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
[ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]
Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).
Reference counting of auth keys revisited:
Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.
User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a
("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.
Fixes: 730fc3d05c ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In SCTP, selection of active (T.ACT) and retransmission (T.RET)
transports is being done whenever transport control operations
(UP, DOWN, PF, ...) are engaged through sctp_assoc_control_transport().
Commits 4c47af4d5e ("net: sctp: rework multihoming retransmission
path selection to rfc4960") and a7288c4dd5 ("net: sctp: improve
sctp_select_active_and_retran_path selection") have both improved
it towards a more fine-grained and optimal path selection.
Currently, the selection algorithm for T.ACT and T.RET is as follows:
1) Elect the two most recently used ACTIVE transports T1, T2 for
T.ACT, T.RET, where T.ACT<-T1 and T1 is most recently used
2) In case primary path T.PRI not in {T1, T2} but ACTIVE, set
T.ACT<-T.PRI and T.RET<-T1
3) If only T1 is ACTIVE from the set, set T.ACT<-T1 and T.RET<-T1
4) If none is ACTIVE, set T.ACT<-best(T.PRI, T.RET, T3) where
T3 is the most recently used (if avail) in PF, set T.RET<-T.PRI
Prior to above commits, 4) was simply a camp on T.ACT<-T.PRI and
T.RET<-T.PRI, ignoring possible paths in PF. Camping on T.PRI is
still slightly suboptimal as it can lead to the following scenario:
Setup:
<A> <B>
T1: p1p1 (10.0.10.10) <==> .'`) <==> p1p1 (10.0.10.12) <= T.PRI
T2: p1p2 (10.0.10.20) <==> (_ . ) <==> p1p2 (10.0.10.22)
net.sctp.rto_min = 1000
net.sctp.path_max_retrans = 2
net.sctp.pf_retrans = 0
net.sctp.hb_interval = 1000
T.PRI is permanently down, T2 is put briefly into PF state (e.g. due to
link flapping). Here, the first time transmission is sent over PF path
T2 as it's the only non-INACTIVE path, but the retransmitted data-chunks
are sent over the INACTIVE path T1 (T.PRI), which is not good.
After the patch, it's choosing better transports in both cases by
modifying step 4):
4) If none is ACTIVE, set T.ACT_new<-best(T.ACT_old, T3) where T3 is
the most recently used (if avail) in PF, set T.RET<-T.ACT_new
This will still select a best possible path in PF if available (which
can also include T.PRI/T.RET), and set both T.ACT/T.RET to it.
In case sctp_assoc_control_transport() *just* put T.ACT_old into INACTIVE
as it transitioned from ACTIVE->PF->INACTIVE and stays in INACTIVE just
for a very short while before going back ACTIVE, it will guarantee that
this path will be reselected for T.ACT/T.RET since T3 (PF) is not
available.
Previously, this was not possible, as we would only select between T.PRI
and T.RET, and a possible T3 would be NULL due to the fact that we have
just transitioned T3 in sctp_assoc_control_transport() from PF->INACTIVE
and would select a suboptimal path when T.PRI/T.RET have worse properties.
In the case that T.ACT_old permanently went to INACTIVE during this
transition and there's no PF path available, plus T.PRI and T.RET are
INACTIVE as well, we would now camp on T.ACT_old, but if everything is
being INACTIVE there's really not much we can do except hoping for a
successful HB to bring one of the transports back up again and, thus
cause a new selection through sctp_assoc_control_transport().
Now both tests work fine:
Case 1:
1. T1 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT
T2 S(ACTIVE) T.RET
2. T1 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET
T2 S(PF)
3. T1 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET
T2 S(INACTIVE)
5. T1 S(PF) T.ACT, T.RET
T2 S(INACTIVE)
[ 5.1 T1 S(INACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET
T2 S(INACTIVE) ]
6. T1 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET
T2 S(INACTIVE)
7. T1 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT
T2 S(ACTIVE) T.RET
Case 2:
1. T1 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT
T2 S(ACTIVE) T.RET
2. T1 S(PF)
T2 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET
3. T1 S(INACTIVE)
T2 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET
5. T1 S(INACTIVE)
T2 S(PF) T.ACT, T.RET
[ 5.1 T1 S(INACTIVE)
T2 S(INACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET ]
6. T1 S(INACTIVE)
T2 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT, T.RET
7. T1 S(ACTIVE) T.ACT
T2 S(ACTIVE) T.RET
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When both transports are the same, we don't have to go down that
road only to realize that we will return the very same transport.
We are guaranteed that curr is always non-NULL. Therefore, just
short-circuit this special case.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since the transport has always been in state SCTP_UNCONFIRMED, it
therefore wasn't active before and hasn't been used before, and it
always has been, so it is unnecessary to bug the user with a
notification.
Reported-by: Deepak Khandelwal <khandelwal.deepak.1987@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <Yanjun.Zhu@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7 ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05c ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Consider the scenario:
For a TCP-style socket, while processing the COOKIE_ECHO chunk in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(), after it has passed a series of sanity check,
a new association would be created in sctp_unpack_cookie(), but afterwards,
some processing maybe failed, and sctp_association_free() will be called to
free the previously allocated association, in sctp_association_free(),
sk_ack_backlog value is decremented for this socket, since the initial
value for sk_ack_backlog is 0, after the decrement, it will be 65535,
a wrap-around problem happens, and if we want to establish new associations
afterward in the same socket, ABORT would be triggered since sctp deem the
accept queue as full.
Fix this issue by only decrementing sk_ack_backlog for associations in
the endpoint's list.
Fix-suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fixes the following sparse warning:
net/sctp/associola.c:1556:29: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different base types)
net/sctp/associola.c:1556:29: expected bool [unsigned] [usertype] preload
net/sctp/associola.c:1556:29: got restricted gfp_t
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In function sctp_select_active_and_retran_path(), we walk the
transport list in order to look for the two most recently used
ACTIVE transports (trans_pri, trans_sec). In case we didn't find
anything ACTIVE, we currently just camp on a possibly PF or
INACTIVE transport that is primary path; this behavior actually
dates back to linux-history tree of the very early days of
lksctp, and can yield a behavior that chooses suboptimal
transport paths.
Instead, be a bit more clever by reusing and extending the
recently introduced sctp_trans_elect_best() handler. In case
both transports are evaluated to have the same score resulting
from their states, break the tie by looking at: 1) transport
patch error count 2) last_time_heard value from each transport.
This is analogous to Nishida's Quick Failover draft [1],
section 5.1, 3:
The sender SHOULD avoid data transmission to PF destinations.
When all destinations are in either PF or Inactive state,
the sender MAY either move the destination from PF to active
state (and transmit data to the active destination) or the
sender MAY transmit data to a PF destination. In the former
scenario, (i) the sender MUST NOT notify the ULP about the
state transition, and (ii) MUST NOT clear the destination's
error counter. It is recommended that the sender picks the
PF destination with least error count (fewest consecutive
timeouts) for data transmission. In case of a tie (multiple PF
destinations with same error count), the sender MAY choose the
last active destination.
Thus for sctp_select_active_and_retran_path(), we keep track of
the best, if any, transport that is in PF state and in case no
ACTIVE transport has been found (hence trans_{pri,sec} is NULL),
we select the best out of the three: current primary_path and
retran_path as well as a possible PF transport.
The secondary may still camp on the original primary_path as
before. The change in sctp_trans_elect_best() with a more fine
grained tie selection also improves at the same time path selection
for sctp_assoc_update_retran_path() in case of non-ACTIVE states.
[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nishida-tsvwg-sctp-failover-05
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Be more precise in transport path selection and use ktime
helpers instead of jiffies to compare and pick the better
primary and secondary recently used transports. This also
avoids any side-effects during a possible roll-over, and
could lead to better path decision-making.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch just refactors and moves the code for the active
path selection into its own helper function outside of
sctp_assoc_control_transport() which is already big enough.
No functional changes here.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is basically just to let Coverity et al shut up. Remove an
unneeded NULL check in sctp_assoc_update_retran_path().
It is safe to remove it, because in sctp_assoc_update_retran_path()
we iterate over the list of transports, our own transport which is
asoc->peer.retran_path included. In the iteration, we skip the
list head element and transports in state SCTP_UNCONFIRMED.
Such transports came from peer addresses received in INIT/INIT-ACK
address parameters. They are not yet confirmed by a heartbeat and
not available for data transfers.
We know however that in the list of transports, even if it contains
such elements, it at least contains our asoc->peer.retran_path as
well, so even if next to that element, we only encounter
SCTP_UNCONFIRMED transports, we are always going to fall back to
asoc->peer.retran_path through sctp_trans_elect_best(), as that is
for sure not SCTP_UNCONFIRMED as per fbdf501c93 ("sctp: Do no
select unconfirmed transports for retransmissions").
Whenever we call sctp_trans_elect_best() it will give us a non-NULL
element back, and therefore when we break out of the loop, we are
guaranteed to have a non-NULL transport pointer, and can remove
the NULL check.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Problem statement: 1) both paths (primary path1 and alternate
path2) are up after the association has been established i.e.,
HB packets are normally exchanged, 2) path2 gets inactive after
path_max_retrans * max_rto timed out (i.e. path2 is down completely),
3) now, if a transmission times out on the only surviving/active
path1 (any ~1sec network service impact could cause this like
a channel bonding failover), then the retransmitted packets are
sent over the inactive path2; this happens with partial failover
and without it.
Besides not being optimal in the above scenario, a small failure
or timeout in the only existing path has the potential to cause
long delays in the retransmission (depending on RTO_MAX) until
the still active path is reselected. Further, when the T3-timeout
occurs, we have active_patch == retrans_path, and even though the
timeout occurred on the initial transmission of data, not a
retransmit, we end up updating retransmit path.
RFC4960, section 6.4. "Multi-Homed SCTP Endpoints" states under
6.4.1. "Failover from an Inactive Destination Address" the
following:
Some of the transport addresses of a multi-homed SCTP endpoint
may become inactive due to either the occurrence of certain
error conditions (see Section 8.2) or adjustments from the
SCTP user.
When there is outbound data to send and the primary path
becomes inactive (e.g., due to failures), or where the SCTP
user explicitly requests to send data to an inactive
destination transport address, before reporting an error to
its ULP, the SCTP endpoint should try to send the data to an
alternate __active__ destination transport address if one
exists.
When retransmitting data that timed out, if the endpoint is
multihomed, it should consider each source-destination address
pair in its retransmission selection policy. When retransmitting
timed-out data, the endpoint should attempt to pick the most
divergent source-destination pair from the original
source-destination pair to which the packet was transmitted.
Note: Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination
pair are an implementation decision and are not specified
within this document.
So, we should first reconsider to take the current active
retransmission transport if we cannot find an alternative
active one. If all of that fails, we can still round robin
through unkown, partial failover, and inactive ones in the
hope to find something still suitable.
Commit 4141ddc02a ("sctp: retran_path update bug fix") broke
that behaviour by selecting the next inactive transport when
no other active transport was found besides the current assoc's
peer.retran_path. Before commit 4141ddc02a, we would have
traversed through the list until we reach our peer.retran_path
again, and in case that is still in state SCTP_ACTIVE, we would
take it and return. Only if that is not the case either, we
take the next inactive transport.
Besides all that, another issue is that transports in state
SCTP_UNKNOWN could be preferred over transports in state
SCTP_ACTIVE in case a SCTP_ACTIVE transport appears after
SCTP_UNKNOWN in the transport list yielding a weaker transport
state to be used in retransmission.
This patch mostly reverts 4141ddc02a, but also rewrites
this function to introduce more clarity and strictness into
the code. A strict priority of transport states is enforced
in this patch, hence selection is active > unkown > partial
failover > inactive.
Fixes: 4141ddc02a ("sctp: retran_path update bug fix")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Implementation of (a)rwnd calculation might lead to severe performance issues
and associations completely stalling. These problems are described and solution
is proposed which improves lksctp's robustness in congestion state.
1) Sudden drop of a_rwnd and incomplete window recovery afterwards
Data accounted in sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease takes only payload size (sctp data),
but size of sk_buff, which is blamed against receiver buffer, is not accounted
in rwnd. Theoretically, this should not be the problem as actual size of buffer
is double the amount requested on the socket (SO_RECVBUF). Problem here is
that this will have bad scaling for data which is less then sizeof sk_buff.
E.g. in 4G (LTE) networks, link interfacing radio side will have a large portion
of traffic of this size (less then 100B).
An example of sudden drop and incomplete window recovery is given below. Node B
exhibits problematic behavior. Node A initiates association and B is configured
to advertise rwnd of 10000. A sends messages of size 43B (size of typical sctp
message in 4G (LTE) network). On B data is left in buffer by not reading socket
in userspace.
Lets examine when we will hit pressure state and declare rwnd to be 0 for
scenario with above stated parameters (rwnd == 10000, chunk size == 43, each
chunk is sent in separate sctp packet)
Logic is implemented in sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease:
socket_buffer (see below) is maximum size which can be held in socket buffer
(sk_rcvbuf). current_alloced is amount of data currently allocated (rx_count)
A simple expression is given for which it will be examined after how many
packets for above stated parameters we enter pressure state:
We start by condition which has to be met in order to enter pressure state:
socket_buffer < currently_alloced;
currently_alloced is represented as size of sctp packets received so far and not
yet delivered to userspace. x is the number of chunks/packets (since there is no
bundling, and each chunk is delivered in separate packet, we can observe each
chunk also as sctp packet, and what is important here, having its own sk_buff):
socket_buffer < x*each_sctp_packet;
each_sctp_packet is sctp chunk size + sizeof(struct sk_buff). socket_buffer is
twice the amount of initially requested size of socket buffer, which is in case
of sctp, twice the a_rwnd requested:
2*rwnd < x*(payload+sizeof(struc sk_buff));
sizeof(struct sk_buff) is 190 (3.13.0-rc4+). Above is stated that rwnd is 10000
and each payload size is 43
20000 < x(43+190);
x > 20000/233;
x ~> 84;
After ~84 messages, pressure state is entered and 0 rwnd is advertised while
received 84*43B ~= 3612B sctp data. This is why external observer notices sudden
drop from 6474 to 0, as it will be now shown in example:
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 1875509148] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 1096057017]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3198966556] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 902132839]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057017] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057017] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057018] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057018] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057019] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 2] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057019] [a_rwnd 9914] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
<...>
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057098] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 81] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057098] [a_rwnd 6517] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057099] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 82] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057099] [a_rwnd 6474] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057100] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 83] [PPID 0x18]
--> Sudden drop
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
At this point, rwnd_press stores current rwnd value so it can be later restored
in sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase. This however doesn't happen as condition to start
slowly increasing rwnd until rwnd_press is returned to rwnd is never met. This
condition is not met since rwnd, after it hit 0, must first reach rwnd_press by
adding amount which is read from userspace. Let us observe values in above
example. Initial a_rwnd is 10000, pressure was hit when rwnd was ~6500 and the
amount of actual sctp data currently waiting to be delivered to userspace
is ~3500. When userspace starts to read, sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase will be blamed
only for sctp data, which is ~3500. Condition is never met, and when userspace
reads all data, rwnd stays on 3569.
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 1505] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 3010] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057101] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 84] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057101] [a_rwnd 3569] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> At this point userspace read everything, rwnd recovered only to 3569
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057102] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 85] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057102] [a_rwnd 3569] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
Reproduction is straight forward, it is enough for sender to send packets of
size less then sizeof(struct sk_buff) and receiver keeping them in its buffers.
2) Minute size window for associations sharing the same socket buffer
In case multiple associations share the same socket, and same socket buffer
(sctp.rcvbuf_policy == 0), different scenarios exist in which congestion on one
of the associations can permanently drop rwnd of other association(s).
Situation will be typically observed as one association suddenly having rwnd
dropped to size of last packet received and never recovering beyond that point.
Different scenarios will lead to it, but all have in common that one of the
associations (let it be association from 1)) nearly depleted socket buffer, and
the other association blames socket buffer just for the amount enough to start
the pressure. This association will enter pressure state, set rwnd_press and
announce 0 rwnd.
When data is read by userspace, similar situation as in 1) will occur, rwnd will
increase just for the size read by userspace but rwnd_press will be high enough
so that association doesn't have enough credit to reach rwnd_press and restore
to previous state. This case is special case of 1), being worse as there is, in
the worst case, only one packet in buffer for which size rwnd will be increased.
Consequence is association which has very low maximum rwnd ('minute size', in
our case down to 43B - size of packet which caused pressure) and as such
unusable.
Scenario happened in the field and labs frequently after congestion state (link
breaks, different probabilities of packet drop, packet reordering) and with
scenario 1) preceding. Here is given a deterministic scenario for reproduction:
>From node A establish two associations on the same socket, with rcvbuf_policy
being set to share one common buffer (sctp.rcvbuf_policy == 0). On association 1
repeat scenario from 1), that is, bring it down to 0 and restore up. Observe
scenario 1). Use small payload size (here we use 43). Once rwnd is 'recovered',
bring it down close to 0, as in just one more packet would close it. This has as
a consequence that association number 2 is able to receive (at least) one more
packet which will bring it in pressure state. E.g. if association 2 had rwnd of
10000, packet received was 43, and we enter at this point into pressure,
rwnd_press will have 9957. Once payload is delivered to userspace, rwnd will
increase for 43, but conditions to restore rwnd to original state, just as in
1), will never be satisfied.
--> Association 1, between A.y and B.12345
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 836880897] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 4032536569]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 2873310749] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3799315613]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
--> Association 2, between A.z and B.12346
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 534798321] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 2099285173]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 516668823] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3676403240]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
--> Deplete socket buffer by sending messages of size 43B over association 1
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315613] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315613] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
<...>
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315696] [a_rwnd 6388] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315697] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 84] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315697] [a_rwnd 6345] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Sudden drop on 1
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315698] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 85] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315698] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Here userspace read, rwnd 'recovered' to 3698, now deplete again using
association 1 so there is place in buffer for only one more packet
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315799] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 186] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315799] [a_rwnd 86] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315800] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 187] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 43] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Socket buffer is almost depleted, but there is space for one more packet,
send them over association 2, size 43B
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3676403240] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3676403240] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Immediate drop
IP A.60995 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 387491510] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Read everything from the socket, both association recover up to maximum rwnd
they are capable of reaching, note that association 1 recovered up to 3698,
and association 2 recovered only to 43
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 1548] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 3053] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315801] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 188] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315801] [a_rwnd 3698] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3676403241] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3676403241] [a_rwnd 43] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
A careful reader might wonder why it is necessary to reproduce 1) prior
reproduction of 2). It is simply easier to observe when to send packet over
association 2 which will push association into the pressure state.
Proposed solution:
Both problems share the same root cause, and that is improper scaling of socket
buffer with rwnd. Solution in which sizeof(sk_buff) is taken into concern while
calculating rwnd is not possible due to fact that there is no linear
relationship between amount of data blamed in increase/decrease with IP packet
in which payload arrived. Even in case such solution would be followed,
complexity of the code would increase. Due to nature of current rwnd handling,
slow increase (in sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase) of rwnd after pressure state is
entered is rationale, but it gives false representation to the sender of current
buffer space. Furthermore, it implements additional congestion control mechanism
which is defined on implementation, and not on standard basis.
Proposed solution simplifies whole algorithm having on mind definition from rfc:
o Receiver Window (rwnd): This gives the sender an indication of the space
available in the receiver's inbound buffer.
Core of the proposed solution is given with these lines:
sctp_assoc_rwnd_update:
if ((asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) > 0)
asoc->rwnd = (asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) >> 1;
else
asoc->rwnd = 0;
We advertise to sender (half of) actual space we have. Half is in the braces
depending whether you would like to observe size of socket buffer as SO_RECVBUF
or twice the amount, i.e. size is the one visible from userspace, that is,
from kernelspace.
In this way sender is given with good approximation of our buffer space,
regardless of the buffer policy - we always advertise what we have. Proposed
solution fixes described problems and removes necessity for rwnd restoration
algorithm. Finally, as proposed solution is simplification, some lines of code,
along with some bytes in struct sctp_association are saved.
Version 2 of the patch addressed comments from Vlad. Name of the function is set
to be more descriptive, and two parts of code are changed, in one removing the
superfluous call to sctp_assoc_rwnd_update since call would not result in update
of rwnd, and the other being reordering of the code in a way that call to
sctp_assoc_rwnd_update updates rwnd. Version 3 corrected change introduced in v2
in a way that existing function is not reordered/copied in line, but it is
correctly called. Thanks Vlad for suggesting.
Signed-off-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
drivers/net/macvtap.c
Both minor merge hassles, simple overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, sctp associations latch a sockets autoclose value to an association
at association init time, subject to capping constraints from the max_autoclose
sysctl value. This leads to an odd situation where an application may set a
socket level autoclose timeout, but sliently sctp will limit the autoclose
timeout to something less than that.
Fix this by modifying the autoclose setsockopt function to check the limit, cap
it and warn the user via syslog that the timeout is capped. This will allow
getsockopt to return valid autoclose timeout values that reflect what subsequent
associations actually use.
While were at it, also elimintate the assoc->autoclose variable, it duplicates
whats in the timeout array, which leads to multiple sources for the same
information, that may differ (as the former isn't subject to any capping). This
gives us the timeout information in a canonical place and saves some space in
the association structure as well.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
fix some typos
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
sctp_peer_needs_update only return 0 or 1.
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make the code more simplification.
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kzalloc had initialize the allocated memroy. Therefore, remove the
initialize with 0 and the memset.
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Several files refer to an old address for the Free Software Foundation
in the file header comment. Resolve by replacing the address with
the URL <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> so that we do not have to keep
updating the header comments anytime the address changes.
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When a transport recovers due to the new coming sack, SCTP should
iterate all of its transport_list to locate the __two__ most recently used
transport and set to active_path and retran_path respectively. The exising
code does not find the two properly - In case of the following list:
[most-recent] -> [2nd-most-recent] -> ...
Both active_path and retran_path would be set to the 1st element.
The bug happens when:
1) multi-homing
2) failure/partial_failure transport recovers
Both active_path and retran_path would be set to the same most-recent one, in
other words, retran_path would not take its role - an end user might not even
notice this issue.
Signed-off-by: Chang Xiangzhong <changxiangzhong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
fix some typos
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The SCTP Quick failover draft [1] section 5.1, point 5 says that the cwnd
should be 1 MTU. So, instead of 1, set it to 1 MTU.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nishida-tsvwg-sctp-failover-05
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
