This patch moves pmd dissection out of reporting loop: huge pages are
reported as bunch of normal pages with contiguous PFNs.
Add missing "FILE" bit in hugetlb vmas.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch removes page-shift bits (scheduled to remove since 3.11) and
completes migration to the new bit layout. Also it cleans messy macro.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patchset makes pagemap useable again in the safe way (after row
hammer bug it was made CAP_SYS_ADMIN-only). This patchset restores access
for non-privileged users but hides PFNs from them.
Also it adds bit 'map-exclusive' which is set if page is mapped only here:
it helps in estimation of working set without exposing pfns and allows to
distinguish CoWed and non-CoWed private anonymous pages.
Second patch removes page-shift bits and completes migration to the new
pagemap format: flags soft-dirty and mmap-exclusive are available only in
the new format.
This patch (of 5):
This patch moves permission checks from pagemap_read() into pagemap_open().
Pointer to mm is saved in file->private_data. This reference pins only
mm_struct itself. /proc/*/mem, maps, smaps already work in the same way.
See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFyKpWrt_Ajzh1rzp_GcwZ4=6Y=kOv8hBz172CFJp6L8Tg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
These two flags gets set in vma->vm_flags to tell the VM common code
if the userfaultfd is armed and in which mode (only tracking missing
faults, only tracking wrprotect faults or both). If neither flags is
set it means the userfaultfd is not armed on the vma.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
are only secure because such files do not exist.
It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
/proc/<pid>/ns/*.
It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.
Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that
application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
on /sys/fs/cgroup.
The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the
last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Two families of fixes:
- Fix an FPU context related boot crash on newer x86 hardware with
larger context sizes than what most people test. To fix this
without ugly kludges or extensive reverts we had to touch core task
allocator, to allow x86 to determine the task size dynamically, at
boot time.
I've tested it on a number of x86 platforms, and I cross-built it
to a handful of architectures:
(warns) (warns)
testing x86-64: -git: pass ( 0), -tip: pass ( 0)
testing x86-32: -git: pass ( 0), -tip: pass ( 0)
testing arm: -git: pass ( 1359), -tip: pass ( 1359)
testing cris: -git: pass ( 1031), -tip: pass ( 1031)
testing m32r: -git: pass ( 1135), -tip: pass ( 1135)
testing m68k: -git: pass ( 1471), -tip: pass ( 1471)
testing mips: -git: pass ( 1162), -tip: pass ( 1162)
testing mn10300: -git: pass ( 1058), -tip: pass ( 1058)
testing parisc: -git: pass ( 1846), -tip: pass ( 1846)
testing sparc: -git: pass ( 1185), -tip: pass ( 1185)
... so I hope the cross-arch impact 'none', as intended.
(by Dave Hansen)
- Fix various NMI handling related bugs unearthed by the big asm code
rewrite and generally make the NMI code more robust and more
maintainable while at it. These changes are a bit late in the
cycle, I hope they are still acceptable.
(by Andy Lutomirski)"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/fpu, sched: Introduce CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT and use it on x86
x86/fpu, sched: Dynamically allocate 'struct fpu'
x86/entry/64, x86/nmi/64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY NMI testing code
x86/nmi/64: Make the "NMI executing" variable more consistent
x86/nmi/64: Minor asm simplification
x86/nmi/64: Use DF to avoid userspace RSP confusing nested NMI detection
x86/nmi/64: Reorder nested NMI checks
x86/nmi/64: Improve nested NMI comments
x86/nmi/64: Switch stacks on userspace NMI entry
x86/nmi/64: Remove asm code that saves CR2
x86/nmi: Enable nested do_nmi() handling for 64-bit kernels
Don't burden architectures without dynamic task_struct sizing
with the overhead of dynamic sizing.
Also optimize the x86 code a bit by caching task_struct_size.
Acked-and-Tested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-3-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The FPU rewrite removed the dynamic allocations of 'struct fpu'.
But, this potentially wastes massive amounts of memory (2k per
task on systems that do not have AVX-512 for instance).
Instead of having a separate slab, this patch just appends the
space that we need to the 'task_struct' which we dynamically
allocate already. This saves from doing an extra slab
allocation at fork().
The only real downside here is that we have to stick everything
and the end of the task_struct. But, I think the
BUILD_BUG_ON()s I stuck in there should keep that from being too
fragile.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-2-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
/proc/*/cmdline code checks if it should look at ENVP area by checking
last byte of ARGV area:
rv = access_remote_vm(mm, arg_end - 1, &c, 1, 0);
if (rv <= 0)
goto out_free_page;
If ARGV is somehow made empty (by doing execve(..., NULL, ...) or
manually setting ->arg_start and ->arg_end to equal values), the decision
will be based on byte which doesn't even belong to ARGV/ENVP.
So, quickly check if ARGV area is empty and report 0 to match previous
behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The purpose of the option was documented in
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt but the help text was missing.
Add small help text that also points to the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
stuff). UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle). 9P fixes.
fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"
[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups". The
file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge. - Linus ]
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
dax: Add block size note to documentation
fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()
fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
make simple_positive() public
ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
remove the pointless include of lglock.h
fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate
fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
...
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Debug info and other statistics fixes and related enhancements"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/numa: Fix numa balancing stats in /proc/pid/sched
sched/numa: Show numa_group ID in /proc/sched_debug task listings
sched/debug: Move print_cfs_rq() declaration to kernel/sched/sched.h
sched/stat: Expose /proc/pid/schedstat if CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y
sched/stat: Simplify the sched_info accounting dependency
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.
Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.
There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems
mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree
directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories
for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container
projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.
This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime,
read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
attributes remains for another time.
This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of
/proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
converted) and is not now actively wrong.
There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
I will mention briefly.
It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user
namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly
so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
performance part of pathname resolution.
As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
they are recognized"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
Add a new function proc_create_mount_point that when used to creates a
directory that can not be added to.
Add a new function is_empty_pde to test if a function is a mount
point.
Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting
a permanently empty directory to the vfs.
Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.
Update /proc/openprom and /proc/fs/nfsd to be permanently empty directories.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Add a magic sysctl table sysctl_mount_point that when used to
create a directory forces that directory to be permanently empty.
Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when accessing permanently
empty directories.
Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.
Update /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc to be a permanently empty directory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Commit 818411616b ("fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children
entry") introduced the children entry for checkpoint restore and the
file is only available on kernels configured with CONFIG_EXPERT and
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
This is available in most distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, CoreOS)
because they usually enable CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
But Arch does not enable CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
However, the children proc file is useful outside of checkpoint restore.
I would like to use it in rkt. The rkt process exec() another program
it does not control, and that other program will fork()+exec() a child
process. I would like to find the pid of the child process from an
external tool without iterating in /proc over all processes to find
which one has a parent pid equal to rkt.
This commit introduces CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN and makes
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE select it. This allows enabling
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children without needing to enable
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and CONFIG_EXPERT.
Alban tested that /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children is present when the
kernel is configured with CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y but without
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com>
Tested-by: Alban Crequy <alban@endocode.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <djalal@endocode.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
/proc/$PID/cmdline truncates output at PAGE_SIZE. It is easy to see with
$ cat /proc/self/cmdline $(seq 1037) 2>/dev/null
However, command line size was never limited to PAGE_SIZE but to 128 KB
and relatively recently limitation was removed altogether.
People noticed and ask questions:
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/199130/how-do-i-increase-the-proc-pid-cmdline-4096-byte-limit
seq file interface is not OK, because it kmalloc's for whole output and
open + read(, 1) + sleep will pin arbitrary amounts of kernel memory. To
not do that, limit must be imposed which is incompatible with arbitrary
sized command lines.
I apologize for hairy code, but this it direct consequence of command line
layout in memory and hacks to support things like "init [3]".
The loops are "unrolled" otherwise it is either macros which hide control
flow or functions with 7-8 arguments with equal line count.
There should be real setproctitle(2) or something.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix a billion min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Allowing watchdog threads to be parked means that we now have the
opportunity of actually seeing persistent parked threads in the output
of /proc/<pid>/stat and /proc/<pid>/status. The existing code reported
such threads as "Running", which is kind-of true if you think of the
case where we park them as part of taking cpus offline. But if we allow
parking them indefinitely, "Running" is pretty misleading, so we report
them as "Sleeping" instead.
We could simply report them with a new string, "Parked", but it feels
like it's a bit risky for userspace to see unexpected new values; the
output is already documented in Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt, and
it seems like a mistake to change that lightly.
The scheduler does report parked tasks with a "P" in debugging output
from sched_show_task() or dump_cpu_task(), but that's a different API.
Similarly, the trace_ctxwake_* routines report a "P" for parked tasks,
but again, different API.
This change seemed slightly cleaner than updating the task_state_array
to have additional rows. TASK_DEAD should be subsumed by the exit_state
bits; TASK_WAKEKILL is just a modifier; and TASK_WAKING can very
reasonably be reported as "Running" (as it is now). Only TASK_PARKED
shows up with unreasonable output here.
Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount. Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags. Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.
Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.
Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
a) instead of storing the symlink body (via nd_set_link()) and returning
an opaque pointer later passed to ->put_link(), ->follow_link() _stores_
that opaque pointer (into void * passed by address by caller) and returns
the symlink body. Returning ERR_PTR() on error, NULL on jump (procfs magic
symlinks) and pointer to symlink body for normal symlinks. Stored pointer
is ignored in all cases except the last one.
Storing NULL for opaque pointer (or not storing it at all) means no call
of ->put_link().
b) the body used to be passed to ->put_link() implicitly (via nameidata).
Now only the opaque pointer is. In the cases when we used the symlink body
to free stuff, ->follow_link() now should store it as opaque pointer in addition
to returning it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in
its fdinfo file.
Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock. We
can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there
can be wrong. For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and
dies. In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be
reused by another process.
$ cat /proc/locks
...
6: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF
...
$ ps -C rpcbind
PID TTY TIME CMD
332 ? 00:00:00 rpcbind
$ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4
pos: 0
flags: 0100000
mnt_id: 22
lock: 1: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF
$ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4
lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar 5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock
$ ls -l /proc/324/fd/
total 0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0
You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock.
This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file
locks.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused,
will eventually be converted to void.
See: commit 1f33c41c03 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
seq_has_overflowed() and make public")
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The current semantics of string_escape_mem are inadequate for one of its
current users, vsnprintf(). If that is to honour its contract, it must
know how much space would be needed for the entire escaped buffer, and
string_escape_mem provides no way of obtaining that (short of allocating a
large enough buffer (~4 times input string) to let it play with, and
that's definitely a big no-no inside vsnprintf).
So change the semantics for string_escape_mem to be more snprintf-like:
Return the size of the output that would be generated if the destination
buffer was big enough, but of course still only write to the part of dst
it is allowed to, and (contrary to snprintf) don't do '\0'-termination.
It is then up to the caller to detect whether output was truncated and to
append a '\0' if desired. Also, we must output partial escape sequences,
otherwise a call such as snprintf(buf, 3, "%1pE", "\123") would cause
printf to write a \0 to buf[2] but leaving buf[0] and buf[1] with whatever
they previously contained.
This also fixes a bug in the escaped_string() helper function, which used
to unconditionally pass a length of "end-buf" to string_escape_mem();
since the latter doesn't check osz for being insanely large, it would
happily write to dst. For example, kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "something and
then %pE", ...); is an easy way to trigger an oops.
In test-string_helpers.c, the -ENOMEM test is replaced with testing for
getting the expected return value even if the buffer is too small. We
also ensure that nothing is written (by relying on a NULL pointer deref)
if the output size is 0 by passing NULL - this has to work for
kasprintf("%pE") to work.
In net/sunrpc/cache.c, I think qword_add still has the same semantics.
Someone should definitely double-check this.
In fs/proc/array.c, I made the minimum possible change, but longer-term it
should stop poking around in seq_file internals.
[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: simplify qword_add]
[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: add missed curly braces]
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If some issues occurred inside a container guest, host user could not know
which process is in trouble just by guest pid: the users of container
guest only knew the pid inside containers. This will bring obstacle for
trouble shooting.
This patch adds four fields: NStgid, NSpid, NSpgid and NSsid:
a) In init_pid_ns, nothing changed;
b) In one pidns, will tell the pid inside containers:
NStgid: 21776 5 1
NSpid: 21776 5 1
NSpgid: 21776 5 1
NSsid: 21729 1 0
** Process id is 21776 in level 0, 5 in level 1, 1 in level 2.
c) If pidns is nested, it depends on which pidns are you in.
NStgid: 5 1
NSpid: 5 1
NSpgid: 5 1
NSsid: 1 0
** Views from level 1
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add CONFIG_PID_NS ifdef]
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Scott <nathans@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro:
"This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending
more or less one pull request per branch.
This is the first pile; more to follow in a few. In this one are
several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for
separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount,
switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in
namespace_unlock()"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
new fs_pin killing logics
allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock
get rid of the second argument of acct_kill()
take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin
dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock
pull bumping refcount into ->kill()
kill pin_put()
mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio
file->f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open...
get rid of lustre_dump_dentry()
gut proc_register() a bit
kill d_validate()
ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense
selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
When updating PT_NOTE header size (ie. p_memsz), an overflow issue
happens with the following bogus note entry:
n_namesz = 0xFFFFFFFF
n_descsz = 0x0
n_type = 0x0
This kind of note entry should be dropped during updating p_memsz. But
because n_namesz is 32bit, after (n_namesz + 3) & (~3), it's overflow to
0x0, the note entry size looks sane and reserved.
When userspace (eg. crash utility) is trying to access such bogus note,
it could lead to an unexpected behavior (eg. crash utility segment fault
because it's reading bogus address).
The source of bogus note hasn't been identified yet. At least we could
drop the bogus note so user space wouldn't be surprised.
Signed-off-by: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Wright <rwright@hp.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Pearson <greg.pearson@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
printk and friends can now format bitmaps using '%*pb[l]'. cpumask
and nodemask also provide cpumask_pr_args() and nodemask_pr_args()
respectively which can be used to generate the two printf arguments
necessary to format the specified cpu/nodemask.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of custom approach let's use string_escape_str() to escape a given
string (task_name in this case).
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The output of /proc/$pid/numa_maps is in terms of number of pages like
anon=22 or dirty=54. Here's some output:
7f4680000000 default file=/hugetlb/bigfile anon=50 dirty=50 N0=50
7f7659600000 default file=/anon_hugepage\040(deleted) anon=50 dirty=50 N0=50
7fff8d425000 default stack anon=50 dirty=50 N0=50
Looks like we have a stack and a couple of anonymous hugetlbfs
areas page which both use the same amount of memory. They don't.
The 'bigfile' uses 1GB pages and takes up ~50GB of space. The
anon_hugepage uses 2MB pages and takes up ~100MB of space while the stack
uses normal 4k pages. You can go over to smaps to figure out what the
page size _really_ is with KernelPageSize or MMUPageSize. But, I think
this is a pretty nasty and counterintuitive interface as it stands.
This patch introduces 'kernelpagesize_kB' line element to
/proc/<pid>/numa_maps report file in order to help identifying the size of
pages that are backing memory areas mapped by a given task. This is
specially useful to help differentiating between HUGE and GIGANTIC page
backed VMAs.
This patch is based on Dave Hansen's proposal and reviewer's follow-ups
taken from the following dicussion threads:
* https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/9/21/454
* https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/20/66
Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use the PDE() helper to get proc_dir_entry instead of coding it directly.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Peak resident size of a process can be reset back to the process's
current rss value by writing "5" to /proc/pid/clear_refs. The driving
use-case for this would be getting the peak RSS value, which can be
retrieved from the VmHWM field in /proc/pid/status, per benchmark
iteration or test scenario.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: clarify behaviour in documentation]
Signed-off-by: Petr Cermak <petrcermak@chromium.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Primiano Tucci <primiano@chromium.org>
Cc: Petr Cermak <petrcermak@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently pagewalker splits all THP pages on any clear_refs request. It's
not necessary. We can handle this on PMD level.
One side effect is that soft dirty will potentially see more dirty memory,
since we will mark whole THP page dirty at once.
Sanity checked with CRIU test suite. More testing is required.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
walk_page_range() silently skips vma having VM_PFNMAP set, which leads to
undesirable behaviour at client end (who called walk_page_range). For
example for pagemap_read(), when no callbacks are called against VM_PFNMAP
vma, pagemap_read() may prepare pagemap data for next virtual address
range at wrong index. That could confuse and/or break userspace
applications.
This patch avoid this misbehavior caused by vma(VM_PFNMAP) like follows:
- for pagemap_read() which has its own ->pte_hole(), call the ->pte_hole()
over vma(VM_PFNMAP),
- for clear_refs and queue_pages which have their own ->tests_walk,
just return 1 and skip vma(VM_PFNMAP). This is no problem because
these are not interested in hole regions,
- for other callers, just skip the vma(VM_PFNMAP) as a default behavior.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Hashim <shashim@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
pagewalk.c can handle vma in itself, so we don't have to pass vma via
walk->private. And show_numa_map() walks pages on vma basis, so using
walk_page_vma() is preferable.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Just doing s/gather_hugetbl_stats/gather_hugetlb_stats/g, this makes code
grep-friendly.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Page table walker has the information of the current vma in mm_walk, so we
don't have to call find_vma() in each pagemap_(pte|hugetlb)_range() call
any longer. Currently pagemap_pte_range() does vma loop itself, so this
patch reduces many lines of code.
NULL-vma check is omitted because we assume that we never run these
callbacks on any address outside vma. And even if it were broken, NULL
pointer dereference would be detected, so we can get enough information
for debugging.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
clear_refs_write() has some prechecks to determine if we really walk over
a given vma. Now we have a test_walk() callback to filter vmas, so let's
utilize it.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
pagewalk.c can handle vma in itself, so we don't have to pass vma via
walk->private. And show_smap() walks pages on vma basis, so using
walk_page_vma() is preferable.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Lockless access to pte in pagemap_pte_range() might race with page
migration and trigger BUG_ON(!PageLocked()) in migration_entry_to_page():
CPU A (pagemap) CPU B (migration)
lock_page()
try_to_unmap(page, TTU_MIGRATION...)
make_migration_entry()
set_pte_at()
<read *pte>
pte_to_pagemap_entry()
remove_migration_ptes()
unlock_page()
if(is_migration_entry())
migration_entry_to_page()
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page))
Also lockless read might be non-atomic if pte is larger than wordsize.
Other pte walkers (smaps, numa_maps, clear_refs) already lock ptes.
Fixes: 052fb0d635 ("proc: report file/anon bit in /proc/pid/pagemap")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.5+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Dave noticed that unprivileged process can allocate significant amount of
memory -- >500 MiB on x86_64 -- and stay unnoticed by oom-killer and
memory cgroup. The trick is to allocate a lot of PMD page tables. Linux
kernel doesn't account PMD tables to the process, only PTE.
The use-cases below use few tricks to allocate a lot of PMD page tables
while keeping VmRSS and VmPTE low. oom_score for the process will be 0.
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#define PUD_SIZE (1UL << 30)
#define PMD_SIZE (1UL << 21)
#define NR_PUD 130000
int main(void)
{
char *addr = NULL;
unsigned long i;
prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE);
for (i = 0; i < NR_PUD ; i++) {
addr = mmap(addr + PUD_SIZE, PUD_SIZE, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
break;
}
*addr = 'x';
munmap(addr, PMD_SIZE);
mmap(addr, PMD_SIZE, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
perror("re-mmap"), exit(1);
}
printf("PID %d consumed %lu KiB in PMD page tables\n",
getpid(), i * 4096 >> 10);
return pause();
}
The patch addresses the issue by account PMD tables to the process the
same way we account PTE.
The main place where PMD tables is accounted is __pmd_alloc() and
free_pmd_range(). But there're few corner cases:
- HugeTLB can share PMD page tables. The patch handles by accounting
the table to all processes who share it.
- x86 PAE pre-allocates few PMD tables on fork.
- Architectures with FIRST_USER_ADDRESS > 0. We need to adjust sanity
check on exit(2).
Accounting only happens on configuration where PMD page table's level is
present (PMD is not folded). As with nr_ptes we use per-mm counter. The
counter value is used to calculate baseline for badness score by
oom-killer.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add KPF_ZERO_PAGE flag for zero_page, so that userspace processes can
detect zero_page in /proc/kpageflags, and then do memory analysis more
accurately.
Signed-off-by: Yalin Wang <yalin.wang@sonymobile.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We have to handle non-linear mappings for /proc/PID/{smaps,clear_refs}
which is unused now. Let's drop it.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are only 3 callers and quite a bit of that thing is executed
exactly in one of those. Just lift it there...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull irq core fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single fix plugging a long standing race between proc/stat and
proc/interrupts access and freeing of interrupt descriptors"
* 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
genirq: Prevent proc race against freeing of irq descriptors
This patch include CMA info (CMATotal, CMAFree) in /proc/meminfo.
Currently, in a CMA enabled system, if somebody wants to know the total
CMA size declared, there is no way to tell, other than the dmesg or
/var/log/messages logs.
With this patch we are showing the CMA info as part of meminfo, so that it
can be determined at any point of time. This will be populated only when
CMA is enabled.
Below is the sample output from a ARM based device with RAM:512MB and CMA:16MB.
MemTotal: 471172 kB
MemFree: 111712 kB
MemAvailable: 271172 kB
.
.
.
CmaTotal: 16384 kB
CmaFree: 6144 kB
This patch also fix below checkpatch errors that were found during these changes.
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:ExV)
199: FILE: fs/proc/meminfo.c:199:
+ ,atomic_long_read(&num_poisoned_pages) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10)
^
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:ExV)
202: FILE: fs/proc/meminfo.c:202:
+ ,K(global_page_state(NR_ANON_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGES) *
^
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:ExV)
206: FILE: fs/proc/meminfo.c:206:
+ ,K(totalcma_pages)
^
total: 3 errors, 0 warnings, 2 checks, 236 lines checked
Signed-off-by: Pintu Kumar <pintu.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishnu Pratap Singh <vishnu.ps@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman:
"As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for
backporting to stable.
The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a
regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged
remount were closed. I go on to update the remount test to make it
easy to detect if this issue reoccurs.
Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes.
Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design
bug in the permission checks of gid_map. Unix since the beginning has
allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and
other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx). As the unix permission checks
stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups
that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is
possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a
process. Which means dropping a group can increase a processes
privileges.
The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable
without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been
set to permanently disable setgroups.
The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications
using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain
unaffected by this change. Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user
space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one
of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c).
To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security
fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly
like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes.
> So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-)
> Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9.
> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine.
> Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
> Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels.
> Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using
> my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid
> as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches.
> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
> I tested this with Sandstorm. It breaks as is and it works if I add
> the setgroups thing.
> Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> # breaks things as designed :("
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests
userns; Correct the comment in map_write
userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.
groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root
mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt
mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.
umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
mnt: Update unprivileged remount test
mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
Pull vfs pile #2 from Al Viro:
"Next pile (and there'll be one or two more).
The large piece in this one is getting rid of /proc/*/ns/* weirdness;
among other things, it allows to (finally) make nameidata completely
opaque outside of fs/namei.c, making for easier further cleanups in
there"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
coda_venus_readdir(): use file_inode()
fs/namei.c: fold link_path_walk() call into path_init()
path_init(): don't bother with LOOKUP_PARENT in argument
fs/namei.c: new helper (path_cleanup())
path_init(): store the "base" pointer to file in nameidata itself
make default ->i_fop have ->open() fail with ENXIO
make nameidata completely opaque outside of fs/namei.c
kill proc_ns completely
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
bury struct proc_ns in fs/proc
copy address of proc_ns_ops into ns_common
new helpers: ns_alloc_inum/ns_free_inum
make proc_ns_operations work with struct ns_common * instead of void *
switch the rest of proc_ns_operations to working with &...->ns
netns: switch ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() to working with &net->ns
make mntns ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() work with &mnt_ns->ns
common object embedded into various struct ....ns
Since the rework of the sparse interrupt code to actually free the
unused interrupt descriptors there exists a race between the /proc
interfaces to the irq subsystem and the code which frees the interrupt
descriptor.
CPU0 CPU1
show_interrupts()
desc = irq_to_desc(X);
free_desc(desc)
remove_from_radix_tree();
kfree(desc);
raw_spinlock_irq(&desc->lock);
/proc/interrupts is the only interface which can actively corrupt
kernel memory via the lock access. /proc/stat can only read from freed
memory. Extremly hard to trigger, but possible.
The interfaces in /proc/irq/N/ are not affected by this because the
removal of the proc file is serialized in procfs against concurrent
readers/writers. The removal happens before the descriptor is freed.
For architectures which have CONFIG_SPARSE_IRQ=n this is a non issue
as the descriptor is never freed. It's merely cleared out with the irq
descriptor lock held. So any concurrent proc access will either see
the old correct value or the cleared out ones.
Protect the lookup and access to the irq descriptor in
show_interrupts() with the sparse_irq_lock.
Provide kstat_irqs_usr() which is protecting the lookup and access
with sparse_irq_lock and switch /proc/stat to use it.
Document the existing kstat_irqs interfaces so it's clear that the
caller needs to take care about protection. The users of these
interfaces are either not affected due to SPARSE_IRQ=n or already
protected against removal.
Fixes: 1f5a5b87f7 "genirq: Implement a sane sparse_irq allocator"
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups
A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
future in this user namespace.
A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.
- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
their parents.
- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
not allow checking the permissions at open time.
- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
for the user namespace is set.
This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
from a process that already has that ability.
A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without
privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Merge first patchbomb from Andrew Morton:
- a few minor cifs fixes
- dma-debug upadtes
- ocfs2
- slab
- about half of MM
- procfs
- kernel/exit.c
- panic.c tweaks
- printk upates
- lib/ updates
- checkpatch updates
- fs/binfmt updates
- the drivers/rtc tree
- nilfs
- kmod fixes
- more kernel/exit.c
- various other misc tweaks and fixes
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (190 commits)
exit: pidns: fix/update the comments in zap_pid_ns_processes()
exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting
exit: exit_notify: re-use "dead" list to autoreap current
exit: reparent: call forget_original_parent() under tasklist_lock
exit: reparent: avoid find_new_reaper() if no children
exit: reparent: introduce find_alive_thread()
exit: reparent: introduce find_child_reaper()
exit: reparent: document the ->has_child_subreaper checks
exit: reparent: s/while_each_thread/for_each_thread/ in find_new_reaper()
exit: reparent: fix the cross-namespace PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER reparenting
exit: reparent: fix the dead-parent PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER reparenting
exit: proc: don't try to flush /proc/tgid/task/tgid
exit: release_task: fix the comment about group leader accounting
exit: wait: drop tasklist_lock before psig->c* accounting
exit: wait: don't use zombie->real_parent
exit: wait: cleanup the ptrace_reparented() checks
usermodehelper: kill the kmod_thread_locker logic
usermodehelper: don't use CLONE_VFORK for ____call_usermodehelper()
fs/hfs/catalog.c: fix comparison bug in hfs_cat_keycmp
nilfs2: fix the nilfs_iget() vs. nilfs_new_inode() races
...
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
proc_flush_task_mnt() always tries to flush task/pid, but this is
pointless if we reap the leader. d_invalidate() is recursive, and
if nothing else the next d_hash_and_lookup(tgid) should fail anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
p->ptrace != 0 means that release_task(p) was not called, so pid_alive()
buys nothing and we can remove this check. Other callers already use it
directly without additional checks.
Note: with or without this patch ptrace_parent() can return the pointer to
the freed task, this will be explained/fixed later.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
task_state() does seq_printf() under rcu_read_lock(), but this is only
needed for task_tgid_nr_ns() and task_numa_group_id(). We can calculate
tgid/ngid and drop rcu lock.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. The usage of fdt looks very ugly, it can't be NULL if ->files is
not NULL. We can use "unsigned int max_fds" instead.
2. This also allows to move seq_printf(max_fds) outside of task_lock()
and join it with the previous seq_printf(). See also the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
task_state() reads cred->group_info under task_lock() because a long ago
it was task_struct->group_info and it was actually protected by
task->alloc_lock. Today this task_unlock() after rcu_read_unlock() just
adds the confusion, move task_unlock() up.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Better to use existing macro that rewriting them.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When a lot of netdevices are created, one of the bottleneck is the
creation of proc entries. This serie aims to accelerate this part.
The current implementation for the directories in /proc is using a single
linked list. This is slow when handling directories with large numbers of
entries (eg netdevice-related entries when lots of tunnels are opened).
This patch replaces this linked list by a red-black tree.
Here are some numbers:
dummy30000.batch contains 30 000 times 'link add type dummy'.
Before the patch:
$ time ip -b dummy30000.batch
real 2m31.950s
user 0m0.440s
sys 2m21.440s
$ time rmmod dummy
real 1m35.764s
user 0m0.000s
sys 1m24.088s
After the patch:
$ time ip -b dummy30000.batch
real 2m0.874s
user 0m0.448s
sys 1m49.720s
$ time rmmod dummy
real 1m13.988s
user 0m0.000s
sys 1m1.008s
The idea of improving this part was suggested by Thierry Herbelot.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: initialise proc_root.subdir at compile time]
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thierry Herbelot <thierry.herbelot@6wind.com>.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As a small zero page, huge zero page should not be accounted in smaps
report as normal page.
For small pages we rely on vm_normal_page() to filter out zero page, but
vm_normal_page() is not designed to handle pmds. We only get here due
hackish cast pmd to pte in smaps_pte_range() -- pte and pmd format is not
necessary compatible on each and every architecture.
Let's add separate codepath to handle pmds. follow_trans_huge_pmd() will
detect huge zero page for us.
We would need pmd_dirty() helper to do this properly. The patch adds it
to THP-enabled architectures which don't yet have one.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use do_div to fix 32-bit build]
Signed-off-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Fengwei Yin <yfw.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull VFS changes from Al Viro:
"First pile out of several (there _definitely_ will be more). Stuff in
this one:
- unification of d_splice_alias()/d_materialize_unique()
- iov_iter rewrite
- killing a bunch of ->f_path.dentry users (and f_dentry macro).
Getting that completed will make life much simpler for
unionmount/overlayfs, since then we'll be able to limit the places
sensitive to file _dentry_ to reasonably few. Which allows to have
file_inode(file) pointing to inode in a covered layer, with dentry
pointing to (negative) dentry in union one.
Still not complete, but much closer now.
- crapectomy in lustre (dead code removal, mostly)
- "let's make seq_printf return nothing" preparations
- assorted cleanups and fixes
There _definitely_ will be more piles"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
copy_from_iter_nocache()
new helper: iov_iter_kvec()
csum_and_copy_..._iter()
iov_iter.c: handle ITER_KVEC directly
iov_iter.c: convert copy_to_iter() to iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: convert copy_from_iter() to iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: get rid of bvec_copy_page_{to,from}_iter()
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_zero() to iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_get_pages_alloc() to iterate_all_kinds
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_get_pages() to iterate_all_kinds
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_npages() to iterate_all_kinds
iov_iter.c: iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: macros for iterating over iov_iter
kill f_dentry macro
dcache: fix kmemcheck warning in switch_names
new helper: audit_file()
nfsd_vfs_write(): use file_inode()
ncpfs: use file_inode()
kill f_dentry uses
lockd: get rid of ->f_path.dentry->d_sb
...
a) make get_proc_ns() return a pointer to struct ns_common
b) mirror ns_ops in dentry->d_fsdata of ns dentries, so that
is_mnt_ns_file() could get away with fewer dereferences.
That way struct proc_ns becomes invisible outside of fs/proc/*.c
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull the beginning of seq_file cleanup from Steven:
"I'm looking to clean up the seq_file code and to eventually merge the
trace_seq code with seq_file as well, since they basically do the same thing.
Part of this process is to remove the return code of seq_printf() and friends
as they are rather inconsistent. It is better to use the new function
seq_has_overflowed() if you want to stop processing when the buffer
is full. Note, if the buffer is full, the seq_file code will throw away
the contents, allocate a bigger buffer, and then call your code again
to fill in the data. The only thing that breaking out of the function
early does is to save a little time which is probably never noticed.
I started with patches from Joe Perches and modified them as well.
There's many more places that need to be updated before we can convert
seq_printf() and friends to return void. But this patch set introduces
the seq_has_overflowed() and does some initial updates."
MPX-enabled applications using large swaths of memory can
potentially have large numbers of bounds tables in process
address space to save bounds information. These tables can take
up huge swaths of memory (as much as 80% of the memory on the
system) even if we clean them up aggressively. In the worst-case
scenario, the tables can be 4x the size of the data structure
being tracked. IOW, a 1-page structure can require 4 bounds-table
pages.
Being this huge, our expectation is that folks using MPX are
going to be keen on figuring out how much memory is being
dedicated to it. So we need a way to track memory use for MPX.
If we want to specifically track MPX VMAs we need to be able to
distinguish them from normal VMAs, and keep them from getting
merged with normal VMAs. A new VM_ flag set only on MPX VMAs does
both of those things. With this flag, MPX bounds-table VMAs can
be distinguished from other VMAs, and userspace can also walk
/proc/$pid/smaps to get memory usage for MPX.
In addition to this flag, we also introduce a special ->vm_ops
specific to MPX VMAs (see the patch "add MPX specific mmap
interface"), but currently different ->vm_ops do not by
themselves prevent VMA merging, so we still need this flag.
We understand that VM_ flags are scarce and are open to other
options.
Signed-off-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151825.565625B3@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
seq_printf functions shouldn't really check the return value.
Checking seq_has_overflowed() occasionally is used instead.
Update vfs documentation.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/e37e6e7b76acbdcc3bb4ab2a57c8f8ca1ae11b9a.1412031505.git.joe@perches.com
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
[ did a few clean ups ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
For VMAs that don't want write notifications, PTEs created for read faults
have their write bit set. If the read fault happens after VM_SOFTDIRTY is
cleared, then the PTE's softdirty bit will remain clear after subsequent
writes.
Here's a simple code snippet to demonstrate the bug:
char* m = mmap(NULL, getpagesize(), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_SHARED, -1, 0);
system("echo 4 > /proc/$PPID/clear_refs"); /* clear VM_SOFTDIRTY */
assert(*m == '\0'); /* new PTE allows write access */
assert(!soft_dirty(x));
*m = 'x'; /* should dirty the page */
assert(soft_dirty(x)); /* fails */
With this patch, write notifications are enabled when VM_SOFTDIRTY is
cleared. Furthermore, to avoid unnecessary faults, write notifications
are disabled when VM_SOFTDIRTY is set.
As a side effect of enabling and disabling write notifications with
care, this patch fixes a bug in mprotect where vm_page_prot bits set by
drivers were zapped on mprotect. An analogous bug was fixed in mmap by
commit c9d0bf2414 ("mm: uncached vma support with writenotify").
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Reported-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Jamie Liu <jamieliu@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
"The big thing in this pile is Eric's unmount-on-rmdir series; we
finally have everything we need for that. The final piece of prereqs
is delayed mntput() - now filesystem shutdown always happens on
shallow stack.
Other than that, we have several new primitives for iov_iter (Matt
Wilcox, culled from his XIP-related series) pushing the conversion to
->read_iter()/ ->write_iter() a bit more, a bunch of fs/dcache.c
cleanups and fixes (including the external name refcounting, which
gives consistent behaviour of d_move() wrt procfs symlinks for long
and short names alike) and assorted cleanups and fixes all over the
place.
This is just the first pile; there's a lot of stuff from various
people that ought to go in this window. Starting with
unionmount/overlayfs mess... ;-/"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (60 commits)
fs/file_table.c: Update alloc_file() comment
vfs: Deduplicate code shared by xattr system calls operating on paths
reiserfs: remove pointless forward declaration of struct nameidata
don't need that forward declaration of struct nameidata in dcache.h anymore
take dname_external() into fs/dcache.c
let path_init() failures treated the same way as subsequent link_path_walk()
fix misuses of f_count() in ppp and netlink
ncpfs: use list_for_each_entry() for d_subdirs walk
vfs: move getname() from callers to do_mount()
gfs2_atomic_open(): skip lookups on hashed dentry
[infiniband] remove pointless assignments
gadgetfs: saner API for gadgetfs_create_file()
f_fs: saner API for ffs_sb_create_file()
jfs: don't hash direct inode
[s390] remove pointless assignment of ->f_op in vmlogrdr ->open()
ecryptfs: ->f_op is never NULL
android: ->f_op is never NULL
nouveau: __iomem misannotations
missing annotation in fs/file.c
fs: namespace: suppress 'may be used uninitialized' warnings
...
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"Nothing too interesting. Just a handful of cleanup patches"
* 'for-3.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
Revert "cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()"
cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()
cgroup: fix missing unlock in cgroup_release_agent()
cgroup: remove CGRP_RELEASABLE flag
perf/cgroup: Remove perf_put_cgroup()
cgroup: remove redundant check in cgroup_ino()
cpuset: simplify proc_cpuset_show()
cgroup: simplify proc_cgroup_show()
cgroup: use a per-cgroup work for release agent
cgroup: remove bogus comments
cgroup: remove redundant code in cgroup_rmdir()
cgroup: remove some useless forward declarations
cgroup: fix a typo in comment.
Always mark pages with PageBalloon even if balloon compaction is disabled
and expose this mark in /proc/kpageflags as KPF_BALLOON.
Also this patch adds three counters into /proc/vmstat: "balloon_inflate",
"balloon_deflate" and "balloon_migrate". They accumulate balloon
activity. Current size of balloon is (balloon_inflate - balloon_deflate)
pages.
All generic balloon code now gathered under option CONFIG_MEMORY_BALLOON.
It should be selected by ballooning driver which wants use this feature.
Currently virtio-balloon is the only user.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If a /proc/pid/pagemap read spans a [VMA, an unmapped region, then a
VM_SOFTDIRTY VMA], the virtual pages in the unmapped region are reported
as softdirty. Here's a program to demonstrate the bug:
int main() {
const uint64_t PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY = 1ul << 55;
uint64_t pme[3];
int fd = open("/proc/self/pagemap", O_RDONLY);;
char *m = mmap(NULL, 3 * getpagesize(), PROT_READ,
MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_SHARED, -1, 0);
munmap(m + getpagesize(), getpagesize());
pread(fd, pme, 24, (unsigned long) m / getpagesize() * 8);
assert(pme[0] & PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY); /* passes */
assert(!(pme[1] & PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY)); /* fails */
assert(pme[2] & PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY); /* passes */
return 0;
}
(Note that all pages in new VMAs are softdirty until cleared).
Tested:
Used the program given above. I'm going to include this code in
a selftest in the future.
[n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com: prevent pagemap_pte_range() from overrunning]
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Jamie Liu <jamieliu@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
9e7814404b "hold task->mempolicy while numa_maps scans." fixed the
race with the exiting task but this is not enough.
The current code assumes that get_vma_policy(task) should either see
task->mempolicy == NULL or it should be equal to ->task_mempolicy saved
by hold_task_mempolicy(), so we can never race with __mpol_put(). But
this can only work if we can't race with do_set_mempolicy(), and thus
we can't race with another do_set_mempolicy() or do_exit() after that.
However, do_set_mempolicy()->down_write(mmap_sem) can not prevent this
race. This task can exec, change it's ->mm, and call do_set_mempolicy()
after that; in this case they take 2 different locks.
Change hold_task_mempolicy() to use get_task_policy(), it never returns
NULL, and change show_numa_map() to use __get_vma_policy() or fall back
to proc_priv->task_mempolicy.
Note: this is the minimal fix, we will cleanup this code later. I think
hold_task_mempolicy() and release_task_mempolicy() should die, we can
move this logic into show_numa_map(). Or we can move get_task_policy()
outside of ->mmap_sem and !CONFIG_NUMA code at least.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On some ARCHs modules range is eauql to vmalloc range. E.g on i686
"#define MODULES_VADDR VMALLOC_START"
"#define MODULES_END VMALLOC_END"
This will cause 2 duplicate program segments in /proc/kcore, and no flag
to indicate they are different. This is confusing. And usually people
who need check the elf header or read the content of kcore will check
memory ranges. Two program segments which are the same are unnecessary.
So check if the modules range is equal to vmalloc range. If so, just skip
adding the modules range.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Rename vm_is_stack() to task_of_stack() and change it to return
"struct task_struct *" rather than the global (and thus wrong in
general) pid_t.
- Add the new pid_of_stack() helper which calls task_of_stack() and
uses the right namespace to report the correct pid_t.
Unfortunately we need to define this helper twice, in task_mmu.c
and in task_nommu.c. perhaps it makes sense to add fs/proc/util.c
and move at least pid_of_stack/task_of_stack there to avoid the
code duplication.
- Change show_map_vma() and show_numa_map() to use the new helper.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
m_start() can use get_proc_task() instead, and "struct inode *"
provides more potentially useful info, see the next changes.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I do not know if CONFIG_PREEMPT/SMP is possible without CONFIG_MMU
but the usage of task->mm in m_stop(). The task can exit/exec before
we take mmap_sem, in this case m_stop() can hit NULL or unlock the
wrong rw_semaphore.
Also, this code uses priv->task != NULL to decide whether we need
up_read/mmput. This is correct, but we will probably kill priv->task.
Change m_start/m_stop to rely on IS_ERR_OR_NULL() like task_mmu.c does.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Copy-and-paste the changes from "fs/proc/task_mmu.c: shift mm_access()
from m_start() to proc_maps_open()" into task_nommu.c.
Change maps_open() to initialize priv->mm using proc_mem_open(), m_start()
can rely on atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_users) like task_mmu.c does.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change the main loop in m_start() to update m->version. Mostly for
consistency, but this can help to avoid the same loop if the very
1st ->show() fails due to seq_overflow().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add the "last_addr" optimization back. Like before, every ->show()
method checks !seq_overflow() and sets m->version = vma->vm_start.
However, it also checks that m_next_vma(vma) != NULL, otherwise it
sets m->version = -1 for the lockless "EOF" fast-path in m_start().
m_start() can simply do find_vma() + m_next_vma() if last_addr is
not zero, the code looks clear and simple and this case is clearly
separated from "scan vmas" path.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Extract the tail_vma/vm_next calculation from m_next() into the new
trivial helper, m_next_vma().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that m->version is gone we can cleanup m_start(). In particular,
- Remove the "unsigned long" typecast, m->index can't be negative
or exceed ->map_count. But lets use "unsigned int pos" to make
it clear that "pos < map_count" is safe.
- Remove the unnecessary "vma != NULL" check in the main loop. It
can't be NULL unless we have a vm bug.
- This also means that "pos < map_count" case can simply return the
valid vma and avoid "goto" and subsequent checks.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
m_start() carefully documents, checks, and sets "m->version = -1" if
we are going to return NULL. The only problem is that we will be never
called again if m_start() returns NULL, so this is simply pointless
and misleading.
Otoh, ->show() methods m->version = 0 if vma == tail_vma and this is
just wrong, we want -1 in this case. And in fact we also want -1 if
->vm_next == NULL and ->tail_vma == NULL.
And it is not used consistently, the "scan vmas" loop in m_start()
should update last_addr too.
Finally, imo the whole "last_addr" logic in m_start() looks horrible.
find_vma(last_addr) is called unconditionally even if we are not going
to use the result. But the main problem is that this code participates
in tail_vma-or-NULL mess, and this looks simply unfixable.
Remove this optimization. We will add it back after some cleanups.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. There is no reason to reset ->tail_vma in m_start(), if we return
IS_ERR_OR_NULL() it won't be used.
2. m_start() also clears priv->task to ensure that m_stop() won't use
the stale pointer if we fail before get_task_struct(). But this is
ugly and confusing, move this initialization in m_stop().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. Kill the first "vma != NULL" check. Firstly this is not possible,
m_next() won't be called if ->start() or the previous ->next()
returns NULL.
And if it was possible the 2nd "vma != tail_vma" check is buggy,
we should not wrongly return ->tail_vma.
2. Make this function readable. The logic is very simple, we should
return check "vma != tail" once and return "vm_next || tail_vma".
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
m_start() drops ->mmap_sem and does mmput() if it retuns vsyscall
vma. This is because in this case m_stop()->vma_stop() obviously
can't use gate_vma->vm_mm.
Now that we have proc_maps_private->mm we can simplify this logic:
- Change m_start() to return with ->mmap_sem held unless it returns
IS_ERR_OR_NULL().
- Change vma_stop() to use priv->mm and avoid the ugly vma checks,
this makes "vm_area_struct *vma" unnecessary.
- This also allows m_start() to use vm_stop().
- Cleanup m_next() to follow the new locking rule.
Note: m_stop() looks very ugly, and this temporary uglifies it
even more. Fixed by the next change.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
