fix a ld.lld linker (in)compatibility quirk and make the x86 SMP init code a bit
more conservative to fix kexec() lockups.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2023-09-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix preemption delays in the SGX code, remove unnecessarily
UAPI-exported code, fix a ld.lld linker (in)compatibility quirk and
make the x86 SMP init code a bit more conservative to fix kexec()
lockups"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2023-09-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/sgx: Break up long non-preemptible delays in sgx_vepc_release()
x86: Remove the arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() macro from the UAPI
x86/build: Fix linker fill bytes quirk/incompatibility for ld.lld
x86/smp: Don't send INIT to non-present and non-booted CPUs
On large enclaves we hit the softlockup warning with following call trace:
xa_erase()
sgx_vepc_release()
__fput()
task_work_run()
do_exit()
The latency issue is similar to the one fixed in:
8795359e35 ("x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves")
The test system has 64GB of enclave memory, and all is assigned to a single VM.
Release of 'vepc' takes a longer time and causes long latencies, which triggers
the softlockup warning.
Add cond_resched() to give other tasks a chance to run and reduce
latencies, which also avoids the softlockup detector.
[ mingo: Rewrote the changelog. ]
Fixes: 540745ddbc ("x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests")
Reported-by: Yu Zhang <yu.zhang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Yu Zhang <yu.zhang@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Merge tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20230902' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux
Pull hyperv updates from Wei Liu:
- Support for SEV-SNP guests on Hyper-V (Tianyu Lan)
- Support for TDX guests on Hyper-V (Dexuan Cui)
- Use SBRM API in Hyper-V balloon driver (Mitchell Levy)
- Avoid dereferencing ACPI root object handle in VMBus driver (Maciej
Szmigiero)
- A few misecllaneous fixes (Jiapeng Chong, Nathan Chancellor, Saurabh
Sengar)
* tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20230902' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux: (24 commits)
x86/hyperv: Remove duplicate include
x86/hyperv: Move the code in ivm.c around to avoid unnecessary ifdef's
x86/hyperv: Remove hv_isolation_type_en_snp
x86/hyperv: Use TDX GHCI to access some MSRs in a TDX VM with the paravisor
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bring the post_msg_page back for TDX VMs with the paravisor
x86/hyperv: Introduce a global variable hyperv_paravisor_present
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support >64 VPs for a fully enlightened TDX/SNP VM
x86/hyperv: Fix serial console interrupts for fully enlightened TDX guests
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support fully enlightened TDX guests
x86/hyperv: Support hypercalls for fully enlightened TDX guests
x86/hyperv: Add hv_isolation_type_tdx() to detect TDX guests
x86/hyperv: Fix undefined reference to isolation_type_en_snp without CONFIG_HYPERV
x86/hyperv: Add missing 'inline' to hv_snp_boot_ap() stub
hv: hyperv.h: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't dereference ACPI root object handle
x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
x86/hyperv: Add smp support for SEV-SNP guest
clocksource: hyper-v: Mark hyperv tsc page unencrypted in sev-snp enlightened guest
x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest
drivers: hv: Mark percpu hvcall input arg page unencrypted in SEV-SNP enlightened guest
...
* Fix PKRU covert channel
* Fix -Wmissing-variable-declarations warning for ia32_xyz_class
* Fix kernel-doc annotation warning
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Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2023-09-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Dave Hansen:
"The most important fix here adds a missing CPU model to the recent
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) mitigation list to ensure that mitigations
are available on that CPU.
There are also a pair of warning fixes, and closure of a covert
channel that pops up when protection keys are disabled.
Summary:
- Mark all Skylake CPUs as vulnerable to GDS
- Fix PKRU covert channel
- Fix -Wmissing-variable-declarations warning for ia32_xyz_class
- Fix kernel-doc annotation warning"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2023-09-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/fpu/xstate: Fix PKRU covert channel
x86/irq/i8259: Fix kernel-doc annotation warning
x86/speculation: Mark all Skylake CPUs as vulnerable to GDS
x86/audit: Fix -Wmissing-variable-declarations warning for ia32_xyz_class
Here is a small set of driver core updates and additions for 6.6-rc1.
Included in here are:
- stable kernel documentation updates
- class structure const work from Ivan on various subsystems
- kernfs tweaks
- driver core tests!
- kobject sanity cleanups
- kobject structure reordering to save space
- driver core error code handling fixups
- other minor driver core cleanups
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
problems.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'driver-core-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
"Here is a small set of driver core updates and additions for 6.6-rc1.
Included in here are:
- stable kernel documentation updates
- class structure const work from Ivan on various subsystems
- kernfs tweaks
- driver core tests!
- kobject sanity cleanups
- kobject structure reordering to save space
- driver core error code handling fixups
- other minor driver core cleanups
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
problems"
* tag 'driver-core-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (32 commits)
driver core: Call in reversed order in device_platform_notify_remove()
driver core: Return proper error code when dev_set_name() fails
kobject: Remove redundant checks for whether ktype is NULL
kobject: Add sanity check for kset->kobj.ktype in kset_register()
drivers: base: test: Add missing MODULE_* macros to root device tests
drivers: base: test: Add missing MODULE_* macros for platform devices tests
drivers: base: Free devm resources when unregistering a device
drivers: base: Add basic devm tests for platform devices
drivers: base: Add basic devm tests for root devices
kernfs: fix missing kernfs_iattr_rwsem locking
docs: stable-kernel-rules: mention that regressions must be prevented
docs: stable-kernel-rules: fine-tune various details
docs: stable-kernel-rules: make the examples for option 1 a proper list
docs: stable-kernel-rules: move text around to improve flow
docs: stable-kernel-rules: improve structure by changing headlines
base/node: Remove duplicated include
kernfs: attach uuid for every kernfs and report it in fsid
kernfs: add stub helper for kernfs_generic_poll()
x86/resctrl: make pseudo_lock_class a static const structure
x86/MSR: make msr_class a static const structure
...
Convert IBT selftest to asm to fix objtool warning
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Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
"This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
part of this feature, and just for userspace.
The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.
For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
versions of this patch set"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
...
The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability is common to all Skylake
processors. However, the "client" Skylakes* are now in this list:
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000022396/processors.html
which means they are no longer included for new vulnerabilities here:
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
or in other GDS documentation. Thus, they were not included in the
original GDS mitigation patches.
Mark SKYLAKE and SKYLAKE_L as vulnerable to GDS to match all the
other Skylake CPUs (which include Kaby Lake). Also group the CPUs
so that the ones that share the exact same vulnerabilities are next
to each other.
Last, move SRBDS to the end of each line. This makes it clear at a
glance that SKYLAKE_X is unique. Of the five Skylakes, it is the
only "server" CPU and has a different implementation from the
clients of the "special register" hardware, making it immune to SRBDS.
This makes the diff much harder to read, but the resulting table is
worth it.
I very much appreciate the report from Michael Zhivich about this
issue. Despite what level of support a hardware vendor is providing,
the kernel very much needs an accurate and up-to-date list of
vulnerable CPUs. More reports like this are very welcome.
* Client Skylakes are CPUID 406E3/506E3 which is family 6, models
0x4E and 0x5E, aka INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE and INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L.
Reported-by: Michael Zhivich <mzhivich@akamai.com>
Fixes: 8974eb5882 ("x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
coalescing lots of silly duplicates.
* Use static_calls() instead of indirect calls for apic->foo()
* Tons of cleanups an crap removal along the way
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Merge tag 'x86_apic_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 apic updates from Dave Hansen:
"This includes a very thorough rework of the 'struct apic' handlers.
Quite a variety of them popped up over the years, especially in the
32-bit days when odd apics were much more in vogue.
The end result speaks for itself, which is a removal of a ton of code
and static calls to replace indirect calls.
If there's any breakage here, it's likely to be around the 32-bit
museum pieces that get light to no testing these days.
Summary:
- Rework apic callbacks, getting rid of unnecessary ones and
coalescing lots of silly duplicates.
- Use static_calls() instead of indirect calls for apic->foo()
- Tons of cleanups an crap removal along the way"
* tag 'x86_apic_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (64 commits)
x86/apic: Turn on static calls
x86/apic: Provide static call infrastructure for APIC callbacks
x86/apic: Wrap IPI calls into helper functions
x86/apic: Mark all hotpath APIC callback wrappers __always_inline
x86/xen/apic: Mark apic __ro_after_init
x86/apic: Convert other overrides to apic_update_callback()
x86/apic: Replace acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update() and apic_set_eoi_cb()
x86/apic: Provide apic_update_callback()
x86/xen/apic: Use standard apic driver mechanism for Xen PV
x86/apic: Provide common init infrastructure
x86/apic: Wrap apic->native_eoi() into a helper
x86/apic: Nuke ack_APIC_irq()
x86/apic: Remove pointless arguments from [native_]eoi_write()
x86/apic/noop: Tidy up the code
x86/apic: Remove pointless NULL initializations
x86/apic: Sanitize APIC ID range validation
x86/apic: Prepare x2APIC for using apic::max_apic_id
x86/apic: Simplify X2APIC ID validation
x86/apic: Add max_apic_id member
x86/apic: Wrap APIC ID validation into an inline
...
working on. This part makes the loader core code as it is practically
enabled on pretty much every baremetal machine so there's no need to
have the Kconfig items. In addition, there are cleanups which prepare
for future feature enablement.
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Merge tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.6_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 microcode loading updates from Borislav Petkov:
"The first, cleanup part of the microcode loader reorg tglx has been
working on. The other part wasn't fully ready in time so it will
follow on later.
This part makes the loader core code as it is practically enabled on
pretty much every baremetal machine so there's no need to have the
Kconfig items.
In addition, there are cleanups which prepare for future feature
enablement"
* tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.6_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/microcode: Remove remaining references to CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD
x86/microcode/intel: Remove pointless mutex
x86/microcode/intel: Remove debug code
x86/microcode: Move core specific defines to local header
x86/microcode/intel: Rename get_datasize() since its used externally
x86/microcode: Make reload_early_microcode() static
x86/microcode: Include vendor headers into microcode.h
x86/microcode/intel: Move microcode functions out of cpu/intel.c
x86/microcode: Hide the config knob
x86/mm: Remove unused microcode.h include
x86/microcode: Remove microcode_mutex
x86/microcode/AMD: Rip out static buffers
consumption MCEs are not delivered synchronously but still within the
same context, which can lead to erroneously increased error severity
and unneeded kernel panics
- Do not log errors caught by polling shared MCA banks as they
materialize as duplicated error records otherwise
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Merge tag 'ras_core_for_v6.6_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 RAS updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add a quirk for AMD Zen machines where Instruction Fetch unit poison
consumption MCEs are not delivered synchronously but still within the
same context, which can lead to erroneously increased error severity
and unneeded kernel panics
- Do not log errors caught by polling shared MCA banks as they
materialize as duplicated error records otherwise
* tag 'ras_core_for_v6.6_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/MCE: Always save CS register on AMD Zen IF Poison errors
x86/mce: Prevent duplicate error records
- Support partial SMT enablement.
So far the sysfs SMT control only allows to toggle between SMT on and
off. That's sufficient for x86 which usually has at max two threads
except for the Xeon PHI platform which has four threads per core.
Though PowerPC has up to 16 threads per core and so far it's only
possible to control the number of enabled threads per core via a
command line option. There is some way to control this at runtime, but
that lacks enforcement and the usability is awkward.
This update expands the sysfs interface and the core infrastructure to
accept numerical values so PowerPC can build SMT runtime control for
partial SMT enablement on top.
The core support has also been provided to the PowerPC maintainers who
added the PowerPC related changes on top.
- Minor cleanups and documentation updates.
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Merge tag 'smp-core-2023-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull CPU hotplug updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Updates for the CPU hotplug core:
- Support partial SMT enablement.
So far the sysfs SMT control only allows to toggle between SMT on
and off. That's sufficient for x86 which usually has at max two
threads except for the Xeon PHI platform which has four threads per
core
Though PowerPC has up to 16 threads per core and so far it's only
possible to control the number of enabled threads per core via a
command line option. There is some way to control this at runtime,
but that lacks enforcement and the usability is awkward
This update expands the sysfs interface and the core infrastructure
to accept numerical values so PowerPC can build SMT runtime control
for partial SMT enablement on top
The core support has also been provided to the PowerPC maintainers
who added the PowerPC related changes on top
- Minor cleanups and documentation updates"
* tag 'smp-core-2023-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Documentation: core-api/cpuhotplug: Fix state names
cpu/hotplug: Remove unused function declaration cpu_set_state_online()
cpu/SMT: Fix cpu_smt_possible() comment
cpu/SMT: Allow enabling partial SMT states via sysfs
cpu/SMT: Create topology_smt_thread_allowed()
cpu/SMT: Remove topology_smt_supported()
cpu/SMT: Store the current/max number of threads
cpu/SMT: Move smt/control simple exit cases earlier
cpu/SMT: Move SMT prototypes into cpu_smt.h
cpu/hotplug: Remove dependancy against cpu_primary_thread_mask
Commit e6bcfdd75d ("x86/microcode: Hide the config knob") removed the
MICROCODE_AMD config, but left some references in defconfigs and comments,
that have no effect on any kernel build around.
Clean up those remaining config references. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230825141226.13566-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
In ms_hyperv_init_platform(), do not distinguish between a SNP VM with
the paravisor and a SNP VM without the paravisor.
Replace hv_isolation_type_en_snp() with
!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && hv_isolation_type_snp().
The hv_isolation_type_en_snp() in drivers/hv/hv.c and
drivers/hv/hv_common.c can be changed to hv_isolation_type_snp() since
we know !ms_hyperv.paravisor_present is true there.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-10-decui@microsoft.com
When the paravisor is present, a SNP VM must use GHCB to access some
special MSRs, including HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID and some SynIC MSRs.
Similarly, when the paravisor is present, a TDX VM must use TDX GHCI
to access the same MSRs.
Implement hv_tdx_msr_write() and hv_tdx_msr_read(), and use the helper
functions hv_ivm_msr_read() and hv_ivm_msr_write() to access the MSRs
in a unified way for SNP/TDX VMs with the paravisor.
Do not export hv_tdx_msr_write() and hv_tdx_msr_read(), because we never
really used hv_ghcb_msr_write() and hv_ghcb_msr_read() in any module.
Update arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h so that the kernel can still build
if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT or CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST is not set, or
neither is set.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-9-decui@microsoft.com
The new variable hyperv_paravisor_present is set only when the VM
is a SNP/TDX VM with the paravisor running: see ms_hyperv_init_platform().
We introduce hyperv_paravisor_present because we can not use
ms_hyperv.paravisor_present in arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h:
struct ms_hyperv_info is defined in include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h, which
is included at the end of arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h, but at the
beginning of arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h, we would already need to use
struct ms_hyperv_info in hv_do_hypercall().
We use hyperv_paravisor_present only in include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h,
and use ms_hyperv.paravisor_present elsewhere. In the future, we'll
introduce a hypercall function structure for different VM types, and
at boot time, the right function pointers would be written into the
structure so that runtime testing of TDX vs. SNP vs. normal will be
avoided and hyperv_paravisor_present will no longer be needed.
Call hv_vtom_init() when it's a VBS VM or when ms_hyperv.paravisor_present
is true, i.e. the VM is a SNP VM or TDX VM with the paravisor.
Enhance hv_vtom_init() for a TDX VM with the paravisor.
In hv_common_cpu_init(), don't decrypt the hyperv_pcpu_input_arg
for a TDX VM with the paravisor, just like we don't decrypt the page
for a SNP VM with the paravisor.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-7-decui@microsoft.com
When a fully enlightened TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, the UEFI firmware sets
the HW_REDUCED flag and consequently ttyS0 interrupts can't work. Fix the
issue by overriding x86_init.acpi.reduced_hw_early_init().
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-5-decui@microsoft.com
Add Hyper-V specific code so that a fully enlightened TDX guest (i.e.
without the paravisor) can run on Hyper-V:
Don't use hv_vp_assist_page. Use GHCI instead.
Don't try to use the unsupported HV_REGISTER_CRASH_CTL.
Don't trust (use) Hyper-V's TLB-flushing hypercalls.
Don't use lazy EOI.
Share the SynIC Event/Message pages with the hypervisor.
Don't use the Hyper-V TSC page for now, because non-trivial work is
required to share the page with the hypervisor.
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-4-decui@microsoft.com
No logic change to SNP/VBS guests.
hv_isolation_type_tdx() will be used to instruct a TDX guest on Hyper-V to
do some TDX-specific operations, e.g. for a fully enlightened TDX guest
(i.e. without the paravisor), hv_do_hypercall() should use
__tdx_hypercall() and such a guest on Hyper-V should handle the Hyper-V
Event/Message/Monitor pages specially.
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-2-decui@microsoft.com
When CONFIG_HYPERV is not set, arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c is not built (see
arch/x86/Kbuild), so 'isolation_type_en_snp' in the ivm.c is not defined,
and this failure happens:
ld: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.o: in function `ms_hyperv_init_platform':
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c:417: undefined reference to `isolation_type_en_snp'
Fix the failure by testing hv_get_isolation_type() and
ms_hyperv.paravisor_present for a fully enlightened SNP VM: when
CONFIG_HYPERV is not set, hv_get_isolation_type() is defined as a
static inline function that always returns HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE
(see include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h), so the compiler won't generate any
code for the ms_hyperv.paravisor_present and static_branch_enable().
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b4979997-23b9-0c43-574e-e4a3506500ff@amd.com/
Fixes: d6e2d65244 ("x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest static key")
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230823032008.18186-1-decui@microsoft.com
Add Hyperv-specific handling for faults caused by VMMCALL
instructions.
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230818102919.1318039-9-ltykernel@gmail.com
In the AMD SEV-SNP guest, AP needs to be started up via sev es
save area and Hyper-V requires to call HVCALL_START_VP hypercall
to pass the gpa of sev es save area with AP's vp index and VTL(Virtual
trust level) parameters. Override wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 callback
with hv_snp_boot_ap.
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230818102919.1318039-8-ltykernel@gmail.com
The Instruction Fetch (IF) units on current AMD Zen-based systems do not
guarantee a synchronous #MC is delivered for poison consumption errors.
Therefore, MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV] will not be set. However, the
microarchitecture does guarantee that the exception is delivered within
the same context. In other words, the exact rIP is not known, but the
context is known to not have changed.
There is no architecturally-defined method to determine this behavior.
The Code Segment (CS) register is always valid on such IF unit poison
errors regardless of the value of MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV].
Add a quirk to save the CS register for poison consumption from the IF
unit banks.
This is needed to properly determine the context of the error.
Otherwise, the severity grading function will assume the context is
IN_KERNEL due to the m->cs value being 0 (the initialized value). This
leads to unnecessary kernel panics on data poison errors due to the
kernel believing the poison consumption occurred in kernel context.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814200853.29258-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
Specify how is SRSO mitigated when SMT is disabled. Also, correct the
SMT check for that.
Fixes: e9fbc47b81 ("x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations")
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814200813.p5czl47zssuej7nv@treble
The following warning is reported when frame pointers and kernel IBT are
enabled:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ibt_selftest+0x11: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
The problem is that objtool interprets the indirect branch in
ibt_selftest() as a sibling call, and GCC inserts a (partial) frame
pointer prologue before it:
0000 000000000003f550 <ibt_selftest>:
0000 3f550: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
0004 3f554: e8 00 00 00 00 call 3f559 <ibt_selftest+0x9> 3f555: R_X86_64_PLT32 __fentry__-0x4
0009 3f559: 55 push %rbp
000a 3f55a: 48 8d 05 02 00 00 00 lea 0x2(%rip),%rax # 3f563 <ibt_selftest_ip>
0011 3f561: ff e0 jmp *%rax
Note the inline asm is missing ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, so the 'push %rbp'
happens before the indirect branch and the 'mov %rsp, %rbp' happens
afterwards.
Simplify the generated code and make it easier to understand for both
tools and humans by moving the selftest to proper asm.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99a7e16b97bda97bf0a04aa141d6241cd8a839a2.1680912949.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Similar to how it doesn't make sense to have UNTRAIN_RET have two
untrain calls, it also doesn't make sense for VMEXIT to have an extra
IBPB call.
This cures VMEXIT doing potentially unret+IBPB or double IBPB.
Also, the (SEV) VMEXIT case seems to have been overlooked.
Redefine the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags to:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry (was: entry + VMEXIT)
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VMEXIT
And have 'retbleed=ibpb' set *BOTH* feature flags to ensure it retains
the previous behaviour and issues IBPB on entry+VMEXIT.
The new 'srso=ibpb_vmexit' option only sets IBPB_ON_VMEXIT.
Create UNTRAIN_RET_VM specifically for the VMEXIT case, and have that
check IBPB_ON_VMEXIT.
All this avoids having the VMEXIT case having to check both ENTRY_IBPB
and IBPB_ON_VMEXIT and simplifies the alternatives.
Fixes: fb3bd914b3 ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121149.109557833@infradead.org
Since there can only be one active return_thunk, there only needs be
one (matching) untrain_ret. It fundamentally doesn't make sense to
allow multiple untrain_ret at the same time.
Fold all the 3 different untrain methods into a single (temporary)
helper stub.
Fixes: fb3bd914b3 ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121149.042774962@infradead.org
Rename the original retbleed return thunk and untrain_ret to
retbleed_return_thunk() and retbleed_untrain_ret().
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121148.909378169@infradead.org
Use the existing configurable return thunk. There is absolute no
justification for having created this __x86_return_thunk alternative.
To clarify, the whole thing looks like:
Zen3/4 does:
srso_alias_untrain_ret:
nop2
lfence
jmp srso_alias_return_thunk
int3
srso_alias_safe_ret: // aliasses srso_alias_untrain_ret just so
add $8, %rsp
ret
int3
srso_alias_return_thunk:
call srso_alias_safe_ret
ud2
While Zen1/2 does:
srso_untrain_ret:
movabs $foo, %rax
lfence
call srso_safe_ret (jmp srso_return_thunk ?)
int3
srso_safe_ret: // embedded in movabs instruction
add $8,%rsp
ret
int3
srso_return_thunk:
call srso_safe_ret
ud2
While retbleed does:
zen_untrain_ret:
test $0xcc, %bl
lfence
jmp zen_return_thunk
int3
zen_return_thunk: // embedded in the test instruction
ret
int3
Where Zen1/2 flush the BTB entry using the instruction decoder trick
(test,movabs) Zen3/4 use BTB aliasing. SRSO adds a return sequence
(srso_safe_ret()) which forces the function return instruction to
speculate into a trap (UD2). This RET will then mispredict and
execution will continue at the return site read from the top of the
stack.
Pick one of three options at boot (evey function can only ever return
once).
[ bp: Fixup commit message uarch details and add them in a comment in
the code too. Add a comment about the srso_select_mitigation()
dependency on retbleed_select_mitigation(). Add moar ifdeffery for
32-bit builds. Add a dummy srso_untrain_ret_alias() definition for
32-bit alternatives needing the symbol. ]
Fixes: fb3bd914b3 ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121148.842775684@infradead.org
There is infrastructure to rewrite return thunks to point to any
random thunk one desires, unwrap that from CALL_THUNKS, which up to
now was the sole user of that.
[ bp: Make the thunks visible on 32-bit and add ifdeffery for the
32-bit builds. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121148.775293785@infradead.org
Skip the srso cmd line parsing which is not needed on Zen1/2 with SMT
disabled and with the proper microcode applied (latter should be the
case anyway) as those are not affected.
Fixes: 5a15d83488 ("x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230813104517.3346-1-bp@alien8.de
Initially, it was thought that doing an innocuous division in the #DE
handler would take care to prevent any leaking of old data from the
divider but by the time the fault is raised, the speculation has already
advanced too far and such data could already have been used by younger
operations.
Therefore, do the innocuous division on every exit to userspace so that
userspace doesn't see any potentially old data from integer divisions in
kernel space.
Do the same before VMRUN too, to protect host data from leaking into the
guest too.
Fixes: 77245f1c3c ("x86/CPU/AMD: Do not leak quotient data after a division by 0")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811213824.10025-1-bp@alien8.de
There is no reason to expose all of this globally. Move everything which is
not required outside of the microcode specific code to local header files
and into the respective source files.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230812195727.952876381@linutronix.de
Rename get_datasize() to intel_microcode_get_datasize() and make it an inline.
[ tglx: Make the argument typed and fix up the IFS code ]
Suggested-by: Boris Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230812195727.894165745@linutronix.de
fe055896c0 ("x86/microcode: Merge the early microcode loader") left this
needlessly public. Git archaeology provided by Borislav.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230812195727.834943153@linutronix.de
Currently vendor specific headers are included explicitly when used in
common code. Instead, include the vendor specific headers in
microcode.h, and include that in all usages.
No functional change.
Suggested-by: Boris Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230812195727.776541545@linutronix.de
There is really no point to have that in the CPUID evaluation code. Move it
into the Intel-specific microcode handling along with the data
structures, defines and helpers required by it. The exports need to stay
for IFS.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230812195727.719202319@linutronix.de
In reality CONFIG_MICROCODE is enabled in any reasonable configuration when
Intel or AMD support is enabled. Accommodate to reality.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230812195727.660453052@linutronix.de
leads to an EFI config table ending up unmapped
- Use the correct segment selector in the 32-bit version of getcpu() in
the vDSO
- Make sure vDSO and VVAR regions are placed in the 47-bit VA range even
on 5-level paging systems
- Add models 0x90-0x91 to the range of AMD Zenbleed-affected CPUs
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Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.5_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Do not parse the confidential computing blob on non-AMD hardware as
it leads to an EFI config table ending up unmapped
- Use the correct segment selector in the 32-bit version of getcpu() in
the vDSO
- Make sure vDSO and VVAR regions are placed in the 47-bit VA range
even on 5-level paging systems
- Add models 0x90-0x91 to the range of AMD Zenbleed-affected CPUs
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.5_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu/amd: Enable Zenbleed fix for AMD Custom APU 0405
x86/mm: Fix VDSO and VVAR placement on 5-level paging machines
x86/linkage: Fix typo of BUILD_VDSO in asm/linkage.h
x86/vdso: Choose the right GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE for 32-bit getcpu() on 64-bit kernel
x86/sev: Do not try to parse for the CC blob on non-AMD hardware
Commit
522b1d6921 ("x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix")
provided a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug affecting
a range of CPU models, but the AMD Custom APU 0405 found on SteamDeck
was not listed, although it is clearly affected by the vulnerability.
Add this CPU variant to the Zenbleed erratum list, in order to
unconditionally enable the fallback fix until a proper microcode update
is available.
Fixes: 522b1d6921 ("x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811203705.1699914-1-cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com
Alderlake N is an E-core only product using Gracemont
micro-architecture. It fits the pre-existing naming scheme perfectly
fine, adhere to it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807150405.686834933@infradead.org
Move them to one place so the static call conversion gets simpler.
No functional change.
[ dhansen: merge against recent x86/apic changes ]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> # Xen PV (dom0 and unpriv. guest)
Yet another wrapper of a wrapper gone along with the outdated comment
that this compiles to a single instruction.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> # Xen PV (dom0 and unpriv. guest)
No point in having a wrapper around read_apic_id().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> # Xen PV (dom0 and unpriv. guest)
It's not longer used outside the source file.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> # Xen PV (dom0 and unpriv. guest)
Under certain circumstances, an integer division by 0 which faults, can
leave stale quotient data from a previous division operation on Zen1
microarchitectures.
Do a dummy division 0/1 before returning from the #DE exception handler
in order to avoid any leaks of potentially sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
microcode_mutex is only used by reload_store(). It has a comment saying
"to synchronize with each other". Other user of this mutex have been
removed in the commits
181b6f40e9 ("x86/microcode: Rip out the OLD_INTERFACE").
b6f86689d5 ("x86/microcode: Rip out the subsys interface gunk")
The sysfs interface does not need additional synchronisation vs itself
because it is provided as kernfs_ops::mutex which is acquired in
kernfs_fop_write_iter().
Remove the superfluous microcode_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230804075853.JF_n6GXC@linutronix.de
