Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To avoid a naming collision when we add a sha256() library function,
rename the "sha256" static variable in sha256_glue.c to "sha256_alg".
For consistency, also rename "sha224" to "sha224_alg".
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
<linux/cryptohash.h> sounds very generic and important, like it's the
header to include if you're doing cryptographic hashing in the kernel.
But actually it only includes the library implementation of the SHA-1
compression function (not even the full SHA-1). This should basically
never be used anymore; SHA-1 is no longer considered secure, and there
are much better ways to do cryptographic hashing in the kernel.
Most files that include this header don't actually need it. So in
preparation for removing it, remove all these unneeded includes of it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the glue code for the SPARC64 DES opcodes implementations of
DES-ECB, DES-CBC, 3DES-ECB, and 3DES-CBC from the deprecated "blkcipher"
API to the "skcipher" API. This is needed in order for the blkcipher
API to be removed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the glue code for the SPARC64 Camellia opcodes implementations
of Camellia-ECB and Camellia-CBC from the deprecated "blkcipher" API to
the "skcipher" API. This is needed in order for the blkcipher API to be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the glue code for the SPARC64 AES opcodes implementations of
AES-ECB, AES-CBC, and AES-CTR from the deprecated "blkcipher" API to the
"skcipher" API. This is needed in order for the blkcipher API to be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Switch to the refactored DES key verification routines. While at it,
rename the DES encrypt/decrypt routines so they will not conflict with
the DES library later on.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Rename some local AES encrypt/decrypt routines so they don't clash with
the names we are about to introduce for the routines exposed by the
generic AES library.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it
sounds like it is requesting a weak key. Actually, it is requesting
that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of
"weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do).
Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which
it can be easily confused. (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver,
though just in some debugging messages.)
Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some algorithms initialize their .cra_list prior to registration.
But this is unnecessary since crypto_register_alg() will overwrite
.cra_list when adding the algorithm to the 'crypto_alg_list'.
Apparently the useless assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignments.
Exception: paes_s390.c uses cra_list to check whether the algorithm is
registered or not, so I left that as-is for now.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many shash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But this
is redundant with the C structure type ('struct shash_alg'), and
crypto_register_shash() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the shash algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Enforce the setting of keys for keyed aead/hash/skcipher
algorithms.
- Add multibuf speed tests in tcrypt.
Algorithms:
- Improve performance of sha3-generic.
- Add native sha512 support on arm64.
- Add v8.2 Crypto Extentions version of sha3/sm3 on arm64.
- Avoid hmac nesting by requiring underlying algorithm to be unkeyed.
- Add cryptd_max_cpu_qlen module parameter to cryptd.
Drivers:
- Add support for EIP97 engine in inside-secure.
- Add inline IPsec support to chelsio.
- Add RevB core support to crypto4xx.
- Fix AEAD ICV check in crypto4xx.
- Add stm32 crypto driver.
- Add support for BCM63xx platforms in bcm2835 and remove bcm63xx.
- Add Derived Key Protocol (DKP) support in caam.
- Add Samsung Exynos True RNG driver.
- Add support for Exynos5250+ SoCs in exynos PRNG driver"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (166 commits)
crypto: picoxcell - Fix error handling in spacc_probe()
crypto: arm64/sha512 - fix/improve new v8.2 Crypto Extensions code
crypto: arm64/sm3 - new v8.2 Crypto Extensions implementation
crypto: arm64/sha3 - new v8.2 Crypto Extensions implementation
crypto: testmgr - add new testcases for sha3
crypto: sha3-generic - export init/update/final routines
crypto: sha3-generic - simplify code
crypto: sha3-generic - rewrite KECCAK transform to help the compiler optimize
crypto: sha3-generic - fixes for alignment and big endian operation
crypto: aesni - handle zero length dst buffer
crypto: artpec6 - remove select on non-existing CRYPTO_SHA384
hwrng: bcm2835 - Remove redundant dev_err call in bcm2835_rng_probe()
crypto: stm32 - remove redundant dev_err call in stm32_cryp_probe()
crypto: axis - remove unnecessary platform_get_resource() error check
crypto: testmgr - test misuse of result in ahash
crypto: inside-secure - make function safexcel_try_push_requests static
crypto: aes-generic - fix aes-generic regression on powerpc
crypto: chelsio - Fix indentation warning
crypto: arm64/sha1-ce - get rid of literal pool
crypto: arm64/sha2-ce - move the round constant table to .rodata section
...
This patch fixes the typo CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_SPARC64 => CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_SPARC64
Fixes: 81658ad0d9 ("sparc64: Add CAMELLIA driver making use of the new camellia opcodes.")
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)
Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.
The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.
Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are quite a number of occurrences in the kernel of the pattern
if (dst != src)
memcpy(dst, src, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_xor(dst, final, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
or
crypto_xor(keystream, src, nbytes);
memcpy(dst, keystream, nbytes);
where crypto_xor() is preceded or followed by a memcpy() invocation
that is only there because crypto_xor() uses its output parameter as
one of the inputs. To avoid having to add new instances of this pattern
in the arm64 code, which will be refactored to implement non-SIMD
fallbacks, add an alternative implementation called crypto_xor_cpy(),
taking separate input and output arguments. This removes the need for
the separate memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some of the crypto algorithms write to the initialization vector,
but no space has been allocated for it. This clobbers adjacent memory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since MD5 IV are now available in crypto/md5.h, use them.
Signed-off-by: LABBE Corentin <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
MD5 is not SHA1.
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This module provides implementations for "des3_ede", too. Announce those
via an appropriate crypto module alias so it can be used in favour to
the generic C implementation.
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The module alias should be "camellia", not "aes".
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
AES is a block cipher, not a hash.
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Memset on a local variable may be removed when it is called just before the
variable goes out of scope. Using memzero_explicit defeats this
optimization. A simplified version of the semantic patch that makes this
change is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
identifier x;
type T;
@@
{
... when any
T x[...];
... when any
when exists
- memset
+ memzero_explicit
(x,
-0,
...)
... when != x
when strict
}
// </smpl>
This change was suggested by Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix following warnings:
aes_glue.c:127:16: warning: symbol 'aes128_ops' was not declared. Should it be static?
aes_glue.c:139:16: warning: symbol 'aes192_ops' was not declared. Should it be static?
aes_glue.c:151:16: warning: symbol 'aes256_ops' was not declared. Should it be static?
Fix by defining the variables static as they are not used outside this file
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Like the generic versions, we need to support a block size
of '1' for CTR mode AES.
This was discovered thanks to all of the new test cases added by
Jussi Kivilinna.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The basic scheme of the block mode assembler is that we start by
enabling the FPU, loading the key into the floating point registers,
then iterate calling the encrypt/decrypt routine for each block.
For the 256-bit key cases, we run short on registers in the unrolled
loops.
So the {ENCRYPT,DECRYPT}_256_2() macros reload the key registers that
get clobbered.
The unrolled macros, {ENCRYPT,DECRYPT}_256(), are not mindful of this.
So if we have a mix of multi-block and single-block calls, the
single-block unrolled 256-bit encrypt/decrypt can run with some
of the key registers clobbered.
Handle this by always explicitly loading those registers before using
the non-unrolled 256-bit macro.
This was discovered thanks to all of the new test cases added by
Jussi Kivilinna.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We tried linking in a single built object to hold the device table,
but only works if all of the sparc64 crypto modules get built the same
way (modular vs. non-modular).
Just include the device ID stub into each driver source file so that
the table gets compiled into the correct result in all cases.
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The IV wasn't being propagated properly past the first loop
iteration.
This bug lived only because the crypto layer tests for
cbc(des) do not have any cases that go more than one loop.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Just simply provide a device table containing an entry for sun4v cpus,
the capability mask checks in the drivers themselves will take care of
the rest.
This makes the bootup logs on pre-T4 cpus slightly more verbose, with
each driver indicating lack of support for the associated opcode(s).
But this isn't too much of a real problem.
I toyed with the idea of using explicit entries with compatability
fields of "SPARC-T4", "SPARC-T5", etc. but all future cpus will have
some subset of these opcodes available and this would just be one more
pointless thing to do as each new cpu is released with a new string.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make the crypto opcode implementations have a higher priority than
those provides by the ring buffer based Niagara crypto device.
Also, several crypto opcode hashes were not setting the priority value
at all.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some dm-crypt testing revealed several bugs in the 256-bit unrolled
loops.
The DECRYPT_256_2() macro had two errors:
1) Missing reload of KEY registers %f60 and %f62
2) Missing "\" in penultimate line of definition.
In aes_sparc64_ecb_decrypt_256, we were storing the second half of the
encryption result from the wrong source registers.
In aes_sparc64_ctr_crypt_256 we have to be careful when we fall out of
the 32-byte-at-a-time loop and handle a trailing 16-byte chunk. In
that case we've clobbered the final key holding registers and have to
restore them before executing the ENCRYPT_256() macro. Inside of the
32-byte-at-a-time loop things are OK, because we do this key register
restoring during the first few rounds of the ENCRYPT_256_2() macro.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Before:
testing speed of ctr(aes) encryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 206 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 244 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 360 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 814 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5021 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 206 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 240 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 378 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 939 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6395 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 209 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 249 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 414 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1073 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 7110 cycles (8192 bytes)
testing speed of ctr(aes) decryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 225 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 233 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 344 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 810 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5021 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 206 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 240 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 376 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 938 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6380 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 214 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 251 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 411 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1070 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 7114 cycles (8192 bytes)
After:
testing speed of ctr(aes) encryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 211 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 246 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 344 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 799 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 4975 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 210 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 236 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 365 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 888 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6055 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 209 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 255 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 404 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1010 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6669 cycles (8192 bytes)
testing speed of ctr(aes) decryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 210 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 233 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 340 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 818 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 4956 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 206 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 239 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 361 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 888 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5996 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 214 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 248 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 395 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1010 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6664 cycles (8192 bytes)
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Before:
testing speed of ecb(aes) decryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 223 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 230 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 325 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 719 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 4266 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 211 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 234 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 353 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 808 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5344 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 214 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 243 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 393 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 939 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6039 cycles (8192 bytes)
After:
testing speed of ecb(aes) decryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 226 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 231 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 313 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 681 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 3964 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 205 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 240 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 341 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 770 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5050 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 216 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 250 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 371 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 869 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5494 cycles (8192 bytes)
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The AES opcodes have a 3 cycle latency, so by doing 32-bytes at a
time we avoid a pipeline bubble in between every round.
For the 256-bit key case, it looks like we're doing more work in
order to reload the KEY registers during the loop to make space
for scarce temporaries. But the load dual issues with the AES
operations so we get the KEY reloads essentially for free.
Before:
testing speed of ecb(aes) encryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 264 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 231 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 329 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 715 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 4248 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 221 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 234 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 359 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 803 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5366 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 209 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 255 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 379 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 938 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6041 cycles (8192 bytes)
After:
testing speed of ecb(aes) encryption
test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 266 cycles (16 bytes)
test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 256 cycles (64 bytes)
test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 305 cycles (256 bytes)
test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 676 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 3981 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 210 cycles (16 bytes)
test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 233 cycles (64 bytes)
test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 340 cycles (256 bytes)
test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 766 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5136 cycles (8192 bytes)
test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 206 cycles (16 bytes)
test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 268 cycles (64 bytes)
test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 368 cycles (256 bytes)
test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 890 cycles (1024 bytes)
test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 5718 cycles (8192 bytes)
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Instead of testing and branching off of the key size on every
encrypt/decrypt call, use method ops assigned at key set time.
Reverse the order of float registers used for decryption to make
future changes easier.
Align all assembler routines on a 32-byte boundary.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
