In security_load_policy(), we can defer allocating the newpolicydb
ancillary array to after checking state->initialized, thereby avoiding
the pointless allocation when loading policy the first time.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merged portions by hand]
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Two places used u32 where there should have been __le32.
Fixes sparse warnings:
CHECK [...]/security/selinux/ss/services.c
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The disabled/enforcing/initialized flags are all accessed concurrently
by threads so use the appropriate accessors that ensure atomicity and
document that it is expected.
Use smp_load/acquire...() helpers (with memory barriers) for the
initialized flag, since it gates access to the rest of the state
structures.
Note that the disabled flag is currently not used for anything other
than avoiding double disable, but it will be used for bailing out of
hooks once security_delete_hooks() is removed.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_port_sid:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2346:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_ib_endport_sid:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2435:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_netif_sid:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2480:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_fs_use:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2831:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Since commit 66f8e2f03c ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table")
'sidtab' is not used any more, so remove it.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Check to make sure we have loaded a policy before we query the
sidtab's hash stats. Failure to do so could result in a kernel
panic/oops due to a dereferenced NULL pointer.
Fixes: 66f8e2f03c ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures.
Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss,
policydb, and task_security_struct data structures.
NB To test/use this mechanism, one must install the
necessary build-time dependencies, e.g. gcc-plugin-devel on Fedora,
and enable CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT in the kernel configuration.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[PM: double semi-colon fixed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if
the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite
noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs
to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with
the SO_PASSSEC option enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald
when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be
reproduced with:
cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger &
timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g
kill %1
perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctx
Before the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context
string (security_secid_to_secctx() function) takes up ~65% of
systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories
set and Fedora x86_64 release kernel configs). After this patch
(assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just
~2%.
This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time
configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated
translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of
memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field
to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to
a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept
in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a
cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is
removed to make space for the new entry.
The patch migrates security_sid_to_context_core() to use the cache (also
a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but
these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is
rare).
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259
Cc: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
[PM: lots of merge fixups due to collisions with other sidtab patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a
hashtable which improves cache-miss reverse-lookup times from
O(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reverse
cache hit.
This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us
to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.
The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API,
It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source,
and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()
to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.
This change also maintains the improvement introduced in
commit ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance") which removed the need to keep the current sidtab
locked during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic
locking of the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab
entries are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored
in the sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid
hashtable to reduce memory usage.
This bug was reported by:
- On the selinux bug tracker.
BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37
- Jovana Knezevic on Android's bugtracker.
Bug: 140252993
"During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users
many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over
20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over
~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation,
making perf benchmarks unreliable."
* Hashtable lookup is only O(1) when n < the number of buckets.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic <jovanak@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: subj tweak, removed changelog from patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Only three SELinux patches for v5.5:
- Remove the size limit on SELinux policies, the limitation was a
lingering vestige and no longer necessary.
- Allow file labeling before the policy is loaded. This should ease
some of the burden when the policy is initially loaded (no need to
relabel files), but it should also help enable some new system
concepts which dynamically create the root filesystem in the
initrd.
- Add support for the "greatest lower bound" policy construct which
is defined as the intersection of the MLS range of two SELinux
labels"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: default_range glblub implementation
selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
selinux: remove load size limit
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore:
"One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and
the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of
the two contexts.
The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated
as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities
and the and of each category bitmap.
This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies,
for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in.
Some examples are:
User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label
---------------------|----------------------|----------------
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0 | s0
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0-s1:c0.c1023 | s0-s1:c0.c12
s0-s4:c0.c512 | s1-s1:c0.c1023 | s1-s1:c0.c512
s0-s15:c0,c2 | s4-s6:c0.c128 | s4-s6:c0,c2
s0-s4 | s2-s6 | s2-s4
s0-s4 | s5-s8 | INVALID
s5-s8 | s0-s4 | INVALID
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
[PM: subject lines and checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to
copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid
storing the corrupted context.
Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the
context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(),
this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be
disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored
length and not the null character).
How to reproduce on Fedora and similar:
# dnf install -y memcached
# systemctl start memcached
# semodule -d memcached
# load_policy
# load_policy
# systemctl stop memcached
# ausearch -m AVC
type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc: denied { signal } for pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Milos Malik <mmalik@redhat.com>
Fixes: ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify,
fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the
LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks.
- The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in
the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for
good.
- Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return
the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we
would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now
we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry
for it.
- Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with
READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection.
- A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward
declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc)
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm: remove current_security()
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications
selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one
selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array
selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings
selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
As noted in Documentation/atomic_t.txt, if we don't need the RMW atomic
operations, we should only use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() +
smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() where necessary (or the combined variants
smp_load_acquire()/smp_store_release()).
This patch converts the sidtab code to use regular u32 for the counter
and reverse lookup cache and use the appropriate operations instead of
atomic_get()/atomic_set(). Note that when reading/updating the reverse
lookup cache we don't need memory barriers as it doesn't need to be
consistent or accurate. We can now also replace some atomic ops with
regular loads (when under spinlock) and stores (for conversion target
fields that are always accessed under the master table's spinlock).
We can now also bump SIDTAB_MAX to U32_MAX as we can use the full u32
range again.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The name is overly long and inconsistent with the other *_val_to_struct
members. Dropping the "_array" prefix makes the code easier to read and
gets rid of one line over 80 characters warning.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix most of the code style warnings discovered when moving code around.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
No code changes, but move a lot of the policydb destructors higher up
so we can get rid of a forward declaration.
This patch does expose a few old checkpatch.pl errors, but those will
be dealt with in a separate (set of) patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more small fix for a potential memory leak in an error path"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()
Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190726' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to add some proper bounds/overflow checking
when adding a new sid/secid"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190726' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Like the audit pull request this is a little early due to some
upcoming vacation plans and uncertain network access while I'm away.
Also like the audit PR, the list of patches here is pretty minor, the
highlights include:
- Explicitly use __le variables to make sure "sparse" can verify
proper byte endian handling.
- Remove some BUG_ON()s that are no longer needed.
- Allow zero-byte writes to the "keycreate" procfs attribute without
requiring key:create to make it easier for userspace to reset the
keycreate label.
- Consistently log the "invalid_context" field as an untrusted string
in the AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR audit records"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
selinux: remove some no-op BUG_ONs
selinux: provide __le variables explicitly
The userspace tools expect all fields of the same name to be logged
consistently with the same encoding. Since the invalid_context fields
contain untrusted strings in selinux_inode_setxattr()
and selinux_setprocattr(), encode all instances of this field the same
way as though they were untrusted even though
compute_sid_handle_invalid_context() and security_sid_mls_copy() are
trusted.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/57
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 135 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081036.435762997@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since acdf52d97f ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc"), these check whether
an address-of value is NULL, which is pointless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
While the endiannes is being handled properly sparse was unable to verify
this due to type inconsistency. So introduce an additional __le32
respectively _le64 variable to be passed to le32/64_to_cpu() to allow
sparse to verify proper typing. Note that this patch does not change
the generated binary on little-endian systems - on 32bit powerpc it
does change the binary.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Mc Guire <hofrat@osadl.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a few SELinux patches for the v5.2 merge window, the
highlights are below:
- Add LSM hooks, and the SELinux implementation, for proper labeling
of kernfs. While we are only including the SELinux implementation
here, the rest of the LSM folks have given the hooks a thumbs-up.
- Update the SELinux mdp (Make Dummy Policy) script to actually work
on a modern system.
- Disallow userspace to change the LSM credentials via
/proc/self/attr when the task's credentials are already overridden.
The change was made in procfs because all the LSM folks agreed this
was the Right Thing To Do and duplicating it across each LSM was
going to be annoying"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials
selinux: Check address length before reading address family
kernfs: fix xattr name handling in LSM helpers
MAINTAINERS: update SELinux file patterns
selinux: avoid uninitialized variable warning
selinux: remove useless assignments
LSM: lsm_hooks.h - fix missing colon in docstring
selinux: Make selinux_kernfs_init_security static
kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook
LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization
kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes
selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems
kernfs: do not alloc iattrs in kernfs_xattr_get
kernfs: clean up struct kernfs_iattrs
scripts/selinux: fix build
selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp
The code incorrectly assigned directly to the variables instead of the
values they point to. Since the values are already set to NULL/0 at the
beginning of the function, we can simply remove these useless
assignments.
Reported-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hariprasad.kelam@gmail.com>
Fixes: fede148324 ("selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: removed a bad comment that was causing compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The conversion to kvmalloc() forgot to account for the possibility that
p->type_attr_map_array might be null in policydb_destroy().
Fix this by destroying its contents only if it is not NULL.
Also make sure ebitmap_init() is called on all entries before
policydb_destroy() can be called. Right now this is a no-op, because
both kvcalloc() and ebitmap_init() just zero out the whole struct, but
let's rather not rely on a specific implementation.
Reported-by: syzbot+a57b2aff60832666fc28@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: acdf52d97f ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The flex arrays were being used for constant sized arrays, so there's no
benefit to using flex_arrays over something simpler.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181217131929.11727-4-kent.overstreet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Nine SELinux patches for v5.1, all bug fixes.
As far as I'm concerned, nothing really jumps out as risky or special
to me, but each commit has a decent description so you can judge for
yourself. As usual, everything passes the selinux-testsuite; please
merge for v5.1"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix avc audit messages
selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c
selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs
selinux: replace some BUG_ON()s with a WARN_ON()
selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once
selinux: do not override context on context mounts
selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In case a file has an invalid context set, in an AVC record generated
upon access to such file, the target context is always reported as
unlabeled. This patch adds new optional fields to the AVC record
(srawcon and trawcon) that report the actual context string if it
differs from the one reported in scontext/tcontext. This is useful for
diagnosing SELinux denials involving invalid contexts.
To trigger an AVC that illustrates this situation:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/testfile
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 /tmp/testfile
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/testfile
AVC before:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1
AVC after:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1 trawcon=system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0
Note that it is also possible to encounter this situation with the
'scontext' field - e.g. when a new policy is loaded while a process is
running, whose context is not valid in the new policy.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1135683
Cc: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'v5.0-rc3' into next-general
Sync to Linux 5.0-rc3 to pull in the VFS changes which impacted a lot
of the LSM code.
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small patch to fix a potential NULL dereference on a failed
SELinux policy load"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy
levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There are no longer users of selinux_is_enabled().
Remove it. As selinux_is_enabled() is the only reason
for include/linux/selinux.h remove that as well.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux patches from Paul Moore:
"I already used my best holiday pull request lines in the audit pull
request, so this one is going to be a bit more boring, sorry about
that. To make up for this, we do have a birthday of sorts to
celebrate: SELinux turns 18 years old this December. Perhaps not the
most exciting thing in the world for most people, but I think it's
safe to say that anyone reading this email doesn't exactly fall into
the "most people" category.
Back to business and the pull request itself:
Ondrej has five patches in this pull request and I lump them into
three categories: one patch to always allow submounts (using similar
logic to elsewhere in the kernel), one to fix some issues with the
SELinux policydb, and the others to cleanup and improve the SELinux
sidtab.
The other patches from Alexey and Petr and trivial fixes that are
adequately described in their respective subject lines.
With this last pull request of the year, I want to thank everyone who
has contributed patches, testing, and reviews to the SELinux project
this year, and the past 18 years. Like any good open source effort,
SELinux is only as good as the community which supports it, and I'm
very happy that we have the community we do - thank you all!"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance
selinux: use separate table for initial SID lookup
selinux: make "selinux_policycap_names[]" const char *
selinux: always allow mounting submounts
selinux: refactor sidtab conversion
Documentation: Update SELinux reference policy URL
selinux: policydb - fix byte order and alignment issues
Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen
and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new
entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM.
Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of
distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't
handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the
following reproducer:
while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done &
for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do
runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break
# or:
# chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break
done
This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during
policy reload, thus solving the above problem.
The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated
sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets
indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages:
1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in
logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups)
and can still be done safely without locking.
2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after
acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be
searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a
new entry are now about twice as fast.
3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible
to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion.
The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up
to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about
4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32
entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point
the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway...
The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that
each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for
kmalloc() to handle.
Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent
logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the
hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries.
The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but
it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the
contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its
effectivity, not the correctness of lookups.
Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple
stress test:
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38
Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com>
Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts]
[PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This moves handling of initial SIDs into a separate table. Note that the
SIDs stored in the main table are now shifted by SECINITSID_NUM and
converted to/from the actual SIDs transparently by helper functions.
This change doesn't make much sense on its own, but it simplifies
further sidtab overhaul in a succeeding patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed some checkpatch warnings on line length, whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This is a purely cosmetic change that encapsulates the three-step sidtab
conversion logic (shutdown -> clone -> map) into a single function
defined in sidtab.c (as opposed to services.c).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespaces fixes to make checkpatch happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make
it stricter") inadvertently changed how we handle labels that did not
contain MLS information. This patch restores the proper behavior in
mls_context_to_sid() and adds a comment explaining the proper
behavior to help ensure this doesn't happen again.
Fixes: 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks.
The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy
with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by
running (on e.g. ppc64):
cat >my_module.cil <<EOF
(type test_ibendport_t)
(roletype object_r test_ibendport_t)
(ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0))))
EOF
semodule -i my_module.cil
Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to
use a correctly aligned buffer.
Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32)
should be used instead.
Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this
patch applied.
Cc: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+
Fixes: a806f7a161 ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The intended behavior change for this patch is to reject any MLS strings
that contain (trailing) garbage if p->mls_enabled is true.
As suggested by Paul Moore, change mls_context_to_sid() so that the two
parts of the range are extracted before the rest of the parsing. Because
now we don't have to scan for two different separators simultaneously
everywhere, we can actually switch to strchr() everywhere instead of the
open-coded loops that scan for two separators at once.
mls_context_to_sid() used to signal how much of the input string was parsed
by updating `*scontext`. However, there is actually no case in which
mls_context_to_sid() only parses a subset of the input and still returns
a success (other than the buggy case with a second '-' in which it
incorrectly claims to have consumed the entire string). Turn `scontext`
into a simple pointer argument and stop redundantly checking whether the
entire input was consumed in string_to_context_struct(). This also lets us
remove the `scontext_len` argument from `string_to_context_struct()`.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[PM: minor merge fuzz in convert_context()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
