Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and
task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be
merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This
work is from Casey and Kees.
- There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid
family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given
UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This
feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits)
keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified
LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable
security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
tomoyo: Bump version.
LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs()
LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include
LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY
LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines.
tomoyo: Coding style fix.
tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security.
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through
...
The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on
it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning
for this:
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] <asn:1>*<noident>
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: got struct keyctl_pkey_query *<noident>
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.
The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.
Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.
The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
setreuid(5000, 5000);
request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
}
Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset.
Fixes: 31d5a79d7f ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.
Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
payload available outside of security/keys/.
(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
record and operation name.
Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.
Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).
Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb4 ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up.
This commit remove the following warnings:
security/keys/request_key.c:293:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/request_key.c:298:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/request_key.c:307:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up.
This commit remove the following warning:
security/keys/process_keys.c:380:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/process_keys.c:404:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/process_keys.c:424:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
this place in the code produced a warning (W=1).
This commit remove the following warning:
security/keys/keyring.c:248:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
We need to check the return value of match_token() for Opt_err before
doing anything with it.
[ Not only did the old "-1" value for Opt_err cause problems for the
__test_and_set_bit(), as fixed in commit 94c13f66e1 ("security:
don't use a negative Opt_err token index"), but accessing
"args[0].from" is invalid for the Opt_err case, as pointed out by Eric
later. - Linus ]
Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.20
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
security model supports locking access to the media at
device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and secure-erase
(crypto-scramble).
Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm security
implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations at OS
runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys facility to
provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key material. The
usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is driven via
libnvdimm sysfs.
* Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes.
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Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
"The vast bulk of this update is the new support for the security
capabilities of some nvdimms.
The userspace tooling for this capability is still a work in progress,
but the changes survive the existing libnvdimm unit tests. The changes
also pass manual checkout on hardware and the new nfit_test emulation
of the security capability.
The touches of the security/keys/ files have received the necessary
acks from Mimi and David. Those changes were necessary to allow for a
new generic encrypted-key type, and allow the nvdimm sub-system to
lookup key material referenced by the libnvdimm-sysfs interface.
Summary:
- Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
security model supports locking access to the media at
device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and
secure-erase (crypto-scramble).
Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm
security implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations
at OS runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys
facility to provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key
material. The usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is
driven via libnvdimm sysfs.
- Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes"
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (21 commits)
libnvdimm/security: Quiet security operations
libnvdimm/security: Add documentation for nvdimm security support
tools/testing/nvdimm: add Intel DSM 1.8 support for nfit_test
tools/testing/nvdimm: Add overwrite support for nfit_test
tools/testing/nvdimm: Add test support for Intel nvdimm security DSMs
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: add Intel DSM 1.8 master passphrase support
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add enable/update passphrase support for Intel nvdimms
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add disable passphrase support to Intel nvdimm.
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add unlock of nvdimm support for Intel DIMMs
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add freeze security support to Intel nvdimm
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops
keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys
keys: Export lookup_user_key to external users
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Store dimm id as a member to struct nvdimm
libnvdimm, namespace: Replace kmemdup() with kstrndup()
libnvdimm, label: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()
ACPI/nfit: Adjust annotation for why return 0 if fail to find NFIT at start
libnvdimm, bus: Check id immediately following ida_simple_get
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add 1472-byte test to tcrypt for IPsec
- Reintroduced crypto stats interface with numerous changes
- Support incremental algorithm dumps
Algorithms:
- Add xchacha12/20
- Add nhpoly1305
- Add adiantum
- Add streebog hash
- Mark cts(cbc(aes)) as FIPS allowed
Drivers:
- Improve performance of arm64/chacha20
- Improve performance of x86/chacha20
- Add NEON-accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add SSE2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add AVX2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add support for 192/256-bit keys in gcmaes AVX
- Add SG support in gcmaes AVX
- ESN for inline IPsec tx in chcr
- Add support for CryptoCell 703 in ccree
- Add support for CryptoCell 713 in ccree
- Add SM4 support in ccree
- Add SM3 support in ccree
- Add support for chacha20 in caam/qi2
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/jr
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/qi2
- Add AEAD cipher support in cavium/nitrox"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (130 commits)
crypto: skcipher - remove remnants of internal IV generators
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix build with !CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
crypto: salsa20-generic - don't unnecessarily use atomic walk
crypto: skcipher - add might_sleep() to skcipher_walk_virt()
crypto: x86/chacha - avoid sleeping under kernel_fpu_begin()
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Added AEAD cipher support
crypto: mxc-scc - fix build warnings on ARM64
crypto: api - document missing stats member
crypto: user - remove unused dump functions
crypto: chelsio - Fix wrong error counter increments
crypto: chelsio - Reset counters on cxgb4 Detach
crypto: chelsio - Handle PCI shutdown event
crypto: chelsio - cleanup:send addr as value in function argument
crypto: chelsio - Use same value for both channel in single WR
crypto: chelsio - Swap location of AAD and IV sent in WR
crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'kctx_len'
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in hash_set_dma_transfer
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in cryp_set_dma_transfer
crypto: aesni - Add scatter/gather avx stubs, and use them in C
crypto: aesni - Introduce partial block macro
..
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main changes here are Paul Gortmaker's removal of unneccesary
module.h infrastructure"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: integrity: partial revert of make ima_main explicitly non-modular
security: fs: make inode explicitly non-modular
security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h
security: integrity: make evm_main explicitly non-modular
keys: remove needless modular infrastructure from ecryptfs_format
security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly non-modular
tomoyo: fix small typo
The code uses a bitmap to check for duplicate tokens during parsing, and
that doesn't work at all for the negative Opt_err token case.
There is absolutely no reason to make Opt_err be negative, and in fact
it only confuses things, since some of the affected functions actually
return a positive Opt_xyz enum _or_ a regular negative error code (eg
-EINVAL), and using -1 for Opt_err makes no sense.
There are similar problems in ima_policy.c and key encryption, but they
don't have the immediate bug wrt bitmap handing, and ima_policy.c in
particular needs a different patch to make the enum values match the
token array index. Mimi is sending that separately.
Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5208cc8342 ("keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options")
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Export lookup_user_key() symbol in order to allow nvdimm passphrase
update to retrieve user injected keys.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Even though the support can be modular, only one file needs to use
all the macros like MODULE_AUTHOR, MODULE_LICENSE etc. Only the one
responsible for registering/removal with module_init/module_exit
needs to declare these. In this case, that file is "encrypted.c"
and it already has the MODULE_LICENSE that we are removing here.
Since the file does EXPORT_SYMBOL, we add export.h - and build tests
show that module.h (which includes everything) was hiding an implicit
use of string.h - so that is added as well.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect. Many users therefore
already don't pass it, but some still do. This inconsistency can cause
confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is
somewhat counterintuitive.
Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.
In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.
(*) Query an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);
Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned
in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:
__u32 supported_ops;
A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is
constructed from a bitwise-OR of:
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}
__u32 key_size;
The size in bits of the key.
__u16 max_data_size;
__u16 max_sig_size;
__u16 max_enc_size;
__u16 max_dec_size;
The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.
reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand
over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.
If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key,
EOPNOTSUPP is returned.
(*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
const void *in2);
Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
a blob of data.
The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
values:
__s32 key_id;
__u32 in_len;
__u32 out_len;
__u32 in2_len;
For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:
Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len
======================= =============== =============== ===========
KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature -
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature
info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
information.
The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is
intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
required to unlock a key.
If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell:
ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute':
ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'?
struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
^~~~~~~
dh_private
This reverts commit 8a2336e549.
Fixes: 8a2336e549 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name")
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since this header is in "include/uapi/linux/", apparently people want to
use it in userspace programs -- even in C++ ones. However, the header
uses a C++ reserved keyword ("private"), so change that to "dh_private"
instead to allow the header file to be used in C++ userspace.
Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191051
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0db6c314-1ef4-9bfa-1baa-7214dd2ee061@infradead.org
Fixes: ddbb411487 ("KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some crypto API users allocating a tfm with crypto_alloc_$FOO() are also
specifying the type flags for $FOO, e.g. crypto_alloc_shash() with
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But, that's redundant since the crypto API will
override any specified type flag/mask with the correct ones.
So, remove the unneeded flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Commit 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed
kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a
multiple of the digest size. The length was supposed to be rounded up
accordingly. However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives
the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash
algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes. In some cases this resulted in
a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer.
Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs.
Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull security system updates from James Morris:
- incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux
and Smack modules. From David Herrmann:
"The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets
created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if
you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket.
Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a
socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating
process."
- remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon).
- remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho
Andersen)
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
big key: get rid of stack array allocation
smack: provide socketpair callback
selinux: provide socketpair callback
net: hook socketpair() into LSM
security: add hook for socketpair()
security: remove security_settime
Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations
argument and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers.
All trivial callers converted over.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in
the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
This case is interesting, since we really just need an array of bytes that
are zero. The loop already ensures that if the array isn't exactly the
right size that enough zero bytes will be copied in. So, instead of
choosing this value to be the size of the hash, let's just choose it to be
32, since that is a common size, is not too big, and will not result in too
many extra iterations of the loop.
v2: split out from other patch, just hardcode array size instead of
dynamically allocating something the right size
v3: fix typo of 256 -> 32
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the
kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
This particular vla is used as a temporary output buffer in case there is
too much hash output for the destination buffer. Instead, let's just
allocate a buffer that's big enough initially, but only copy back to
userspace the amount that was originally asked for.
v2: allocate enough in the original output buffer vs creating a temporary
output buffer
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the
kernel [1]. This patch simply hardcodes the iv length to match that of the
hardcoded cipher.
[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
v2: hardcode the length of the nonce to be the GCM AES IV length, and do a
sanity check in init(), Eric Biggers
v3: * remember to free big_key_aead when sanity check fails
* define a constant for big key IV size so it can be changed along side
the algorithm in the code
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.
This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig. It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes. I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.
Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms. Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).
[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
combine all of those. ]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> [2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kmalloc() can't always allocate large enough buffers for big_key to use for
crypto (1MB + some metadata) so we cannot use that to allocate the buffer.
Further, vmalloc'd pages can't be passed to sg_init_one() and the aead
crypto accessors cannot be called progressively and must be passed all the
data in one go (which means we can't pass the data in one block at a time).
Fix this by allocating the buffer pages individually and passing them
through a multientry scatterlist to the crypto layer. This has the bonus
advantage that we don't have to allocate a contiguous series of pages.
We then vmap() the page list and pass that through to the VFS read/write
routines.
This can trigger a warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 60912 at mm/page_alloc.c:3883 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xb7c/0x15f8
([<00000000002acbb6>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1ee/0x15f8)
[<00000000002dd356>] kmalloc_order+0x46/0x90
[<00000000002dd3e0>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x40/0x1f8
[<0000000000326a10>] __kmalloc+0x430/0x4c0
[<00000000004343e4>] big_key_preparse+0x7c/0x210
[<000000000042c040>] key_create_or_update+0x128/0x420
[<000000000042e52c>] SyS_add_key+0x124/0x220
[<00000000007bba2c>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0
from the keyctl/padd/useradd test of the keyutils testsuite on s390x.
Note that it might be better to shovel data through in page-sized lumps
instead as there's no particular need to use a monolithic buffer unless the
kernel itself wants to access the data.
Fixes: 13100a72f4 ("Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted")
Reported-by: Paul Bunyan <pbunyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:
- reduce polling delays in tpm_tis
- support retrieving TPM 2.0 Event Log through EFI before
ExitBootServices
- replace tpm-rng.c with a hwrng device managed by the driver for each
TPM device
- TPM resource manager synthesizes TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response instead
of returning -EINVAL for unknown TPM commands. This makes user space
more sound.
- CLKRUN fixes:
* Keep #CLKRUN disable through the entier TPM command/response flow
* Check whether #CLKRUN is enabled before disabling and enabling it
again because enabling it breaks PS/2 devices on a system where it
is disabled
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
tpm: remove unused variables
tpm: remove unused data fields from I2C and OF device ID tables
tpm: only attempt to disable the LPC CLKRUN if is already enabled
tpm: follow coding style for variable declaration in tpm_tis_core_init()
tpm: delete the TPM_TIS_CLK_ENABLE flag
tpm: Update MAINTAINERS for Jason Gunthorpe
tpm: Keep CLKRUN enabled throughout the duration of transmit_cmd()
tpm_tis: Move ilb_base_addr to tpm_tis_data
tpm2-cmd: allow more attempts for selftest execution
tpm: return a TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response if command is not implemented
tpm: Move Linux RNG connection to hwrng
tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
tpm: add event log format version
tpm: rename event log provider files
tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
tpm: use tpm_msleep() value as max delay
tpm: reduce tpm polling delay in tpm_tis_core
tpm: move wait_for_tpm_stat() to respective driver files
Device number (the character device index) is not a stable identifier
for a TPM chip. That is the reason why every call site passes
TPM_ANY_NUM to tpm_chip_find_get().
This commit changes the API in a way that instead a struct tpm_chip
instance is given and NULL means the default chip. In addition, this
commit refines the documentation to be up to date with the
implementation.
Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> (@chip_num -> @chip part)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Tested-by: PrasannaKumar Muralidharan <prasannatsmkumar@gmail.com>
Pull RCU updates from Paul E. McKenney:
- Updates to use cond_resched() instead of cond_resched_rcu_qs()
where feasible (currently everywhere except in kernel/rcu and
in kernel/torture.c). Also a couple of fixes to avoid sending
IPIs to offline CPUs.
- Updates to simplify RCU's dyntick-idle handling.
- Updates to remove almost all uses of smp_read_barrier_depends()
and read_barrier_depends().
- Miscellaneous fixes.
- Torture-test updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
keyctl_restrict_keyring() allows through a NULL restriction when the
"type" is non-NULL, which causes a NULL pointer dereference in
asymmetric_lookup_restriction() when it calls strcmp() on the
restriction string.
But no key types actually use a "NULL restriction" to mean anything, so
update keyctl_restrict_keyring() to reject it with EINVAL.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 97d3aa0f31 ("KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Variable key_ref is being assigned a value that is never read;
key_ref is being re-assigned a few statements later. Hence this
assignment is redundant and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b5
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In request_key_and_link(), in the case where the dest_keyring was
explicitly specified, there is no need to get another reference to
dest_keyring before calling key_link(), then drop it afterwards. This
is because by definition, we already have a reference to dest_keyring.
This change is useful because we'll be making
construct_get_dest_keyring() able to return an error code, and we don't
want to have to handle that error here for no reason.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Now that the associative-array library properly heads dependency chains,
the various smp_read_barrier_depends() calls in security/keys/keyring.c
are no longer needed. This commit therefore removes them.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- The final conversion of timer wheel timers to timer_setup().
A few manual conversions and a large coccinelle assisted sweep and
the removal of the old initialization mechanisms and the related
code.
- Remove the now unused VSYSCALL update code
- Fix permissions of /proc/timer_list. I still need to get rid of that
file completely
- Rename a misnomed clocksource function and remove a stale declaration
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits)
m68k/macboing: Fix missed timer callback assignment
treewide: Remove TIMER_FUNC_TYPE and TIMER_DATA_TYPE casts
timer: Remove redundant __setup_timer*() macros
timer: Pass function down to initialization routines
timer: Remove unused data arguments from macros
timer: Switch callback prototype to take struct timer_list * argument
timer: Pass timer_list pointer to callbacks unconditionally
Coccinelle: Remove setup_timer.cocci
timer: Remove setup_*timer() interface
timer: Remove init_timer() interface
treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup() (2 field)
treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup()
treewide: init_timer() -> setup_timer()
treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list *
s390: cmm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
lightnvm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/net: cris: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drm/vc4: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
block/laptop_mode: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
net/atm/mpc: Avoid open-coded assignment of timer callback function
...
This changes all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks to use a struct timer_list
pointer instead of unsigned long. Since the data argument has already been
removed, none of these callbacks are using their argument currently, so
this renames the argument to "unused".
Done using the following semantic patch:
@match_define_timer@
declarer name DEFINE_TIMER;
identifier _timer, _callback;
@@
DEFINE_TIMER(_timer, _callback);
@change_callback depends on match_define_timer@
identifier match_define_timer._callback;
type _origtype;
identifier _origarg;
@@
void
-_callback(_origtype _origarg)
+_callback(struct timer_list *unused)
{ ... }
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The 'struct key_preparsed_payload' will use 'time_t' which we will
try to remove in the kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on
32bits systems.
Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe on 32 bits system for 'struct key_preparsed_payload', moreover
we should use the 'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t'
type variable.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The 'struct key' will use 'time_t' which we try to remove in the
kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on 32bit systems.
Also the 'struct keyring_search_context' will use 'timespec' type
to record current time, which is also not year 2038 safe on 32bit
systems.
Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe for 'struct key', and replace 'timespec' with 'time64_t' for the
'struct keyring_search_context', since we only look at the the seconds
part of 'timespec' variable. Moreover we also change the codes where
using the 'time_t' and 'timespec', and we can get current time by
ktime_get_real_seconds() instead of current_kernel_time(), and use
'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t' type variable.
Especially in proc.c file, we have replaced 'unsigned long' and 'timespec'
type with 'u64' and 'time64_t' type to save the timeout value, which means
user will get one 'u64' type timeout value by issuing proc_keys_show()
function.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another big pile of changes:
- More year 2038 work from Arnd slowly reaching the point where we
need to think about the syscalls themself.
- A new timer function which allows to conditionally (re)arm a timer
only when it's either not running or the new expiry time is sooner
than the armed expiry time. This allows to use a single timer for
multiple timeout requirements w/o caring about the first expiry
time at the call site.
- A new NMI safe accessor to clock real time for the printk timestamp
work. Can be used by tracing, perf as well if required.
- A large number of timer setup conversions from Kees which got
collected here because either maintainers requested so or they
simply got ignored. As Kees pointed out already there are a few
trivial merge conflicts and some redundant commits which was
unavoidable due to the size of this conversion effort.
- Avoid a redundant iteration in the timer wheel softirq processing.
- Provide a mechanism to treat RTC implementations depending on their
hardware properties, i.e. don't inflict the write at the 0.5
seconds boundary which originates from the PC CMOS RTC to all RTCs.
No functional change as drivers need to be updated separately.
- The usual small updates to core code clocksource drivers. Nothing
really exciting"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (111 commits)
timers: Add a function to start/reduce a timer
pstore: Use ktime_get_real_fast_ns() instead of __getnstimeofday()
timer: Prepare to change all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks
netfilter: ipvs: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
scsi: qla2xxx: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
block/aoe: discover_timer: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
ide: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drbd: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
mailbox: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
crypto: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/pcmcia: omap1: Fix error in automated timer conversion
ARM: footbridge: Fix typo in timer conversion
drivers/sgi-xp: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/pcmcia: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/memstick: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/macintosh: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
hwrng/xgene-rng: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
auxdisplay: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
sparc/led: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
mips: ip22/32: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
...
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull initial SPDX identifiers from Greg KH:
"License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the
'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally
binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate
text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart
and Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset
of the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to
license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied
to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of
the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver)
producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.
Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review
of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537
files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the
scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license
identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any
determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with
the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained
>5 lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that
was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that
became the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected
a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply
(and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases,
confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.
The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in
part, so they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot
checks in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect
the correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial
patch version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch
license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the
applied SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>"
* tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license
License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
