Provide correct siginfo_t.si_stime on MIPS64
Bug description:
MIPS version of copy_siginfo() is not aware of alignment on platforms with
64-bit long integers, which leads to an incorrect si_stime passed to signal
handlers, because the last element (si_stime) of _sifields._sigchld is not
copied. If _MIPS_SZLONG is 64, then the _sifields starts at the offset of
4 * sizeof(int).
Patch description:
Use the generic copy_siginfo, which doesn't have this problem.
Signed-off-by: Petr Malat <oss@malat.biz>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8671/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
We need to check the ASEs support against the core's CFLAGS instead
of depending to the default -march option from the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/9180/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
The loongson 3A cores do not select a suitable -march option so the build
system uses the default one from the toolchain. This may or may not be
suitable for a loongson 3A build. In order to avoid that, we explicitly set
a suitable -march option for that core. Furthermore, some very old
compilers don't support -march= at all and there is the possibility of
toolchain combinations such as GCC 4.9 and binutils 2.24 for which
-march=loongson3a will result in MIPS64 R2 code being generated but then
rejected by GAS. So treat the Longsoon 3A as an R2 CPU.
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
We do not check the input data bounds containing the microcode before
copying a struct microcode_intel_header from it. A specially crafted
microcode could cause the kernel to read invalid memory and lead to a
denial-of-service.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-3-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
[ Made error message differ from the next one and flipped comparison. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Pull ASLR and kASLR fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Add a global flag announcing KASLR state so that relevant code can do
informed decisions based on its setting. (Jiri Kosina)
- Fix a stack randomization entropy decrease bug. (Hector Marco-Gisbert)
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
a255651d4c ("ceph: ensure auth ops are defined before use") made
kfree() in put_osd() conditional on the authorizer. A mechanical
mistake most likely - fix it.
Cc: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
It turns out it's possible to get __remove_osd() called twice on the
same OSD. That doesn't sit well with rb_erase() - depending on the
shape of the tree we can get a NULL dereference, a soft lockup or
a random crash at some point in the future as we end up touching freed
memory. One scenario that I was able to reproduce is as follows:
<osd3 is idle, on the osd lru list>
<con reset - osd3>
con_fault_finish()
osd_reset()
<osdmap - osd3 down>
ceph_osdc_handle_map()
<takes map_sem>
kick_requests()
<takes request_mutex>
reset_changed_osds()
__reset_osd()
__remove_osd()
<releases request_mutex>
<releases map_sem>
<takes map_sem>
<takes request_mutex>
__kick_osd_requests()
__reset_osd()
__remove_osd() <-- !!!
A case can be made that osd refcounting is imperfect and reworking it
would be a proper resolution, but for now Sage and I decided to fix
this by adding a safe guard around __remove_osd().
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8087
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+: 7c6e6fc53e: libceph: assert both regular and lingering lists in __remove_osd()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+: cc9f1f518c: libceph: change from BUG to WARN for __remove_osd() asserts
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
This converts the rbd driver to use the blk-mq infrastructure. Except
for switching to a per-request work item this is almost mechanical.
This was tested by Alexandre DERUMIER in November, and found to give
him 120000 iops, although the only comparism available was an old
3.10 kernel which gave 80000iops.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
[idryomov@gmail.com: context, blk_mq_init_queue() EH]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
With 32-bit non-PAE kernels, we have 2 page sizes available
(at most): 4k and 4M.
Enabling PAE replaces that 4M size with a 2M one (which 64-bit
systems use too).
But, when booting a 32-bit non-PAE kernel, in one of our
early-boot printouts, we say:
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff]
[mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff] page 4k
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff]
[mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff] page 2M
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00100000-0x36ffffff]
[mem 0x00100000-0x003fffff] page 4k
[mem 0x00400000-0x36ffffff] page 2M
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff]
[mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff] page 4k
Which is obviously wrong. There is no 2M page available. This
is probably because of a badly-named variable: in the map_range
code: PG_LEVEL_2M.
Instead of renaming all the PG_LEVEL_2M's. This patch just
fixes the printout:
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff]
[mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff] page 4k
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff]
[mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff] page 4M
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00100000-0x36ffffff]
[mem 0x00100000-0x003fffff] page 4k
[mem 0x00400000-0x36ffffff] page 4M
init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff]
[mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff] page 4k
BRK [0x03206000, 0x03206fff] PGTABLE
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150210212030.665EC267@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Commit:
e2b32e6785 ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address")
makes the base address for module to be unconditionally randomized in
case when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is defined and "nokaslr" option isn't
present on the commandline.
This is not consistent with how choose_kernel_location() decides whether
it will randomize kernel load base.
Namely, CONFIG_HIBERNATION disables kASLR (unless "kaslr" option is
explicitly specified on kernel commandline), which makes the state space
larger than what module loader is looking at. IOW CONFIG_HIBERNATION &&
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is a valid config option, kASLR wouldn't be applied
by default in that case, but module loader is not aware of that.
Instead of fixing the logic in module.c, this patch takes more generic
aproach. It introduces a new bootparam setup data_type SETUP_KASLR and
uses that to pass the information whether kaslr has been applied during
kernel decompression, and sets a global 'kaslr_enabled' variable
accordingly, so that any kernel code (module loading, livepatching, ...)
can make decisions based on its value.
x86 module loader is converted to make use of this flag.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1502101411280.10719@pobox.suse.cz
[ Always dump correct kaslr status when panicking ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
When we receives traceless reply for request that created new inode,
we re-send a lookup request to MDS get information of the newly created
inode. (VFS expects FS' callback return an inode in create case)
This breaks one request into two requests. Other client may modify or
move to the new inode in the middle.
When the race happens, ceph_handle_notrace_create() unconditionally
links the dentry for 'create' operation to the inode returned by lookup.
This may confuse VFS when the inode is a directory (VFS does not allow
multiple linkages for directory inode).
This patch makes ceph_handle_notrace_create() when it detect a race.
This event should be rare and it happens only when we talk to old MDS.
Recent MDS does not send traceless reply for request that creates new
inode.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
So that MDS can check if any request is already completed and process
completed requests in clientreplay stage. When completed requests are
processed in clientreplay stage, MDS can avoid sending traceless
replies.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
If the clone is resized down to 0, it becomes standalone. If such
resize is carried over while an image is mapped we would detect this
and call rbd_dev_parent_put() which means "let go of all parent state,
including the spec(s) of parent images(s)". This leads to a mismatch
between "rbd info" and sysfs parent fields, so a fix is in order.
# rbd create --image-format 2 --size 1 foo
# rbd snap create foo@snap
# rbd snap protect foo@snap
# rbd clone foo@snap bar
# DEV=$(rbd map bar)
# rbd resize --allow-shrink --size 0 bar
# rbd resize --size 1 bar
# rbd info bar | grep parent
parent: rbd/foo@snap
Before:
# cat /sys/bus/rbd/devices/0/parent
(no parent image)
After:
# cat /sys/bus/rbd/devices/0/parent
pool_id 0
pool_name rbd
image_id 10056b8b4567
image_name foo
snap_id 2
snap_name snap
overlap 0
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <jdurgin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
ceph_add_cap() calls __check_cap_issue(), which clears directory
inode' complete flag. so we should set the complete flag for empty
directory should be set after calling ceph_add_cap().
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
struct timespec uses 'long' to present second and nanosecond. 'long'
is 64 bits on 64bits machine. ceph MDS expects time stamp to be
encoded as struct ceph_timespec, which uses 'u32' to present second
and nanosecond.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
when inode has inline data but its size > PAGE_SIZE (it was truncated
to larger size), previous direct read code return -EIO. This patch adds
code to return zeros for data whose offset > PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
we should not do block operation in wait_event_interruptible()'s condition
check function, but reading inline data can block. so move the read inline
data code to ceph_get_caps()
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
check_cap_flush() calls mutex_lock(), which may block. So we can't
use it as condition check function for wait_event();
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
header_rwsem should be released on errors. Also remove useless
rbd_dev->mapping.size != rbd_dev->header.image_size test.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
When snaprealm is created, its initial reference count is zero.
But in some rare cases, the newly created snaprealm is not referenced
by anyone. This causes snaprealm with zero reference count not freed.
The fix is set reference count of newly snaprealm to 1. The reference
is return the function who requests to create the snaprealm. When the
function finishes its job, it releases the reference.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
A bug is found in striped_read() of fs/ceph/file.c. striped_read() calls
ceph_zero_pape_vector_range(). The first argument, page_align + read + ret,
passed to ceph_zero_pape_vector_range() is wrong.
When a file has holes, this wrong parameter may cause memory corruption
either in kernal space or user space. Kernel space memory may be corrupted in
the case of non direct IO; user space memory may be corrupted in the case of
direct IO. In the latter case, the application doing direct IO may crash due
to memory corruption, as we have experienced.
The correct value should be initial_align + read + ret, where intial_align =
o_direct ? buf_align : io_align. Compared with page_align, the current page
offest, initial_align is the initial page offest, which should be used to
calculate the page and offset in ceph_zero_pape_vector_range().
Reported-by: caifeng zhu <zhucaifeng@unissoft-nj.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Remove the function ceph_get_cached_acl() that is not used anywhere.
This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
It's been largely superseded by dup_token() and unused for over
2 years, identified by cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
[idryomov@redhat.com: changelog]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 5:35 PM, Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net> wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Dec 2014, Ilya Dryomov wrote:
>> Actually, pool op stuff has been unused for over two years - looks like
>> it was added for rbd create_snap and that got ripped out in 2012. It's
>> unlikely we'd ever need to manage pools or snaps from the kernel client
>> so I think it makes sense to nuke it. Sage?
>
> Yep!
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
The base address (STACK_TOP / 3 * 2) for a 64-bit program is two thirds
into the 4GB segment at 0x2aa00000000. The randomization added on z13
can eat another 1GB of the remaining 1.33GB to the next 4GB boundary.
In the worst case 300MB are left for the executable + bss which may
cross into the next 4GB segment. This is bad for branch prediction,
therefore align the base address to 4GB to give the program more room
before it crosses the 4GB boundary.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
of_device_ids (i.e. compatible strings and the respective data) are not
supposed to change at runtime. All functions working with of_device_ids
provided by <linux/of.h> work with const of_device_ids. So mark the
non-const structs in arch/arm as const, too.
While at it also add some __initconst annotations.
Acked-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedameon.net>
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The definition
static const char *axxia_dt_match[] __initconst = {
...
defines a changable array of constant strings. That is you must not do:
*axxia_dt_match[0] = 'k';
but
axxia_dt_match[0] = "different string";
is fine. So the annotation __initconst is wrong and yields a compiler
error when other really const variables are added with __initconst.
As the struct machine_desc member dt_compat is declared as
const char *const *dt_compat;
making the arrays const is the better alternative over changing all
annotations to __initdata.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Commit 32726d2d55 ("ARM: SAMSUNG: Remove legacy clock code")
already removed the callback pointer, but there was one remaining
user:
drivers/cpufreq/s3c24xx-cpufreq.c: In function 's3c_cpufreq_resume_clocks':
drivers/cpufreq/s3c24xx-cpufreq.c:149:14: error: 'struct s3c_cpufreq_info' has no member named 'resume_clocks'
cpu_cur.info->resume_clocks();
^
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 32726d2d55 ("ARM: SAMSUNG: Remove legacy clock code")
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: 3.17+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
The two functions s3c2416_cpufreq_driver_init and s3c_cpufreq_register
are marked init but are called from a context that might be run after
the __init sections are discarded, as the compiler points out:
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.data+0x1ad9dc): Section mismatch in reference from the variable s3c2416_cpufreq_driver to the function .init.text:s3c2416_cpufreq_driver_init()
WARNING: drivers/built-in.o(.text+0x35b5dc): Section mismatch in reference from the function s3c2410a_cpufreq_add() to the function .init.text:s3c_cpufreq_register()
This removes the __init markings.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Add Intel Quark platform support. Quark needs to pull down all
unlocked IMRs to ensure agreement with the EFI memory map post
boot.
This patch adds an entry in Kconfig for Quark as a platform and
makes IMR support mandatory if selected.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.schevchenko@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com>
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422635379-12476-3-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ie
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Intel's Quark X1000 SoC contains a set of registers called
Isolated Memory Regions. IMRs are accessed over the IOSF mailbox
interface. IMRs are areas carved out of memory that define
read/write access rights to the various system agents within the
Quark system. For a given agent in the system it is possible to
specify if that agent may read or write an area of memory
defined by an IMR with a granularity of 1 KiB.
Quark_SecureBootPRM_330234_001.pdf section 4.5 details the
concept of IMRs quark-x1000-datasheet.pdf section 12.7.4 details
the implementation of IMRs in silicon.
eSRAM flush, CPU Snoop write-only, CPU SMM Mode, CPU non-SMM
mode, RMU and PCIe Virtual Channels (VC0 and VC1) can have
individual read/write access masks applied to them for a given
memory region in Quark X1000. This enables IMRs to treat each
memory transaction type listed above on an individual basis and
to filter appropriately based on the IMR access mask for the
memory region. Quark supports eight IMRs.
Since all of the DMA capable SoC components in the X1000 are
mapped to VC0 it is possible to define sections of memory as
invalid for DMA write operations originating from Ethernet, USB,
SD and any other DMA capable south-cluster component on VC0.
Similarly it is possible to mark kernel memory as non-SMM mode
read/write only or to mark BIOS runtime memory as SMM mode
accessible only depending on the particular memory footprint on
a given system.
On an IMR violation Quark SoC X1000 systems are configured to
reset the system, so ensuring that the IMR memory map is
consistent with the EFI provided memory map is critical to
ensure no IMR violations reset the system.
The API for accessing IMRs is based on MTRR code but doesn't
provide a /proc or /sys interface to manipulate IMRs. Defining
the size and extent of IMRs is exclusively the domain of
in-kernel code.
Quark firmware sets up a series of locked IMRs around pieces of
memory that firmware owns such as ACPI runtime data. During boot
a series of unlocked IMRs are placed around items in memory to
guarantee no DMA modification of those items can take place.
Grub also places an unlocked IMR around the kernel boot params
data structure and compressed kernel image. It is necessary for
the kernel to tear down all unlocked IMRs in order to ensure
that the kernel's view of memory passed via the EFI memory map
is consistent with the IMR memory map. Without tearing down all
unlocked IMRs on boot transitory IMRs such as those used to
protect the compressed kernel image will cause IMR violations and system reboots.
The IMR init code tears down all unlocked IMRs and sets a
protective IMR around the kernel .text and .rodata as one
contiguous block. This sanitizes the IMR memory map with respect
to the EFI memory map and protects the read-only portions of the
kernel from unwarranted DMA access.
Tested-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.schevchenko@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com>
Cc: andy.shevchenko@gmail.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422635379-12476-2-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ie
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Without this patch:
LD init/built-in.o
arch/x86/built-in.o: In function `dtb_lapic_setup': kernel/devicetree.c:155:
undefined reference to `apic_force_enable'
Makefile:923: recipe for target 'vmlinux' failed
make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422905231-16067-1-git-send-email-ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Currently, x86 kprobes is unable to boost 2 bytes nop like:
nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
which is 0x0f 0x1f 0x44 0x00 0x00.
Such nops have exactly 5 bytes to hold a relative jmp
instruction. Boosting them should be obviously safe.
This patch enable boosting such nops by simply updating
twobyte_is_boostable[] array.
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423532045-41049-1-git-send-email-wangnan0@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
