Now that the Clang compiler has taken it upon itself to police the
compiler command line, and reject combinations for arguments it views
as incompatible, the AEGIS128 no longer builds correctly, and errors
out like this:
clang-10: warning: ignoring extension 'crypto' because the 'armv7-a'
architecture does not support it [-Winvalid-command-line-argument]
So let's switch to armv8-a instead, which matches the crypto-neon-fp-armv8
FPU profile we specify. Since neither were actually supported by GCC
versions before 4.8, let's tighten the Kconfig dependencies as well so
we won't run into errors when building with an ancient compiler.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reported-by: <ci_notify@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
One should not say "ec can be NULL" and then dereference it.
One cannot talk about the return value if the function returns void.
Signed-off-by: Alexander E. Patrakov <patrakov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The next version of Clang will start policing compiler command line
options, and will reject combinations of -march and -mfpu that it
thinks are incompatible.
This results in errors like
clang-10: warning: ignoring extension 'crypto' because the 'armv7-a'
architecture does not support it [-Winvalid-command-line-argument]
/tmp/aegis128-neon-inner-5ee428.s: Assembler messages:
/tmp/aegis128-neon-inner-5ee428.s:73: Error: selected
processor does not support `aese.8 q2,q14' in ARM mode
when buiding the SIMD aegis128 code for 32-bit ARM, given that the
'armv7-a' -march argument is considered to be compatible with the
ARM crypto extensions. Instead, we should use armv8-a, which does
allow the crypto extensions to be enabled.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Added testvectors for the rfc3686(ctr(sm4)) skcipher algorithm
changes since v1:
- nothing
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Added testvectors for the ofb(sm4) and cfb(sm4) skcipher algorithms
changes since v1:
- nothing
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Added testvectors for the hmac(sm3) ahash authentication algorithm
changes since v1 & v2:
-nothing
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add an additional gcm(aes) test case that triggers the code path in
the new arm64 driver that deals with tail blocks whose size is not
a multiple of the block size, and where the size of the preceding
input is a multiple of 64 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When algif_skcipher does a partial operation it always process data
that is a multiple of blocksize. However, for algorithms such as
CTR this is wrong because even though it can process any number of
bytes overall, the partial block must come at the very end and not
in the middle.
This is exactly what chunksize is meant to describe so this patch
changes blocksize to chunksize.
Fixes: 8ff590903d ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().
In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.
Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.
This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)
The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
ima: always return negative code for error
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
implementation details that do not belong in DM crypt. The wrapper
template for ESSIV generation that was factored out will also be used
by fscrypt in the future.
- Add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification to the DM verity target.
- Add a new "clone" DM target that allows for efficient remote
replication of a device.
- Enhance DM bufio's cache to be tailored to each client based on use.
Clients that make heavy use of the cache get more of it, and those
that use less have reduced cache usage.
- Add a new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl to allow userspace to query the
version number of a DM target (even if the associated module isn't yet
loaded).
- Fix invalid memory access in DM zoned target.
- Fix the max_discard_sectors limit advertised by the DM raid target; it
was mistakenly storing the limit in bytes rather than sectors.
- Small optimizations and cleanups in DM writecache target.
- Various fixes and cleanups in DM core, DM raid1 and space map portion
of DM persistent data library.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQFHBAABCAAxFiEEJfWUX4UqZ4x1O2wixSPxCi2dA1oFAl2D7ycTHHNuaXR6ZXJA
cmVkaGF0LmNvbQAKCRDFI/EKLZ0DWp9QCACwTkVGzPGMCbAaCVlCACo8B5JyY4OO
FNxucqUlt1MHKuBbzJd4XwNGlLg68xjMUKVPYPlgina7TaDl+wvlTbHchaJS8nak
x1zyhDSywy0F9f6HHiXJi/vshmAfa0xnIM6fQXVPM346S6xf9u7hqOJQMCrdvY92
w4FhuW9nVt5xizo8iC/3LzoWbhrWncT7dyZUZtG3/tmglhkEK7QwctlgQxcD7tXg
H1lhntQzHzpxQAVBefWWdw7ubuDd6XCHuQMaxRhyR++c62P3eKDR8ck9hhd3hZKv
E481gtxcsjKuYLxwULjqFJZaNFitWFNMJ7gppQyKRqCzn2zlGAL6npl8
=m6zD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'for-5.4/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm
Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer:
- crypto and DM crypt advances that allow the crypto API to reclaim
implementation details that do not belong in DM crypt. The wrapper
template for ESSIV generation that was factored out will also be used
by fscrypt in the future.
- Add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification to the DM verity target.
- Add a new "clone" DM target that allows for efficient remote
replication of a device.
- Enhance DM bufio's cache to be tailored to each client based on use.
Clients that make heavy use of the cache get more of it, and those
that use less have reduced cache usage.
- Add a new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl to allow userspace to query the
version number of a DM target (even if the associated module isn't
yet loaded).
- Fix invalid memory access in DM zoned target.
- Fix the max_discard_sectors limit advertised by the DM raid target;
it was mistakenly storing the limit in bytes rather than sectors.
- Small optimizations and cleanups in DM writecache target.
- Various fixes and cleanups in DM core, DM raid1 and space map portion
of DM persistent data library.
* tag 'for-5.4/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm: (22 commits)
dm: introduce DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION
dm bufio: introduce a global cache replacement
dm bufio: remove old-style buffer cleanup
dm bufio: introduce a global queue
dm bufio: refactor adjust_total_allocated
dm bufio: call adjust_total_allocated from __link_buffer and __unlink_buffer
dm: add clone target
dm raid: fix updating of max_discard_sectors limit
dm writecache: skip writecache_wait for pmem mode
dm stats: use struct_size() helper
dm crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
dm crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
dm space map common: remove check for impossible sm_find_free() return value
dm raid1: use struct_size() with kzalloc()
dm writecache: optimize performance by sorting the blocks for writeback_all
dm writecache: add unlikely for getting two block with same LBA
dm writecache: remove unused member pointer in writeback_struct
dm zoned: fix invalid memory access
dm verity: add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification
...
With pcrypt's cpumask no longer used, take the CPU hotplug lock inside
padata_alloc_possible.
Useful later in the series for avoiding nested acquisition of the CPU
hotplug lock in padata when padata_alloc_possible is allocating an
unbound workqueue.
Without this patch, this nested acquisition would happen later in the
series:
pcrypt_init_padata
get_online_cpus
alloc_padata_possible
alloc_padata
alloc_workqueue(WQ_UNBOUND) // later in the series
alloc_and_link_pwqs
apply_wqattrs_lock
get_online_cpus // recursive rwsem acquisition
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that padata_do_parallel takes care of finding an alternate callback
CPU, there's no need for pcrypt's callback cpumask, so remove it and the
notifier callback that keeps it in sync.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
padata_do_parallel currently returns -EINVAL if the callback CPU isn't
in the callback cpumask.
pcrypt tries to prevent this situation by keeping its own callback
cpumask in sync with padata's and checks that the callback CPU it passes
to padata is valid. Make padata handle this instead.
padata_do_parallel now takes a pointer to the callback CPU and updates
it for the caller if an alternate CPU is used. Overall behavior in
terms of which callback CPUs are chosen stays the same.
Prepares for removal of the padata cpumask notifier in pcrypt, which
will fix a lockdep complaint about nested acquisition of the CPU hotplug
lock later in the series.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move workqueue allocation inside of padata to prepare for further
changes to how padata uses workqueues.
Guarantees the workqueue is created with max_active=1, which padata
relies on to work correctly. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
skcipher_walk_done may be called with an error by internal or
external callers. For those internal callers we shouldn't unmap
pages but for external callers we must unmap any pages that are
in use.
This patch distinguishes between the two cases by checking whether
walk->nbytes is zero or not. For internal callers, we now set
walk->nbytes to zero prior to the call. For external callers,
walk->nbytes has always been non-zero (as zero is used to indicate
the termination of a walk).
Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Fixes: 5cde0af2a9 ("[CRYPTO] cipher: Added block cipher type")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The generic sha256 implementation from lib/crypto/sha256.c uses data
structs defined in crypto/sha.h, so lets move the function prototypes
there too.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,shash) or (aead,shash) tuple
so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling in fscrypt and dm-crypt and
move it into the crypto API. This will result in better test coverage, and
will allow future changes to make the bare cipher interface internal to the
crypto subsystem, in order to increase robustness of the API against misuse.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
crypto/aegis.h:27:32: warning:
crypto_aegis_const defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
crypto_aegis_const is only used in aegis128-core.c,
just move the definition over there.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256, in both skcipher and AEAD modes
(the latter is used by tcrypt to encapsulate the authenc template
or h/w instantiations of the same)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When building the new aegis128 NEON code in big endian mode, Clang
complains about the const uint8x16_t permute vectors in the following
way:
crypto/aegis128-neon-inner.c:58:40: warning: vector initializers are not
compatible with NEON intrinsics in big endian mode
[-Wnonportable-vector-initialization]
static const uint8x16_t shift_rows = {
^
crypto/aegis128-neon-inner.c:58:40: note: consider using vld1q_u8() to
initialize a vector from memory, or vcombine_u8(vcreate_u8(), vcreate_u8())
to initialize from integer constants
Since the same issue applies to the uint8x16x4_t loads of the AES Sbox,
update those references as well. However, since GCC does not implement
the vld1q_u8_x4() intrinsic, switch from IS_ENABLED() to a preprocessor
conditional to conditionally include this code.
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Drop the duplicate generic sha256 (and sha224) implementation from
crypto/sha256_generic.c and use the implementation from
lib/crypto/sha256.c instead.
"diff -u lib/crypto/sha256.c sha256_generic.c" shows that the core
sha256_transform function from both implementations is identical and
the other code is functionally identical too.
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Before this commit lib/crypto/sha256.c has only been used in the s390 and
x86 purgatory code, make it suitable for generic use:
* Export interesting symbols
* Add -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS to CFLAGS_sha256.o for purgatory builds to
avoid the exports for the purgatory builds
* Add to lib/crypto/Makefile and crypto/Kconfig
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a bunch of missing spaces after commas and arround operators.
Note the main goal of this is to make sha256_transform and its helpers
identical in formatting too the duplcate implementation in lib/sha256.c,
so that "diff -u" can be used to compare them to prove that no functional
changes are made when further patches in this series consolidate the 2
implementations into 1.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Another one for the cipher museum: split off DES core processing into
a separate module so other drivers (mostly for crypto accelerators)
can reuse the code without pulling in the generic DES cipher itself.
This will also permit the cipher interface to be made private to the
crypto API itself once we move the only user in the kernel (CIFS) to
this library interface.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation of moving the shared key expansion routine into the
DES library, move the verification done by __des3_ede_setkey() into
its callers.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The recently added helper routine to perform key strength validation
of triple DES keys is slightly inadequate, since it comes in two versions,
neither of which are highly useful for anything other than skciphers (and
many drivers still use the older blkcipher interfaces).
So let's add a new helper and, considering that this is a helper function
that is only intended to be used by crypto code itself, put it in a new
des.h header under crypto/internal.
While at it, implement a similar helper for single DES, so that we can
start replacing the pattern of calling des_ekey() into a temp buffer
that occurs in many drivers in drivers/crypto.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Provide a version of the core AES transform to the aegis128 SIMD
code that does not rely on the special AES instructions, but uses
plain NEON instructions instead. This allows the SIMD version of
the aegis128 driver to be used on arm64 systems that do not
implement those instructions (which are not mandatory in the
architecture), such as the Raspberry Pi 3.
Since GCC makes a mess of this when using the tbl/tbx intrinsics
to perform the sbox substitution, preload the Sbox into v16..v31
in this case and use inline asm to emit the tbl/tbx instructions.
Clang does not support this approach, nor does it require it, since
it does a much better job at code generation, so there we use the
intrinsics as usual.
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Provide an accelerated implementation of aegis128 by wiring up the
SIMD hooks in the generic driver to an implementation based on NEON
intrinsics, which can be compiled to both ARM and arm64 code.
This results in a performance of 2.2 cycles per byte on Cortex-A53,
which is a performance increase of ~11x compared to the generic
code.
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add some plumbing to allow the AEGIS128 code to be built with SIMD
routines for acceleration.
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add support for the missing ciphertext stealing part of the XTS-AES
specification, which permits inputs of any size >= the block size.
Cc: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Return -EINVAL on an attempt to set the authsize to 0 with an auth.
algorithm with a non-zero digestsize (i.e. anything but digest_null)
as authenticating the data and then throwing away the result does not
make any sense at all.
The digestsize zero exception is for use with digest_null for testing
purposes only.
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto/streebog_generic.c:162:17: warning:
Pi defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
crypto/streebog_generic.c:151:17: warning:
Tau defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
They are never used, so can be removed.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto/aes_generic.c:64:18: warning:
rco_tab defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
It is never used, so can be removed.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reference counters are preferred to use refcount_t instead of
atomic_t.
This is because the implementation of refcount_t can prevent
overflows and detect possible use-after-free.
So convert atomic_t ref counters to refcount_t.
Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Based on seqiv, IPsec ESP and rfc4543/rfc4106 the assoclen can be 16 or
20 bytes.
From esp4/esp6, assoclen is sizeof IP Header. This includes spi, seq_no
and extended seq_no, that is 8 or 12 bytes.
In seqiv, to asscolen is added the IV size (8 bytes).
Therefore, the assoclen, for rfc4543, should be restricted to 16 or 20
bytes, as for rfc4106.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The crypto engine initializes its kworker thread to FIFO-99 (when
requesting RT priority), reduce this to FIFO-50.
FIFO-99 is the very highest priority available to SCHED_FIFO and
it not a suitable default; it would indicate the crypto work is the
most important work on the machine.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Added inline helper functions to check authsize and assoclen for
gcm, rfc4106 and rfc4543.
These are used in the generic implementation of gcm, rfc4106 and
rfc4543.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by
the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce
pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.
Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already
calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that
sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which
allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info())
use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Recent clang-9 snapshots double the kernel stack usage when building
this file with -O0 -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress, compared to clang-8
and older snapshots, this changed between commits svn364966 and
svn366056:
crypto/jitterentropy.c:516:5: error: stack frame size of 2640 bytes in function 'jent_entropy_init' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
int jent_entropy_init(void)
^
crypto/jitterentropy.c:185:14: error: stack frame size of 2224 bytes in function 'jent_lfsr_time' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
static __u64 jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, __u64 loop_cnt)
^
I prepared a reduced test case in case any clang developers want to
take a closer look, but from looking at the earlier output it seems
that even with clang-8, something was very wrong here.
Turn off any KASAN and UBSAN sanitizing for this file, as that likely
clashes with -O0 anyway. Turning off just KASAN avoids the warning
already, but I suspect both of these have undesired side-effects
for jitterentropy.
Link: https://godbolt.org/z/fDcwZ5
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This reverts commit ecc8bc81f2
("crypto: aegis128 - provide a SIMD implementation based on NEON
intrinsics") and commit 7cdc0ddbf7
("crypto: aegis128 - add support for SIMD acceleration").
They cause compile errors on platforms other than ARM because
the mechanism to selectively compile the SIMD code is broken.
Repoted-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To help avoid confusion, add a comment to ghash-generic.c which explains
the convention that the kernel's implementation of GHASH uses.
Also update the Kconfig help text and module descriptions to call GHASH
a "hash function" rather than a "message digest", since the latter
normally means a real cryptographic hash function, which GHASH is not.
Cc: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Clang sometimes makes very different inlining decisions from gcc.
In case of the aegis crypto algorithms, it decides to turn the innermost
primitives (and, xor, ...) into separate functions but inline most of
the rest.
This results in a huge amount of variables spilled on the stack, leading
to rather slow execution as well as kernel stack usage beyond the 32-bit
warning limit when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled:
crypto/aegis256.c:123:13: warning: stack frame size of 648 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis256_encrypt_chunk' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis256.c:366:13: warning: stack frame size of 1264 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis256_crypt' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis256.c:187:13: warning: stack frame size of 656 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis256_decrypt_chunk' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis128l.c:135:13: warning: stack frame size of 832 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis128l_encrypt_chunk' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis128l.c:415:13: warning: stack frame size of 1480 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis128l_crypt' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis128l.c:218:13: warning: stack frame size of 848 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis128l_decrypt_chunk' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis128.c:116:13: warning: stack frame size of 584 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis128_encrypt_chunk' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis128.c:351:13: warning: stack frame size of 1064 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis128_crypt' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
crypto/aegis128.c:177:13: warning: stack frame size of 592 bytes in function 'crypto_aegis128_decrypt_chunk' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
Forcing the primitives to all get inlined avoids the issue and the
resulting code is similar to what gcc produces.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, NETLINK_CRYPTO works only in the init network namespace. It
doesn't make much sense to cut it out of the other network namespaces,
so do the minor plumbing work necessary to make it work in any network
namespace. Code inspired by net/core/sock_diag.c.
Tested using kcapi-dgst from libkcapi [1]:
Before:
# unshare -n kcapi-dgst -c sha256 </dev/null | wc -c
libkcapi - Error: Netlink error: sendmsg failed
libkcapi - Error: Netlink error: sendmsg failed
libkcapi - Error: NETLINK_CRYPTO: cannot obtain cipher information for hmac(sha512) (is required crypto_user.c patch missing? see documentation)
0
After:
# unshare -n kcapi-dgst -c sha256 </dev/null | wc -c
32
[1] https://github.com/smuellerDD/libkcapi
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Provide an accelerated implementation of aegis128 by wiring up the
SIMD hooks in the generic driver to an implementation based on NEON
intrinsics, which can be compiled to both ARM and arm64 code.
This results in a performance of 2.2 cycles per byte on Cortex-A53,
which is a performance increase of ~11x compared to the generic
code.
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add some plumbing to allow the AEGIS128 code to be built with SIMD
routines for acceleration.
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The generic AES code provides four sets of lookup tables, where each
set consists of four tables containing the same 32-bit values, but
rotated by 0, 8, 16 and 24 bits, respectively. This makes sense for
CISC architectures such as x86 which support memory operands, but
for other architectures, the rotates are quite cheap, and using all
four tables needlessly thrashes the D-cache, and actually hurts rather
than helps performance.
Since x86 already has its own implementation of AEGIS based on AES-NI
instructions, let's tweak the generic implementation towards other
architectures, and avoid the prerotated tables, and perform the
rotations inline. On ARM Cortex-A53, this results in a ~8% speedup.
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
