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7ba13abbd3
671 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Filipe Manana
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28b21c558a |
btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot
At ioctl.c:create_snapshot(), we allocate a pending snapshot structure and then attach it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots. After that we call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and if that returns an error we jump to 'fail' label, where we kfree() the pending snapshot structure. This can result in a later use-after-free of the pending snapshot: 1) We allocated the pending snapshot and added it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots; 2) We call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and it fails either at the first call to btrfs_run_delayed_refs() or btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(). In both cases, we don't abort the transaction and we release our transaction handle. We jump to the 'fail' label and free the pending snapshot structure. We return with the pending snapshot still in the transaction's list; 3) Another task commits the transaction. This time there's no error at all, and then during the transaction commit it accesses a pointer to the pending snapshot structure that the snapshot creation task has already freed, resulting in a user-after-free. This issue could actually be detected by smatch, which produced the following warning: fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:843 create_snapshot() warn: '&pending_snapshot->list' not removed from list So fix this by not having the snapshot creation ioctl directly add the pending snapshot to the transaction's list. Instead add the pending snapshot to the transaction handle, and then at btrfs_commit_transaction() we add the snapshot to the list only when we can guarantee that any error returned after that point will result in a transaction abort, in which case the ioctl code can safely free the pending snapshot and no one can access it anymore. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
d96b34248c |
btrfs: make send work with concurrent block group relocation
We don't allow send and balance/relocation to run in parallel in order to prevent send failing or silently producing some bad stream. This is because while send is using an extent (specially metadata) or about to read a metadata extent and expecting it belongs to a specific parent node, relocation can run, the transaction used for the relocation is committed and the extent gets reallocated while send is still using the extent, so it ends up with a different content than expected. This can result in just failing to read a metadata extent due to failure of the validation checks (parent transid, level, etc), failure to find a backreference for a data extent, and other unexpected failures. Besides reallocation, there's also a similar problem of an extent getting discarded when it's unpinned after the transaction used for block group relocation is committed. The restriction between balance and send was added in commit |
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Josef Bacik
|
7fcf8a0050 |
btrfs: remove useless WARN_ON in record_root_in_trans
We don't set SHAREABLE on the extent root, we don't need to have this safety check here. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
29cbcf4017 |
btrfs: stop accessing ->extent_root directly
When we start having multiple extent roots we'll need to use a helper to get to the correct extent_root. Rename fs_info->extent_root to _extent_root and convert all of the users of the extent root to using the btrfs_extent_root() helper. This will allow us to easily clean up the remaining direct accesses in the future. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
826582cabc |
btrfs: do not special case the extent root for switch commit roots
This is a leftover from when we used to independently swap the extent root's commit root and the fs tree commit roots. At the time I simply changed the helper to a list_add. There's actually no reason to not add the extent root to the switch commit root at this point, we don't care about the order we do the switching since it's all done under the commit_root_sem. If we re-mark the extent root dirty after adding it to the switch_commits list we'll see that BTRFS_ROOT_DIRTY isn't set and then list_move it back onto the dirty list, and then we'll redo the tree update and everything will be ok. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
7a60751a33 |
btrfs: remove trans_handle->root
Nobody is using this anymore, remove it. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
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2e4e97abac |
btrfs: pass fs_info to trace_btrfs_transaction_commit
The root on the trans->root can be anything, and generally we're committing from the transaction kthread so it's usually the tree_root. Change this to just take an fs_info, and to maintain compatibility simply put the ROOT_TREE_OBJECTID as the root objectid for the tracepoint. This will allow use to remove trans->root. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
fdfbf02066 |
btrfs: rework async transaction committing
Currently we do this awful thing where we get another ref on a trans handle, async off that handle and commit the transaction from that work. Because we do this we have to mess with current->journal_info and the freeze counting stuff. We already have an async thing to kick for the transaction commit, the transaction kthread. Replace this work struct with a flag on the fs_info to tell the kthread to go ahead and commit even if it's before our timeout. Then we can drastically simplify the async transaction commit path. Note: this can be simplified and functionality based on the pending operation COMMIT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> [ add note ] Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
9270501c16 |
btrfs: change root to fs_info for btrfs_reserve_metadata_bytes
We used to need the root for btrfs_reserve_metadata_bytes to check the orphan cleanup state, but we no longer need that, we simply need the fs_info. Change btrfs_reserve_metadata_bytes() to use the fs_info, and change both btrfs_block_rsv_refill() and btrfs_block_rsv_add() to do the same as they simply call btrfs_reserve_metadata_bytes() and then manipulate the block_rsv that is being used. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
dfba78dc1c |
btrfs: reduce the scope of the tree log mutex during transaction commit
In the transaction commit path we are acquiring the tree log mutex too early and we have a stale comment because: 1) It mentions a function named btrfs_commit_tree_roots(), which does not exists anymore, it was the old name of commit_cowonly_roots(), renamed a very long time ago by commit |
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Josef Bacik
|
8496153945 |
btrfs: add a BTRFS_FS_ERROR helper
We have a few flags that are inconsistently used to describe the fs in different states of failure. As of |
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Filipe Manana
|
79bd37120b |
btrfs: rework chunk allocation to avoid exhaustion of the system chunk array
Commit
|
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Filipe Manana
|
1cb3db1cf3 |
btrfs: fix deadlock with concurrent chunk allocations involving system chunks
When a task attempting to allocate a new chunk verifies that there is not currently enough free space in the system space_info and there is another task that allocated a new system chunk but it did not finish yet the creation of the respective block group, it waits for that other task to finish creating the block group. This is to avoid exhaustion of the system chunk array in the superblock, which is limited, when we have a thundering herd of tasks allocating new chunks. This problem was described and fixed by commit |
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Filipe Manana
|
35b22c19af |
btrfs: send: fix crash when memory allocations trigger reclaim
When doing a send we don't expect the task to ever start a transaction after the initial check that verifies if commit roots match the regular roots. This is because after that we set current->journal_info with a stub (special value) that signals we are in send context, so that we take a read lock on an extent buffer when reading it from disk and verifying it is valid (its generation matches the generation stored in the parent). This stub was introduced in 2014 by commit |
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Naohiro Aota
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44365827cc |
btrfs: fix unbalanced unlock in qgroup_account_snapshot()
qgroup_account_snapshot() is trying to unlock the not taken
tree_log_mutex in a error path. Since ret != 0 in this case, we can
just return from here.
Fixes:
|
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David Sterba
|
ae5d29d4e7 |
btrfs: inline wait_current_trans_commit_start in its caller
Function wait_current_trans_commit_start is now fairly trivial so it can be inlined in its only caller. Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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David Sterba
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32cc4f8759 |
btrfs: sink wait_for_unblock parameter to async commit
There's only one caller left btrfs_ioctl_start_sync that passes 0, so we
can remove the switch in btrfs_commit_transaction_async.
A cleanup
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David Sterba
|
6819703f5a |
btrfs: clear defrag status of a root if starting transaction fails
The defrag loop processes leaves in batches and starting transaction for each. The whole defragmentation on a given root is protected by a bit but in case the transaction fails, the bit is not cleared In case the transaction fails the bit would prevent starting defragmentation again, so make sure it's cleared. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
5963ffcaf3 |
btrfs: always abort the transaction if we abort a trans handle
While stress testing our error handling I noticed that sometimes we would still commit the transaction even though we had aborted the transaction. Currently we track if a trans handle has dirtied any metadata, and if it hasn't we mark the filesystem as having an error (so no new transactions can be started), but we will allow the current transaction to complete as we do not mark the transaction itself as having been aborted. This sounds good in theory, but we were not properly tracking IO errors in btrfs_finish_ordered_io, and thus committing the transaction with bogus free space data. This isn't necessarily a problem per-se with the free space cache, as the other guards in place would have kept us from accepting the free space cache as valid, but highlights a real world case where we had a bug and could have corrupted the filesystem because of it. This "skip abort on empty trans handle" is nice in theory, but assumes we have perfect error handling everywhere, which we clearly do not. Also we do not allow further transactions to be started, so all this does is save the last transaction that was happening, which doesn't necessarily gain us anything other than the potential for real corruption. Remove this particular bit of code, if we decide we need to abort the transaction then abort the current one and keep us from doing real harm to the file system, regardless of whether this specific trans handle dirtied anything or not. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
061dde8245 |
btrfs: fix race between transaction aborts and fsyncs leading to use-after-free
There is a race between a task aborting a transaction during a commit,
a task doing an fsync and the transaction kthread, which leads to an
use-after-free of the log root tree. When this happens, it results in a
stack trace like the following:
BTRFS info (device dm-0): forced readonly
BTRFS warning (device dm-0): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in cleanup_transaction:1958: errno=-5 IO failure
BTRFS warning (device dm-0): lost page write due to IO error on /dev/mapper/error-test (-5)
BTRFS warning (device dm-0): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0xa4e8 len 4096 err no 10
BTRFS error (device dm-0): error writing primary super block to device 1
BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0x12e000 len 4096 err no 10
BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0x12e008 len 4096 err no 10
BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0x12e010 len 4096 err no 10
BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in write_all_supers:4110: errno=-5 IO failure (1 errors while writing supers)
BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in btrfs_sync_log:3308: errno=-5 IO failure
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 2458471 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-btrfs-next-84 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x139/0xa40
Code: c0 74 19 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffff9f18830d7b00 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffffffffb9c54d13 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff9f18830d7bc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff9f18830d7be0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8c6cd199c040
R13: ffff8c6c95821358 R14: 00000000fffffffb R15: ffff8c6cbcf01358
FS: 00007fa9140c2b80(0000) GS:ffff8c6fac600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa913d52000 CR3: 000000013d2b4003 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? __btrfs_handle_fs_error+0xde/0x146 [btrfs]
? btrfs_sync_log+0x7c1/0xf20 [btrfs]
? btrfs_sync_log+0x7c1/0xf20 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_log+0x7c1/0xf20 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_file+0x40c/0x580 [btrfs]
do_fsync+0x38/0x70
__x64_sys_fsync+0x10/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fa9142a55c3
Code: 8b 15 09 (...)
RSP: 002b:00007fff26278d48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563c83cb4560 RCX: 00007fa9142a55c3
RDX: 00007fff26278cb0 RSI: 00007fff26278cb0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fff26278d5c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000340
R13: 00007fff26278de0 R14: 00007fff26278d96 R15: 0000563c83ca57c0
Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...)
---[ end trace ee2f1b19327d791d ]---
The steps that lead to this crash are the following:
1) We are at transaction N;
2) We have two tasks with a transaction handle attached to transaction N.
Task A and Task B. Task B is doing an fsync;
3) Task B is at btrfs_sync_log(), and has saved fs_info->log_root_tree
into a local variable named 'log_root_tree' at the top of
btrfs_sync_log(). Task B is about to call write_all_supers(), but
before that...
4) Task A calls btrfs_commit_transaction(), and after it sets the
transaction state to TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START, an error happens before
it waits for the transaction's 'num_writers' counter to reach a value
of 1 (no one else attached to the transaction), so it jumps to the
label "cleanup_transaction";
5) Task A then calls cleanup_transaction(), where it aborts the
transaction, setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_TRANS_ABORTED on fs_info->fs_state,
setting the ->aborted field of the transaction and the handle to an
errno value and also setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR on fs_info->fs_state.
After that, at cleanup_transaction(), it deletes the transaction from
the list of transactions (fs_info->trans_list), sets the transaction
to the state TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING and then waits for the number
of writers to go down to 1, as it's currently 2 (1 for task A and 1
for task B);
6) The transaction kthread is running and sees that BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR
is set in fs_info->fs_state, so it calls btrfs_cleanup_transaction().
There it sees the list fs_info->trans_list is empty, and then proceeds
into calling btrfs_drop_all_logs(), which frees the log root tree with
a call to btrfs_free_log_root_tree();
7) Task B calls write_all_supers() and, shortly after, under the label
'out_wake_log_root', it deferences the pointer stored in
'log_root_tree', which was already freed in the previous step by the
transaction kthread. This results in a use-after-free leading to a
crash.
Fix this by deleting the transaction from the list of transactions at
cleanup_transaction() only after setting the transaction state to
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING and waiting for all existing tasks that are
attached to the transaction to release their transaction handles.
This makes the transaction kthread wait for all the tasks attached to
the transaction to be done with the transaction before dropping the
log roots and doing other cleanups.
Fixes:
|
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Josef Bacik
|
2dd8298eb3 |
btrfs: handle btrfs_update_reloc_root failure in commit_fs_roots
btrfs_update_reloc_root will will return errors in the future, so handle the error properly in commit_fs_roots. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
03a7e111a9 |
btrfs: return an error from btrfs_record_root_in_trans
We can create a reloc root when we record the root in the trans, which can fail for all sorts of different reasons. Propagate this error up the chain of callers. Future patches will fix the callers of btrfs_record_root_in_trans() to handle the error. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
f0118cb6bc |
btrfs: handle record_root_in_trans failure in create_pending_snapshot
record_root_in_trans can currently fail, so handle this failure properly. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
1409e6cc74 |
btrfs: handle record_root_in_trans failure in btrfs_record_root_in_trans
record_root_in_trans can fail currently, handle this failure properly. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
1c442d2246 |
btrfs: handle record_root_in_trans failure in qgroup_account_snapshot
record_root_in_trans can fail currently, so handle this failure properly. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
68075ea8d7 |
btrfs: handle btrfs_record_root_in_trans failure in start_transaction
btrfs_record_root_in_trans will return errors in the future, so handle the error properly in start_transaction. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add comment ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
eafa4fd0ad |
btrfs: fix exhaustion of the system chunk array due to concurrent allocations
When we are running out of space for updating the chunk tree, that is, when we are low on available space in the system space info, if we have many task concurrently allocating block groups, via fallocate for example, many of them can end up all allocating new system chunks when only one is needed. In extreme cases this can lead to exhaustion of the system chunk array, which has a size limit of 2048 bytes, and results in a transaction abort with errno EFBIG, producing a trace in dmesg like the following, which was triggered on a PowerPC machine with a node/leaf size of 64K: [1359.518899] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [1359.518980] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -27) [1359.519135] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 16463 at ../fs/btrfs/block-group.c:1968 btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x340/0x3c0 [btrfs] [1359.519152] Modules linked in: (...) [1359.519239] Supported: Yes, External [1359.519252] CPU: 3 PID: 16463 Comm: stress-ng Tainted: G X 5.3.18-47-default #1 SLE15-SP3 [1359.519274] NIP: c008000000e36fe8 LR: c008000000e36fe4 CTR: 00000000006de8e8 [1359.519293] REGS: c00000056890b700 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G X (5.3.18-47-default) [1359.519317] MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48008222 XER: 00000007 [1359.519356] CFAR: c00000000013e170 IRQMASK: 0 [1359.519356] GPR00: c008000000e36fe4 c00000056890b990 c008000000e83200 0000000000000026 [1359.519356] GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000d52a3b027651 0000000000000007 [1359.519356] GPR08: 0000000000000003 0000000000000001 0000000000000007 0000000000000000 [1359.519356] GPR12: 0000000000008000 c00000063fe44600 000000001015e028 000000001015dfd0 [1359.519356] GPR16: 000000000000404f 0000000000000001 0000000000010000 0000dd1e287affff [1359.519356] GPR20: 0000000000000001 c000000637c9a000 ffffffffffffffe5 0000000000000000 [1359.519356] GPR24: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000100 ffffffffffffffc0 [1359.519356] GPR28: c000000637c9a000 c000000630e09230 c000000630e091d8 c000000562188b08 [1359.519561] NIP [c008000000e36fe8] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x340/0x3c0 [btrfs] [1359.519613] LR [c008000000e36fe4] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x33c/0x3c0 [btrfs] [1359.519626] Call Trace: [1359.519671] [c00000056890b990] [c008000000e36fe4] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x33c/0x3c0 [btrfs] (unreliable) [1359.519729] [c00000056890ba90] [c008000000d68d44] __btrfs_end_transaction+0xbc/0x2f0 [btrfs] [1359.519782] [c00000056890bae0] [c008000000e309ac] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x154/0x610 [btrfs] [1359.519844] [c00000056890bba0] [c008000000d8a0fc] btrfs_fallocate+0xe4/0x10e0 [btrfs] [1359.519891] [c00000056890bd00] [c0000000004a23b4] vfs_fallocate+0x174/0x350 [1359.519929] [c00000056890bd50] [c0000000004a3cf8] ksys_fallocate+0x68/0xf0 [1359.519957] [c00000056890bda0] [c0000000004a3da8] sys_fallocate+0x28/0x40 [1359.519988] [c00000056890bdc0] [c000000000038968] system_call_exception+0xe8/0x170 [1359.520021] [c00000056890be20] [c00000000000cb70] system_call_common+0xf0/0x278 [1359.520037] Instruction dump: [1359.520049] 7d0049ad 40c2fff4 7c0004ac 71490004 40820024 2f83fffb 419e0048 3c620000 [1359.520082] e863bcb8 7ec4b378 48010d91 e8410018 <0fe00000> 3c820000 e884bcc8 7ec6b378 [1359.520122] ---[ end trace d6c186e151022e20 ]--- The following steps explain how we can end up in this situation: 1) Task A is at check_system_chunk(), either because it is allocating a new data or metadata block group, at btrfs_chunk_alloc(), or because it is removing a block group or turning a block group RO. It does not matter why; 2) Task A sees that there is not enough free space in the system space_info object, that is 'left' is < 'thresh'. And at this point the system space_info has a value of 0 for its 'bytes_may_use' counter; 3) As a consequence task A calls btrfs_alloc_chunk() in order to allocate a new system block group (chunk) and then reserves 'thresh' bytes in the chunk block reserve with the call to btrfs_block_rsv_add(). This changes the chunk block reserve's 'reserved' and 'size' counters by an amount of 'thresh', and changes the 'bytes_may_use' counter of the system space_info object from 0 to 'thresh'. Also during its call to btrfs_alloc_chunk(), we end up increasing the value of the 'total_bytes' counter of the system space_info object by 8MiB (the size of a system chunk stripe). This happens through the call chain: btrfs_alloc_chunk() create_chunk() btrfs_make_block_group() btrfs_update_space_info() 4) After it finishes the first phase of the block group allocation, at btrfs_chunk_alloc(), task A unlocks the chunk mutex; 5) At this point the new system block group was added to the transaction handle's list of new block groups, but its block group item, device items and chunk item were not yet inserted in the extent, device and chunk trees, respectively. That only happens later when we call btrfs_finish_chunk_alloc() through a call to btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(); Note that only when we update the chunk tree, through the call to btrfs_finish_chunk_alloc(), we decrement the 'reserved' counter of the chunk block reserve as we COW/allocate extent buffers, through: btrfs_alloc_tree_block() btrfs_use_block_rsv() btrfs_block_rsv_use_bytes() And the system space_info's 'bytes_may_use' is decremented everytime we allocate an extent buffer for COW operations on the chunk tree, through: btrfs_alloc_tree_block() btrfs_reserve_extent() find_free_extent() btrfs_add_reserved_bytes() If we end up COWing less chunk btree nodes/leaves than expected, which is the typical case since the amount of space we reserve is always pessimistic to account for the worst possible case, we release the unused space through: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups() btrfs_trans_release_chunk_metadata() btrfs_block_rsv_release() block_rsv_release_bytes() btrfs_space_info_free_bytes_may_use() But before task A gets into btrfs_create_pending_block_groups()... 6) Many other tasks start allocating new block groups through fallocate, each one does the first phase of block group allocation in a serialized way, since btrfs_chunk_alloc() takes the chunk mutex before calling check_system_chunk() and btrfs_alloc_chunk(). However before everyone enters the final phase of the block group allocation, that is, before calling btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(), new tasks keep coming to allocate new block groups and while at check_system_chunk(), the system space_info's 'bytes_may_use' keeps increasing each time a task reserves space in the chunk block reserve. This means that eventually some other task can end up not seeing enough free space in the system space_info and decide to allocate yet another system chunk. This may repeat several times if yet more new tasks keep allocating new block groups before task A, and all the other tasks, finish the creation of the pending block groups, which is when reserved space in excess is released. Eventually this can result in exhaustion of system chunk array in the superblock, with btrfs_add_system_chunk() returning EFBIG, resulting later in a transaction abort. Even when we don't reach the extreme case of exhausting the system array, most, if not all, unnecessarily created system block groups end up being unused since when finishing creation of the first pending system block group, the creation of the following ones end up not needing to COW nodes/leaves of the chunk tree, so we never allocate and deallocate from them, resulting in them never being added to the list of unused block groups - as a consequence they don't get deleted by the cleaner kthread - the only exceptions are if we unmount and mount the filesystem again, which adds any unused block groups to the list of unused block groups, if a scrub is run, which also adds unused block groups to the unused list, and under some circumstances when using a zoned filesystem or async discard, which may also add unused block groups to the unused list. So fix this by: *) Tracking the number of reserved bytes for the chunk tree per transaction, which is the sum of reserved chunk bytes by each transaction handle currently being used; *) When there is not enough free space in the system space_info, if there are other transaction handles which reserved chunk space, wait for some of them to complete in order to have enough excess reserved space released, and then try again. Otherwise proceed with the creation of a new system chunk. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Naohiro Aota
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d3575156f6 |
btrfs: zoned: redirty released extent buffers
Tree manipulating operations like merging nodes often release once-allocated tree nodes. Such nodes are cleaned so that pages in the node are not uselessly written out. On zoned volumes, however, such optimization blocks the following IOs as the cancellation of the write out of the freed blocks breaks the sequential write sequence expected by the device. Introduce a list of clean and unwritten extent buffers that have been released in a transaction. Redirty the buffers so that btree_write_cache_pages() can send proper bios to the devices. Besides it clears the entire content of the extent buffer not to confuse raw block scanners e.g. 'btrfs check'. By clearing the content, csum_dirty_buffer() complains about bytenr mismatch, so avoid the checking and checksum using newly introduced buffer flag EXTENT_BUFFER_NO_CHECK. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
d0c2f4fa55 |
btrfs: make concurrent fsyncs wait less when waiting for a transaction commit
Often an fsync needs to fallback to a transaction commit for several reasons (to ensure consistency after a power failure, a new block group was allocated or a temporary error such as ENOMEM or ENOSPC happened). In that case the log is marked as needing a full commit and any concurrent tasks attempting to log inodes or commit the log will also fallback to the transaction commit. When this happens they all wait for the task that first started the transaction commit to finish the transaction commit - however they wait until the full transaction commit happens, which is not needed, as they only need to wait for the superblocks to be persisted and not for unpinning all the extents pinned during the transaction's lifetime, which even for short lived transactions can be a few thousand and take some significant amount of time to complete - for dbench workloads I have observed up to 4~5 milliseconds of time spent unpinning extents in the worst cases, and the number of pinned extents was between 2 to 3 thousand. So allow fsync tasks to skip waiting for the unpinning of extents when they call btrfs_commit_transaction() and they were not the task that started the transaction commit (that one has to do it, the alternative would be to offload the transaction commit to another task so that it could avoid waiting for the extent unpinning or offload the extent unpinning to another task). This patch is part of a patchset comprised of the following patches: btrfs: remove unnecessary directory inode item update when deleting dir entry btrfs: stop setting nbytes when filling inode item for logging btrfs: avoid logging new ancestor inodes when logging new inode btrfs: skip logging directories already logged when logging all parents btrfs: skip logging inodes already logged when logging new entries btrfs: remove unnecessary check_parent_dirs_for_sync() btrfs: make concurrent fsyncs wait less when waiting for a transaction commit After applying the entire patchset, dbench shows improvements in respect to throughput and latency. The script used to measure it is the following: $ cat dbench-test.sh #!/bin/bash DEV=/dev/sdk MNT=/mnt/sdk MOUNT_OPTIONS="-o ssd" MKFS_OPTIONS="-m single -d single" echo "performance" | tee /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/scaling_governor umount $DEV &> /dev/null mkfs.btrfs -f $MKFS_OPTIONS $DEV mount $MOUNT_OPTIONS $DEV $MNT dbench -D $MNT -t 300 64 umount $MNT The test was run on a physical machine with 12 cores (Intel corei7), 64G of ram, using a NVMe device and a non-debug kernel configuration (Debian's default configuration). Before applying patchset, 32 clients: Operation Count AvgLat MaxLat ---------------------------------------- NTCreateX |
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Josef Bacik
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488bc2a2d2 |
btrfs: run delayed refs less often in commit_cowonly_roots
We love running delayed refs in commit_cowonly_roots, but it is a bit excessive. I was seeing cases of running 3 or 4 refs a few times in a row during this time. Instead simply: - update all of the roots first - then run delayed refs - then handle the empty block groups case - and then if we have any more dirty roots do the whole thing again This allows us to be much more efficient with our delayed ref running, as we can batch a few more operations at once. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
dac348e925 |
btrfs: stop running all delayed refs during snapshot
This was added in commit
|
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Josef Bacik
|
2a4d84c11a |
btrfs: move delayed ref flushing for qgroup into qgroup helper
The commit
|
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Josef Bacik
|
ad368f3394 |
btrfs: only run delayed refs once before committing
We try to pre-flush the delayed refs when committing, because we want to do as little work as possible in the critical section of the transaction commit. However doing this twice can lead to very long transaction commit delays as other threads are allowed to continue to generate more delayed refs, which potentially delays the commit by multiple minutes in very extreme cases. So simply stick to one pre-flush, and then continue the rest of the transaction commit. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
e19eb11f4f |
btrfs: only let one thread pre-flush delayed refs in commit
I've been running a stress test that runs 20 workers in their own subvolume, which are running an fsstress instance with 4 threads per worker, which is 80 total fsstress threads. In addition to this I'm running balance in the background as well as creating and deleting snapshots. This test takes around 12 hours to run normally, going slower and slower as the test goes on. The reason for this is because fsstress is running fsync sometimes, and because we're messing with block groups we often fall through to btrfs_commit_transaction, so will often have 20-30 threads all calling btrfs_commit_transaction at the same time. These all get stuck contending on the extent tree while they try to run delayed refs during the initial part of the commit. This is suboptimal, really because the extent tree is a single point of failure we only want one thread acting on that tree at once to reduce lock contention. Fix this by making the flushing mechanism a bit operation, to make it easy to use test_and_set_bit() in order to make sure only one task does this initial flush. Once we're into the transaction commit we only have one thread doing delayed ref running, it's just this initial pre-flush that is problematic. With this patch my stress test takes around 90 minutes to run, instead of 12 hours. The memory barrier is not necessary for the flushing bit as it's ordered, unlike plain int. The transaction state accessed in btrfs_should_end_transaction could be affected by that too as it's not always used under transaction lock. Upon Nikolay's analysis in [1] it's not necessary: In should_end_transaction it's read without holding any locks. (U) It's modified in btrfs_cleanup_transaction without holding the fs_info->trans_lock (U), but the STATE_ERROR flag is going to be set. set in cleanup_transaction under fs_info->trans_lock (L) set in btrfs_commit_trans to COMMIT_START under fs_info->trans_lock.(L) set in btrfs_commit_trans to COMMIT_DOING under fs_info->trans_lock.(L) set in btrfs_commit_trans to COMMIT_UNBLOCK under fs_info->trans_lock.(L) set in btrfs_commit_trans to COMMIT_COMPLETED without locks but at this point the transaction is finished and fs_info->running_trans is NULL (U but irrelevant). So by the looks of it we can have a concurrent READ race with a WRITE, due to reads not taking a lock. In this case what we want to ensure is we either see new or old state. I consulted with Will Deacon and he said that in such a case we'd want to annotate the accesses to ->state with (READ|WRITE)_ONCE so as to avoid a theoretical tear, in this case I don't think this could happen but I imagine at some point KCSAN would flag such an access as racy (which it is). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/e1fd5cc1-0f28-f670-69f4-e9958b4964e6@suse.com Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> [ add comments regarding memory barrier ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Nikolay Borisov
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543068a217 |
btrfs: rename btrfs_find_free_objectid to btrfs_get_free_objectid
This better reflects the semantics of the function i.e no search is performed whatsoever. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
4f4317c13a |
btrfs: fix error handling in commit_fs_roots
While doing error injection I would sometimes get a corrupt file system. This is because I was injecting errors at btrfs_search_slot, but would only do it one time per stack. This uncovered a problem in commit_fs_roots, where if we get an error we would just break. However we're in a nested loop, the first loop being a loop to find all the dirty fs roots, and then subsequent root updates would succeed clearing the error value. This isn't likely to happen in real scenarios, however we could potentially get a random ENOMEM once and then not again, and we'd end up with a corrupted file system. Fix this by moving the error checking around a bit to the main loop, as this is the only place where something will fail, and return the error as soon as it occurs. With this patch my reproducer no longer corrupts the file system. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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David Sterba
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14ff8e1970 |
btrfs: no need to run delayed refs after commit_fs_roots during commit
The inode number cache has been removed in this dev cycle, there's one
more leftover. We don't need to run the delayed refs again after
commit_fs_roots as stated in the comment, because btrfs_save_ino_cache
is no more since
|
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Boris Burkov
|
9484622945 |
btrfs: keep sb cache_generation consistent with space_cache
When mounting, btrfs uses the cache_generation in the super block to determine if space cache v1 is in use. However, by mounting with nospace_cache or space_cache=v2, it is possible to disable space cache v1, which does not result in un-setting cache_generation back to 0. In order to base some logic, like mount option printing in /proc/mounts, on the current state of the space cache rather than just the values of the mount option, keep the value of cache_generation consistent with the status of space cache v1. We ensure that cache_generation > 0 iff the file system is using space_cache v1. This requires committing a transaction on any mount which changes whether we are using v1. (v1->nospace_cache, v1->v2, nospace_cache->v1, v2->v1). Since the mechanism for writing out the cache generation is transaction commit, but we want some finer grained control over when we un-set it, we can't just rely on the SPACE_CACHE mount option, and introduce an fs_info flag that mount can use when it wants to unset the generation. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Nikolay Borisov
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5297199a8b |
btrfs: remove inode number cache feature
It's been deprecated since commit
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Nikolay Borisov
|
a2633b6a29 |
btrfs: return bool from btrfs_should_end_transaction
Results in slightly smaller code. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/1 up/down: 0/-11 (-11) Function old new delta btrfs_should_end_transaction 96 85 -11 Total: Before=20070, After=20059, chg -0.05% Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Nikolay Borisov
|
8a8f4deaba |
btrfs: return bool from should_end_transaction
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Nikolay Borisov
|
729f796172 |
btrfs: make btrfs_update_inode_fallback take btrfs_inode
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
bbb86a3717 |
btrfs: protect fs_info->caching_block_groups by block_group_cache_lock
I got the following lockdep splat ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0+ #101 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs-cleaner/3445 is trying to acquire lock: ffff89dbec39ab48 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 but task is already holding lock: ffff89dbeaf28a88 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_find_all_roots+0x41/0x80 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_write+0x3d/0x70 btrfs_cache_block_group+0x2d5/0x510 find_free_extent+0xb6e/0x12f0 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb1/0x330 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11d/0x580 btrfs_cow_block+0x10c/0x220 commit_cowonly_roots+0x47/0x2e0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x595/0xbd0 sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x12d/0x190 task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1df/0x200 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x54/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x40/0x130 find_free_extent+0x2ed/0x12f0 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb1/0x330 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11d/0x580 btrfs_cow_block+0x10c/0x220 commit_cowonly_roots+0x47/0x2e0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x595/0xbd0 sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x12d/0x190 task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1df/0x200 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x54/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1167/0x2150 lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3d0 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x614/0x9d0 btrfs_find_root+0x35/0x1b0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x120 btrfs_get_root_ref+0x14b/0x600 find_parent_nodes+0x3e6/0x1b30 btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0xb4/0x130 btrfs_find_all_roots+0x60/0x80 btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_post+0x27/0x40 btrfs_add_delayed_data_ref+0x3fd/0x460 btrfs_free_extent+0x42/0x100 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x1d7/0x2f0 walk_up_proc+0x11c/0x400 walk_up_tree+0xf0/0x180 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x1c7/0x780 btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xfb/0x110 cleaner_kthread+0xd4/0x140 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-root-00 --> &space_info->groups_sem --> &fs_info->commit_root_sem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->commit_root_sem); lock(&space_info->groups_sem); lock(&fs_info->commit_root_sem); lock(btrfs-root-00); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by btrfs-cleaner/3445: #0: ffff89dbeaf28838 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cleaner_kthread+0x6e/0x140 #1: ffff89dbeb6c7640 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5c0 #2: ffff89dbeaf28a88 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_find_all_roots+0x41/0x80 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 3445 Comm: btrfs-cleaner Not tainted 5.9.0+ #101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 __lock_acquire+0x1167/0x2150 ? __bfs+0x42/0x210 lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3d0 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x614/0x9d0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 btrfs_find_root+0x35/0x1b0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x120 btrfs_get_root_ref+0x14b/0x600 find_parent_nodes+0x3e6/0x1b30 btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0xb4/0x130 btrfs_find_all_roots+0x60/0x80 btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_post+0x27/0x40 btrfs_add_delayed_data_ref+0x3fd/0x460 btrfs_free_extent+0x42/0x100 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x1d7/0x2f0 walk_up_proc+0x11c/0x400 walk_up_tree+0xf0/0x180 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x1c7/0x780 ? btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0x73/0x110 btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xfb/0x110 cleaner_kthread+0xd4/0x140 ? btrfs_alloc_root+0x50/0x50 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 while testing another lockdep fix. This happens because we're using the commit_root_sem to protect fs_info->caching_block_groups, which creates a dependency on the groups_sem -> commit_root_sem, which is problematic because we will allocate blocks while holding tree roots. Fix this by making the list itself protected by the fs_info->block_group_cache_lock. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
27d56e62e4 |
btrfs: update last_byte_to_unpin in switch_commit_roots
While writing an explanation for the need of the commit_root_sem for btrfs_prepare_extent_commit, I realized we have a slight hole that could result in leaked space if we have to do the old style caching. Consider the following scenario commit root +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ |\\\\| |\\\\|\\\\| |\\\\|\\\\| +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 new commit root +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ | | | |\\\\| | |\\\\| +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Prior to this patch, we run btrfs_prepare_extent_commit, which updates the last_byte_to_unpin, and then we subsequently run switch_commit_roots. In this example lets assume that caching_ctl->progress == 1 at btrfs_prepare_extent_commit() time, which means that cache->last_byte_to_unpin == 1. Then we go and do the switch_commit_roots(), but in the meantime the caching thread has made some more progress, because we drop the commit_root_sem and re-acquired it. Now caching_ctl->progress == 3. We swap out the commit root and carry on to unpin. The race can happen like: 1) The caching thread was running using the old commit root when it found the extent for [2, 3); 2) Then it released the commit_root_sem because it was in the last item of a leaf and the semaphore was contended, and set ->progress to 3 (value of 'last'), as the last extent item in the current leaf was for the extent for range [2, 3); 3) Next time it gets the commit_root_sem, will start using the new commit root and search for a key with offset 3, so it never finds the hole for [2, 3). So the caching thread never saw [2, 3) as free space in any of the commit roots, and by the time finish_extent_commit() was called for the range [0, 3), ->last_byte_to_unpin was 1, so it only returned the subrange [0, 1) to the free space cache, skipping [2, 3). In the unpin code we have last_byte_to_unpin == 1, so we unpin [0,1), but do not unpin [2,3). However because caching_ctl->progress == 3 we do not see the newly freed section of [2,3), and thus do not add it to our free space cache. This results in us missing a chunk of free space in memory (on disk too, unless we have a power failure before writing the free space cache to disk). Fix this by making sure the ->last_byte_to_unpin is set at the same time that we swap the commit roots, this ensures that we will always be consistent. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> [ update changelog with Filipe's review comments ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
ac5887c8e0 |
btrfs: locking: remove all the blocking helpers
Now that we're using a rw_semaphore we no longer need to indicate if a lock is blocking or not, nor do we need to flip the entire path from blocking to spinning. Remove these helpers and all the places they are called. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
88090ad36a |
btrfs: do not start and wait for delalloc on snapshot roots on transaction commit
We do not need anymore to start writeback for delalloc of roots that are being snapshotted and wait for it to complete. This was done in commit |
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Josef Bacik
|
9631e4cc1a |
btrfs: introduce BTRFS_NESTING_COW for cow'ing blocks
When we COW a block we are holding a lock on the original block, and then we lock the new COW block. Because our lockdep maps are based on root + level, this will make lockdep complain. We need a way to indicate a subclass for locking the COW'ed block, so plumb through our btrfs_lock_nesting from btrfs_cow_block down to the btrfs_init_buffer, and then introduce BTRFS_NESTING_COW to be used for cow'ing blocks. The reason I've added all this extra infrastructure is because there will be need of different nesting classes in follow up patches. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
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487781796d |
btrfs: make fast fsyncs wait only for writeback
Currently regardless of a full or a fast fsync we always wait for ordered
extents to complete, and then start logging the inode after that. However
for fast fsyncs we can just wait for the writeback to complete, we don't
need to wait for the ordered extents to complete since we use the list of
modified extents maps to figure out which extents we must log and we can
get their checksums directly from the ordered extents that are still in
flight, otherwise look them up from the checksums tree.
Until commit
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Filipe Manana
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2d892ccdc1 |
btrfs: fix NULL pointer dereference after failure to create snapshot
When trying to get a new fs root for a snapshot during the transaction
at transaction.c:create_pending_snapshot(), if btrfs_get_new_fs_root()
fails we leave "pending->snap" pointing to an error pointer, and then
later at ioctl.c:create_snapshot() we dereference that pointer, resulting
in a crash:
[12264.614689] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000007c4
[12264.615650] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[12264.616487] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[12264.617436] PGD 0 P4D 0
[12264.618328] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[12264.619150] CPU: 0 PID: 2310635 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc3-btrfs-next-67 #1
[12264.619960] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[12264.621769] RIP: 0010:btrfs_mksubvol+0x438/0x4a0 [btrfs]
[12264.622528] Code: bc ef ff ff (...)
[12264.624092] RSP: 0018:ffffaa6fc7277cd8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[12264.624669] RAX: 00000000fffffff4 RBX: ffff9d3e8f151a60 RCX: 0000000000000000
[12264.625249] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff9d56c9be RDI: fffffffffffffff4
[12264.625830] RBP: ffff9d3e8f151b48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[12264.626413] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff4
[12264.626994] R13: ffff9d3ede380538 R14: ffff9d3ede380500 R15: ffff9d3f61b2eeb8
[12264.627582] FS: 00007f140d5d8200(0000) GS:ffff9d3fb5e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[12264.628176] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[12264.628773] CR2: 00000000000007c4 CR3: 000000020f8e8004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[12264.629379] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[12264.629994] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[12264.630594] Call Trace:
[12264.631227] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x7b/0xb0 [btrfs]
[12264.631840] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x16f/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[12264.632458] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xb0/0xf0 [btrfs]
[12264.633078] btrfs_ioctl+0x1864/0x3130 [btrfs]
[12264.633689] ? do_sys_openat2+0x1a7/0x2d0
[12264.634295] ? kmem_cache_free+0x147/0x3a0
[12264.634899] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[12264.635488] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[12264.636058] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[12264.636616] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
(gdb) list *(btrfs_mksubvol+0x438)
0x7c7b8 is in btrfs_mksubvol (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:858).
853 ret = 0;
854 pending_snapshot->anon_dev = 0;
855 fail:
856 /* Prevent double freeing of anon_dev */
857 if (ret && pending_snapshot->snap)
858 pending_snapshot->snap->anon_dev = 0;
859 btrfs_put_root(pending_snapshot->snap);
860 btrfs_subvolume_release_metadata(root, &pending_snapshot->block_rsv);
861 free_pending:
862 if (pending_snapshot->anon_dev)
So fix this by setting "pending->snap" to NULL if we get an error from the
call to btrfs_get_new_fs_root() at transaction.c:create_pending_snapshot().
Fixes:
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Josef Bacik
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fbabd4a36f |
btrfs: return EROFS for BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR cases
Eric reported seeing this message while running generic/475 BTRFS: error (device dm-3) in btrfs_sync_log:3084: errno=-117 Filesystem corrupted Full stack trace: BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in btrfs_commit_transaction:2323: errno=-5 IO failure (Error while writing out transaction) BTRFS info (device dm-0): forced readonly BTRFS warning (device dm-0): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. ------------[ cut here ]------------ BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in cleanup_transaction:1894: errno=-5 IO failure BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -117) BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c6480 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c6488 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c6490 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c6498 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c64a0 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c64a8 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c64b0 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c64b8 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3555 rw 0,0 sector 0x1c64c0 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3572 rw 0,0 sector 0x1b85e8 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3572 rw 0,0 sector 0x1b85f0 len 4096 err no 10 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 23985 at fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:3084 btrfs_sync_log+0xbc8/0xd60 [btrfs] BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d4288 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d4290 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d4298 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d42a0 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d42a8 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d42b0 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d42b8 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d42c0 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d42c8 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 3548 rw 0,0 sector 0x1d42d0 len 4096 err no 10 CPU: 3 PID: 23985 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W L 5.8.0-rc4-default+ #1181 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_sync_log+0xbc8/0xd60 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffff909a44d17bd0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffff8f3be41cb940 RSI: ffffffffb0108d2b RDI: ffffffffb0108ff7 RBP: ffff909a44d17e70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000037988 R12: ffff8f3bd20e4000 R13: ffff8f3bd20e4428 R14: 00000000ffffff8b R15: ffff909a44d17c70 FS: 00007f6a6ed3fb80(0000) GS:ffff8f3c3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6a6ed3e000 CR3: 00000000525c0003 CR4: 0000000000160ee0 Call Trace: ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0 ? lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 ? lockref_put_or_lock+0x9/0x30 ? dput+0x20/0x4a0 ? dput+0x20/0x4a0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30 btrfs_sync_file+0x335/0x490 [btrfs] do_fsync+0x38/0x70 __x64_sys_fsync+0x10/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f6a6ef1b6e3 Code: Bad RIP value. RSP: 002b:00007ffd01e20038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000007a120 RCX: 00007f6a6ef1b6e3 RDX: 00007ffd01e1ffa0 RSI: 00007ffd01e1ffa0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffd01e2004c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000009f R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb007fe0b>] copy_process+0x67b/0x1b00 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb007fe0b>] copy_process+0x67b/0x1b00 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace af146e0e38433456 ]--- BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in btrfs_sync_log:3084: errno=-117 Filesystem corrupted This ret came from btrfs_write_marked_extents(). If we get an aborted transaction via EIO before, we'll see it in btree_write_cache_pages() and return EUCLEAN, which gets printed as "Filesystem corrupted". Except we shouldn't be returning EUCLEAN here, we need to be returning EROFS because EUCLEAN is reserved for actual corruption, not IO errors. We are inconsistent about our handling of BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR elsewhere, but we want to use EROFS for this particular case. The original transaction abort has the real error code for why we ended up with an aborted transaction, all subsequent actions just need to return EROFS because they may not have a trans handle and have no idea about the original cause of the abort. After patch "btrfs: don't WARN if we abort a transaction with EROFS" the stacktrace will not be dumped either. Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add full test stacktrace ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |