When we write entropy into a non-empty pool, we currently don't
account at all for the fact that we will probabilistically overwrite
some of the entropy in that pool. This means that unless the pool is
fully empty, we are currently *guaranteed* to overestimate the amount
of entropy in the pool!
Assuming Shannon entropy with zero correlations we end up with an
exponentally decaying value of new entropy added:
entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
(1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
However, calculations involving fractional exponentials are not
practical in the kernel, so apply a piecewise linearization:
For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
(1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >= (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
... so we can approximate the exponential with
3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
In order for the loop not to take arbitrary amounts of time if a bad
ioctl is received, terminate if we are within one bit of full. This
way the loop is guaranteed to terminate after no more than
log2(poolsize) iterations, no matter what the input value is. The
vast majority of the time the loop will be executed exactly once.
The piecewise linearization is very conservative, approaching 3/4 of
the usable input value for small inputs, however, our entropy
estimation is pretty weak at best, especially for small values; we
have no handle on correlation; and the Shannon entropy measure (Rényi
entropy of order 1) is not the correct one to use in the first place,
but rather the correct entropy measure is the min-entropy, the Rényi
entropy of infinite order.
As such, this conservatism seems more than justified.
This does introduce fractional bit values. I have left it to have 3
bits of fraction, so that with a pool of 2^12 bits the multiply in
credit_entropy_bits() can still fit into an int, as 2*(3+12) < 31. It
is definitely possible to allow for more fractional accounting, but
that multiply then would have to be turned into a 32*32 -> 64 multiply.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: DJ Johnston <dj.johnston@intel.com>
Allow fractional bits of entropy to be tracked by scaling the entropy
counter (fixed point). This will be used in a subsequent patch that
accounts for entropy lost due to overwrites.
[ Modified by tytso to fix up a few missing places where the
entropy_count wasn't properly converted from fractional bits to
bits. ]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Use a macro to statically compute poolbitshift (will be used in a
subsequent patch), poolbytes, and poolbits. On virtually all
architectures the cost of a memory load with an offset is the same as
the one of a memory load.
It is still possible for this to generate worse code since the C
compiler doesn't know the fixed relationship between these fields, but
that is somewhat unlikely.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Previously if CPU chip had a built-in random number generator (i.e.,
RDRAND on newer x86 chips), we mixed it in at the very end of
extract_buf() using an XOR operation.
We now mix it in right after the calculate a hash across the entire
pool. This has the advantage that any contribution of entropy from
the CPU's HWRNG will get mixed back into the pool. In addition, it
means that if the HWRNG has any defects (either accidentally or
maliciously introduced), this will be mitigated via the non-linear
transform of the SHA-1 hash function before we hand out generated
output.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Allow architectures which have a disabled get_cycles() function to
provide a random_get_entropy() function which provides a fine-grained,
rapidly changing counter that can be used by the /dev/random driver.
For example, an architecture might have a rapidly changing register
used to control random TLB cache eviction, or DRAM refresh that
doesn't meet the requirements of get_cycles(), but which is good
enough for the needs of the random driver.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as
late_initcalls for some unknown reason. So make sure
random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are
run.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
After the last architecture switched to generic hard irqs the config
options HAVE_GENERIC_HARDIRQS & GENERIC_HARDIRQS and the related code
for !CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
This typedef is unnecessary and should just be removed.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 902c098a36 ("random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt
path") turned IRQ path from being spinlock protected into lockless
cmpxchg-retry update.
That commit removed r->lock serialization between crediting entropy bits
from IRQ context and accounting when extracting entropy on userspace
read path, but didn't turn the r->entropy_count reads/updates in
account() to use cmpxchg as well.
It has been observed, that under certain circumstances this leads to
read() on /dev/urandom to return 0 (EOF), as r->entropy_count gets
corrupted and becomes negative, which in turn results in propagating 0
all the way from account() to the actual read() call.
Convert the accounting code to be the proper lockless counterpart of
what has been partially done by 902c098a36.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit ec8f02da9e ("random: prime last_data value per fips
requirements") added priming of last_data per fips requirements.
Unfortuantely, it did so in a way that can lead to multiple threads all
incrementing nbytes, but only one actually doing anything with the extra
data, which leads to some fun random corruption and panics.
The fix is to simply do everything needed to prime last_data in a single
shot, so there's no window for multiple cpus to increment nbytes -- in
fact, we won't even increment or decrement nbytes anymore, we'll just
extract the needed EXTRACT_SIZE one time per pool and then carry on with
the normal routine.
All these changes have been tested across multiple hosts and
architectures where panics were previously encoutered. The code changes
are are strictly limited to areas only touched when when booted in fips
mode.
This change should also go into 3.8-stable, to make the myriads of fips
users on 3.8.x happy.
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stodola <jstodola@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are several places in kernel where modules unescapes input to convert
C-Style Escape Sequences into byte codes.
The patch provides generic implementation of such approach. Test cases are
also included into the patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: clarify comment]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export get_random_int() to modules]
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: William Hubbs <w.d.hubbs@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Brannon <chris@the-brannons.com>
Cc: Kirk Reiser <kirk@braille.uwo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
used by a thread when it exits.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Fix a circular locking dependency in random's collection of cputime
used by a thread when it exits."
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: fix locking dependency with the tasklist_lock
Commit 6133705494 introduced a circular lock dependency because
posix_cpu_timers_exit() is called by release_task(), which is holding
a writer lock on tasklist_lock, and this can cause a deadlock since
kill_fasync() gets called with nonblocking_pool.lock taken.
There's no reason why kill_fasync() needs to be taken while the random
pool is locked, so move it out to fix this locking dependency.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Russ Dill <Russ.Dill@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
The static lock initializers want to be fed the proper name of the
lock and not some random string. In mainline random strings are
obfuscating the readability of debug output, but for RT they prevent
the spinlock substitution. Fix it up.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The value stored in last_data must be primed for FIPS 140-2 purposes. Upon
first use, either on system startup or after an RNDCLEARPOOL ioctl, we
need to take an initial random sample, store it internally in last_data,
then pass along the value after that to the requester, so that consistency
checks aren't being run against stale and possibly known data.
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Fix the following warnings in formatting debug output:
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘xfer_secondary_pool’:
drivers/char/random.c:827: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 7 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘account’:
drivers/char/random.c:859: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c:881: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘random_read’:
drivers/char/random.c:1141: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘ssize_t’
drivers/char/random.c:1145: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘ssize_t’
drivers/char/random.c:1145: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 6 has type ‘long unsigned int’
by using '%zd' instead of '%d' to properly denote ssize_t/size_t conversion.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The module parameter that turns debugging mode (which basically means
printing a few extra lines during runtime) is in '#if 0' block. Forcing
everyone who would like to see how entropy is behaving on his system to
rebuild seems to be a little bit too harsh.
If we were concerned about speed, we could potentially turn 'debug' into a
static key, but I don't think it's necessary.
Drop the '#if 0' block to allow using the 'debug' parameter without rebuilding.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Mix in any architectural randomness in extract_buf() instead of
xfer_secondary_buf(). This allows us to mix in more architectural
randomness, and it also makes xfer_secondary_buf() faster, moving a
tiny bit of additional CPU overhead to process which is extracting the
randomness.
[ Commit description modified by tytso to remove an extended
advertisement for the RDRAND instruction. ]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: DJ Johnston <dj.johnston@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Many platforms have per-machine instance data (serial numbers,
asset tags, etc.) squirreled away in areas that are accessed
during early system bringup. Mixing this data into the random
pools has a very high value in providing better random data,
so we should allow (and even encourage) architecture code to
call add_device_randomness() from the setup_arch() paths.
However, this limits our options for internal structure of
the random driver since random_initialize() is not called
until long after setup_arch().
Add a big fat comment to rand_initialize() spelling out
this requirement.
Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.
[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
rand_initialize_irq() ]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.
The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)
It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
--- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a
whitener. Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of
RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented
to the specifications claimed by Intel. Short of using a tunnelling
electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and
disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us
to tell for sure.
Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able
to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most
time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own
cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed.
So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random
number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into
/dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy
pool.
This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any
potential liabilities. The only benefits we forgo is the
speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't
depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG
anyway.
For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG,
if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch().
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
If the CPU supports a hardware random number generator, use it in
xfer_secondary_pool(), where it will significantly improve things and
where we can afford it.
Also, remove the use of the arch-specific rng in
add_timer_randomness(), since the call is significantly slower than
get_cycles(), and we're much better off using it in
xfer_secondary_pool() anyway.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot). This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
in question. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.
This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool. Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool. This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.
(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)
Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently by userspace
processes. If two (or more) user-space processes concurrently read
boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race can occur making
boot_id differ between the reads. Because the whole point of the boot id
is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this by protecting this
operation with a spinlock.
Given that this operation is not frequently used, hitting the spinlock
on each call should not be an issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'x86/rdrand' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
random: Adjust the number of loops when initializing
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store
When we are initializing using arch_get_random_long() we only need to
loop enough times to touch all the bytes in the buffer; using
poolwords for that does twice the number of operations necessary on a
64-bit machine, since in the random number generator code "word" means
32 bits.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
module_param(bool) used to counter-intuitively take an int. In
fddd5201 (mid-2009) we allowed bool or int/unsigned int using a messy
trick.
It's time to remove the int/unsigned int option. For this version
it'll simply give a warning, but it'll break next kernel version.
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We still don't use rdrand in /dev/random, which just seems stupid. We
accept the *cycle*counter* as a random input, but we don't accept
rdrand? That's just broken.
Sure, people can do things in user space (write to /dev/random, use
rdrand in addition to /dev/random themselves etc etc), but that
*still* seems to be a particularly stupid reason for saying "we
shouldn't bother to try to do better in /dev/random".
And even if somebody really doesn't trust rdrand as a source of random
bytes, it seems singularly stupid to trust the cycle counter *more*.
So I'd suggest the attached patch. I'm not going to even bother
arguing that we should add more bits to the entropy estimate, because
that's not the point - I don't care if /dev/random fills up slowly or
not, I think it's just stupid to not use the bits we can get from
rdrand and mix them into the strong randomness pool.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFwn59N1=m651QAyTy-1gO1noGbK18zwKDwvwqnravA84A@mail.gmail.com
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
If there is an architecture-specific random number generator we use it
to acquire randomness one "long" at a time. We should put these random
words into consecutive words in the result buffer - not just overwrite
the first word again and again.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'x86-rdrand-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabled
x86, random: Architectural inlines to get random integers with RDRAND
random: Add support for architectural random hooks
Fix up trivial conflicts in drivers/char/random.c: the architectural
random hooks touched "get_random_int()" that was simplified to use MD5
and not do the keyptr thing any more (see commit 6e5714eaf7: "net:
Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5").
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed
random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the
architecture random number generator interfaces for the
userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus
eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool
pointer.
Changes in version 3:
- Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes().
- Changes the hooks to inlines.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
At present, the comment header in random.c makes no mention of
add_disk_randomness, and instead, suggests that disk activity adds to the
random pool by way of add_interrupt_randomness, which appears to not have
been the case since sometime prior to the existence of git, and even prior
to bitkeeper. Didn't look any further back. At least, as far as I can
tell, there are no storage drivers setting IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM, which is a
requirement for add_interrupt_randomness to trigger, so the only way for a
disk to contribute entropy is by way of add_disk_randomness. Update
comments accordingly, complete with special mention about solid state
drives being a crappy source of entropy (see e2e1a148bc for reference).
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
__this_cpu_inc can create a single instruction to do the same as
__get_cpu_var()++.
Cc: Richard Kennedy <richard@rsk.demon.co.uk>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Re-order structure entropy_store to remove 8 bytes of padding on
64 bit builds, so shrinking this structure from 72 to 64 bytes
and allowing it to fit into one cache line.
Signed-off-by: Richard Kennedy <richard@rsk.demon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Rather than dynamically allocate 10 bytes, move it to static allocation.
This saves space and avoids the need for error checking.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some comments misspell "truly"; this fixes them. No code changes.
Signed-off-by: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
The previous changeset left behind an unused inode variable.
This patch removes it.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
No other driver does anything remotely like this that I know of except
for the tty drivers, and I can't see any reason for random/urandom to do
it. In fact, it's a (trivial, harmless) timing information leak. And
obviously, it generates power- and flash-cycle wasting I/O, especially
if combined with something like hwrngd. Also, it breaks ubifs's
expectations.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For consistency drop & in front of every proc_handler. Explicity
taking the address is unnecessary and it prevents optimizations
like stubbing the proc_handlers to NULL.
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that sys_sysctl is a wrapper around /proc/sys all of
the binary sysctl support elsewhere in the tree is
dead code.
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> for drivers/char/hpet.c
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
It's unused.
It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl
shouldn't care about the rest.
It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
FIPS-140 requires that all random number generators implement continuous self
tests in which each extracted block of data is compared against the last block
for repetition. The ansi_cprng implements such a test, but it would be nice if
the hw rng's did the same thing. Obviously its not something thats always
needed, but it seems like it would be a nice feature to have on occasion. I've
written the below patch which allows individual entropy stores to be flagged as
desiring a continuous test to be run on them as is extracted. By default this
option is off, but is enabled in the event that fips mode is selected during
bootup.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Martin Knoblauch reports that trying to build 2.6.30-rc6-git3 with
RHEL4.3 userspace (gcc (GCC) 3.4.5 20051201 (Red Hat 3.4.5-2)) causes an
internal compiler error (ICE):
drivers/char/random.c: In function `get_random_int':
drivers/char/random.c:1672: error: unrecognizable insn:
(insn 202 148 150 0 /scratch/build/linux-2.6.30-rc6-git3/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h:23 (set (reg:SI 0 ax [91])
(subreg:SI (plus:DI (plus:DI (reg:DI 0 ax [88])
(subreg:DI (reg:SI 6 bp) 0))
(const_int -4 [0xfffffffffffffffc])) 0)) -1 (nil)
(nil))
drivers/char/random.c:1672: internal compiler error: in extract_insn, at recog.c:2083
and after some debugging it turns out that it's due to the code trying
to figure out the rough value of the current stack pointer by taking an
address of an uninitialized variable and casting that to an integer.
This is clearly a compiler bug, but it's not worth fighting - while the
current stack kernel pointer might be somewhat hard to predict in user
space, it's also not generally going to change for a lot of the call
chains for a particular process.
So just drop it, and mumble some incoherent curses at the compiler.
Tested-by: Martin Knoblauch <spamtrap@knobisoft.de>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It's a really simple patch that basically just open-codes the current
"secure_ip_id()" call, but when open-coding it we now use a _static_
hashing area, so that it gets updated every time.
And to make sure somebody can't just start from the same original seed of
all-zeroes, and then do the "half_md4_transform()" over and over until
they get the same sequence as the kernel has, each iteration also mixes in
the same old "current->pid + jiffies" we used - so we should now have a
regular strong pseudo-number generator, but we also have one that doesn't
have a single seed.
Note: the "pid + jiffies" is just meant to be a tiny tiny bit of noise. It
has no real meaning. It could be anything. I just picked the previous
seed, it's just that now we keep the state in between calls and that will
feed into the next result, and that should make all the difference.
I made that hash be a per-cpu data just to avoid cache-line ping-pong:
having multiple CPU's write to the same data would be fine for randomness,
and add yet another layer of chaos to it, but since get_random_int() is
supposed to be a fast interface I did it that way instead. I considered
using "__raw_get_cpu_var()" to avoid any preemption overhead while still
getting the hash be _mostly_ ping-pong free, but in the end good taste won
out.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Align rekey_work. Even though it's infrequent, we may as well line it up.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> tip/kernel/fork.c: In function 'copy_signal':
> tip/kernel/fork.c:825: warning: unused variable 'ret'
> tip/drivers/char/random.c: In function 'get_timer_rand_state':
> tip/drivers/char/random.c:584: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
> tip/drivers/char/random.c: In function 'set_timer_rand_state':
> tip/drivers/char/random.c:594: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
> make[3]: *** [drivers/char/random.o] Error 1
irq_desc is defined in linux/irq.h, so include it in the genirq case.
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: clean up sparseirq fallout on random.c
Ingo suggested to change some ifdef from SPARSE_IRQ to GENERIC_HARDIRQS
so we could some #ifdef later if all arch support genirq
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
As a non-atomic value, it's only safe to look at entropy_count when the
pool lock is held, so we move the BUG_ON inside the lock for correctness.
Also remove the spurious comment. It's ok for entropy_count to
temporarily exceed POOLBITS so long as it's left in a consistent state
when the lock is released.
This is a more correct, simple, and idiomatic fix for the bug in
8b76f46a2d. I've left the reorderings introduced by that patch in place
as they're harmless, even though they don't properly deal with potential
atomicity issues.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
those two functions only used in that C file
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Impact: new feature
Problem on distro kernels: irq_desc[NR_IRQS] takes megabytes of RAM with
NR_CPUS set to large values. The goal is to be able to scale up to much
larger NR_IRQS value without impacting the (important) common case.
To solve this, we generalize irq_desc[NR_IRQS] to an (optional) array of
irq_desc pointers.
When CONFIG_SPARSE_IRQ=y is used, we use kzalloc_node to get irq_desc,
this also makes the IRQ descriptors NUMA-local (to the site that calls
request_irq()).
This gets rid of the irq_cfg[] static array on x86 as well: irq_cfg now
uses desc->chip_data for x86 to store irq_cfg.
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
As it is, all instances of ->release() for files that have ->fasync()
need to remember to evict file from fasync lists; forgetting that
creates a hole and we actually have a bunch that *does* forget.
So let's keep our lives simple - let __fput() check FASYNC in
file->f_flags and call ->fasync() there if it's been set. And lose that
crap in ->release() instances - leaving it there is still valid, but we
don't have to bother anymore.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This merges branches irq/genirq, irq/sparseirq-v4, timers/hpet-percpu
and x86/uv.
The sparseirq branch is just preliminary groundwork: no sparse IRQs are
actually implemented by this tree anymore - just the new APIs are added
while keeping the old way intact as well (the new APIs map 1:1 to
irq_desc[]). The 'real' sparse IRQ support will then be a relatively
small patch ontop of this - with a v2.6.29 merge target.
* 'genirq-v28-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (178 commits)
genirq: improve include files
intr_remapping: fix typo
io_apic: make irq_mis_count available on 64-bit too
genirq: fix name space collisions of nr_irqs in arch/*
genirq: fix name space collision of nr_irqs in autoprobe.c
genirq: use iterators for irq_desc loops
proc: fixup irq iterator
genirq: add reverse iterator for irq_desc
x86: move ack_bad_irq() to irq.c
x86: unify show_interrupts() and proc helpers
x86: cleanup show_interrupts
genirq: cleanup the sparseirq modifications
genirq: remove artifacts from sparseirq removal
genirq: revert dynarray
genirq: remove irq_to_desc_alloc
genirq: remove sparse irq code
genirq: use inline function for irq_to_desc
genirq: consolidate nr_irqs and for_each_irq_desc()
x86: remove sparse irq from Kconfig
genirq: define nr_irqs for architectures with GENERIC_HARDIRQS=n
...
name and nlen parameters passed to ->strategy hook are unused, remove
them. In general ->strategy hook should know what it's doing, and don't
do something tricky for which, say, pointer to original userspace array
may be needed (name).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [ networking bits ]
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This code is not ready, but we need to rip it out instead of rebasing
as we would lose the APIC/IO_APIC unification otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
irq_timer_state[] is a NR_IRQS sized array that is a side-by array to
the real irq_desc[] array.
Integrate that field into the (now dynamic) irq_desc dynamic array and
save some RAM.
v2: keep the old way to support arch not support irq_desc
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* Implement disk_devt() and part_devt() and use them to directly
access devt instead of computing it from ->major and ->first_minor.
Note that all references to ->major and ->first_minor outside of
block layer is used to determine devt of the disk (the part0) and as
->major and ->first_minor will continue to represent devt for the
disk, converting these users aren't strictly necessary. However,
convert them for consistency.
* Implement disk_max_parts() to avoid directly deferencing
genhd->minors.
* Update bdget_disk() such that it doesn't assume consecutive minor
space.
* Move devt computation from register_disk() to add_disk() and make it
the only one (all other usages use the initially determined value).
These changes clean up the code and will help disk->part dereference
fix and extended block device numbers.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Fix a bug reported by and diagnosed by Aaron Straus.
This is a regression intruduced into 2.6.26 by
commit adc782dae6
Author: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Date: Tue Apr 29 01:03:07 2008 -0700
random: simplify and rename credit_entropy_store
credit_entropy_bits() does:
spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
...
if (r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS)
r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo->POOLBITS;
so there is a time window in which this BUG_ON():
static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
int reserved)
{
unsigned long flags;
BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS);
/* Hold lock while accounting */
spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
can trigger.
We could fix this by moving the assertion inside the lock, but it seems
safer and saner to revert to the old behaviour wherein
entropy_store.entropy_count at no time exceeds
entropy_store.poolinfo->POOLBITS.
Reported-by: Aaron Straus <aaron@merfinllc.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.26.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use incoming network tuple as seed for NAT port randomization.
This avoids concerns of leaking net_random() bits, and also gives better
port distribution. Don't have NAT server, compile tested only.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
[ added missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ]
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On 32-bit architectures PAGE_ALIGN() truncates 64-bit values to the 32-bit
boundary. For example:
u64 val = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
always returns a value < 4GB even if size is greater than 4GB.
The problem resides in PAGE_MASK definition (from include/asm-x86/page.h for
example):
#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
#define PAGE_SIZE (_AC(1,UL) << PAGE_SHIFT)
#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE-1))
...
#define PAGE_ALIGN(addr) (((addr)+PAGE_SIZE-1)&PAGE_MASK)
The "~" is performed on a 32-bit value, so everything in "and" with
PAGE_MASK greater than 4GB will be truncated to the 32-bit boundary.
Using the ALIGN() macro seems to be the right way, because it uses
typeof(addr) for the mask.
Also move the PAGE_ALIGN() definitions out of include/asm-*/page.h in
include/linux/mm.h.
See also lkml discussion: http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/6/11/237
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/media/video/uvc/uvc_queue.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix v850]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix powerpc]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/media/video/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-dvb.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/mtd/maps/uclinux.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix powerpc]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- emphasize bits in the name
- make zero bits lock-free
- simplify logic
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Switch add_entropy_words to a byte-oriented interface, eliminating numerous
casts and byte/word size rounding issues. This also reduces the overall
bit/byte/word confusion in this code.
We now mix a byte at a time into the word-based pool. This takes four times
as many iterations, but should be negligible compared to hashing overhead.
This also increases our pool churn, which adds some depth against some
theoretical failure modes.
The function name is changed to emphasize pool mixing and deemphasize entropy
(the samples mixed in may not contain any). extract is added to the core
function to make it clear that it extracts from the pool.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The add_ptr variable wasn't used in a sensible way, use only i instead.
i got reused later for a different purpose, use j instead.
While we're here, put tap0 first in the tap list and add a comment.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The urandom output pool (ie the fast path) fits in one cacheline, so
this is pretty unnecessary. Further, the output path has already
fetched the entire pool to hash it before calling in here.
(This was the only user of prefetch_range in the kernel, and it passed
in words rather than bytes!)
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Earlier changes greatly reduce the number of times we grab the lock
per output byte, so we shouldn't need this particular hack any more.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
At each extraction, we change (poolbits / 16) + 32 bits in the pool,
or 96 bits in the case of the secondary pools. Thus, a brute-force
backtracking attack on the pool state is less difficult than breaking
the hash. In certain cases, this difficulty may be is reduced to 2^64
iterations.
Instead, hash the entire pool in one go, then feedback the whole hash
(160 bits) in one go. This will make backtracking at least as hard as
inverting the hash.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- split the SHA variables apart into hash and workspace
- rename data to extract
- wipe extract and workspace after hashing
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reduce latency for large writes to /dev/[u]random
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Sami Farin <safari-kernel@safari.iki.fi>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch removes the no longer used EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness).
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
All 32 bits machines but i386 dont have CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR. On these
machines, ktime.tv64 is more than 4 times the (correct) result given
by ktime_to_ns()
Again on these machines, using ktime_get_real().tv64 >> 6 give a
32bits rollover every 64 seconds, which is not wanted (less than the
120 s MSL)
Using ktime_to_ns() is the portable way to get nsecs from a ktime, and
have correct code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Get rid of sparse related warnings from places that use integer as NULL
pointer.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
TCP V4 sequence numbers are 32bits, and RFC 793 assumed a 250 KHz clock.
In order to follow network speed increase, we can use a faster clock, but
we should limit this clock so that the delay between two rollovers is
greater than MSL (TCP Maximum Segment Lifetime : 2 minutes)
Choosing a 64 nsec clock should be OK, since the rollovers occur every
274 seconds.
Problem spotted by Denys Fedoryshchenko
[ This bug was introduced by f859581519 ]
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If root raised the default wakeup threshold over the size of the
output pool, the pool transfer function could overflow the stack with
RNG bytes, causing a DoS or potential privilege escalation.
(Bug reported by the PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>)
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(As reported by linux@horizon.com)
Folding is done to minimize the theoretical possibility of systematic
weakness in the particular bits of the SHA1 hash output. The result of
this bug is that 16 out of 80 bits are un-folded. Without a major new
vulnerability being found in SHA1, this is harmless, but still worth
fixing.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add data from zero-entropy random_writes directly to output pools to
avoid accounting difficulties on machines without entropy sources.
Tested on lguest with all entropy sources disabled.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In order to get more randomness for secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(),
secure_tcp_sequence_number(), secure_dccp_sequence_number() functions,
we can use the high resolution time services, providing nanosec
resolution.
I've also done two kmalloc()/kzalloc() conversions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch removes the following not or no longer used exports:
- drivers/char/random.c: secure_tcp_sequence_number
- net/dccp/options.c: sysctl_dccp_feat_sequence_window
- net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_set_err
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c
drivers/net/chelsio/cxgb2.c
drivers/net/wireless/bcm43xx/bcm43xx_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/prism54/islpci_eth.c
drivers/usb/core/hub.h
drivers/usb/input/hid-core.c
net/core/netpoll.c
Fix up merge failures with Linus's head and fix new compilation failures.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
