Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton.
* emailed from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (4 patches)
frv: delete incorrect task prototypes causing compile fail
slub: missing test for partial pages flush work in flush_all()
fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries
drivers/rtc/rtc-pl031.c: configure correct wday for 2000-01-01
Instead of doing the i_mode calculations at proc_fd_instantiate() time,
move them into tid_fd_revalidate(), which is where the other inode state
(notably uid/gid information) is updated too.
Otherwise we'll end up with stale i_mode information if an fd is re-used
while the dentry still hangs around. Not that anything really *cares*
(symlink permissions don't really matter), but Tetsuo Handa noticed that
the owner read/write bits don't always match the state of the
readability of the file descriptor, and we _used_ to get this right a
long time ago in a galaxy far, far away.
Besides, aside from fixing an ugly detail (that has apparently been this
way since commit 61a2878402: "proc: Remove the hard coded inode
numbers" in 2006), this removes more lines of code than it adds. And it
just makes sense to update i_mode in the same place we update i_uid/gid.
Al Viro correctly points out that we could just do the inode fill in the
inode iops ->getattr() function instead. However, that does require
somewhat slightly more invasive changes, and adds yet *another* lookup
of the file descriptor. We need to do the revalidate() for other
reasons anyway, and have the file descriptor handy, so we might as well
fill in the information at this point.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
map_files/ entries are never supposed to be executed, still curious
minds might try to run them, which leads to the following deadlock
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.4.0-rc4-24406-g841e6a6 #121 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
bash/1556 is trying to acquire lock:
(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}, at: do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1
but task is already holding lock:
(&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: prepare_bprm_creds+0x2d/0x69
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}:
validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
__lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
__mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x40/0x45
lock_trace+0x24/0x59
proc_map_files_lookup+0x5a/0x165
__lookup_hash+0x52/0x73
do_lookup+0x276/0x2b1
walk_component+0x3d/0x114
do_last+0xfc/0x540
path_openat+0xd3/0x306
do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
do_sys_open+0x74/0x106
sys_open+0x21/0x23
tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
-> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}:
check_prev_add+0x6a/0x1ef
validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
__lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
__mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x45
do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1
walk_component+0x3d/0x114
link_path_walk+0x1f9/0x48f
path_openat+0xb6/0x306
do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
open_exec+0x25/0xa0
do_execve_common+0xea/0x2f9
do_execve+0x43/0x45
sys_execve+0x43/0x5a
stub_execve+0x6c/0xc0
This is because prepare_bprm_creds grabs task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
and when do_lookup happens we try to grab task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
again in lock_trace.
Fix it using plain ptrace_may_access() helper in proc_map_files_lookup()
and in proc_map_files_readdir() instead of lock_trace(), the caller must
be CAP_SYS_ADMIN granted anyway.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers
- Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel
internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed.
* Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel
internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today,
leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test.
- Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map
These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added
if a mapping does not exist.
- Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping.
Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids
still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't
have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid
and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid
and gid mapping.
Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies
the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing
the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the
slight weirdness worth it.
- Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global
uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping
but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar
to what we do with jiffies.
- Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and
gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once
and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are
trivial but a little atypical.
Performance:
In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to
stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same.
The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where
all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and
kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop
with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache.
My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else
was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping
through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the
individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times
where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were
not in the processors cache. My results:
v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled)
All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests
that ran in the cpu cache.
So in summary the performance impact is:
1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out.
8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
syscalls.
This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}
* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
x32: Add ptrace for x32
x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
x32: Add x32 VDSO support
x32: Allow x32 to be configured
x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
x32: Handle process creation
x32: Signal-related system calls
x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
...
Pass nice as a value to proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice().
No side effect is expected, and the variable err will be overwritten with
the return value.
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4F45FBB7.5090607@ct.jp.nec.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.
The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.
This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:
void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.
Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array. Possibly that should exist too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This fixes the race in process_vm_core found by Oleg (see
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1235667/
for details).
This has been updated since I last sent it as the creation of the new
mm_access() function did almost exactly the same thing as parts of the
previous version of this patch did.
In order to use mm_access() even when /proc isn't enabled, we move it to
kernel/fork.c where other related process mm access functions already
are.
Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Once /proc/pid/mem is opened, the memory can't be released until
mem_release() even if its owner exits.
Change mem_open() to do atomic_inc(mm_count) + mmput(), this only
pins mm_struct. Change mem_rw() to do atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_count)
before access_remote_vm(), this verifies that this mm is still alive.
I am not sure what should mem_rw() return if atomic_inc_not_zero()
fails. With this patch it returns zero to match the "mm == NULL" case,
may be it should return -EINVAL like it did before e268337d.
Perhaps it makes sense to add the additional fatal_signal_pending()
check into the main loop, to ensure we do not hold this memory if
the target task was oom-killed.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
No functional changes, cleanup and preparation.
mem_read() and mem_write() are very similar. Move this code into the
new common helper, mem_rw(), which takes the additional "int write"
argument.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mem_release() can hit mm == NULL, add the necessary check.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit: (29 commits)
audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix
audit: treat s_id as an untrusted string
audit: fix signedness bug in audit_log_execve_info()
audit: comparison on interprocess fields
audit: implement all object interfield comparisons
audit: allow interfield comparison between gid and ogid
audit: complex interfield comparison helper
audit: allow interfield comparison in audit rules
Kernel: Audit Support For The ARM Platform
audit: do not call audit_getname on error
audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1
audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid
audit: allow audit matching on inode gid
audit: allow matching on obj_uid
audit: remove audit_finish_fork as it can't be called
audit: reject entry,always rules
audit: inline audit_free to simplify the look of generic code
audit: drop audit_set_macxattr as it doesn't do anything
audit: inline checks for not needing to collect aux records
audit: drop some potentially inadvisable likely notations
...
Use evil merge to fix up grammar mistakes in Kconfig file.
Bad speling and horrible grammar (and copious swearing) is to be
expected, but let's keep it to commit messages and comments, rather than
expose it to users in config help texts or printouts.
Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very
robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
other related files.
This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open. That
simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_
VM.
That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler. If
somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
this commit.
I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
addresses will also have changed as part of the execve. So you cannot
actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
the offsets for IO would have changed too.
Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.
Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for
them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.
If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The function always deals with current. Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something. You can't.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
get_proc_task() can fail to search the task and return NULL,
put_task_struct() will then bomb the kernel with following oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81217d34>] proc_pid_permission+0x64/0xe0
PGD 112075067 PUD 112814067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
This is a regression introduced by commit 0499680a ("procfs: add hidepid=
and gid= mount options"). The kernel should return -ESRCH if
get_proc_task() failed.
Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dannyfeng@tencent.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/
directories. The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left
untouched.
The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much
info about processes we want to be available for non-owners:
hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all
world-readable /proc/PID/* files.
hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but
their own. Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected
against other users. As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission()
and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific
files' modes are not confused.
hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other
users. It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be
learned by other means, e.g. by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid
and egid. It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running
processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether
another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any
program at all, etc.
gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
(as in hidepid=0 mode). This group should be used instead of putting
nonroot user in sudoers file or something. However, untrusted users (like
daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole
system should not be added to the group.
hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which
might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes
timings:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3
hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools. ps, top, pgrep, and
conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is
the only user running processes. pstree shows the process subtree which
contains "pstree" process.
Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping
preopened descriptors of procfs files (like
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368). We rely on that the leaked
information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten
anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the
counters.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
"vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file. Opening a symlink
results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
This *helps* checkpointing process in three ways:
1. When dumping a task mappings we do know exact file that is mapped
by particular region. We do this by opening
/proc/$pid/map_files/$address symlink the way we do with file
descriptors.
2. This also helps in determining which anonymous shared mappings are
shared with each other by comparing the inodes of them.
3. When restoring a set of processes in case two of them has a mapping
shared, we map the memory by the 1st one and then open its
/proc/$pid/map_files/$address file and map it by the 2nd task.
Using /proc/$pid/maps for this is quite inconvenient since it brings
repeatable re-reading and reparsing for this text file which slows down
restore procedure significantly. Also as being pointed in (3) it is a way
easier to use top level shared mapping in children as
/proc/$pid/map_files/$address when needed.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[gorcunov@openvz.org: make map_files depend on CHECKPOINT_RESTORE]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Reviewed-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Prepare the ground for the next "map_files" patch which needs a name of a
link file to analyse.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of
problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj
and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set.
This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds
3 trace points.
- creating new task
- renaming a task (exec)
- set oom_score_adj
To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
output will be like this.
# grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000
Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reverts commit aa6afca5bc.
It escalates of some of the google-chrome SELinux problems with ptrace
("Check failed: pid_ > 0. Did not find zygote process"), and Andrew
says that it is also causing mystery lockdep reports.
Reported-by: Alex Villacís Lasso <a_villacis@palosanto.com>
Requested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Requested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Says Andrew:
"60 patches. That's good enough for -rc1 I guess. I have quite a lot
of detritus to be rechecked, work through maintainers, etc.
- most of the remains of MM
- rtc
- various misc
- cgroups
- memcg
- cpusets
- procfs
- ipc
- rapidio
- sysctl
- pps
- w1
- drivers/misc
- aio"
* akpm: (60 commits)
memcg: replace ss->id_lock with a rwlock
aio: allocate kiocbs in batches
drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c: fix typo in code comment
drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c: determine page allocation flag can_sleep outside loop
w1: disable irqs in critical section
drivers/w1/w1_int.c: multiple masters used same init_name
drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: fix deadlock upon insertion and removal
drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: add a nolock function to w1 interface
drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: create central point for calling w1 interface
w1: ds2760 and ds2780, use ida for id and ida_simple_get() to get it
pps gpio client: add missing dependency
pps: new client driver using GPIO
pps: default echo function
include/linux/dma-mapping.h: add dma_zalloc_coherent()
sysctl: make CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL default to n
sysctl: add support for poll()
RapidIO: documentation update
drivers/net/rionet.c: fix ethernet address macros for LE platforms
RapidIO: fix potential null deref in rio_setup_device()
RapidIO: add mport driver for Tsi721 bridge
...
fd* files are restricted to the task's owner, and other users may not get
direct access to them. But one may open any of these files and run any
setuid program, keeping opened file descriptors. As there are permission
checks on open(), but not on readdir() and read(), operations on the kept
file descriptors will not be checked. It makes it possible to violate
procfs permission model.
Reading fdinfo/* may disclosure current fds' position and flags, reading
directory contents of fdinfo/ and fd/ may disclosure the number of opened
files by the target task. This information is not sensible per se, but it
can reveal some private information (like length of a password stored in a
file) under certain conditions.
Used existing (un)lock_trace functions to check for ptrace_may_access(),
but instead of using EPERM return code from it use EACCES to be consistent
with existing proc_pid_follow_link()/proc_pid_readlink() return code. If
they differ, attacker can guess what fds exist by analyzing stat() return
code. Patched handlers: stat() for fd/*, stat() and read() for fdindo/*,
readdir() and lookup() for fd/ and fdinfo/.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace remaining direct i_nlink updates with a new set_nlink()
updater function.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
This removes mm->oom_disable_count entirely since it's unnecessary and
currently buggy. The counter was intended to be per-process but it's
currently decremented in the exit path for each thread that exits, causing
it to underflow.
The count was originally intended to prevent oom killing threads that
share memory with threads that cannot be killed since it doesn't lead to
future memory freeing. The counter could be fixed to represent all
threads sharing the same mm, but it's better to remove the count since:
- it is possible that the OOM_DISABLE thread sharing memory with the
victim is waiting on that thread to exit and will actually cause
future memory freeing, and
- there is no guarantee that a thread is disabled from oom killing just
because another thread sharing its mm is oom disabled.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The CLOEXE bit is magical, and for performance (and semantic) reasons we
don't actually maintain it in the file descriptor itself, but in a
separate bit array. Which means that when we show f_flags, the CLOEXE
status is shown incorrectly: we show the status not as it is now, but as
it was when the file was opened.
Fix that by looking up the bit properly in the 'fdt->close_on_exec' bit
array.
Uli needs this in order to re-implement the pfiles program:
"For normal file descriptors (not sockets) this was the last piece of
information which wasn't available. This is all part of my 'give
Solaris users no reason to not switch' effort. I intend to offer the
code to the util-linux-ng maintainers."
Requested-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@akkadia.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
WARN_ONCE() is very annoying, in that it shows the stack trace that we
don't care about at all, and also triggers various user-level "kernel
oopsed" logic that we really don't care about. And it's not like the
user can do anything about the applications (sshd) in question, it's a
distro issue.
Requested-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> (and many others)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If an inode's mode permits opening /proc/PID/io and the resulting file
descriptor is kept across execve() of a setuid or similar binary, the
ptrace_may_access() check tries to prevent using this fd against the
task with escalated privileges.
Unfortunately, there is a race in the check against execve(). If
execve() is processed after the ptrace check, but before the actual io
information gathering, io statistics will be gathered from the
privileged process. At least in theory this might lead to gathering
sensible information (like ssh/ftp password length) that wouldn't be
available otherwise.
Holding task->signal->cred_guard_mutex while gathering the io
information should protect against the race.
The order of locking is similar to the one inside of ptrace_attach():
first goes cred_guard_mutex, then lock_task_sighand().
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
/proc/pid/oom_adj is deprecated and scheduled for removal in August 2012
according to Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt.
This patch makes the warning more verbose by making it appear as a more
serious problem (the presence of a stack trace and being multiline should
attract more attention) so that applications still using the old interface
can get fixed.
Very popular users of the old interface have been converted since the oom
killer rewrite has been introduced. udevd switched to the
/proc/pid/oom_score_adj interface for v162, kde switched in 4.6.1, and
opensshd switched in 5.7p1.
At the start of 2012, this should be changed into a WARN() to emit all
such incidents and then finally remove the tunable in August 2012 as
scheduled.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (107 commits)
vfs: use ERR_CAST for err-ptr tossing in lookup_instantiate_filp
isofs: Remove global fs lock
jffs2: fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() killing a directory
fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() on ramfs et.al.
mm/truncate.c: fix build for CONFIG_BLOCK not enabled
fs:update the NOTE of the file_operations structure
Remove dead code in dget_parent()
AFS: Fix silly characters in a comment
switch d_add_ci() to d_splice_alias() in "found negative" case as well
simplify gfs2_lookup()
jfs_lookup(): don't bother with . or ..
get rid of useless dget_parent() in btrfs rename() and link()
get rid of useless dget_parent() in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
fs: push i_mutex and filemap_write_and_wait down into ->fsync() handlers
drivers: fix up various ->llseek() implementations
fs: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA properly in all fs's that define their own llseek
Ext4: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA generically
Btrfs: implement our own ->llseek
fs: add SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA flags
reiserfs: make reiserfs default to barrier=flush
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_super.c due to the new
shrinker callout for the inode cache, that clashed with the xfs code to
start the periodic workers later.
* 'ptrace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/misc: (39 commits)
ptrace: do_wait(traced_leader_killed_by_mt_exec) can block forever
ptrace: fix ptrace_signal() && STOP_DEQUEUED interaction
connector: add an event for monitoring process tracers
ptrace: dont send SIGSTOP on auto-attach if PT_SEIZED
ptrace: mv send-SIGSTOP from do_fork() to ptrace_init_task()
ptrace_init_task: initialize child->jobctl explicitly
has_stopped_jobs: s/task_is_stopped/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/
ptrace: make former thread ID available via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG after PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop
ptrace: wait_consider_task: s/same_thread_group/ptrace_reparented/
ptrace: kill real_parent_is_ptracer() in in favor of ptrace_reparented()
ptrace: ptrace_reparented() should check same_thread_group()
redefine thread_group_leader() as exit_signal >= 0
do not change dead_task->exit_signal
kill task_detached()
reparent_leader: check EXIT_DEAD instead of task_detached()
make do_notify_parent() __must_check, update the callers
__ptrace_detach: avoid task_detached(), check do_notify_parent()
kill tracehook_notify_death()
make do_notify_parent() return bool
ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/
...
Moving the event counter into the dynamically allocated 'struc seq_file'
allows poll() support without the need to allocate its own tracking
structure.
All current users are switched over to use the new counter.
Requested-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Tested-by: Lucas De Marchi lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
its value depends only on inode and does not change; we might as
well store it in ->i_op->check_acl and be done with that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
tracehook.h is on the way out. Rename tracehook_tracer_task() to
ptrace_parent() and move it from tracehook.h to ptrace.h.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
This change introduces a few of the less controversial /proc and
/proc/sys interfaces for tile, along with sysfs attributes for
various things that were originally proposed as /proc/tile files.
It also adjusts the "hardwall" proc API.
Arnd Bergmann reviewed the initial arch/tile submission, which
included a complete set of all the /proc/tile and /proc/sys/tile
knobs that we had added in a somewhat ad hoc way during initial
development, and provided feedback on where most of them should go.
One knob turned out to be similar enough to the existing
/proc/sys/debug/exception-trace that it was re-implemented to use
that model instead.
Another knob was /proc/tile/grid, which reported the "grid" dimensions
of a tile chip (e.g. 8x8 processors = 64-core chip). Arnd suggested
looking at sysfs for that, so this change moves that information
to a pair of sysfs attributes (chip_width and chip_height) in the
/sys/devices/system/cpu directory. We also put the "chip_serial"
and "chip_revision" information from our old /proc/tile/board file
as attributes in /sys/devices/system/cpu.
Other information collected via hypervisor APIs is now placed in
/sys/hypervisor. We create a /sys/hypervisor/type file (holding the
constant string "tilera") to be parallel with the Xen use of
/sys/hypervisor/type holding "xen". We create three top-level files,
"version" (the hypervisor's own version), "config_version" (the
version of the configuration file), and "hvconfig" (the contents of
the configuration file). The remaining information from our old
/proc/tile/board and /proc/tile/switch files becomes an attribute
group appearing under /sys/hypervisor/board/.
Finally, after some feedback from Arnd Bergmann for the previous
version of this patch, the /proc/tile/hardwall file is split up into
two conceptual parts. First, a directory /proc/tile/hardwall/ which
contains one file per active hardwall, each file named after the
hardwall's ID and holding a cpulist that says which cpus are enclosed by
the hardwall. Second, a /proc/PID file "hardwall" that is either
empty (for non-hardwall-using processes) or contains the hardwall ID.
Finally, this change pushes the /proc/sys/tile/unaligned_fixup/
directory, with knobs controlling the kernel code for handling the
fixup of unaligned exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
It whould be better if put check_mem_permission after __get_free_page in
mem_write, to be same as function mem_read.
Hugh Dickins explained the reason.
check_mem_permission gets a reference to the mm. If we __get_free_page
after check_mem_permission, imagine what happens if the system is out
of memory, and the mm we're looking at is selected for killing by the
OOM killer: while we wait in __get_free_page for more memory, no memory
is freed from the selected mm because it cannot reach exit_mmap while
we hold that reference.
Reported-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Setup and cleanup of mm_struct->exe_file is currently done in fs/proc/.
This was because exe_file was needed only for /proc/<pid>/exe. Since we
will need the exe_file functionality also for core dumps (so core name can
contain full binary path), built this functionality always into the
kernel.
To achieve that move that out of proc FS to the kernel/ where in fact it
should belong. By doing that we can make dup_mm_exe_file static. Also we
can drop linux/proc_fs.h inclusion in fs/exec.c and kernel/fork.c.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Create files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ to allow controlling the
namespaces of a process.
This addresses three specific problems that can make namespaces hard to
work with.
- Namespaces require a dedicated process to pin them in memory.
- It is not possible to use a namespace unless you are the child
of the original creator.
- Namespaces don't have names that userspace can use to talk about
them.
The namespace files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ can be opened and the
file descriptor can be used to talk about a specific namespace, and
to keep the specified namespace alive.
A namespace can be kept alive by either holding the file descriptor
open or bind mounting the file someplace else. aka:
mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /some/filesystem/path
mount --bind /proc/self/fd/<N> /some/filesystem/path
This allows namespaces to be named with userspace policy.
It requires additional support to make use of these filedescriptors
and that will be comming in the following patches.
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
