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5bff69b364
1743 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Al Viro
|
d99cf13f14 |
selinux: kill 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()
... along with avc_has_perm_flags() itself, since now it's identical to avc_has_perm() (as pointed out by Paul Moore) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [PM: add "selinux:" prefix to subj and tweak for length] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Al Viro
|
b17ec22fb3 |
selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking
dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Yang Li
|
d0a83314db |
selinux: Fix kernel-doc
Fix function name and add comment for parameter state in ss/services.c kernel-doc to remove some warnings found by running make W=1 LLVM=1. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Minchan Kim
|
648f2c6100 |
selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC
In the field, we have seen lots of allocation failure from the call
path below.
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Binder : 31542_2: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x800(GFP_NOWAIT), nodemask=(null),cpuset=background,mems_allowed=0
...
...
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Call trace:
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : warn_alloc+0x158/0x1c8
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x9d8/0xb80
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1c4/0x430
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : allocate_slab+0xb4/0x390
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : ___slab_alloc+0x12c/0x3a4
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : kmem_cache_alloc+0x358/0x5e4
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_alloc_node+0x30/0x184
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_update_node+0x54/0x4f0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_has_extended_perms+0x1a4/0x460
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : selinux_file_ioctl+0x320/0x3d0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xec/0x1fc
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc_common+0xc0/0x24c
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc+0x28/0x88
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xf0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync+0x1a4/0x1c0
..
..
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
Based on [1], selinux is tolerate for failure of memory allocation.
Then, use __GFP_NOWARN together.
[1]
|
||
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
869cbeef18 |
lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by reference
While trying to address a Coverity warning that the dev_name string might end up unterminated when strcpy'ing it in selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(), I realized that it is possible (and simpler) to just pass the dev_name pointer directly, rather than copying the string to a buffer. The ibendport variable goes out of scope at the end of the function anyway, so the lifetime of the dev_name pointer will never be shorter than that of ibendport, thus we can safely just pass the dev_name pointer and be done with it. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Jiapeng Chong
|
fd781f459b |
selinux: Remove redundant assignment to rc
Variable rc is set to '-EINVAL' but this value is never read as it is overwritten or not used later on, hence it is a redundant assignment and can be removed. Cleans up the following clang-analyzer warning: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2103:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2079:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2071:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2062:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2592:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Souptick Joarder
|
7cffc377e1 |
selinux: Corrected comment to match kernel-doc comment
Minor documentation update. Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Zhongjun Tan
|
8a922805fb |
selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argument
seliunx_xfrm_policy_lookup() is hooks of security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). The dir argument is uselss in security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). So remove the dir argument from selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). Signed-off-by: Zhongjun Tan <tanzhongjun@yulong.com> [PM: reformat the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
e1cce3a3cb |
selinux: constify some avtab function arguments
This makes the code a bit easier to reason about. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
fba472bb38 |
selinux: simplify duplicate_policydb_cond_list() by using kmemdup()
We can do the allocation + copying of expr.nodes in one go using kmemdup(). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Linus Torvalds
|
17ae69aba8 |
Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
9d31d23389 |
Networking changes for 5.13.
Core:
- bpf:
- allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to
reuse TCP congestion control implementations)
- enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the
need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing
programs access to task local storage previously added for
BPF_LSM
- add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to
walk all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify
fashion
- sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT
redirection
- lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie
- add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF
on s390 which has floats in its headers files
- improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc
parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers
- libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files
- improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets
- xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup,
improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks
- xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve
performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices
which don't need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio)
- nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability
on next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw)
- ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation
- icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages
- inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation
- tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't
give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is
slow in reporting that it completed transmitting the original
- tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality
- mptcp:
- add sockopt support for common TCP options
- add support for common TCP msg flags
- include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR
- add reset option support for resetting one subflow
- udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list'
co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take
place correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic
- micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid
retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO
- use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using
u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls
- veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP
packets before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc.
- allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace
- netfilter:
- nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2
- nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used
to define a default action in case normal lookup missed
- use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating
per-ns memory unnecessarily
- xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound
accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other
re-configuration under traffic
- add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch
underflows in testing
Device APIs:
- add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and
hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor-
-independent APIs
- ethtool:
- add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and
bnxt support)
- allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data,
current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP
which define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support)
- act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second
policing (incl. offload for nfp)
- psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay
for packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress
and policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver)
- dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA
- netfilter:
- flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP
forwarding, bridging, vlans etc.
- nftables: counter hardware offload support
- Bluetooth:
- improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices
- add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities
- add support for virtio transport driver
- mac80211:
- allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap
- set priority and queue mapping for injected frames
- phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback
- pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface
to distribute MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support)
New hardware/drivers:
- dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x -
11-port Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet
and 3x 10-Gigabit interfaces.
- dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365
and BCM63xx switches
- Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches
- ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device
- Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334
- phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support
- mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller
- r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips
- mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA)
- Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC
- can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces
Pure driver changes:
- add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac
- add AF_XDP support to: stmmac
- virtio:
- page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom
(21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames)
- support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx
queues with the stack when necessary
- mlx5:
- flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack,
matching on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more
- support packet sampling with flow offloads
- persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode
changes
- allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping
- add ethtool extended link error state reporting
- ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload
- dpaa2-switch:
- move the driver out of staging
- add spanning tree (STP) support
- add rx copybreak support
- add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic
- ionic:
- implement Rx page reuse
- support HW PTP time-stamping
- octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress
and egress ratelimitting.
- stmmac:
- add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower
- support frame preemption (FPE)
- intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment
- ocelot:
- support forwarding of MRP frames in HW
- support multiple bridges
- support PTP Sync one-step timestamping
- dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like
learning, flooding etc.
- ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350,
SC7280 SoCs)
- mt7601u: enable TDLS support
- mt76:
- add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615)
- mt7915 flash pre-calibration support
- mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- bpf:
- allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to
reuse TCP congestion control implementations)
- enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the
need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing
programs access to task local storage previously added for
BPF_LSM
- add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to walk
all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify fashion
- sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT
redirection
- lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie
- add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF on
s390 which has floats in its headers files
- improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc
parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers
- libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files
- improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets
- xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup,
improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks
- xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve
performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices which don't
need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio)
- nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability on
next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw)
- ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation
- icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages
- inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation
- tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't
give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is slow in
reporting that it completed transmitting the original
- tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality
- mptcp:
- add sockopt support for common TCP options
- add support for common TCP msg flags
- include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR
- add reset option support for resetting one subflow
- udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list'
co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take place
correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic
- micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid
retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO
- use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using
u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls
- veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP packets
before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc.
- allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace
- netfilter:
- nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2
- nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used to
define a default action in case normal lookup missed
- use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating
per-ns memory unnecessarily
- xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound
accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other
re-configuration under traffic
- add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch
underflows in testing
Device APIs:
- add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and
hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor-
independent APIs
- ethtool:
- add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and bnxt
support)
- allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data,
current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP which
define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support)
- act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second
policing (incl. offload for nfp)
- psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay for
packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress and
policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver)
- dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA
- netfilter:
- flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP forwarding,
bridging, vlans etc.
- nftables: counter hardware offload support
- Bluetooth:
- improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices
- add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities
- add support for virtio transport driver
- mac80211:
- allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap
- set priority and queue mapping for injected frames
- phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback
- pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface to distribute
MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support)
New hardware/drivers:
- dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x - 11-port
Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet and 3x 10-Gigabit
interfaces.
- dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365 and
BCM63xx switches
- Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches
- ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device
- Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334
- phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support
- mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller
- r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips
- mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA)
- Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC
- can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces
Pure driver changes:
- add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac
- add AF_XDP support to: stmmac
- virtio:
- page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom
(21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames)
- support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx
queues with the stack when necessary
- mlx5:
- flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack, matching
on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more
- support packet sampling with flow offloads
- persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode changes
- allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping
- add ethtool extended link error state reporting
- ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload
- dpaa2-switch:
- move the driver out of staging
- add spanning tree (STP) support
- add rx copybreak support
- add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic
- ionic:
- implement Rx page reuse
- support HW PTP time-stamping
- octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress
and egress ratelimitting.
- stmmac:
- add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower
- support frame preemption (FPE)
- intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment
- ocelot:
- support forwarding of MRP frames in HW
- support multiple bridges
- support PTP Sync one-step timestamping
- dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like
learning, flooding etc.
- ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350,
SC7280 SoCs)
- mt7601u: enable TDLS support
- mt76:
- add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615)
- mt7915 flash pre-calibration support
- mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes"
* tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2451 commits)
net: selftest: fix build issue if INET is disabled
net: netrom: nr_in: Remove redundant assignment to ns
net: tun: Remove redundant assignment to ret
net: phy: marvell: add downshift support for M88E1240
net: dsa: ksz: Make reg_mib_cnt a u8 as it never exceeds 255
net/sched: act_ct: Remove redundant ct get and check
icmp: standardize naming of RFC 8335 PROBE constants
bpf, selftests: Update array map tests for per-cpu batched ops
bpf: Add batched ops support for percpu array
bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf
seq_file: Add a seq_bprintf function
sfc: adjust efx->xdp_tx_queue_count with the real number of initialized queues
net:nfc:digital: Fix a double free in digital_tg_recv_dep_req
net: fix a concurrency bug in l2tp_tunnel_register()
net/smc: Remove redundant assignment to rc
mpls: Remove redundant assignment to err
llc2: Remove redundant assignment to rc
net/tls: Remove redundant initialization of record
rds: Remove redundant assignment to nr_sig
dt-bindings: net: mdio-gpio: add compatible for microchip,mdio-smi0
...
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
f1c921fb70 |
selinux/stable-5.13 PR 20210426
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmCHM2sUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXNfCg/9GmoCyCh+ZRj5RGQ6M+yJas1+yyJQ uEfTNde54yfATUTaaWYnZG59yqzM3I2uaV11U7tqg8ajiFPxJKqbs5R9jl3lnSjH 0Dg22nXPSCOTKcU0x/DeLoKRr+M9jO1K/nQ8NEZvYX4nC/OgtCvJqb/oEQZIKAk5 2a7OEmNNQyFGd274p9dELaDHxN9UIaJ2PzQFXtq7ROHgBXQO4ONb2ajOf6mDSFQb vP/CDHwaH+pcE28w44oRy0/YBkO1SrdqoFQchg5yFagM5tQRLGkXK4OFSs5KHi5Q YMtmaOzMPIv1e5eaC1HuuMJYA4pPb30T9hFHP7tmBVZfmZaFaDeUs+BhMm98WTiS o0iTP7tfs36/poOR1Q0/sB06uvF9hUAAX1ZuE95YySifbXU9hsUc9b0uQSwCdg9P /J9rcdHLTpWqjw9n02mezWmAvo5U8ZvbDs+0xPIwI+3RTUP5t6mp+Hd5Tc7bPTq1 0rpWXx+FQoSytFap5qiUSiwBp+HF6HQnNIXB0Muf6wctChoTjvo7TwoxH//z4kEm +SddhOCNkB7VC/X7hOxhl0F/rdHuXvb1AFIWjpTLJH2CR1PvMtF+sGey+uPT6hKZ /gvhmQGjFdph99eGlfVbCNvx1pM61O25IscaYD1T2wGImw+z7dX4WkG3WoOdDSkR bRjrBkcHh0gLhWk= =HTEy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities using IMA. - A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts. - Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/. - Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission list for two SELinux object classes. * tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super() lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool selinux: measure state and policy capabilities selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs |
||
Casey Schaufler
|
1aea780837 |
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> |
||
Paul Moore
|
e4c82eafb6 |
selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions
This patch adds the missing NULL termination to the "bpf" and "perf_event" object class permission lists. This missing NULL termination should really only affect the tools under scripts/selinux, with the most important being genheaders.c, although in practice this has not been an issue on any of my dev/test systems. If the problem were to manifest itself it would likely result in bogus permissions added to the end of the object class; thankfully with no access control checks using these bogus permissions and no policies defining these permissions the impact would likely be limited to some noise about undefined permissions during policy load. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: |
||
Jakub Kicinski
|
8859a44ea0 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Conflicts: MAINTAINERS - keep Chandrasekar drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c - simple fix + trust the code re-added to param.c in -next is fine include/linux/bpf.h - trivial include/linux/ethtool.h - trivial, fix kdoc while at it include/linux/skmsg.h - move to relevant place in tcp.c, comment re-wrapped net/core/skmsg.c - add the sk = sk // sk = NULL around calls net/tipc/crypto.c - trivial Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
60144b23c9 |
selinux/stable-5.12 PR 20210409
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmBwjZcUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXOAcg//eZL4z0ksGo9s/Y+/9qOIYH2tMPU5 OOVZCekBENiq2LOuVbzAndeHOLZflf3iigBwtMvqHaAsdPAKH/3UedzD0/nxG39m S2gowEuNEfxtuBwuIZMFaMGzzLyjlZJ3xxi6omIyj/2JqPNyBbbFxR/VC4agJZI5 oG6VfwhZJmFi1oJiNoGKjwihKHZQ90yd8UU5rMI+Np0TnP1Or3OvRaZjR47r+dWS tAu3nTKrVEyGTcPeGzg9TS5tIko0jQ1FyrqPDBhfaJta48bX/9s70We6rwqJj8Vg HiiSDPMK5EKkPLso+1vqvBI9q6xdhNeS+M2JP+/ewK/cqVKMkTVVys6l+T3a6HcY rIXdgTWdMFiAQ6OW44z30fiwSxW3kI5M62um31nepoqvzX7acl6R1laILFztedWM EOfCznZmE6ccYmcZnrqEmNsdF+Se1TUiM87bN90tAGmF9F4Yw2qGM0raiV3OJhDZ P2zR/+DceSHI2pNfFtB5VVXZelHoKVhoRcRWvpzn7YW3UmnAl83HoJasBfa/j4rx qvo+nj5ptCSX/kUYjvfvrRV1rY/BAaSVlFLpgYKY1r8/hdRN5DLpdE5cHh6Gky6B fJen4a7yVecp8IKK+WR3maJ0hymo5ccUoB5AKzMOXeECKRqKkIDAKiEN59g9t96+ avKfojgsh1tNHA0= =mGDl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Three SELinux fixes. These fix known problems relating to (re)loading SELinux policy or changing the policy booleans, and pass our test suite without problem" * tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: fix race between old and new sidtab selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robust |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
9ad6e9cb39 |
selinux: fix race between old and new sidtab
Since commit |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
d8f5f0ea5b |
selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans
Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.
To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
av_lists exactly once.
The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
# setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off
On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
command:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
While on the broken kernels, it will be different:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the
nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which
makes the sequence more consistent.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
442dc00f82 |
selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robust
1. Make sure all fileds are initialized in avtab_init(). 2. Slightly refactor avtab_alloc() to use the above fact. 3. Use h->nslot == 0 as a sentinel in the access functions to prevent dereferencing h->htable when it's not allocated. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
David S. Miller
|
efd13b71a3 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
||
|
Paul Moore
|
eb1231f73c |
selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
SELinux has a function, task_sid(), which returns the task's objective credentials, but unfortunately is used in a few places where the subjective task credentials should be used. Most notably in the new security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook. This patch fixes this and attempts to make things more obvious by introducing a new function, task_sid_subj(), and renaming the existing task_sid() function to task_sid_obj(). This patch also adds an interesting function in task_sid_binder(). The task_sid_binder() function has a comment which hopefully describes it's reason for being, but it basically boils down to the simple fact that we can't safely access another task's subjective credentials so in the case of binder we need to stick with the objective credentials regardless. Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Paul Moore
|
4ebd7651bf |
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Olga Kornievskaia
|
69c4a42d72 |
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount with new options and determines if new options confict with an existing mount or not. A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
8419639062 |
selinux/stable-5.12 PR 20210322
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches:
- Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated
function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the
SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious
reasons.
- Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages
when loading the SELinux policy.
All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our
testing with no failures"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
|
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
ee5de60a08 |
selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one
pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in
sel_write_load().
Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after
|
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
6406887a12 |
selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
Commit |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
519dad3bcd |
selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1',
as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record,
even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump
label now becomes unused and can be removed.
Fixes:
|
||
Ido Schimmel
|
710ec56223 |
nexthop: Add netlink defines and enumerators for resilient NH groups
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOP et.al. that handle resilient groups will have a new nested
attribute, NHA_RES_GROUP, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_GROUP_*.
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET et.al. is a suite of new messages that will
currently serve only for dumping of individual buckets of resilient next
hop groups. For nexthop group buckets, these messages will carry a nested
attribute NHA_RES_BUCKET, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_BUCKET_*.
There are several reasons why a new suite of messages is created for
nexthop buckets instead of overloading the information on the existing
RTM_{NEW,DEL,GET}NEXTHOP messages.
First, a nexthop group can contain a large number of nexthop buckets (4k
is not unheard of). This imposes limits on the amount of information that
can be encoded for each nexthop bucket given a netlink message is limited
to 64k bytes.
Second, while RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET is only used for notifications at
this point, in the future it can be extended to provide user space with
control over nexthop buckets configuration.
- The new group type is NEXTHOP_GRP_TYPE_RES. Note that nexthop code is
adjusted to bounce groups with that type for now.
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
||
Xiong Zhenwu
|
431c3be16b |
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
A typo is f out by codespell tool in 422th line of security.h: $ codespell ./security/selinux/include/ ./security.h:422: thie ==> the, this Fix a typo found by codespell. Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Xiong Zhenwu
|
63ddf1baa0 |
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 16th line of hashtab.c $ codespell ./security/selinux/ss/ ./hashtab.c:16: rouding ==> rounding Fix a typo found by codespell. Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
|
2554a48f44 |
selinux: measure state and policy capabilities
SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities
in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact
on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data
through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for
an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime.
Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling
the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities:
10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b
Execute the following command to extract the measured data
from the IMA's runtime measurements list:
grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state
reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following
files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands):
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file]
Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state
and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring
"initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;"
for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually
set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy
itself via seinfo, for example).
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||
Vivek Goyal
|
7fa2e79a6b |
selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs
Now overlayfs allow unpriviliged mounts. That is root inside a non-init user namespace can mount overlayfs. This is being added in 5.11 kernel. Giuseppe tried to mount overlayfs with option "context" and it failed with error -EACCESS. $ su test $ unshare -rm $ mkdir -p lower upper work merged $ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,userxattr,context='system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0' none merged This fails with -EACCESS. It works if option "-o context" is not specified. Little debugging showed that selinux_set_mnt_opts() returns -EACCESS. So this patch adds "overlay" to the list, where it is fine to specific context from non init_user_ns. Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> [PM: trimmed the changelog from the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
7d6beb71da |
idmapped-mounts-v5.12
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
d643a99089 |
integrity-v5.12
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||
Christian Brauner
|
71bc356f93
|
commoncap: handle idmapped mounts
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
Tycho Andersen
|
c7c7a1a18a
|
xattr: handle idmapped mounts
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
21cb47be6f
|
inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount aware
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
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|
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
|
fdd1ffe8a8 |
selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate the policy contents at runtime. Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry. To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required: 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time. For example, BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy: To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match. sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get the expected hash. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> |
||
Daniel Colascione
|
29cd6591ab |
selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in
the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control
anonymous-inode files that are created using the new
anon_inode_getfd_secure() function.
A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by
adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security
type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used
for the name-based transition is the name associated with the
anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or
"[perf_event]".
Example:
type uffd_t;
type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]";
allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create };
(The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd
support this new interface. The example above is just
for exposition.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
08abe46b2c |
selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr support
When a superblock is assigned the SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR behavior by the
policy yet it lacks xattr support, try to fall back to genfs rather than
rejecting the mount. If a genfscon rule is found for the filesystem,
then change the behavior to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS, otherwise reject the
mount as before. A similar fallback is already done in security_fs_use()
if no behavior specification is found for the given filesystem.
This is needed e.g. for virtiofs, which may or may not support xattrs
depending on the backing host filesystem.
Example:
# seinfo --genfs | grep ' ramfs'
genfscon ramfs / system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0
# echo '(fsuse xattr ramfs (system_u object_r fs_t ((s0) (s0))))' >ramfs_xattr.cil
# semodule -i ramfs_xattr.cil
# mount -t ramfs none /mnt
Before:
mount: /mnt: mount(2) system call failed: Operation not supported.
After:
(mount succeeds)
# ls -Zd /mnt
system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0 /mnt
See also:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20210105142148.GA3200@redhat.com/T/
https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/pull/478
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
e0de8a9aeb |
selinux: mark selinux_xfrm_refcount as __read_mostly
This is motivated by a perfomance regression of selinux_xfrm_enabled() that happened on a RHEL kernel due to false sharing between selinux_xfrm_refcount and (the late) selinux_ss.policy_rwlock (i.e. the .bss section memory layout changed such that they happened to share the same cacheline). Since the policy rwlock's memory region was modified upon each read-side critical section, the readers of selinux_xfrm_refcount had frequent cache misses, eventually leading to a significant performance degradation under a TCP SYN flood on a system with many cores (32 in this case, but it's detectable on less cores as well). While upstream has since switched to RCU locking, so the same can no longer happen here, selinux_xfrm_refcount could still share a cacheline with another frequently written region, thus marking it __read_mostly still makes sense. __read_mostly helps, because it will put the symbol in a separate section along with other read-mostly variables, so there should never be a clash with frequently written data. Since selinux_xfrm_refcount is modified only in case of an explicit action, it should be safe to do this (i.e. it shouldn't disrupt other read-mostly variables too much). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
cd2bb4cb09 |
selinux: mark some global variables __ro_after_init
All of these are never modified outside initcalls, so they can be __ro_after_init. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
db478cd60d |
selinux: make selinuxfs_mount static
It is not referenced outside selinuxfs.c, so remove its extern header declaration and make it static. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
3c797e514b |
selinux: drop the unnecessary aurule_callback variable
Its value is actually not changed anywhere, so it can be substituted for a direct call to audit_update_lsm_rules(). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
46434ba040 |
selinux: remove unused global variables
All of sel_ib_pkey_list, sel_netif_list, sel_netnode_list, and sel_netport_list are declared but never used. Remove them. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
Amir Goldstein
|
a9ffe682c5 |
selinux: fix inconsistency between inode_getxattr and inode_listsecurity
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.
When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.
This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().
Match the logic of inode_listsecurity to that of inode_getxattr and
do not list the security.selinux xattr if selinux is not initialized.
Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/
Fixes:
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Paolo Abeni
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95ca90726e |
selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP
The MPTCP protocol uses a specific protocol value, even if it's an extension to TCP. Additionally, MPTCP sockets could 'fall-back' to TCP at run-time, depending on peer MPTCP support and available resources. As a consequence of the specific protocol number, selinux applies the raw_socket class to MPTCP sockets. Existing TCP application converted to MPTCP - or forced to use MPTCP socket with user-space hacks - will need an updated policy to run successfully. This change lets selinux attach the TCP socket class to MPTCP sockets, too, so that no policy changes are needed in the above scenario. Note that the MPTCP is setting, propagating and updating the security context on all the subflows and related request socket. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhTaK3xx0hEGByD2zxfF7fadyPP1kb-WeWH_YCyq9X-sRg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> [PM: tweaked subject's prefix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
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ca5b877b6c |
selinux/stable-5.11 PR 20201214
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a
few changes worth highlighting:
- Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead
of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the
full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it
safely (missing information on the address family).
This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team
netdev) and James Morris (representing team
LSMs-other-than-SELinux).
- Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we
attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of
continuing to treat it as unlabeled.
- Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx
SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are
effective even without the allowx statement.
Everything passes our test suite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx
selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
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Florian Westphal
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41dd9596d6 |
security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various places
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const' qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the 'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function expects a 'struct sock *'. However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to security_inet_conn_request instead. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |