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10 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Dave Hansen
|
42222eae17 |
mm: remove arch_bprm_mm_init() hook
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> MPX is being removed from the kernel due to a lack of support in the toolchain going forward (gcc). arch_bprm_mm_init() is used at execve() time. The only non-stub implementation is on x86 for MPX. Remove the hook entirely from all architectures and generic code. Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> |
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Dave Hansen
|
5a28fc94c9 |
x86/mpx, mm/core: Fix recursive munmap() corruption
This is a bit of a mess, to put it mildly. But, it's a bug
that only seems to have showed up in 4.20 but wasn't noticed
until now, because nobody uses MPX.
MPX has the arch_unmap() hook inside of munmap() because MPX
uses bounds tables that protect other areas of memory. When
memory is unmapped, there is also a need to unmap the MPX
bounds tables. Barring this, unused bounds tables can eat 80%
of the address space.
But, the recursive do_munmap() that gets called vi arch_unmap()
wreaks havoc with __do_munmap()'s state. It can result in
freeing populated page tables, accessing bogus VMA state,
double-freed VMAs and more.
See the "long story" further below for the gory details.
To fix this, call arch_unmap() before __do_unmap() has a chance
to do anything meaningful. Also, remove the 'vma' argument
and force the MPX code to do its own, independent VMA lookup.
== UML / unicore32 impact ==
Remove unused 'vma' argument to arch_unmap(). No functional
change.
I compile tested this on UML but not unicore32.
== powerpc impact ==
powerpc uses arch_unmap() well to watch for munmap() on the
VDSO and zeroes out 'current->mm->context.vdso_base'. Moving
arch_unmap() makes this happen earlier in __do_munmap(). But,
'vdso_base' seems to only be used in perf and in the signal
delivery that happens near the return to userspace. I can not
find any likely impact to powerpc, other than the zeroing
happening a little earlier.
powerpc does not use the 'vma' argument and is unaffected by
its removal.
I compile-tested a 64-bit powerpc defconfig.
== x86 impact ==
For the common success case this is functionally identical to
what was there before. For the munmap() failure case, it's
possible that some MPX tables will be zapped for memory that
continues to be in use. But, this is an extraordinarily
unlikely scenario and the harm would be that MPX provides no
protection since the bounds table got reset (zeroed).
I can't imagine anyone doing this:
ptr = mmap();
// use ptr
ret = munmap(ptr);
if (ret)
// oh, there was an error, I'll
// keep using ptr.
Because if you're doing munmap(), you are *done* with the
memory. There's probably no good data in there _anyway_.
This passes the original reproducer from Richard Biener as
well as the existing mpx selftests/.
The long story:
munmap() has a couple of pieces:
1. Find the affected VMA(s)
2. Split the start/end one(s) if neceesary
3. Pull the VMAs out of the rbtree
4. Actually zap the memory via unmap_region(), including
freeing page tables (or queueing them to be freed).
5. Fix up some of the accounting (like fput()) and actually
free the VMA itself.
This specific ordering was actually introduced by:
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Thomas Gleixner
|
c10e83f598 |
arch, mm: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail
In order to sanitize the LDT initialization on x86 arch_dup_mmap() must be allowed to fail. Fix up all instances. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
|
b24413180f |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Kirill A. Shutemov
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9a804fecee |
mm/gup: Drop the arch_pte_access_permitted() MMU callback
The only arch that defines it to something meaningful is x86. But x86 doesn't use the generic GUP_fast() implementation -- the only place where the callback is called. Let's drop it. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K . V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dann Frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Steve Capper <steve.capper@linaro.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316152655.37789-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Dave Hansen
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d61172b4b6 |
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
As discussed earlier, we attempt to enforce protection keys in software. However, the code checks all faults to ensure that they are not violating protection key permissions. It was assumed that all faults are either write faults where we check PKRU[key].WD (write disable) or read faults where we check the AD (access disable) bit. But, there is a third category of faults for protection keys: instruction faults. Instruction faults never run afoul of protection keys because they do not affect instruction fetches. So, plumb the PF_INSTR bit down in to the arch_vma_access_permitted() function where we do the protection key checks. We also add a new FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION. This is because handle_mm_fault() is not passed the architecture-specific error_code where we keep PF_INSTR, so we need to encode the instruction fetch information in to the arch-generic fault flags. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210224.96928009@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Dave Hansen
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1b2ee1266e |
mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
We try to enforce protection keys in software the same way that we do in hardware. (See long example below). But, we only want to do this when accessing our *own* process's memory. If GDB set PKRU[6].AD=1 (disable access to PKEY 6), then tried to PTRACE_POKE a target process which just happened to have some mprotect_pkey(pkey=6) memory, we do *not* want to deny the debugger access to that memory. PKRU is fundamentally a thread-local structure and we do not want to enforce it on access to _another_ thread's data. This gets especially tricky when we have workqueues or other delayed-work mechanisms that might run in a random process's context. We can check that we only enforce pkeys when operating on our *own* mm, but delayed work gets performed when a random user context is active. We might end up with a situation where a delayed-work gup fails when running randomly under its "own" task but succeeds when running under another process. We want to avoid that. To avoid that, we use the new GUP flag: FOLL_REMOTE and add a fault flag: FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE. They indicate that we are walking an mm which is not guranteed to be the same as current->mm and should not be subject to protection key enforcement. Thanks to Jerome Glisse for pointing out this scenario. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Boaz Harrosh <boaz@plexistor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Dingel <dingel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dominik Vogt <vogt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@akamai.com> Cc: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com> Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Dave Hansen
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33a709b25a |
mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
Today, for normal faults and page table walks, we check the VMA and/or PTE to ensure that it is compatible with the action. For instance, if we get a write fault on a non-writeable VMA, we SIGSEGV. We try to do the same thing for protection keys. Basically, we try to make sure that if a user does this: mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE); *ptr = foo; they see the same effects with protection keys when they do this: mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE); set_pkey(ptr, size, 4); wrpkru(0xffffff3f); // access disable pkey 4 *ptr = foo; The state to do that checking is in the VMA, but we also sometimes have to do it on the page tables only, like when doing a get_user_pages_fast() where we have no VMA. We add two functions and expose them to generic code: arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_flags, write) arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write) These are, of course, backed up in x86 arch code with checks against the PTE or VMA's protection key. But, there are also cases where we do not want to respect protection keys. When we ptrace(), for instance, we do not want to apply the tracer's PKRU permissions to the PTEs from the process being traced. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Boaz Harrosh <boaz@plexistor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Dingel <dingel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dominik Vogt <vogt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com> Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210219.14D5D715@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Dave Hansen
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62e88b1c00 |
mm: Make arch_unmap()/bprm_mm_init() available to all architectures
The x86 MPX patch set calls arch_unmap() and arch_bprm_mm_init() from fs/exec.c, so we need at least a stub for them in all architectures. They are only called under an #ifdef for CONFIG_MMU=y, so we can at least restict this to architectures with MMU support. blackfin/c6x have no MMU support, so do not call arch_unmap(). They also do not include mm_hooks.h or mmu_context.h at all and do not need to be touched. s390, um and unicore32 do not use asm-generic/mm_hooks.h, so got their own arch_unmap() versions. (I also moved um's arch_dup_mmap() to be closer to the other mm_hooks.h functions). xtensa only includes mm_hooks when MMU=y, which should be fine since arch_unmap() is called only from MMU=y code. For the rest, we use the stub copies of these functions in asm-generic/mm_hook.h. I cross compiled defconfigs for cris (to check NOMMU) and s390 to make sure that this works. I also checked a 64-bit build of UML and all my normal x86 builds including PARAVIRT on and off. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141118182350.8B4AA2C2@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge
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d6dd61c831 |
[PATCH] x86: PARAVIRT: add hooks to intercept mm creation and destruction
Add hooks to allow a paravirt implementation to track the lifetime of an mm. Paravirtualization requires three hooks, but only two are needed in common code. They are: arch_dup_mmap, which is called when a new mmap is created at fork arch_exit_mmap, which is called when the last process reference to an mm is dropped, which typically happens on exit and exec. The third hook is activate_mm, which is called from the arch-specific activate_mm() macro/function, and so doesn't need stub versions for other architectures. It's called when an mm is first used. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@SteelEye.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |