Cachefiles has a problem in that it needs to keep the backing file for a
cookie open whilst there are local modifications pending that need to be
written to it. However, we don't want to keep the file open indefinitely,
as that causes EMFILE/ENFILE/ENOMEM problems.
Reopening the cache file, however, is a problem if this is being done due
to writeback triggered by exit(). Some filesystems will oops if we try to
open a file in that context because they want to access current->fs or
other resources that have already been dismantled.
To get around this, I added the following:
(1) An inode flag, I_PINNING_FSCACHE_WB, to be set on a network filesystem
inode to indicate that we have a usage count on the cookie caching
that inode.
(2) A flag in struct writeback_control, unpinned_fscache_wb, that is set
when __writeback_single_inode() clears the last dirty page from
i_pages - at which point it clears I_PINNING_FSCACHE_WB and sets this
flag.
This has to be done here so that clearing I_PINNING_FSCACHE_WB can be
done atomically with the check of PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY that clears
I_DIRTY_PAGES.
(3) A function, fscache_set_page_dirty(), which if it is not set, sets
I_PINNING_FSCACHE_WB and calls fscache_use_cookie() to pin the cache
resources.
(4) A function, fscache_unpin_writeback(), to be called by ->write_inode()
to unuse the cookie.
(5) A function, fscache_clear_inode_writeback(), to be called when the
inode is evicted, before clear_inode() is called. This cleans up any
lingering I_PINNING_FSCACHE_WB.
The network filesystem can then use these tools to make sure that
fscache_write_to_cache() can write locally modified data to the cache as
well as to the server.
For the future, I'm working on write helpers for netfs lib that should
allow this facility to be removed by keeping track of the dirty regions
separately - but that's incomplete at the moment and is also going to be
affected by folios, one way or another, since it deals with pages
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819615157.215744.17623791756928043114.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906917856.143852.8224898306177154573.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967124567.1823006.14188359004568060298.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021524705.640689.17824932021727663017.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Provide a higher-level function than fscache_write() to perform a write
from an inode's pagecache to the cache, whilst fending off concurrent
writes by means of the PG_fscache mark on a page:
void fscache_write_to_cache(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t start,
size_t len,
loff_t i_size,
netfs_io_terminated_t term_func,
void *term_func_priv,
bool caching);
If caching is false, this function does nothing except call (*term_func)()
if given. It assumes that, in such a case, PG_fscache will not have been
set on the pages.
Otherwise, if caching is true, this function requires the source pages to
have had PG_fscache set on them before calling. start and len define the
region of the file to be modified and i_size indicates the new file size.
The source pages are extracted from the mapping.
term_func and term_func_priv work as for fscache_write(). The PG_fscache
marks will be cleared at the end of the operation, before term_func is
called or the function otherwise returns.
There is an additonal helper function to clear the PG_fscache bits from a
range of pages:
void fscache_clear_page_bits(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t start, size_t len,
bool caching);
If caching is true, the pages to be managed are expected to be located on
mapping in the range defined by start and len. If caching is false, it
does nothing.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819614155.215744.5528123235123721230.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906916346.143852.15632773570362489926.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967123599.1823006.12946816026724657428.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021522672.640689.4381958316198807813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Provide a function to begin a read operation:
int fscache_begin_read_operation(
struct netfs_cache_resources *cres,
struct fscache_cookie *cookie)
This is primarily intended to be called by network filesystems on behalf of
netfslib, but may also be called to use the I/O access functions directly.
It attaches the resources required by the cache to cres struct from the
supplied cookie.
This holds access to the cache behind the cookie for the duration of the
operation and forces cache withdrawal and cookie invalidation to perform
synchronisation on the operation. cres->inval_counter is set from the
cookie at this point so that it can be compared at the end of the
operation.
Note that this does not guarantee that the cache state is fully set up and
able to perform I/O immediately; looking up and creation may be left in
progress in the background. The operations intended to be called by the
network filesystem, such as reading and writing, are expected to wait for
the cookie to move to the correct state.
This will, however, potentially sleep, waiting for a certain minimum state
to be set or for operations such as invalidate to advance far enough that
I/O can resume.
Also provide a function for the cache to call to wait for the cache object
to get to a state where it can be used for certain things:
bool fscache_wait_for_operation(struct netfs_cache_resources *cres,
enum fscache_want_stage stage);
This looks at the cache resources provided by the begin function and waits
for them to get to an appropriate stage. There's a choice of wanting just
some parameters (FSCACHE_WANT_PARAM) or the ability to do I/O
(FSCACHE_WANT_READ or FSCACHE_WANT_WRITE).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819603692.215744.146724961588817028.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906910672.143852.13856103384424986357.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967110245.1823006.2239170567540431836.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021513617.640689.16627329360866150606.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Provide a pair of functions to count the number of users of a cookie (open
files, writeback, invalidation, resizing, reads, writes), to obtain and pin
resources for the cookie and to prevent culling for the whilst there are
users.
The first function marks a cookie as being in use:
void fscache_use_cookie(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
bool will_modify);
The caller should indicate the cookie to use and whether or not the caller
is in a context that may modify the cookie (e.g. a file open O_RDWR).
If the cookie is not already resourced, fscache will ask the cache backend
in the background to do whatever it needs to look up, create or otherwise
obtain the resources necessary to access data. This is pinned to the
cookie and may not be culled, though it may be withdrawn if the cache as a
whole is withdrawn.
The second function removes the in-use mark from a cookie and, optionally,
updates the coherency data:
void fscache_unuse_cookie(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
const void *aux_data,
const loff_t *object_size);
If non-NULL, the aux_data buffer and/or the object_size will be saved into
the cookie and will be set on the backing store when the object is
committed.
If this removes the last usage on a cookie, the cookie is placed onto an
LRU list from which it will be removed and closed after a couple of seconds
if it doesn't get reused. This prevents resource overload in the cache -
in particular it prevents it from holding too many files open.
Changes
=======
ver #2:
- Fix fscache_unuse_cookie() to use atomic_dec_and_lock() to avoid a
potential race if the cookie gets reused before it completes the
unusement.
- Added missing transition to LRU_DISCARDING state.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819600612.215744.13678350304176542741.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906907567.143852.16979631199380722019.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967106467.1823006.6790864931048582667.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021511674.640689.10084988363699111860.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Add a number of helper functions to manage access to a cookie, pinning the
cache object in place for the duration to prevent cache withdrawal from
removing it:
(1) void fscache_init_access_gate(struct fscache_cookie *cookie);
This function initialises the access count when a cache binds to a
cookie. An extra ref is taken on the access count to prevent wakeups
while the cache is active. We're only interested in the wakeup when a
cookie is being withdrawn and we're waiting for it to quiesce - at
which point the counter will be decremented before the wait.
The FSCACHE_COOKIE_NACC_ELEVATED flag is set on the cookie to keep
track of the extra ref in order to handle a race between
relinquishment and withdrawal both trying to drop the extra ref.
(2) bool fscache_begin_cookie_access(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
enum fscache_access_trace why);
This function attempts to begin access upon a cookie, pinning it in
place if it's cached. If successful, it returns true and leaves a the
access count incremented.
(3) void fscache_end_cookie_access(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
enum fscache_access_trace why);
This function drops the access count obtained by (2), permitting
object withdrawal to take place when it reaches zero.
A tracepoint is provided to track changes to the access counter on a
cookie.
Changes
=======
ver #2:
- Don't hold n_accesses elevated whilst cache is bound to a cookie, but
rather add a flag that prevents the state machine from being queued when
n_accesses reaches 0.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819595085.215744.1706073049250505427.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906895313.143852.10141619544149102193.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967095980.1823006.1133648159424418877.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021503063.640689.8870918985269528670.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Add a pair of helper functions to manage access to a volume, pinning the
volume in place for the duration to prevent cache withdrawal from removing
it:
bool fscache_begin_volume_access(struct fscache_volume *volume,
enum fscache_access_trace why);
void fscache_end_volume_access(struct fscache_volume *volume,
enum fscache_access_trace why);
The way the access gate on the volume works/will work is:
(1) If the cache tests as not live (state is not FSCACHE_CACHE_IS_ACTIVE),
then we return false to indicate access was not permitted.
(2) If the cache tests as live, then we increment the volume's n_accesses
count and then recheck the cache liveness, ending the access if it
ceased to be live.
(3) When we end the access, we decrement the volume's n_accesses and wake
up the any waiters if it reaches 0.
(4) Whilst the cache is caching, the volume's n_accesses is kept
artificially incremented to prevent wakeups from happening.
(5) When the cache is taken offline, the state is changed to prevent new
accesses, the volume's n_accesses is decremented and we wait for it to
become 0.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819594158.215744.8285859817391683254.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906894315.143852.5454793807544710479.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967095028.1823006.9173132503876627466.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021501546.640689.9631510472149608443.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Add functions to the fscache API to allow data file cookies to be acquired
and relinquished by the network filesystem. It is intended that the
filesystem will create such cookies per-inode under a volume.
To request a cookie, the filesystem should call:
struct fscache_cookie *
fscache_acquire_cookie(struct fscache_volume *volume,
u8 advice,
const void *index_key,
size_t index_key_len,
const void *aux_data,
size_t aux_data_len,
loff_t object_size)
The filesystem must first have created a volume cookie, which is passed in
here. If it passes in NULL then the function will just return a NULL
cookie.
A binary key should be passed in index_key and is of size index_key_len.
This is saved in the cookie and is used to locate the associated data in
the cache.
A coherency data buffer of size aux_data_len will be allocated and
initialised from the buffer pointed to by aux_data. This is used to
validate cache objects when they're opened and is stored on disk with them
when they're committed. The data is stored in the cookie and will be
updateable by various functions in later patches.
The object_size must also be given. This is also used to perform a
coherency check and to size the backing storage appropriately.
This function disallows a cookie from being acquired twice in parallel,
though it will cause the second user to wait if the first is busy
relinquishing its cookie.
When a network filesystem has finished with a cookie, it should call:
void
fscache_relinquish_cookie(struct fscache_volume *volume,
bool retire)
If retire is true, any backing data will be discarded immediately.
Changes
=======
ver #3:
- fscache_hash()'s size parameter is now in bytes. Use __le32 as the unit
to round up to.
- When comparing cookies, simply see if the attributes are the same rather
than subtracting them to produce a strcmp-style return[1].
- Add a check to see if the cookie is still hashed at the point of
freeing.
ver #2:
- Don't hold n_accesses elevated whilst cache is bound to a cookie, but
rather add a flag that prevents the state machine from being queued when
n_accesses reaches 0.
- Remove the unused cookie pointer field from the fscache_acquire
tracepoint.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=whtkzB446+hX0zdLsdcUJsJ=8_-0S1mE_R+YurThfUbLA@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819590658.215744.14934902514281054323.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906891983.143852.6219772337558577395.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967088507.1823006.12659006350221417165.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021498432.640689.12743483856927722772.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Add functions to the fscache API to allow volumes to be acquired and
relinquished by the network filesystem. A volume is an index of data
storage cache objects. A volume is represented by a volume cookie in the
API. A filesystem would typically create a volume for a superblock and
then create per-inode cookies within it.
To request a volume, the filesystem calls:
struct fscache_volume *
fscache_acquire_volume(const char *volume_key,
const char *cache_name,
const void *coherency_data,
size_t coherency_len)
The volume_key is a printable string used to match the volume in the cache.
It should not contain any '/' characters. For AFS, for example, this would
be "afs,<cellname>,<volume_id>", e.g. "afs,example.com,523001".
The cache_name can be NULL, but if not it should be a string indicating the
name of the cache to use if there's more than one available.
The coherency data, if given, is an arbitrarily-sized blob that's attached
to the volume and is compared when the volume is looked up. If it doesn't
match, the old volume is judged to be out of date and it and everything
within it is discarded.
Acquiring a volume twice concurrently is disallowed, though the function
will wait if an old volume cookie is being relinquishing.
When a network filesystem has finished with a volume, it should return the
volume cookie by calling:
void
fscache_relinquish_volume(struct fscache_volume *volume,
const void *coherency_data,
bool invalidate)
If invalidate is true, the entire volume will be discarded; if false, the
volume will be synced and the coherency data will be updated.
Changes
=======
ver #4:
- Removed an extraneous param from kdoc on fscache_relinquish_volume()[3].
ver #3:
- fscache_hash()'s size parameter is now in bytes. Use __le32 as the unit
to round up to.
- When comparing cookies, simply see if the attributes are the same rather
than subtracting them to produce a strcmp-style return[2].
- Make the coherency data an arbitrary blob rather than a u64, but don't
store it for the moment.
ver #2:
- Fix error check[1].
- Make a fscache_acquire_volume() return errors, including EBUSY if a
conflicting volume cookie already exists. No error is printed now -
that's left to the netfs.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203095608.GC2480@kili/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=whtkzB446+hX0zdLsdcUJsJ=8_-0S1mE_R+YurThfUbLA@mail.gmail.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211220224646.30e8205c@canb.auug.org.au/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819588944.215744.1629085755564865996.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906890630.143852.13972180614535611154.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967086836.1823006.8191672796841981763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021495816.640689.4403156093668590217.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
fscache_cookie_put() accesses the cookie it has just put inside the
tracepoint that monitors the change - but this is something it's not
allowed to do if we didn't reduce the count to zero.
Fix this by dropping most of those values from the tracepoint and grabbing
the cookie debug ID before doing the dec.
Also take the opportunity to switch over the usage and where arguments on
the tracepoint to put the reason last.
Fixes: a18feb5576 ("fscache: Add tracepoints")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162431203107.2908479.3259582550347000088.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
The current hash algorithm used for hashing cookie keys is really bad,
producing almost no dispersion (after a test kernel build, ~30000 files
were split over just 18 out of the 32768 hash buckets).
Borrow the full_name_hash() hash function into fscache to do the hashing
for cookie keys and, in the future, volume keys.
I don't want to use full_name_hash() as-is because I want the hash value to
be consistent across arches and over time as the hash value produced may
get used on disk.
I can also optimise parts of it away as the key will always be a padded
array of aligned 32-bit words.
Fixes: ec0328e46d ("fscache: Maintain a catalogue of allocated cookies")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162431201844.2908479.8293647220901514696.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
Augusto von Dentz.
2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.
3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.
4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.
5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.
6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.
7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.
9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
Horatiu Vultur.
10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.
12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab.
13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
from Doug Berger.
14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
Dmitry Yakunin.
15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
userspace, from Johannes Berg.
16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.
19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
'int'. From Yunjian Wang.
20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
Rempel.
21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.
22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
facility.
23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.
24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.
27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.
29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.
30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
...
- Add a SPDX header;
- Adjust document and section titles;
- Comment out text ToC for html/pdf output;
- Some whitespace fixes and new line breaks;
- Add table markups;
- Add it to filesystems/index.rst.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e33ec382a53cf10ffcbd802f6de3f384159cddba.1588021877.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
- Add a SPDX header;
- Adjust document and section titles;
- Comment out text ToC for html/pdf output;
- Some whitespace fixes and new line breaks;
- Adjust the events list to make them look better for html output;
- Add it to filesystems/index.rst.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/49026a8ea7e714c2e0f003aa26b975b1025476b7.1588021877.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which
is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and
from userspace in common code. This also means that the strings are
always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit
safer.
As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers
a lot of the changes are mechnical.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
