Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Peter Collingbourne
d2e0d8f974 arm64: move preemption disablement to prctl handlers
In the next patch, we will start reading sctlr_user from
mte_update_sctlr_user and subsequently writing a new value based on the
task's TCF setting and potentially the per-CPU TCF preference. This
means that we need to be careful to disable preemption around any
code sequences that read from sctlr_user and subsequently write to
sctlr_user and/or SCTLR_EL1, so that we don't end up writing a stale
value (based on the previous CPU's TCF preference) to either of them.

We currently have four such sequences, in the prctl handlers for
PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL and PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS, as well as in
the task initialization code that resets the prctl settings. Change
the prctl handlers to disable preemption in the handlers themselves
rather than the functions that they call, and change the task
initialization code to call the respective prctl handlers instead of
setting sctlr_user directly.

As a result of this change, we no longer need the helper function
set_task_sctlr_el1, nor does its behavior make sense any more, so
remove it.

Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ic0e8a0c00bb47d786c1e8011df0b7fe99bee4bb5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727205300.2554659-4-pcc@google.com
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2021-07-28 18:33:49 +01:00
Peter Collingbourne
b90e483938 arm64: pac: Optimize kernel entry/exit key installation code paths
The kernel does not use any keys besides IA so we don't need to
install IB/DA/DB/GA on kernel exit if we arrange to install them
on task switch instead, which we can expect to happen an order of
magnitude less often.

Furthermore we can avoid installing the user IA in the case where the
user task has IA disabled and just leave the kernel IA installed. This
also lets us avoid needing to install IA on kernel entry.

On an Apple M1 under a hypervisor, the overhead of kernel entry/exit
has been measured to be reduced by 15.6ns in the case where IA is
enabled, and 31.9ns in the case where IA is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ieddf6b580d23c9e0bed45a822dabe72d2ffc9a8e
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2d653d055f38f779937f2b92f8ddd5cf9e4af4f4.1616123271.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2021-04-13 17:31:44 +01:00
Peter Collingbourne
201698626f arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS)
This change introduces a prctl that allows the user program to control
which PAC keys are enabled in a particular task. The main reason
why this is useful is to enable a userspace ABI that uses PAC to
sign and authenticate function pointers and other pointers exposed
outside of the function, while still allowing binaries conforming
to the ABI to interoperate with legacy binaries that do not sign or
authenticate pointers.

The idea is that a dynamic loader or early startup code would issue
this prctl very early after establishing that a process may load legacy
binaries, but before executing any PAC instructions.

This change adds a small amount of overhead to kernel entry and exit
due to additional required instruction sequences.

On a DragonBoard 845c (Cortex-A75) with the powersave governor, the
overhead of similar instruction sequences was measured as 4.9ns when
simulating the common case where IA is left enabled, or 43.7ns when
simulating the uncommon case where IA is disabled. These numbers can
be seen as the worst case scenario, since in more realistic scenarios
a better performing governor would be used and a newer chip would be
used that would support PAC unlike Cortex-A75 and would be expected
to be faster than Cortex-A75.

On an Apple M1 under a hypervisor, the overhead of the entry/exit
instruction sequences introduced by this patch was measured as 0.3ns
in the case where IA is left enabled, and 33.0ns in the case where
IA is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ibc41a5e6a76b275efbaa126b31119dc197b927a5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6609065f8f40397a4124654eb68c9f490b4d477.1616123271.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2021-04-13 17:31:44 +01:00
Peter Collingbourne
4b7a6ce71e arm64: reject prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS) on compat tasks
It doesn't make sense to issue prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS) on a
compat task because the 32-bit instruction set does not offer PAuth
instructions. For consistency with other 64-bit only prctls such as
{SET,GET}_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, reject the prctl on compat tasks.

Although this is a userspace-visible change, maybe it isn't too late
to make this change given that the hardware isn't available yet and
it's very unlikely that anyone has 32-bit software that actually
depends on this succeeding.

Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ie885a1ff84ab498cc9f62d6451e9f2cfd4b1d06a
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014052430.11630-1-pcc@google.com
[will: Do the same for the SVE prctl()s]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-10-15 10:50:09 +01:00
Kristina Martsenko
be12984256 arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
As we're going to enable pointer auth within the kernel and use a
different APIAKey for the kernel itself, so move the user APIAKey
switch to EL0 exception return.

The other 4 keys could remain switched during task switch, but are also
moved to keep things consistent.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
[Amit: commit msg, re-positioned the patch, comments]
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-03-18 09:50:19 +00:00
Kristina Martsenko
91a1b6ccff arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
We currently enable ptrauth for userspace, but do not use it within the
kernel. We're going to enable it for the kernel, and will need to manage
a separate set of ptrauth keys for the kernel.

We currently keep all 5 keys in struct ptrauth_keys. However, as the
kernel will only need to use 1 key, it is a bit wasteful to allocate a
whole ptrauth_keys struct for every thread.

Therefore, a subsequent patch will define a separate struct, with only 1
key, for the kernel. In preparation for that, rename the existing struct
(and associated macros and functions) to reflect that they are specific
to userspace.

Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
[Amit: Re-positioned the patch to reduce the diff]
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-03-18 09:50:18 +00:00
Will Deacon
84931327a8 arm64: ptr auth: Move per-thread keys from thread_info to thread_struct
We don't need to get at the per-thread keys from assembly at all, so
they can live alongside the rest of the per-thread register state in
thread_struct instead of thread_info.

This will also allow straighforward whitelisting of the keys for
hardened usercopy should we expose them via a ptrace request later on.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-12-13 16:42:47 +00:00
Kristina Martsenko
ba83088565 arm64: add prctl control for resetting ptrauth keys
Add an arm64-specific prctl to allow a thread to reinitialize its
pointer authentication keys to random values. This can be useful when
exec() is not used for starting new processes, to ensure that different
processes still have different keys.

Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-12-13 16:42:46 +00:00