Architectures like PPC64 support mmap hint address based large address
space selection. This test can be run on those architectures too. Move
the test from the x86 selftests to selftest/vm so that other
architectures can use it too.
We also add a few new test scenarios in this patch. We do test a few
boundary conditions before we do a high address mmap. PPC64 uses the
address limit to validate the address in the fault path. We had bugs in
this area w.r.t SLB fault handling before we updated the addess limit.
We also touch the allocated space to make sure we don't have any bugs in
the fault handling path.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: restore tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile alpha ordering]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171123165226.32582-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This contains:
- a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is
disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least
and is incorrect according to the AMD manual.
- a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is
enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the
CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user
space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will
be worked on.
- PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user
space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared
- removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions
- add PTI documentation
- add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually
implements what it advertises.
- a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation
information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the
status.
- the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline:
+ The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support
+ The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM
code
+ Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation
trap
+ The RSB fill after vmexit
- initial objtool support for retpoline
As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches
which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on
hold:
- the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs
- the RSB fill after context switch
Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have
covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits)
x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI
security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI
x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines
selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
...
This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do.
It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as
expected.
If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling,
running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate,
and vsyscall=native are helpful.
(Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their
vDSO equivalents.)
Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three
vsyscall modes. Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure
that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config
option as to which mode you're in. It's quite easy to mess up
the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates
or vice versa.
Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched
kernels. It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress
vsyscalls.
CSigned-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.1515719552.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 page table isolation updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This is the final set of enabling page table isolation on x86:
- Infrastructure patches for handling the extra page tables.
- Patches which map the various bits and pieces which are required to
get in and out of user space into the user space visible page
tables.
- The required changes to have CR3 switching in the entry/exit code.
- Optimizations for the CR3 switching along with documentation how
the ASID/PCID mechanism works.
- Updates to dump pagetables to cover the user space page tables for
W+X scans and extra debugfs files to analyze both the kernel and
the user space visible page tables
The whole functionality is compile time controlled via a config switch
and can be turned on/off on the command line as well"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits)
x86/ldt: Make the LDT mapping RO
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Add page table directory to the debugfs VFS hierarchy
x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig
x86/dumpstack: Indicate in Oops whether PTI is configured and enabled
x86/mm: Clarify the whole ASID/kernel PCID/user PCID naming
x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single()
x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3
x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches
x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3
x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches
x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed
x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on
x86/mm/64: Make a full PGD-entry size hole in the memory map
x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in cpu_entry_area
x86/cpu_entry_area: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area
x86/mm/pti: Map ESPFIX into user space
x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD
x86/entry: Align entry text section to PMD boundary
...
Now that the LDT mapping is in a known area when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is
enabled its a primary target for attacks, if a user space interface fails
to validate a write address correctly. That can never happen, right?
The SDM states:
If the segment descriptors in the GDT or an LDT are placed in ROM, the
processor can enter an indefinite loop if software or the processor
attempts to update (write to) the ROM-based segment descriptors. To
prevent this problem, set the accessed bits for all segment descriptors
placed in a ROM. Also, remove operating-system or executive code that
attempts to modify segment descriptors located in ROM.
So its a valid approach to set the ACCESS bit when setting up the LDT entry
and to map the table RO. Fixup the selftest so it can handle that new mode.
Remove the manual ACCESS bit setter in set_tls_desc() as this is now
pointless. Folded the patch from Peter Ziljstra.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 PTI preparatory patches from Thomas Gleixner:
"Todays Advent calendar window contains twentyfour easy to digest
patches. The original plan was to have twenty three matching the date,
but a late fixup made that moot.
- Move the cpu_entry_area mapping out of the fixmap into a separate
address space. That's necessary because the fixmap becomes too big
with NRCPUS=8192 and this caused already subtle and hard to
diagnose failures.
The top most patch is fresh from today and cures a brain slip of
that tall grumpy german greybeard, who ignored the intricacies of
32bit wraparounds.
- Limit the number of CPUs on 32bit to 64. That's insane big already,
but at least it's small enough to prevent address space issues with
the cpu_entry_area map, which have been observed and debugged with
the fixmap code
- A few TLB flush fixes in various places plus documentation which of
the TLB functions should be used for what.
- Rename the SYSENTER stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA stack as it is used for
more than sysenter now and keeping the name makes backtraces
confusing.
- Prevent LDT inheritance on exec() by moving it to arch_dup_mmap(),
which is only invoked on fork().
- Make vysycall more robust.
- A few fixes and cleanups of the debug_pagetables code. Check
PAGE_PRESENT instead of checking the PTE for 0 and a cleanup of the
C89 initialization of the address hint array which already was out
of sync with the index enums.
- Move the ESPFIX init to a different place to prepare for PTI.
- Several code moves with no functional change to make PTI
integration simpler and header files less convoluted.
- Documentation fixes and clarifications"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
x86/cpu_entry_area: Prevent wraparound in setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes() on 32bit
init: Invoke init_espfix_bsp() from mm_init()
x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap
x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it to a separate unit
x86/mm: Create asm/invpcid.h
x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place
x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks
x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h
x86/mm: Add comments to clarify which TLB-flush functions are supposed to flush what
x86/mm: Remove superfluous barriers
x86/mm: Use __flush_tlb_one() for kernel memory
x86/microcode: Dont abuse the TLB-flush interface
x86/uv: Use the right TLB-flush API
x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack
x86/doc: Remove obvious weirdnesses from the x86 MM layout documentation
x86/mm/64: Improve the memory map documentation
x86/ldt: Prevent LDT inheritance on exec
x86/ldt: Rework locking
arch, mm: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail
x86/vsyscall/64: Warn and fail vsyscall emulation in NATIVE mode
...
The LDT is inherited across fork() or exec(), but that makes no sense
at all because exec() is supposed to start the process clean.
The reason why this happens is that init_new_context_ldt() is called from
init_new_context() which obviously needs to be called for both fork() and
exec().
It would be surprising if anything relies on that behaviour, so it seems to
be safe to remove that misfeature.
Split the context initialization into two parts. Clear the LDT pointer and
initialize the mutex from the general context init and move the LDT
duplication to arch_dup_mmap() which is only called on fork().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
write() is marked as having a must-check return value. Check it and
abort if we fail to write an error message from a signal handler.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171111001232.94813E58@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
'si_pkey' is now #defined to be the name of the new siginfo field that
protection keys uses. Rename it not to conflict.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171111001231.DFFC8285@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The MPX hardware data structurse are defined in a weird way: they define
their size in bytes and then union that with the type with which we want
to access them.
Yes, this is weird, but it does work. But, new GCC's complain that we
are accessing the array out of bounds. Just make it a zero-sized array
so gcc will stop complaining. There was not really a bug here.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171111001229.58A7933D@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
5-level paging provides a 56-bit virtual address space for user space
application. But the kernel defaults to mappings below the 47-bit address
space boundary, which is the upper bound for 4-level paging, unless an
application explicitely request it by using a mmap(2) address hint above
the 47-bit boundary. The kernel prevents mappings which spawn across the
47-bit boundary unless mmap(2) was invoked with MAP_FIXED.
Add a self-test that covers the corner cases of the interface and validates
the correctness of the implementation.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog once more ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171115143607.81541-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
The STR and SLDT instructions are not valid when running on virtual-8086
mode and generate an invalid operand exception. These two instructions are
protected by the Intel User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) security
feature. In protected mode, if UMIP is enabled, these instructions generate
a general protection fault if called from CPL > 0. Linux traps the general
protection fault and emulates the instructions sgdt, sidt and smsw; but not
str and sldt.
These tests are added to verify that the emulation code does not emulate
these two instructions but the expected invalid operand exception is
seen.
Tests fallback to exit with INT3 in case emulation does happen.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-13-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Certain user space programs that run on virtual-8086 mode may utilize
instructions protected by the User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP)
security feature present in new Intel processors: SGDT, SIDT and SMSW. In
such a case, a general protection fault is issued if UMIP is enabled. When
such a fault happens, the kernel traps it and emulates the results of
these instructions with dummy values. The purpose of this new
test is to verify whether the impacted instructions can be executed
without causing such #GP. If no #GP exceptions occur, we expect to exit
virtual-8086 mode from INT3.
The instructions protected by UMIP are executed in representative use
cases:
a) displacement-only memory addressing
b) register-indirect memory addressing
c) results stored directly in operands
Unfortunately, it is not possible to check the results against a set of
expected values because no emulation will occur in systems that do not
have the UMIP feature. Instead, results are printed for verification. A
simple verification is done to ensure that results of all tests are
identical.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-12-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We weren't testing the .limit and .limit_in_pages fields very well.
Add more tests.
This addition seems to trigger the "bits 16:19 are undefined" issue
that was fixed in an earlier patch. I think that, at least on my
CPU, the high nibble of the limit ends in LAR bits 16:19.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5601c15ea9b3113d288953fd2838b18bedf6bc67.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Now that the main test infrastructure supports the GDT, run tests
that will pass the kernel's GDT permission tests against the GDT.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/686a1eda63414da38fcecc2412db8dba1ae40581.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Much of the test design could apply to set_thread_area() (i.e. GDT),
not just modify_ldt(). Add set_thread_area() to the
install_valid_mode() helper.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02c23f8fba5547007f741dc24c3926e5284ede02.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Bits 19:16 of LAR's result are undefined, and some upcoming
improvements to the test case seem to trigger this. Mask off those
bits to avoid spurious failures.
commit 5b781c7e31 ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS
segments") adds a valid case in which LAR's output doesn't quite
agree with set_thread_area()'s input. This isn't triggered in the
test as is, but it will be if we start calling set_thread_area()
with the accessed bit clear. Work around this discrepency.
I've added a Fixes tag so that -stable can pick this up if neccesary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 5b781c7e31 ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS segments")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b82f3f89c034b53580970ac865139fd8863f44e2.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
On new enough glibc, the pkey syscalls numbers are available. Check
first before defining them to avoid warnings like:
protection_keys.c:198:0: warning: "SYS_pkey_alloc" redefined
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1fbef53a9e6befb7165ff855fc1a7d4788a191d6.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sysret_ss_attrs fails to compile leading x86 test run to fail on systems
configured to build using PIE by default. Add -no-pie fix it.
Relocation might still fail if relocated above 4G. For now this change
fixes the build and runs x86 tests.
tools/testing/selftests/x86$ make
gcc -m64 -o .../tools/testing/selftests/x86/single_step_syscall_64 -O2
-g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall single_step_syscall.c -lrt -ldl
gcc -m64 -o .../tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_ss_attrs_64 -O2 -g
-std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall sysret_ss_attrs.c thunks.S -lrt -ldl
/usr/bin/ld: /tmp/ccS6pvIh.o: relocation R_X86_64_32S against `.text'
can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
/usr/bin/ld: final link failed: Nonrepresentable section on output
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
Makefile:49: recipe for target
'.../tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_ss_attrs_64' failed
make: *** [.../tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_ss_attrs_64] Error 1
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Life has been busy and I have not gotten half as much done this round
as I would have liked. I delayed it so that a minor conflict
resolution with the mips tree could spend a little time in linux-next
before I sent this pull request.
This includes two long delayed user namespace changes from Kirill
Tkhai. It also includes a very useful change from Serge Hallyn that
allows the security capability attribute to be used inside of user
namespaces. The practical effect of this is people can now untar
tarballs and install rpms in user namespaces. It had been suggested to
generalize this and encode some of the namespace information
information in the xattr name. Upon close inspection that makes the
things that should be hard easy and the things that should be easy
more expensive.
Then there is my bugfix/cleanup for signal injection that removes the
magic encoding of the siginfo union member from the kernel internal
si_code. The mips folks reported the case where I had used FPE_FIXME
me is impossible so I have remove FPE_FIXME from mips, while at the
same time including a return statement in that case to keep gcc from
complaining about unitialized variables.
I almost finished the work to get make copy_siginfo_to_user a trivial
copy to user. The code is available at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git neuter-copy_siginfo_to_user-v3
But I did not have time/energy to get the code posted and reviewed
before the merge window opened.
I was able to see that the security excuse for just copying fields
that we know are initialized doesn't work in practice there are buggy
initializations that don't initialize the proper fields in siginfo. So
we still sometimes copy unitialized data to userspace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
mips/signal: In force_fcr31_sig return in the impossible case
signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic
fcntl: Don't use ambiguous SIG_POLL si_codes
prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file
security: Use user_namespace::level to avoid redundant iterations in cap_capable()
userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces
signal/testing: Don't look for __SI_FAULT in userspace
signal/mips: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/ia64: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
Those are funny cases. Make sure they work.
(Something is screwy with signal handling if a selector is 1, 2, or 3.
Anyone who wants to dive into that rabbit hole is welcome to do so.)
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chang Seok <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Fix the debug print statements in these tests where they reference
si_codes and in particular __SI_FAULT. __SI_FAULT is a kernel
internal value and should never be seen by userspace.
While I am in there also fix si_code_str. si_codes are an enumeration
there are not a bitmap so == and not & is the apropriate operation to
test for an si_code.
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 5f23f6d082 ("x86/pkeys: Add self-tests")
Fixes: e754aedc26 ("x86/mpx, selftests: Add MPX self test")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This update consists of:
-- important fixes for build failures and clean target related warnings
to address regressions introduced in:
88baa78d1f ("selftests: remove duplicated all and clean target")
-- several minor spelling fixes in and log messages and comment blocks.
-- Enabling configs for better test coverage in ftrace, vm, cpufreq tests.
-- .gitignore changes
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Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-4.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull kselftest updates from Shuah Khan:
"This update consists of:
- important fixes for build failures and clean target related
warnings to address regressions introduced in commit 88baa78d1f
("selftests: remove duplicated all and clean target")
- several minor spelling fixes in and log messages and comment
blocks.
- Enabling configs for better test coverage in ftrace, vm, and
cpufreq tests.
- .gitignore changes"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-4.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (26 commits)
selftests: x86: add missing executables to .gitignore
selftests: watchdog: accept multiple params on command line
selftests: create cpufreq kconfig fragments
selftests: x86: override clean in lib.mk to fix warnings
selftests: sync: override clean in lib.mk to fix warnings
selftests: splice: override clean in lib.mk to fix warnings
selftests: gpio: fix clean target to remove all generated files and dirs
selftests: add gpio generated files to .gitignore
selftests: powerpc: override clean in lib.mk to fix warnings
selftests: gpio: override clean in lib.mk to fix warnings
selftests: futex: override clean in lib.mk to fix warnings
selftests: lib.mk: define CLEAN macro to allow Makefiles to override clean
selftests: splice: fix clean target to not remove default_file_splice_read.sh
selftests: gpio: add config fragment for gpio-mockup
selftests: breakpoints: allow to cross-compile for aarch64/arm64
selftests/Makefile: Add missed PHONY targets
selftests/vm/run_vmtests: Fix wrong comment
selftests/Makefile: Add missed closing `"` in comment
selftests/vm/run_vmtests: Polish output text
selftests/timers: fix spelling mistake: "Asynchronous"
...
Add override with EXTRA_CLEAN for lib.mk clean to fix the following
warnings from clean target run.
Makefile:44: warning: overriding recipe for target 'clean'
../lib.mk:55: warning: ignoring old recipe for target 'clean'
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
The check between the hardware state and our shadow of it is
checked in the signal handler for all bounds exceptions,
even for the ones where we don't keep the shadow up2date.
This is a problem because when no shadow is kept the handler
fails at this point and hides the real reason of the
exception.
Move the check into the code-path evaluating normal bounds
exceptions to prevent this.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491488598-27346-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
i386 glibc is buggy and calls the sigaction syscall incorrectly.
This is asymptomatic for normal programs, but it blows up on
programs that do evil things with segmentation. The ldt_gdt
self-test is an example of such an evil program.
This doesn't appear to be a regression -- I think I just got lucky
with the uninitialized memory that glibc threw at the kernel when I
wrote the test.
This hackish fix manually issues sigaction(2) syscalls to undo the
damage. Without the fix, ldt_gdt_32 segfaults; with the fix, it
passes for me.
See: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=21269
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aaab0f9f93c9af25396f01232608c163a760a668.1490218061.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes and minor updates all over the place:
- an SGI/UV fix
- a defconfig update
- a build warning fix
- move the boot_params file to the arch location in debugfs
- a pkeys fix
- selftests fix
- boot message fixes
- sparse fixes
- a resume warning fix
- ioapic hotplug fixes
- reboot quirks
... plus various minor cleanups"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/build/x86_64_defconfig: Enable CONFIG_R8169
x86/reboot/quirks: Add ASUS EeeBook X205TA/W reboot quirk
x86/hpet: Prevent might sleep splat on resume
x86/boot: Correct setup_header.start_sys name
x86/purgatory: Fix sparse warning, symbol not declared
x86/purgatory: Make functions and variables static
x86/events: Remove last remnants of old filenames
x86/pkeys: Check against max pkey to avoid overflows
x86/ioapic: Split IOAPIC hot-removal into two steps
x86/PCI: Implement pcibios_release_device to release IRQ from IOAPIC
x86/intel_rdt: Remove duplicate inclusion of linux/cpu.h
x86/vmware: Remove duplicate inclusion of asm/timer.h
x86/hyperv: Hide unused label
x86/reboot/quirks: Add ASUS EeeBook X205TA reboot quirk
x86/platform/uv/BAU: Fix HUB errors by remove initial write to sw-ack register
x86/selftests: Add clobbers for int80 on x86_64
x86/apic: Simplify enable_IR_x2apic(), remove try_to_enable_IR()
x86/apic: Fix a warning message in logical CPU IDs allocation
x86/kdebugfs: Move boot params hierarchy under (debugfs)/x86/
PPC:
* correct assumption about ASDR on POWER9
* fix MMIO emulation on POWER9
x86:
* add a simple test for ioperm
* cleanup TSS
(going through KVM tree as the whole undertaking was caused by VMX's
use of TSS)
* fix nVMX interrupt delivery
* fix some performance counters in the guest
And two cleanup patches.
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Merge tag 'kvm-4.11-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull more KVM updates from Radim Krčmář:
"Second batch of KVM changes for the 4.11 merge window:
PPC:
- correct assumption about ASDR on POWER9
- fix MMIO emulation on POWER9
x86:
- add a simple test for ioperm
- cleanup TSS (going through KVM tree as the whole undertaking was
caused by VMX's use of TSS)
- fix nVMX interrupt delivery
- fix some performance counters in the guest
... and two cleanup patches"
* tag 'kvm-4.11-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: nVMX: Fix pending events injection
x86/kvm/vmx: remove unused variable in segment_base()
selftests/x86: Add a basic selftest for ioperm
x86/asm: Tidy up TSS limit code
kvm: convert kvm.users_count from atomic_t to refcount_t
KVM: x86: never specify a sample period for virtualized in_tx_cp counters
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't use ASDR for real-mode HPT faults on POWER9
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix software walk of guest process page tables
This doesn't fully exercise the interaction between KVM and ioperm(),
but it does test basic functionality.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Kernel erases R8..R11 registers prior returning to userspace
from int80:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2009/10/1/164
GCC can reuse these registers and doesn't expect them to change
during syscall invocation. I met this kind of bug in CRIU once
GCC 6.1 and CLANG stored local variables in those registers
and the kernel zerofied them during syscall:
990d33f1a1
By that reason I suggest to add those registers to clobbers
in selftests. Also, as noted by Andy - removed unneeded clobber
for flags in INT $0x80 inline asm.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170213101336.20486-1-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This update consists of:
-- fixes to several existing tests from Stafford Horne
-- cpufreq tests from Viresh Kumar
-- Selftest build and install fixes from Bamvor Jian Zhang
and Michael Ellerman
-- Fixes to protection-keys tests from Dave Hansen
-- Warning fixes from Shuah Khan
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Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull Kselftest update from Shuah Khan:
"This update consists of:
- fixes to several existing tests from Stafford Horne
- cpufreq tests from Viresh Kumar
- Selftest build and install fixes from Bamvor Jian Zhang and Michael
Ellerman
- Fixes to protection-keys tests from Dave Hansen
- Warning fixes from Shuah Khan"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (28 commits)
selftests/powerpc: Fix remaining fallout from recent changes
selftests/powerpc: Fix the clean rule since recent changes
selftests: Fix the .S and .S -> .o rules
selftests: Fix the .c linking rule
selftests: Fix selftests build to just build, not run tests
selftests, x86, protection_keys: fix wrong offset in siginfo
selftests, x86, protection_keys: fix uninitialized variable warning
selftest: cpufreq: Update MAINTAINERS file
selftest: cpufreq: Add special tests
selftest: cpufreq: Add support to test cpufreq modules
selftest: cpufreq: Add suspend/resume/hibernate support
selftest: cpufreq: Add support for cpufreq tests
selftests: Add intel_pstate to TARGETS
selftests/intel_pstate: Update makefile to match new style
selftests/intel_pstate: Fix warning on loop index overflow
cpupower: Restore format of frequency-info limit
selftests/futex: Add headers to makefile dependencies
selftests/futex: Add stdio used for logging
selftests: x86 protection_keys remove dead code
selftests: x86 protection_keys fix unused variable compile warnings
...
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"A laundry list of changes: KASAN improvements/fixes for ptdump, a
self-test fix, PAT cleanup and wbinvd() avoidance, removal of stale
code and documentation updates"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm/ptdump: Add address marker for KASAN shadow region
x86/mm/ptdump: Optimize check for W+X mappings for CONFIG_KASAN=y
x86/mm/pat: Use rb_entry()
x86/mpx: Re-add MPX to selftests Makefile
x86/mm: Remove CONFIG_DEBUG_NX_TEST
x86/mm/cpa: Avoid wbinvd() for PREEMPT
x86/mm: Improve documentation for low-level device I/O functions
Pull x86 asm update from Ingo Molnar:
"This adds a new SYSRET testcase"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SYSRET to noncanonical addresses
The siginfo contains a bunch of information about the fault.
For protection keys, it tells us which protection key's
permissions were violated.
The wrong offset in here leads to reading garbage and thus
failures in the tests.
We should probably eventually move this over to using the
kernel's headers defining the siginfo instead of a hard-coded
offset. But, for now, just do the simplest fix.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
'orig_pkru' might have been uninitialized here. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Ingo pointed out that the MPX tests were no longer in the selftests
Makefile. It appears that I shot myself in the foot on this one
and accidentally removed them when I added the pkeys tests, probably
from bungling a merge conflict.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 5f23f6d082 ("x86/pkeys: Add self-tests")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170201225629.C3070852@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Enable O and KBUILD_OUTPUT for kselftest. User could compile kselftest
to another directory by passing O or KBUILD_OUTPUT. And O is high
priority than KBUILD_OUTPUT.
Signed-off-by: Bamvor Jian Zhang <bamvor.zhangjian@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Fix spelling mistake in print test pass message.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
SYSRET to a noncanonical address will blow up on Intel CPUs. Linux
needs to prevent this from happening in two major cases, and the
criteria will become more complicated when support for larger virtual
address spaces is added.
A fast-path SYSCALL will fall through to the following instruction
using SYSRET without any particular checking. To prevent fall-through
to a noncanonical address, Linux prevents the highest canonical page
from being mapped. This test case checks a variety of possible maximum
addresses to make sure that either we can't map code there or that
SYSCALL fall-through works.
A slow-path system call can return anywhere. Linux needs to make sure
that, if the return address is non-canonical, it won't use SYSRET.
This test cases causes sigreturn() to return to a variety of addresses
(with RCX == RIP) and makes sure that nothing explodes.
Some of this code comes from Kirill Shutemov.
Kirill reported the following output with 5-level paging enabled:
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x800000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x800000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x1000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x1000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x2000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x2000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x4000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x4000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x8000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x8000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x10000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x10000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x20000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x20000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x40000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x40000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x80000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x80000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x100000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x100000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x200000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x200000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x400000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x400000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x800000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x800000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x1000000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x1000000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x2000000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x2000000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x4000000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x4000000000000000
[RUN] sigreturn to 0x8000000000000000
[OK] Got SIGSEGV at RIP=0x8000000000000000
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x7fffffffe000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x7ffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x800000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0xfffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x1000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x1fffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x2000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x3fffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x4000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x7fffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x8000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0xffffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x10000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x1ffffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x20000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x3ffffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x40000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x7ffffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x80000000000000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0xfffffffffff000
[OK] We survived
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x100000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0xfffffffffff000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x1fffffffffff000
[OK] mremap to 0x1ffffffffffe000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x200000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0x1fffffffffff000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x3fffffffffff000
[OK] mremap to 0x3ffffffffffe000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x400000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0x3fffffffffff000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x7fffffffffff000
[OK] mremap to 0x7ffffffffffe000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x800000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0x7fffffffffff000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0xffffffffffff000
[OK] mremap to 0xfffffffffffe000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x1000000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0xffffffffffff000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x1ffffffffffff000
[OK] mremap to 0x1fffffffffffe000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x2000000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0x1ffffffffffff000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x3ffffffffffff000
[OK] mremap to 0x3fffffffffffe000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x4000000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0x3ffffffffffff000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x7ffffffffffff000
[OK] mremap to 0x7fffffffffffe000 failed
[RUN] Trying a SYSCALL that falls through to 0x8000000000000000
[OK] mremap to 0x7ffffffffffff000 failed
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e70bd9a3f90657ba47b755100a20475d038fa26b.1482808435.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull protection keys syscall interface from Thomas Gleixner:
"This is the final step of Protection Keys support which adds the
syscalls so user space can actually allocate keys and protect memory
areas with them. Details and usage examples can be found in the
documentation.
The mm side of this has been acked by Mel"
* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/pkeys: Update documentation
x86/mm/pkeys: Do not skip PKRU register if debug registers are not used
x86/pkeys: Fix pkeys build breakage for some non-x86 arches
x86/pkeys: Add self-tests
x86/pkeys: Allow configuration of init_pkru
x86/pkeys: Default to a restrictive init PKRU
pkeys: Add details of system call use to Documentation/
generic syscalls: Wire up memory protection keys syscalls
x86: Wire up protection keys system calls
x86/pkeys: Allocation/free syscalls
x86/pkeys: Make mprotect_key() mask off additional vm_flags
mm: Implement new pkey_mprotect() system call
x86/pkeys: Add fault handling for PF_PK page fault bit
This code should be a good demonstration of how to use the new
system calls as well as how to use protection keys in general.
This code shows how to:
1. Manipulate the Protection Keys Rights User (PKRU) register
2. Set a protection key on memory
3. Fetch and/or modify PKRU from the signal XSAVE state
4. Read the kernel-provided protection key in the siginfo
5. Set up an execute-only mapping
There are currently 13 tests:
test_read_of_write_disabled_region
test_read_of_access_disabled_region
test_write_of_write_disabled_region
test_write_of_access_disabled_region
test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region
test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region
test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region
test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region
test_executing_on_unreadable_memory
test_ptrace_of_child
test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey
test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args
test_pkey_alloc_exhaust
Each of the tests is run with plain memory (via mmap(MAP_ANON)),
transparent huge pages, and hugetlb.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: shuahkh@osg.samsung.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163024.FC5A0C2D@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Should print this on vDSO remapping success (on new kernels):
[root@localhost ~]# ./test_mremap_vdso_32
AT_SYSINFO_EHDR is 0xf773f000
[NOTE] Moving vDSO: [f773f000, f7740000] -> [a000000, a001000]
[OK]
Or print that mremap() for vDSOs is unsupported:
[root@localhost ~]# ./test_mremap_vdso_32
AT_SYSINFO_EHDR is 0xf773c000
[NOTE] Moving vDSO: [0xf773c000, 0xf773d000] -> [0xf7737000, 0xf7738000]
[FAIL] mremap() of the vDSO does not work on this kernel!
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160628113539.13606-3-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
