Commit Graph

880 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mimi Zohar
c09c59e6a0 ima: replace GFP_KERNEL with GFP_NOFS
While running fsstress tests on the NFSv4 mounted ext3 and ext4
filesystem, the following call trace was generated on the nfs
server machine.

Replace GFP_KERNEL with GFP_NOFS in ima_iint_insert() to avoid a
potential deadlock.

     =================================
    [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
    2.6.31-31.el6.x86_64 #1
    ---------------------------------
    inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage.
    kswapd2/75 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
     (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811edd5e>] jbd2_journal_start+0xfe/0x13f
    {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
      [<ffffffff81091e40>] mark_held_locks+0x65/0x99
      [<ffffffff81091f31>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xbd/0xf5
      [<ffffffff81126fdd>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x40/0x185
      [<ffffffff812344d7>] ima_iint_insert+0x3d/0xf1
      [<ffffffff812345b0>] ima_inode_alloc+0x25/0x44
      [<ffffffff811484ac>] inode_init_always+0xec/0x271
      [<ffffffff81148682>] alloc_inode+0x51/0xa1
      [<ffffffff81148700>] new_inode+0x2e/0x94
      [<ffffffff811b2f08>] ext4_new_inode+0xb8/0xdc9
      [<ffffffff811be611>] ext4_create+0xcf/0x175
      [<ffffffff8113e2cd>] vfs_create+0x82/0xb8
      [<ffffffff8113f337>] do_filp_open+0x32c/0x9ee
      [<ffffffff811309b9>] do_sys_open+0x6c/0x12c
      [<ffffffff81130adc>] sys_open+0x2e/0x44
      [<ffffffff81011e42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
    irq event stamp: 90371
    hardirqs last  enabled at (90371): [<ffffffff8112708d>]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0xf0/0x185
    hardirqs last disabled at (90370): [<ffffffff81127026>]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x89/0x185
    softirqs last  enabled at (89492): [<ffffffff81068ecf>]
    __do_softirq+0x1bf/0x1eb
    softirqs last disabled at (89477): [<ffffffff8101312c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30

    other info that might help us debug this:
    2 locks held by kswapd2/75:
     #0:  (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff810f98ba>] shrink_slab+0x44/0x177
     #1:  (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff811450ba>]

Reported-by: Muni P. Beerakam <mbeeraka@in.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Amit K. Arora <amitarora@in.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-11-19 08:42:01 +11:00
David Howells
21279cfa10 KEYS: get_instantiation_keyring() should inc the keyring refcount in all cases
The destination keyring specified to request_key() and co. is made available to
the process that instantiates the key (the slave process started by
/sbin/request-key typically).  This is passed in the request_key_auth struct as
the dest_keyring member.

keyctl_instantiate_key and keyctl_negate_key() call get_instantiation_keyring()
to get the keyring to attach the newly constructed key to at the end of
instantiation.  This may be given a specific keyring into which a link will be
made later, or it may be asked to find the keyring passed to request_key().  In
the former case, it returns a keyring with the refcount incremented by
lookup_user_key(); in the latter case, it returns the keyring from the
request_key_auth struct - and does _not_ increment the refcount.

The latter case will eventually result in an oops when the keyring prematurely
runs out of references and gets destroyed.  The effect may take some time to
show up as the key is destroyed lazily.

To fix this, the keyring returned by get_instantiation_keyring() must always
have its refcount incremented, no matter where it comes from.

This can be tested by setting /etc/request-key.conf to:

#OP	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	CALLOUT INFO	PROGRAM ARG1 ARG2 ARG3 ...
#======	=======	===============	===============	===============================
create  *	test:*		*		|/bin/false %u %g %d %{user:_display}
negate	*	*		*		/bin/keyctl negate %k 10 @u

and then doing:

	keyctl add user _display aaaaaaaa @u
        while keyctl request2 user test:x test:x @u &&
        keyctl list @u;
        do
                keyctl request2 user test:x test:x @u;
                sleep 31;
                keyctl list @u;
        done

which will oops eventually.  Changing the negate line to have @u rather than
%S at the end is important as that forces the latter case by passing a special
keyring ID rather than an actual keyring ID.

Reported-by: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-10-15 15:19:58 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
828c09509b const: constify remaining file_operations
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix KVM]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-10-01 16:11:11 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
6d39b27f0a Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  lsm: Use a compressed IPv6 string format in audit events
  Audit: send signal info if selinux is disabled
  Audit: rearrange audit_context to save 16 bytes per struct
  Audit: reorganize struct audit_watch to save 8 bytes
2009-09-24 08:31:04 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
8d65af789f sysctl: remove "struct file *" argument of ->proc_handler
It's unused.

It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl
shouldn't care about the rest.

It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:21:04 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
0b7570e77f do_wait() wakeup optimization: change __wake_up_parent() to use filtered wakeup
Ratan Nalumasu reported that in a process with many threads doing
unnecessary wakeups.  Every waiting thread in the process wakes up to loop
through the children and see that the only ones it cares about are still
not ready.

Now that we have struct wait_opts we can change do_wait/__wake_up_parent
to use filtered wakeups.

We can make child_wait_callback() more clever later, right now it only
checks eligible_child().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Ratan Nalumasu <rnalumasu@gmail.com>
Cc: Vitaly Mayatskikh <vmayatsk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:20:59 -07:00
Ben Blum
be367d0992 cgroups: let ss->can_attach and ss->attach do whole threadgroups at a time
Alter the ss->can_attach and ss->attach functions to be able to deal with
a whole threadgroup at a time, for use in cgroup_attach_proc.  (This is a
pre-patch to cgroup-procs-writable.patch.)

Currently, new mode of the attach function can only tell the subsystem
about the old cgroup of the threadgroup leader.  No subsystem currently
needs that information for each thread that's being moved, but if one were
to be added (for example, one that counts tasks within a group) this bit
would need to be reworked a bit to tell the subsystem the right
information.

[hidave.darkstar@gmail.com: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Ben Blum <bblum@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:20:58 -07:00
Paul Moore
d81165919e lsm: Use a compressed IPv6 string format in audit events
Currently the audit subsystem prints uncompressed IPv6 addresses which not
only differs from common usage but also results in ridiculously large audit
strings which is not a good thing.  This patch fixes this by simply converting
audit to always print compressed IPv6 addresses.

Old message example:

 audit(1253576792.161:30): avc:  denied  { ingress } for
  saddr=0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001 src=5000
  daddr=0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001 dest=35502 netif=lo
  scontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
  tcontext=system_u:object_r:lo_netif_t:s0-s15:c0.c1023 tclass=netif

New message example:

 audit(1253576792.161:30): avc:  denied  { ingress } for
  saddr=::1 src=5000 daddr=::1 dest=35502 netif=lo
  scontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
  tcontext=system_u:object_r:lo_netif_t:s0-s15:c0.c1023 tclass=netif

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-09-24 03:50:26 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
c82ffab9a8 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  SELinux: do not destroy the avc_cache_nodep
  KEYS: Have the garbage collector set its timer for live expired keys
  tpm-fixup-pcrs-sysfs-file-update
  creds_are_invalid() needs to be exported for use by modules:
  include/linux/cred.h: fix build

Fix trivial BUILD_BUG_ON-induced conflicts in drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
2009-09-23 15:18:57 -07:00
Eric Paris
5224ee0863 SELinux: do not destroy the avc_cache_nodep
The security_ops reset done when SELinux is disabled at run time is done
after the avc cache is freed and after the kmem_cache for the avc is also
freed.  This means that between the time the selinux disable code destroys
the avc_node_cachep another process could make a security request and could
try to allocate from the cache.  We are just going to leave the cachep around,
like we always have.

SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [<ffffffff81122537>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
last sysfs file:
CPU 1
Modules linked in:
Pid: 12, comm: khelper Not tainted 2.6.31-tip-05525-g0eeacc6-dirty #14819
System Product Name
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81122537>]  [<ffffffff81122537>]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185
RSP: 0018:ffff88003f9258b0  EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000078c0129e
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8130b626 RDI: ffffffff81122528
RBP: ffff88003f925900 R08: 0000000078c0129e R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000078c0129e R12: 0000000000000246
R13: 0000000000008020 R14: ffff88003f8586d8 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880002b00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001001000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: ffffffff827bd420 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process khelper (pid: 12, threadinfo ffff88003f924000, task
ffff88003f928000)
Stack:
 0000000000000246 0000802000000246 ffffffff8130b626 0000000000000001
<0> 0000000078c0129e 0000000000000000 ffff88003f925a70 0000000000000002
<0> 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 ffff88003f925960 ffffffff8130b626
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8130b626>] ? avc_alloc_node+0x36/0x273
 [<ffffffff8130b626>] avc_alloc_node+0x36/0x273
 [<ffffffff8130b545>] ? avc_latest_notif_update+0x7d/0x9e
 [<ffffffff8130b8b4>] avc_insert+0x51/0x18d
 [<ffffffff8130bcce>] avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x9d/0x128
 [<ffffffff8130bf20>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0x88
 [<ffffffff8130f99d>] current_has_perm+0x52/0x6d
 [<ffffffff8130fbb2>] selinux_task_create+0x2f/0x45
 [<ffffffff81303bf7>] security_task_create+0x29/0x3f
 [<ffffffff8105c6ba>] copy_process+0x82/0xdf0
 [<ffffffff81091578>] ? register_lock_class+0x2f/0x36c
 [<ffffffff81091a13>] ? mark_lock+0x2e/0x1e1
 [<ffffffff8105d596>] do_fork+0x16e/0x382
 [<ffffffff81091578>] ? register_lock_class+0x2f/0x36c
 [<ffffffff810d9166>] ? probe_workqueue_execution+0x57/0xf9
 [<ffffffff81091a13>] ? mark_lock+0x2e/0x1e1
 [<ffffffff810d9166>] ? probe_workqueue_execution+0x57/0xf9
 [<ffffffff8100cdb2>] kernel_thread+0x82/0xe0
 [<ffffffff81078b1f>] ? ____call_usermodehelper+0x0/0x139
 [<ffffffff8100ce10>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20
 [<ffffffff81078aea>] ? __call_usermodehelper+0x65/0x9a
 [<ffffffff8107a5c7>] run_workqueue+0x171/0x27e
 [<ffffffff8107a573>] ? run_workqueue+0x11d/0x27e
 [<ffffffff81078a85>] ? __call_usermodehelper+0x0/0x9a
 [<ffffffff8107a7bc>] worker_thread+0xe8/0x10f
 [<ffffffff810808e2>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x63
 [<ffffffff8107a6d4>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x10f
 [<ffffffff8108042e>] kthread+0x91/0x99
 [<ffffffff8100ce1a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20
 [<ffffffff8100c754>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30
 [<ffffffff8108039d>] ? kthread+0x0/0x99
 [<ffffffff8100ce10>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20
Code: 0f 85 99 00 00 00 9c 58 66 66 90 66 90 49 89 c4 fa 66 66 90 66 66 90
e8 83 34 fb ff e8 d7 e9 26 00 48 98 49 8b 94 c6 10 01 00 00 <48> 8b 1a 44
8b 7a 18 48 85 db 74 0f 8b 42 14 48 8b 04 c3 ff 42
RIP  [<ffffffff81122537>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185
 RSP <ffff88003f9258b0>
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace 42f41a982344e606 ]---

Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23 11:16:20 -07:00
David Howells
606531c316 KEYS: Have the garbage collector set its timer for live expired keys
The key garbage collector sets a timer to start a new collection cycle at the
point the earliest key to expire should be considered garbage.  However, it
currently only does this if the key it is considering hasn't yet expired.

If the key being considering has expired, but hasn't yet reached the collection
time then it is ignored, and won't be collected until some other key provokes a
round of collection.

Make the garbage collector set the timer for the earliest key that hasn't yet
passed its collection time, rather than the earliest key that hasn't yet
expired.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23 11:03:47 -07:00
James Morris
88e9d34c72 seq_file: constify seq_operations
Make all seq_operations structs const, to help mitigate against
revectoring user-triggerable function pointers.

This is derived from the grsecurity patch, although generated from scratch
because it's simpler than extracting the changes from there.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:29 -07:00
Nick Black
1fd7317d02 Move magic numbers into magic.h
Move various magic-number definitions into magic.h.

Signed-off-by: Nick Black <dank@qemfd.net>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:28 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
1aaf2e5913 Merge branch 'x86-txt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'x86-txt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86
  x86, intel_txt: Handle ACPI_SLEEP without X86_TRAMPOLINE
  x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help
  x86, intel_txt: Factor out the code for S3 setup
  x86, intel_txt: tboot.c needs <asm/fixmap.h>
  intel_txt: Force IOMMU on for Intel TXT launch
  x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT Sx shutdown support
  x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT reboot/halt shutdown support
  x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support
2009-09-15 09:19:20 -07:00
David Howells
c08ef808ef KEYS: Fix garbage collector
Fix a number of problems with the new key garbage collector:

 (1) A rogue semicolon in keyring_gc() was causing the initial count of dead
     keys to be miscalculated.

 (2) A missing return in keyring_gc() meant that under certain circumstances,
     the keyring semaphore would be unlocked twice.

 (3) The key serial tree iterator (key_garbage_collector()) part of the garbage
     collector has been modified to:

     (a) Complete each scan of the keyrings before setting the new timer.

     (b) Only set the new timer for keys that have yet to expire.  This means
         that the new timer is now calculated correctly, and the gc doesn't
         get into a loop continually scanning for keys that have expired, and
         preventing other things from happening, like RCU cleaning up the old
         keyring contents.

     (c) Perform an extra scan if any keys were garbage collected in this one
     	 as a key might become garbage during a scan, and (b) could mean we
     	 don't set the timer again.

 (4) Made key_schedule_gc() take the time at which to do a collection run,
     rather than the time at which the key expires.  This means the collection
     of dead keys (key type unregistered) can happen immediately.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-15 09:11:02 +10:00
Marc Dionne
5c84342a3e KEYS: Unlock tasklist when exiting early from keyctl_session_to_parent
When we exit early from keyctl_session_to_parent because of permissions or
because the session keyring is the same as the parent, we need to unlock the
tasklist.

The missing unlock causes the system to hang completely when using
keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT) with a keyring shared with the parent.

Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-15 09:10:59 +10:00
Eric Paris
4e6d0bffd3 SELinux: flush the avc before disabling SELinux
Before SELinux is disabled at boot it can create AVC entries.  This patch
will flush those entries before disabling SELinux.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14 12:34:11 +10:00
Eric Paris
008574b111 SELinux: seperate avc_cache flushing
Move the avc_cache flushing into it's own function so it can be reused when
disabling SELinux.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14 12:34:09 +10:00
Eric Paris
ed868a5698 Creds: creds->security can be NULL is selinux is disabled
__validate_process_creds should check if selinux is actually enabled before
running tests on the selinux portion of the credentials struct.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14 12:34:07 +10:00
James Morris
a3c8b97396 Merge branch 'next' into for-linus 2009-09-11 08:04:49 +10:00
David P. Quigley
ddd29ec659 sysfs: Add labeling support for sysfs
This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink
inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the
previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for
the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the
sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the
iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event
that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only
stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved
into one dynamically allocated field.

This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI
configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs
required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd
access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained
labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled
appropriately.

[sds:  Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.]

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10 10:11:29 +10:00
David P. Quigley
1ee65e37e9 LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information.
This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get
all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is
used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context
derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the
LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are
for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security
on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's
explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below.

Quote Stephen Smalley

inode_setsecctx:  Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the
fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
operation.

inode_notifysecctx:  Notify the security module of what the security
context of an inode should be.  Initializes the incore security context
managed by the security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS
client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its
incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the
server returned the file's attributes to the client.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10 10:11:24 +10:00
Mimi Zohar
acd0c93517 IMA: update ima_counts_put
- As ima_counts_put() may be called after the inode has been freed,
verify that the inode is not NULL, before dereferencing it.

- Maintain the IMA file counters in may_open() properly, decrementing
any counter increments on subsequent errors.

Reported-by: Ciprian Docan <docan@eden.rutgers.edu>
Reported-by: J.R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-07 11:54:58 +10:00
David Howells
ee18d64c1f KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:22 +10:00
David Howells
7b1b916459 KEYS: Do some whitespace cleanups [try #6]
Do some whitespace cleanups in the key management code.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:16 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn
ad73a717e0 KEYS: Make /proc/keys use keyid not numread as file position [try #6]
Make the file position maintained by /proc/keys represent the ID of the key
just read rather than the number of keys read.  This should make it faster to
perform a lookup as we don't have to scan the key ID tree from the beginning to
find the current position.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:14 +10:00
David Howells
5d135440fa KEYS: Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. [try #6]
Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys.  This involved
erasing all links to such keys from keyrings that point to them.  At that
point, the key will be deleted in the normal manner.

Keyrings from which garbage collection occurs are shrunk and their quota
consumption reduced as appropriate.

Dead keys (for which the key type has been removed) will be garbage collected
immediately.

Revoked and expired keys will hang around for a number of seconds, as set in
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay before being automatically removed.  The default
is 5 minutes.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:11 +10:00
David Howells
f041ae2f99 KEYS: Flag dead keys to induce EKEYREVOKED [try #6]
Set the KEY_FLAG_DEAD flag on keys for which the type has been removed.  This
causes the key_permission() function to return EKEYREVOKED in response to
various commands.  It does not, however, prevent unlinking or clearing of
keyrings from detaching the key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:09 +10:00
David Howells
0c2c9a3fc7 KEYS: Allow keyctl_revoke() on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE perm [try #6]
Allow keyctl_revoke() to operate on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE
permission, rather than only on keys that have WRITE permission.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:06 +10:00
David Howells
5593122eec KEYS: Deal with dead-type keys appropriately [try #6]
Allow keys for which the key type has been removed to be unlinked.  Currently
dead-type keys can only be disposed of by completely clearing the keyrings
that point to them.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:04 +10:00
David Howells
e0e817392b CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).

Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.

This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):

	http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:01 +10:00
Ingo Molnar
936e894a97 Merge commit 'v2.6.31-rc8' into x86/txt
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
	security/Kconfig

Merge reason: resolve the conflicts, bump up from rc3 to rc8.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-02 08:17:56 +02:00
Shane Wang
69575d3886 x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86
Move tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt
patch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code
init/main.c and kernel/cpu.c.

Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-09-01 18:25:07 -07:00
Paul Moore
ed6d76e4c3 selinux: Support for the new TUN LSM hooks
Add support for the new TUN LSM hooks: security_tun_dev_create(),
security_tun_dev_post_create() and security_tun_dev_attach().  This includes
the addition of a new object class, tun_socket, which represents the socks
associated with TUN devices.  The _tun_dev_create() and _tun_dev_post_create()
hooks are fairly similar to the standard socket functions but _tun_dev_attach()
is a bit special.  The _tun_dev_attach() is unique because it involves a
domain attaching to an existing TUN device and its associated tun_socket
object, an operation which does not exist with standard sockets and most
closely resembles a relabel operation.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-01 08:29:52 +10:00
Paul Moore
2b980dbd77 lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver
The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules,
such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by
TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as
QEMU and KVM.  This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the
creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are:

 * security_tun_dev_create()
   Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices

 * security_tun_dev_post_create()
   Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly
   created TUN devices

 * security_tun_dev_attach()
   Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices
   and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-01 08:29:48 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
5311034ddd Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  IMA: iint put in ima_counts_get and put
2009-08-26 20:17:07 -07:00
Eric Paris
53a7197aff IMA: iint put in ima_counts_get and put
ima_counts_get() calls ima_iint_find_insert_get() which takes a reference
to the iint in question, but does not put that reference at the end of the
function.  This can lead to a nasty memory leak.  Easy enough to reproduce:

#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main (void)
{
	int i;
	void *ptr;

	for (i=0; i < 100000; i++) {
		ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
			   MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
		if (ptr == MAP_FAILED)
			return 2;
		munmap(ptr, 4096);
	}

	return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-27 11:01:03 +10:00
Mimi Zohar
16bfa38b19 ima: hashing large files bug fix
Hashing files larger than INT_MAX causes process to loop.
Dependent on redefining kernel_read() offset type to loff_t.

(http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13909)

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-24 14:58:29 +10:00
Amerigo Wang
bc6a6008e5 selinux: adjust rules for ATTR_FORCE
As suggested by OGAWA Hirofumi in thread:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/8/7/132, we should let selinux_inode_setattr()
to match our ATTR_* rules.  ATTR_FORCE should not force things like
ATTR_SIZE.

[hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp: tweaks]
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-21 14:25:30 +10:00
James Morris
ece13879e7 Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	security/Kconfig

Manual fix.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-20 09:18:42 +10:00
Andreas Schwab
024e6cb408 security: Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

(Verbs are cool!)

Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-19 08:42:56 +10:00
Dave Jones
a58578e47f security: Make LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR default match its help text.
Commit 788084aba2 added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
option, whose help text states "For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots
of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems."
Which implies that it's default setting was typoed.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-19 08:38:29 +10:00
Eric Paris
788084aba2 Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.

The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
Eric Paris
8cf948e744 SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook.  This
means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the
memory space.  This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while
maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero.  This means that processes
which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will
NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:08:48 +10:00
Eric Paris
9c0d90103c Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY.  This patch moves cap_file_mmap
into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
checks are done.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:08:35 +10:00
Thomas Liu
2bf4969032 SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability.

 - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
    avc_audit_data
 - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.

Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit
can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without
doing the actual dump.  This makes it so that the patched version
behaves the same way as the unpatched version.

Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space,
once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the
unpatched.

I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after
this patch.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 08:37:18 +10:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
3c556e4198 x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-08-14 16:43:15 -07:00
Eric Paris
25354c4fee SELinux: add selinux_kernel_module_request
This patch adds a new selinux hook so SELinux can arbitrate if a given
process should be allowed to trigger a request for the kernel to try to
load a module.  This is a different operation than a process trying to load
a module itself, which is already protected by CAP_SYS_MODULE.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-14 11:18:40 +10:00
Eric Paris
9188499cdb security: introducing security_request_module
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel.  This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary.  This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-14 11:18:37 +10:00
James Morris
314dabb83a SELinux: fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c
Fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c

The buffer always needs to be freed here; we either error
out or allocate more memory.

Reported-by: iceberg <strakh@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2009-08-11 08:37:13 +10:00