Userspace needs to know the highest valid capability of the running
kernel, which right now cannot reliably be retrieved from the header files
only. The fact that this value cannot be determined properly right now
creates various problems for libraries compiled on newer header files
which are run on older kernels. They assume capabilities are available
which actually aren't. libcap-ng is one example. And we ran into the
same problem with systemd too.
Now the capability is exported in /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make cap_last_cap const, per Ulrich]
Signed-off-by: Dan Ballard <dan@mindstab.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@akkadia.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support for the shm_rmid_forced sysctl. If set to 1, all shared
memory objects in current ipc namespace will be automatically forced to
use IPC_RMID.
The POSIX way of handling shmem allows one to create shm objects and
call shmdt(), leaving shm object associated with no process, thus
consuming memory not counted via rlimits.
With shm_rmid_forced=1 the shared memory object is counted at least for
one process, so OOM killer may effectively kill the fat process holding
the shared memory.
It obviously breaks POSIX - some programs relying on the feature would
stop working. So set shm_rmid_forced=1 only if you're sure nobody uses
"orphaned" memory. Use shm_rmid_forced=0 by default for compatability
reasons.
The feature was previously impemented in -ow as a configure option.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix documentation, per Randy]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: readability/conventionality tweaks]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix shm_rmid_forced/shm_forced_rmid confusion, use standard comment layout]
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Refresh sysctl/kernel.txt. More specifically,
- drop stale index entries
- sync and sort index and entries
- reflow sticking out paragraphs to colwidth 72
- correct typos
- cleanup whitespace
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now, exe_file is not proc FS dependent, so we can use it to name core
file. So we add %E pattern for core file name cration which extract path
from mm_struct->exe_file. Then it converts slashes to exclamation marks
and pastes the result to the core file name itself.
This is useful for environments where binary names are longer than 16
character (the current->comm limitation). Also where there are binaries
with same name but in a different path. Further in case the binery itself
changes its current->comm after exec.
So by doing (s/$/#/ -- # is treated as git comment):
$ sysctl kernel.core_pattern='core.%p.%e.%E'
$ ln /bin/cat cat45678901234567890
$ ./cat45678901234567890
^Z
$ rm cat45678901234567890
$ fg
^\Quit (core dumped)
$ ls core*
we now get:
core.2434.cat456789012345.!root!cat45678901234567890 (deleted)
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
sysctl.
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.
If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Eric Paris pointed out that it doesn't make sense to require
both CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYSLOG for certain syslog actions.
So require CAP_SYSLOG, not CAP_SYS_ADMIN, when dmesg_restrict
is set.
(I'm also consolidating the now common error path)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.
This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are
enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the
kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add documentation for kernel/bootloader_type and
kernel/bootloader_version to sysctl/kernel.txt. This should really
have been done a long time ago.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Introduce core pipe limiting sysctl.
Since we can dump cores to pipe, rather than directly to the filesystem,
we create a condition in which a user can create a very high load on the
system simply by running bad applications.
If the pipe reader specified in core_pattern is poorly written, we can
have lots of ourstandig resources and processes in the system.
This sysctl introduces an ability to limit that resource consumption.
core_pipe_limit defines how many in-flight dumps may be run in parallel,
dumps beyond this value are skipped and a note is made in the kernel log.
A special value of 0 in core_pipe_limit denotes unlimited core dumps may
be handled (this is the default value).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When syslog is not possible, at the same time there's no serial/net
console available, it will be hard to read the printk messages. For
example oops/panic/warning messages in shutdown phase.
Add a printk delay feature, we can make each printk message delay some
milliseconds.
Setting the delay by proc/sysctl interface: /proc/sys/kernel/printk_delay
The value range from 0 - 10000, default value is 0
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix a few things]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The documentation for /proc/sys/kernel/* does not mention the possible
value 2 for randomize-va-space yet. While being there, doing some
reformatting, fixing grammar problems and clarifying the correlations
between randomize-va-space, kernel parameter "norandmaps" and the
CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK option.
Signed-off-by: Horst Schirmeier <horst@schirmeier.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is
redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys
desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls.
Details are:
merge
- 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data
- 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem
- 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface
with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt.
remove
- 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats
since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt.
merge
- 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters
with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt
remove
- 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters
since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now.
remove
- 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls
since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt
move
- 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff
- 2.9 Appletalk
- 2.10 IPX
to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt.
remove
- 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings
since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt.
add
- Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters
to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters.
Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement a sysctl file that disables module-loading system-wide since
there is no longer a viable way to remove CAP_SYS_MODULE after the system
bounding capability set was removed in 2.6.25.
Value can only be set to "1", and is tested only if standard capability
checks allow CAP_SYS_MODULE. Given existing /dev/mem protections, this
should allow administrators a one-way method to block module loading
after initial boot-time module loading has finished.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This fills in the documentation for all of the current kernel taint
flags, and fixes the number for TAINT_CRAP, which was incorrectly
described.
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
We need to add a flag for all code that is in the drivers/staging/
directory to prevent all other kernel developers from worrying about
issues here, and to notify users that the drivers might not be as good
as they are normally used to.
Based on code from Andreas Gruenbacher and Jeff Mahoney to provide a
TAINT flag for the support level of a kernel module in the Novell
enterprise kernel release.
This is the kernel portion of this feature, the ability for the flag to
be set needs to be done in the build process and will happen in a
follow-up patch.
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch fixes a reference to Documentation/kmod.txt
which was apparently renamed to Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
Signed-off-by: Michael Opdenacker <michael@free-electrons.com>
Cc: "Randy.Dunlap" <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Control the trigger limit for softlockup warnings. This is useful for
debugging softlockups, by lowering the softlockup_thresh to identify
possible softlockups earlier.
This patch:
1. Adds a sysctl softlockup_thresh with valid values of 1-60s
(Higher value to disable false positives)
2. Changes the softlockup printk to print the cpu softlockup time
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: Fix various warnings and add definition of "two"]
Signed-off-by: Ravikiran Thirumalai <kiran@scalex86.org>
Signed-off-by: Shai Fultheim <shai@scalex86.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix various typos in kernel docs and Kconfigs, 2.6.21-rc4.
Signed-off-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Fix the misspellings of "propogate", "writting" and (oh, the shame
:-) "kenrel" in the source tree.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Add sysctl for kstack_depth_to_print. This lets users change
the amount of raw stack data printed in dump_stack() without
having to reboot.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
The pipe-a-coredump-to-a-program feature was undocumented.
*Grumble*.
NB: a good enhancement to that patch would be: save all the stuff that a
core file can get from the %x expansions in the environment.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Urlichs <matthias@urlichs.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Sergey Vlasov noticed that there is not kernel.suid_dumpable, but
fs.suid_dumpable.
How KERN_SETUID_DUMPABLE ended up in fs_table[]? Hell knows...
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Currently, acpi video options can only be set on kernel command line. That's
little inflexible; I'd like userland s2ram application that just works, and
modifying kernel command line according to whitelist is not fun. It is better
to just allow s2ram application to set video options just before suspend
(according to the whitelist).
This implements sysctl to allow setting suspend video options without reboot.
(akpm: Documentation updates for this new sysctl are pending..)
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Cc: "Brown, Len" <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: "Antonino A. Daplas" <adaplas@pol.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl:
This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped
1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended
for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.
2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but
not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will
not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when
adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.
(akpm:
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL?
No problem to me.
> > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
> > current->mm->dumpable = 1;
>
> Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER?
Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines
should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go
everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used
as a bool in untouched code)
> Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that
> would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too.
Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat
rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic
diff because it is used all over the place.
)
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!