Niklāvs reported a boot regression on an Alderlake machine and bisected it
to commit 9df9d2f047 ("init: Invoke arch_cpu_finalize_init() earlier").
By moving the invocation of arch_cpu_finalize_init() further down he
identified that efi_enter_virtual_mode() is the function which causes the
boot hang.
The main difference of the earlier invocation is that the boot CPU is
already fully initialized and mitigations and alternatives are applied.
But the only really interesting change turned out to be IBT, which is now
enabled before efi_enter_virtual_mode(). "ibt=off" on the kernel command
line cured the problem.
Inspection of the involved calls in efi_enter_virtual_mode() unearthed that
efi_set_virtual_address_map() is the only place in the kernel which invokes
an EFI call without the IBT safe wrapper. This went obviously unnoticed so
far as IBT was enabled later.
Use arch_efi_call_virt() instead of efi_call() to cure that.
Fixes: fe379fa4d1 ("x86/ibt: Disable IBT around firmware")
Fixes: 9df9d2f047 ("init: Invoke arch_cpu_finalize_init() earlier")
Reported-by: Niklāvs Koļesņikovs <pinkflames.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217602
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87jzvm12q0.ffs@tglx
UEFI v2.10 extends the EFI memory attributes table with a flag that
indicates whether or not all RuntimeServicesCode regions were
constructed with ENDBR landing pads, permitting the OS to map these
regions with IBT restrictions enabled.
So let's take this into account on x86 as well.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> # ibt_save() changes
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Add the generic plumbing to detect whether or not the runtime code
regions were constructed with BTI/IBT landing pads by the firmware,
permitting the OS to enable enforcement when mapping these regions into
the OS's address space.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We currently pass a minimum major version to the generic EFI helper that
checks the system table magic and version, and refuse to boot if the
value is lower.
The motivation for this check is unknown, and even the code that uses
major version 2 as the minimum (ARM, arm64 and RISC-V) should make it
past this check without problems, and boot to a point where we have
access to a console or some other means to inform the user that the
firmware's major revision number made us unhappy. (Revision 2.0 of the
UEFI specification was released in January 2006, whereas ARM, arm64 and
RISC-V support where added in 2009, 2013 and 2017, respectively, so
checking for major version 2 or higher is completely arbitrary)
So just drop the check.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=KULr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'pci-v6.2-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci
Pull PCI updates from Bjorn Helgaas:
"Enumeration:
- Squash portdrv_{core,pci}.c into portdrv.c to ease maintenance and
make more things static.
- Make portdrv bind to Switch Ports that have AER. Previously, if
these Ports lacked MSI/MSI-X, portdrv failed to bind, which meant
the Ports couldn't be suspended to low-power states. AER on these
Ports doesn't use interrupts, and the AER driver doesn't need to
claim them.
- Assign PCI domain IDs using ida_alloc(), which makes host bridge
add/remove work better.
Resource management:
- To work better with recent BIOSes that use EfiMemoryMappedIO for
PCI host bridge apertures, remove those regions from the E820 map
(E820 entries normally prevent us from allocating BARs). In v5.19,
we added some quirks to disable E820 checking, but that's not very
maintainable. EfiMemoryMappedIO means the OS needs to map the
region for use by EFI runtime services; it shouldn't prevent OS
from using it.
PCIe native device hotplug:
- Build pciehp by default if USB4 is enabled, since Thunderbolt/USB4
PCIe tunneling depends on native PCIe hotplug.
- Enable Command Completed Interrupt only if supported to avoid user
confusion from lspci output that says this is enabled but not
supported.
- Prevent pciehp from binding to Switch Upstream Ports; this happened
because of interaction with acpiphp and caused devices below the
Upstream Port to disappear.
Power management:
- Convert AGP drivers to generic power management. We hope to remove
legacy power management from the PCI core eventually.
Virtualization:
- Fix pci_device_is_present(), which previously always returned
"false" for VFs, causing virtio hangs when unbinding the driver.
Miscellaneous:
- Convert drivers to gpiod API to prepare for dropping some legacy
code.
- Fix DOE fencepost error for the maximum data object length.
Baikal-T1 PCIe controller driver:
- Add driver and DT bindings.
Broadcom STB PCIe controller driver:
- Enable Multi-MSI.
- Delay 100ms after PERST# deassert to allow power and clocks to
stabilize.
- Configure Read Completion Boundary to 64 bytes.
Freescale i.MX6 PCIe controller driver:
- Initialize PHY before deasserting core reset to fix a regression in
v6.0 on boards where the PHY provides the reference.
- Fix imx6sx and imx8mq clock names in DT schema.
Intel VMD host bridge driver:
- Fix Secondary Bus Reset on VMD bridges, which allows reset of NVMe
SSDs in VT-d pass-through scenarios.
- Disable MSI remapping, which gets re-enabled by firmware during
suspend/resume.
MediaTek PCIe Gen3 controller driver:
- Add MT7986 and MT8195 support.
Qualcomm PCIe controller driver:
- Add SC8280XP/SA8540P basic interconnect support.
Rockchip DesignWare PCIe controller driver:
- Base DT schema on common Synopsys schema.
Synopsys DesignWare PCIe core:
- Collect DT items shared between Root Port and Endpoint (PERST GPIO,
PHY info, clocks, resets, link speed, number of lanes, number of
iATU windows, interrupt info, etc) to snps,dw-pcie-common.yaml.
- Add dma-ranges support for Root Ports and Endpoints.
- Consolidate DT resource retrieval for "dbi", "dbi2", "atu", etc. to
reduce code duplication.
- Add generic names for clocks and resets to encourage more
consistent naming across drivers using DesignWare IP.
- Stop advertising PTM Responder role for Endpoints, which aren't
allowed to be responders.
TI J721E PCIe driver:
- Add j721s2 host mode ID to DT schema.
- Add interrupt properties to DT schema.
Toshiba Visconti PCIe controller driver:
- Fix interrupts array max constraints in DT schema"
* tag 'pci-v6.2-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci: (95 commits)
x86/PCI: Use pr_info() when possible
x86/PCI: Fix log message typo
x86/PCI: Tidy E820 removal messages
PCI: Skip allocate_resource() if too little space available
efi/x86: Remove EfiMemoryMappedIO from E820 map
PCI/portdrv: Allow AER service only for Root Ports & RCECs
PCI: xilinx-nwl: Fix coding style violations
PCI: mvebu: Switch to using gpiod API
PCI: pciehp: Enable Command Completed Interrupt only if supported
PCI: aardvark: Switch to using devm_gpiod_get_optional()
dt-bindings: PCI: mediatek-gen3: add support for mt7986
dt-bindings: PCI: mediatek-gen3: add SoC based clock config
dt-bindings: PCI: qcom: Allow 'dma-coherent' property
PCI: mt7621: Add sentinel to quirks table
PCI: vmd: Fix secondary bus reset for Intel bridges
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Fix sparse ntb->reg build warning
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Fix sparse build warning for epf_db
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Replace hardcoded 4 with sizeof(u32)
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Remove unused epf_db_phy struct member
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Fix call pci_epc_mem_free_addr() in error path
...
Firmware can use EfiMemoryMappedIO to request that MMIO regions be mapped
by the OS so they can be accessed by EFI runtime services, but should have
no other significance to the OS (UEFI r2.10, sec 7.2). However, most
bootloaders and EFI stubs convert EfiMemoryMappedIO regions to
E820_TYPE_RESERVED entries, which prevent Linux from allocating space from
them (see remove_e820_regions()).
Some platforms use EfiMemoryMappedIO entries for PCI MMCONFIG space and PCI
host bridge windows, which means Linux can't allocate BAR space for
hot-added devices.
Remove large EfiMemoryMappedIO regions from the E820 map to avoid this
problem.
Leave small (< 256KB) EfiMemoryMappedIO regions alone because on some
platforms, these describe non-window space that's included in host bridge
_CRS. If we assign that space to PCI devices, they don't work. On the
Lenovo X1 Carbon, this leads to suspend/resume failures.
The previous solution to the problem of allocating BARs in these regions
was to add pci_crs_quirks[] entries to disable E820 checking for these
machines (see d341838d77 ("x86/PCI: Disable E820 reserved region clipping
via quirks")):
Acer DMI_PRODUCT_NAME Spin SP513-54N
Clevo DMI_BOARD_NAME X170KM-G
Lenovo DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION *IIL*
Florent reported the BAR allocation issue on the Clevo NL4XLU. We could
add another quirk for the NL4XLU, but I hope this generic change can solve
it for many machines without having to add quirks.
This change has been tested on Clevo X170KM-G (Konrad) and Lenovo Ideapad
Slim 3 (Matt) and solves the problem even when overriding the existing
quirks by booting with "pci=use_e820".
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216565 Clevo NL4XLU
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206459#c78 Clevo X170KM-G
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1868899 Ideapad Slim 3
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2029207 X1 Carbon
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221208190341.1560157-2-helgaas@kernel.org
Reported-by: Florent DELAHAYE <kernelorg@undead.fr>
Tested-by: Konrad J Hambrick <kjhambrick@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Matt Hansen <2lprbe78@duck.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
The EFI runtime map code is only wired up on x86, which is the only
architecture that has a need for it in its implementation of kexec.
So let's move this code under arch/x86 and drop all references to it
from generic code. To ensure that the efi_runtime_map_init() is invoked
at the appropriate time use a 'sync' subsys_initcall() that will be
called right after the EFI initcall made from generic code where the
original invocation of efi_runtime_map_init() resided.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Currently, the EFI_PARAVIRT flag is only used by Xen dom0 boot on x86,
even though other architectures also support pseudo-EFI boot, where the
core kernel is invoked directly and provided with a set of data tables
that resemble the ones constructed by the EFI stub, which never actually
runs in that case.
Let's fix this inconsistency, and always set this flag when booting dom0
via the EFI boot path. Note that Xen on x86 does not provide the EFI
memory map in this case, whereas other architectures do, so move the
associated EFI_PARAVIRT check into the x86 platform code.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The EFI memory map is a description of the memory layout as provided by
the firmware, and only x86 manipulates it in various different ways for
its own memory bookkeeping. So let's move the memmap routines that are
only used by x86 into the x86 arch tree.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The EFI fake memmap support is specific to x86, which manipulates the
EFI memory map in various different ways after receiving it from the EFI
stub. On other architectures, we have managed to push back on this, and
the EFI memory map is kept pristine.
So let's move the fake memmap code into the x86 arch tree, where it
arguably belongs.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
- implement EFI boot support for LoongArch
- implement generic EFI compressed boot support for arm64, RISC-V and
LoongArch, none of which implement a decompressor today
- measure the kernel command line into the TPM if measured boot is in
effect
- refactor the EFI stub code in order to isolate DT dependencies for
architectures other than x86
- avoid calling SetVirtualAddressMap() on arm64 if the configured size
of the VA space guarantees that doing so is unnecessary
- move some ARM specific code out of the generic EFI source files
- unmap kernel code from the x86 mixed mode 1:1 page tables
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=d8Ps
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
"A bit more going on than usual in the EFI subsystem. The main driver
for this has been the introduction of the LoonArch architecture last
cycle, which inspired some cleanup and refactoring of the EFI code.
Another driver for EFI changes this cycle and in the future is
confidential compute.
The LoongArch architecture does not use either struct bootparams or DT
natively [yet], and so passing information between the EFI stub and
the core kernel using either of those is undesirable. And in general,
overloading DT has been a source of issues on arm64, so using DT for
this on new architectures is a to avoid for the time being (even if we
might converge on something DT based for non-x86 architectures in the
future). For this reason, in addition to the patch that enables EFI
boot for LoongArch, there are a number of refactoring patches applied
on top of which separate the DT bits from the generic EFI stub bits.
These changes are on a separate topich branch that has been shared
with the LoongArch maintainers, who will include it in their pull
request as well. This is not ideal, but the best way to manage the
conflicts without stalling LoongArch for another cycle.
Another development inspired by LoongArch is the newly added support
for EFI based decompressors. Instead of adding yet another
arch-specific incarnation of this pattern for LoongArch, we are
introducing an EFI app based on the existing EFI libstub
infrastructure that encapulates the decompression code we use on other
architectures, but in a way that is fully generic. This has been
developed and tested in collaboration with distro and systemd folks,
who are eager to start using this for systemd-boot and also for arm64
secure boot on Fedora. Note that the EFI zimage files this introduces
can also be decompressed by non-EFI bootloaders if needed, as the
image header describes the location of the payload inside the image,
and the type of compression that was used. (Note that Fedora's arm64
GRUB is buggy [0] so you'll need a recent version or switch to
systemd-boot in order to use this.)
Finally, we are adding TPM measurement of the kernel command line
provided by EFI. There is an oversight in the TCG spec which results
in a blind spot for command line arguments passed to loaded images,
which means that either the loader or the stub needs to take the
measurement. Given the combinatorial explosion I am anticipating when
it comes to firmware/bootloader stacks and firmware based attestation
protocols (SEV-SNP, TDX, DICE, DRTM), it is good to set a baseline now
when it comes to EFI measured boot, which is that the kernel measures
the initrd and command line. Intermediate loaders can measure
additional assets if needed, but with the baseline in place, we can
deploy measured boot in a meaningful way even if you boot into Linux
straight from the EFI firmware.
Summary:
- implement EFI boot support for LoongArch
- implement generic EFI compressed boot support for arm64, RISC-V and
LoongArch, none of which implement a decompressor today
- measure the kernel command line into the TPM if measured boot is in
effect
- refactor the EFI stub code in order to isolate DT dependencies for
architectures other than x86
- avoid calling SetVirtualAddressMap() on arm64 if the configured
size of the VA space guarantees that doing so is unnecessary
- move some ARM specific code out of the generic EFI source files
- unmap kernel code from the x86 mixed mode 1:1 page tables"
* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: (24 commits)
efi/arm64: libstub: avoid SetVirtualAddressMap() when possible
efi: zboot: create MemoryMapped() device path for the parent if needed
efi: libstub: fix up the last remaining open coded boot service call
efi/arm: libstub: move ARM specific code out of generic routines
efi/libstub: measure EFI LoadOptions
efi/libstub: refactor the initrd measuring functions
efi/loongarch: libstub: remove dependency on flattened DT
efi: libstub: install boot-time memory map as config table
efi: libstub: remove DT dependency from generic stub
efi: libstub: unify initrd loading between architectures
efi: libstub: remove pointless goto kludge
efi: libstub: simplify efi_get_memory_map() and struct efi_boot_memmap
efi: libstub: avoid efi_get_memory_map() for allocating the virt map
efi: libstub: drop pointless get_memory_map() call
efi: libstub: fix type confusion for load_options_size
arm64: efi: enable generic EFI compressed boot
loongarch: efi: enable generic EFI compressed boot
riscv: efi: enable generic EFI compressed boot
efi/libstub: implement generic EFI zboot
efi/libstub: move efi_system_table global var into separate object
...
Move the EFI mixed mode return trampoline RET into .rodata, so it is
normally mapped without executable permissions. And given that this
snippet of code is really the only kernel code that we ever execute via
this 1:1 mapping, let's unmap the 1:1 mapping of the kernel .text, and
only map the page that covers the return trampoline with executable
permissions.
Note that the remainder of .rodata needs to remain mapped into the 1:1
mapping with RO/NX permissions, as literal GUIDs and strings may be
passed to the variable routines.
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ mingo: Consolidated 4 very similar patches into one, it's silly to spread this out. ]
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <wangborong@cdjrlc.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715044809.20572-1-wangborong@cdjrlc.com
- Enable mirrored memory for arm64
- Fix up several abuses of the efivar API
- Refactor the efivar API in preparation for moving the 'business logic'
part of it into efivarfs
- Enable ACPI PRM on arm64
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQGzBAABCgAdFiEE+9lifEBpyUIVN1cpw08iOZLZjyQFAmLhuDIACgkQw08iOZLZ
jyS9IQv/Wc2nhjN50S3gfrL+68/el/hGdP/J0FK5BOOjNosG2t1ZNYZtSthXqpPH
hRrTU2m6PpQUalRpFDyLiHkJvdBFQe4VmvrzBa3TIBIzyflLQPJzkWrqThPchV+B
qi4lmCtTDNIEJmayewqx1wWA+QmUiyI5zJ8wrZp84LTctBPL75seVv0SB20nqai0
3/I73omB2RLVGpCpeWvb++vePXL8euFW3FEwCTM8hRboICjORTyIZPy8Y5os+3xT
UgrIgVDOtn1Xwd4tK0qVwjOVA51east4Fcn3yGOrL40t+3SFm2jdpAJOO3UvyNPl
vkbtjvXsIjt3/oxreKxXHLbamKyueWIfZRyCLsrg6wrr96oypPk6ID4iDCQoen/X
Zf0VjM2vmvSd4YgnEIblOfSBxVg48cHJA4iVHVxFodNTrVnzGGFYPTmNKmJqo+Xn
JeUILM7jlR4h/t0+cTTK3Busu24annTuuz5L5rjf4bUm6pPf4crb1yJaFWtGhlpa
er233D6O
=zI0R
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Enable mirrored memory for arm64
- Fix up several abuses of the efivar API
- Refactor the efivar API in preparation for moving the 'business
logic' part of it into efivarfs
- Enable ACPI PRM on arm64
* tag 'efi-next-for-v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: (24 commits)
ACPI: Move PRM config option under the main ACPI config
ACPI: Enable Platform Runtime Mechanism(PRM) support on ARM64
ACPI: PRM: Change handler_addr type to void pointer
efi: Simplify arch_efi_call_virt() macro
drivers: fix typo in firmware/efi/memmap.c
efi: vars: Drop __efivar_entry_iter() helper which is no longer used
efi: vars: Use locking version to iterate over efivars linked lists
efi: pstore: Omit efivars caching EFI varstore access layer
efi: vars: Add thin wrapper around EFI get/set variable interface
efi: vars: Don't drop lock in the middle of efivar_init()
pstore: Add priv field to pstore_record for backend specific use
Input: applespi - avoid efivars API and invoke EFI services directly
selftests/kexec: remove broken EFI_VARS secure boot fallback check
brcmfmac: Switch to appropriate helper to load EFI variable contents
iwlwifi: Switch to proper EFI variable store interface
media: atomisp_gmin_platform: stop abusing efivar API
efi: efibc: avoid efivar API for setting variables
efi: avoid efivars layer when loading SSDTs from variables
efi: Correct comment on efi_memmap_alloc
memblock: Disable mirror feature if kernelcore is not specified
...
Commit b05b9f5f9d ("x86, mirror: x86 enabling - find mirrored memory
ranges") introduce the efi_find_mirror() function on x86. In order to reuse
the API we make it public.
Arm64 can support mirrored memory too, so function efi_find_mirror() is added to
efi_init() to this support for arm64.
Since efi_init() is shared by ARM, arm64 and riscv, this patch will bring
mirror memory support for these architectures, but this support is only tested
in arm64.
Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614092156.1972846-2-mawupeng1@huawei.com
[ardb: fix subject to better reflect the payload]
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Rather than waiting for the bots to fix these one-by-one,
fix all occurences of "the the" throughout arch/x86.
Signed-off-by: Bo Liu <liubo03@inspur.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220527061400.5694-1-liubo03@inspur.com
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted
Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs
memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.
Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which
reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it
the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID.
If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to
the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later
by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also
appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II
[ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018
The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The current annotation relies on not running objtool on the file; this
won't work when running objtool on vmlinux.o. Instead explicitly mark
__efi64_thunk() to be ignored.
This preserves the status quo, which is somewhat unfortunate. Luckily
this code is hardly ever used.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154317.402118218@infradead.org
misleading/wrong stacktraces and confuse RELIABLE_STACKTRACE and
LIVEPATCH as the backtrace misses the function which is being fixed up.
- Add Straight Light Speculation mitigation support which uses a new
compiler switch -mharden-sls= which sticks an INT3 after a RET or an
indirect branch in order to block speculation after them. Reportedly,
CPUs do speculate behind such insns.
- The usual set of cleanups and improvements
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=R52z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Get rid of all the .fixup sections because this generates
misleading/wrong stacktraces and confuse RELIABLE_STACKTRACE and
LIVEPATCH as the backtrace misses the function which is being fixed
up.
- Add Straight Line Speculation mitigation support which uses a new
compiler switch -mharden-sls= which sticks an INT3 after a RET or an
indirect branch in order to block speculation after them. Reportedly,
CPUs do speculate behind such insns.
- The usual set of cleanups and improvements
* tag 'x86_core_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits)
x86/entry_32: Fix segment exceptions
objtool: Remove .fixup handling
x86: Remove .fixup section
x86/word-at-a-time: Remove .fixup usage
x86/usercopy: Remove .fixup usage
x86/usercopy_32: Simplify __copy_user_intel_nocache()
x86/sgx: Remove .fixup usage
x86/checksum_32: Remove .fixup usage
x86/vmx: Remove .fixup usage
x86/kvm: Remove .fixup usage
x86/segment: Remove .fixup usage
x86/fpu: Remove .fixup usage
x86/xen: Remove .fixup usage
x86/uaccess: Remove .fixup usage
x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage
x86/msr: Remove .fixup usage
x86/extable: Extend extable functionality
x86/entry_32: Remove .fixup usage
x86/entry_64: Remove .fixup usage
x86/copy_mc_64: Remove .fixup usage
...
- support taking the measurement of the initrd when loaded via the
LoadFile2 protocol
- kobject API cleanup from Greg
- some header file whitespace fixes
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=BY66
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
- support taking the measurement of the initrd when loaded via the
LoadFile2 protocol
- kobject API cleanup from Greg
- some header file whitespace fixes
* tag 'efi-next-for-v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
efi: use default_groups in kobj_type
efi/libstub: measure loaded initrd info into the TPM
efi/libstub: consolidate initrd handling across architectures
efi/libstub: x86/mixed: increase supported argument count
efi/libstub: add prototype of efi_tcg2_protocol::hash_log_extend_event()
include/linux/efi.h: Remove unneeded whitespaces before tabs
Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making
RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without
RET defined.
find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file
do
sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file
done
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
Reserving memory using efi_mem_reserve() calls into the x86
efi_arch_mem_reserve() function. This function will insert a new EFI
memory descriptor into the EFI memory map representing the area of
memory to be reserved and marking it as EFI runtime memory. As part
of adding this new entry, a new EFI memory map is allocated and mapped.
The mapping is where a problem can occur. This new memory map is mapped
using early_memremap() and generally mapped encrypted, unless the new
memory for the mapping happens to come from an area of memory that is
marked as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory. In this case, the new memory will
be mapped unencrypted. However, during replacement of the old memory map,
efi_mem_type() is disabled, so the new memory map will now be long-term
mapped encrypted (in efi.memmap), resulting in the map containing invalid
data and causing the kernel boot to crash.
Since it is known that the area will be mapped encrypted going forward,
explicitly map the new memory map as encrypted using early_memremap_prot().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14.x
Fixes: 8f716c9b5f ("x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ebf1eb2940405438a09d51d121ec0d02c8755558.1634752931.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ardb: incorporate Kconfig fix by Arnd]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Increase the number of arguments supported by mixed mode calls, so that
we will be able to call into the TCG2 protocol to measure the initrd
and extend the associated PCR. This involves the TCG2 protocol's
hash_log_extend_event() method, which takes five arguments, three of
which are u64 and need to be split, producing a total of 8 outgoing
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211119114745.1560453-3-ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Replace uses of sev_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has()
using CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other
memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT
can be updated, as required.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-7-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=xSer
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-core-2021-06-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Two driver API cleanups, and a log message tweak"
* tag 'efi-core-2021-06-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/efi: Log 32/64-bit mismatch with kernel as an error
efi/dev-path-parser: Switch to use for_each_acpi_dev_match()
efi/apple-properties: Handle device properties with software node API
There are BIOSes that are known to corrupt the memory under 1M, or more
precisely under 640K because the memory above 640K is anyway reserved
for the EGA/VGA frame buffer and BIOS.
To prevent usage of the memory that will be potentially clobbered by the
kernel, the beginning of the memory is always reserved. The exact size
of the reserved area is determined by CONFIG_X86_RESERVE_LOW build time
and the "reservelow=" command line option. The reserved range may be
from 4K to 640K with the default of 64K. There are also configurations
that reserve the entire 1M range, like machines with SandyBridge graphic
devices or systems that enable crash kernel.
In addition to the potentially clobbered memory, EBDA of unknown size may
be as low as 128K and the memory above that EBDA start is also reserved
early.
It would have been possible to reserve the entire range under 1M unless for
the real mode trampoline that must reside in that area.
To accommodate placement of the real mode trampoline and keep the memory
safe from being clobbered by BIOS, reserve the first 64K of RAM before
memory allocations are possible and then, after the real mode trampoline
is allocated, reserve the entire range from 0 to 1M.
Update trim_snb_memory() and reserve_real_mode() to avoid redundant
reservations of the same memory range.
Also make sure the memory under 1M is not getting freed by
efi_free_boot_services().
[ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ]
Fixes: a799c2bd29 ("x86/setup: Consolidate early memory reservations")
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213177
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210601075354.5149-2-rppt@kernel.org
First microbatch of EFI updates - not a lot going on these days.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=KsV8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI updates for v5.14 from Ard Biesheuvel:
"First microbatch of EFI updates - not a lot going on these days."
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Log the message
No EFI runtime due to 32/64-bit mismatch with kernel
as an error condition, as several things like efivarfs won’t work
without the EFI runtime.
Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
SEV-SNP builds upon the SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware
protection. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds new NAE events that
are SEV-SNP specific. Rename the sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch} so that all
SEV* functionality can be consolidated in one place.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com
Fix another ~42 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments,
missed a few in the first pass, in particular in .S files.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fix ~144 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments.
Doing this in a single commit should reduce the churn.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
(FNINIT) explicitly when using the FPU + cleanups.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=fJU1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'x86_fpu_for_v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 FPU updates from Borislav Petkov:
"x86 fpu usage optimization and cleanups:
- make 64-bit kernel code which uses 387 insns request a x87 init
(FNINIT) explicitly when using the FPU
- misc cleanups"
* tag 'x86_fpu_for_v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/fpu/xstate: Use sizeof() instead of a constant
x86/fpu/64: Don't FNINIT in kernel_fpu_begin()
x86/fpu: Make the EFI FPU calling convention explicit
- Another initial cleanup - more to follow - to the fault handling code.
- Other minor cleanups and corrections.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmAqU0oACgkQEsHwGGHe
VUruWw//VA+/K7Ykd8tjZdmJPWdfsdqBtOrolh4hiajM6iYckTip/FdwHpeEQwM9
ff0iNMrxICG3gbQxCX6WNzPeJatYsnjtF67whfat2SEzNHSDtZDb1Bm20s2/1fbY
OurRBTEBzuYMolpEJ2XABpu7LQ+6TV3LJ6yUBungILMOjP7KvrCK0SUrWj253VDU
XljK5XBZnmYlEjPU6dlhn64Wsl/GD7AWCAeZGq47EgjH2cR6gxNmu9kYAArGbdiJ
WjF8MWE7qVwCPUTiCBv+P1CjsQawvlcUY54wtG65dBYAZvpjmN82T2ypguzAt8KT
12A38vFlBuEUAWC0rUymNouh8Q20AElpdw/odLElHkpNxbHhf/7RyZ1E00LjsFtn
MF9Gp9aSIQbfYWK+Hin9oRvqXckV08u3KtzUNeyMbdCmpyqHh6prj8JEZaxKZZUp
zCaX8Qasn+Q9zL0DO51WI9EPOwpvSpifUYHmd5RHGbQDW9DjYK4mkBCHhjVfYXd/
NcxRO5rrMLmMG+XuNPg9vuHMi2HJnClJ6odD6b80xGvBodTZxZnqnYO9tUImbYnW
pdmt73YDvakei8XY7cAdNWcsTi0kQYZGfInna6z43Ri2l+I1TZaoKGDqn7TbzNbb
9RB0lrD0tfW0PvvDbVwco0Q+8/ykIbvPkHPvjQGWioxHi6yI49s=
=uVEk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'x86_mm_for_v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm cleanups from Borislav Petkov:
- PTRACE_GETREGS/PTRACE_PUTREGS regset selection cleanup
- Another initial cleanup - more to follow - to the fault handling
code.
- Other minor cleanups and corrections.
* tag 'x86_mm_for_v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/{fault,efi}: Fix and rename efi_recover_from_page_fault()
x86/fault: Don't run fixups for SMAP violations
x86/fault: Don't look for extable entries for SMEP violations
x86/fault: Rename no_context() to kernelmode_fixup_or_oops()
x86/fault: Bypass no_context() for implicit kernel faults from usermode
x86/fault: Split the OOPS code out from no_context()
x86/fault: Improve kernel-executing-user-memory handling
x86/fault: Correct a few user vs kernel checks wrt WRUSS
x86/fault: Document the locking in the fault_signal_pending() path
x86/fault/32: Move is_f00f_bug() to do_kern_addr_fault()
x86/fault: Fold mm_fault_error() into do_user_addr_fault()
x86/fault: Skip the AMD erratum #91 workaround on unaffected CPUs
x86/fault: Fix AMD erratum #91 errata fixup for user code
x86/Kconfig: Remove HPET_EMULATE_RTC depends on RTC
x86/asm: Fixup TASK_SIZE_MAX comment
x86/ptrace: Clean up PTRACE_GETREGS/PTRACE_PUTREGS regset selection
x86/vm86/32: Remove VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP support
x86: Remove definition of DEBUG
x86/entry: Remove now unused do_IRQ() declaration
x86/mm: Remove duplicate definition of _PAGE_PAT_LARGE
...
A few cleanups left and right, some of which were part of a initrd
measured boot series that needs some more work, and so only the cleanup
patches have been included for this release.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=6iND
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel via Borislav Petkov:
"A few cleanups left and right, some of which were part of a initrd
measured boot series that needs some more work, and so only the
cleanup patches have been included for this release"
* tag 'efi-next-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi/arm64: Update debug prints to reflect other entropy sources
efi: x86: clean up previous struct mm switching
efi: x86: move mixed mode stack PA variable out of 'efi_scratch'
efi/libstub: move TPM related prototypes into efistub.h
efi/libstub: fix prototype of efi_tcg2_protocol::get_event_log()
efi/libstub: whitespace cleanup
efi: ia64: move IA64-only declarations to new asm/efi.h header
efi_recover_from_page_fault() doesn't recover -- it does a special EFI
mini-oops. Rename it to make it clear that it crashes.
While renaming it, I noticed a blatant bug: a page fault oops in a
different thread happening concurrently with an EFI runtime service call
would be misinterpreted as an EFI page fault. Fix that.
This isn't quite exact. The situation could be improved by using a
special CS for calls into EFI.
[ bp: Massage commit message and simplify in interrupt check. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f43b1e80830dc78ed60ed8b0826f4f189254570c.1612924255.git.luto@kernel.org
With CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL, CONFIG_UBSAN and CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_OVERFLOW
enabled, clang fails the build with
x86_64-linux-ld: arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.o: in function `efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings':
efi_64.c:(.text+0x22c): undefined reference to `__compiletime_assert_354'
which happens due to -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow being enabled:
-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow: Unsigned integer overflow, where
the result of an unsigned integer computation cannot be represented
in its type. Unlike signed integer overflow, this is not undefined
behavior, but it is often unintentional. This sanitizer does not check
for lossy implicit conversions performed before such a computation
(see -fsanitize=implicit-conversion).
and that fires when the (intentional) EFI_VA_START/END defines overflow
an unsigned long, leading to the assertion expressions not getting
optimized away (on GCC they do)...
However, those checks are superfluous: the runtime services mapping
code already makes sure the ranges don't overshoot EFI_VA_END as the
EFI mapping range is hardcoded. On each runtime services call, it is
switched to the EFI-specific PGD and even if mappings manage to escape
that last PGD, this won't remain unnoticed for long.
So rip them out.
See https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/256 for more info.
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210107223424.4135538-1-arnd@kernel.org
EFI uses kernel_fpu_begin() to conform to the UEFI calling convention.
This specifically requires initializing FCW (FPU Control Word), whereas
no sane 64-bit kernel code should use legacy 387 operations that
reference FCW.
This should allow to safely change the default semantics of
kernel_fpu_begin() to stop initializing FCW on 64-bit kernels.
[ bp: Massage commit message a little. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/25d392fff64680e0f4bb8cf0b1003314dc29eafe.1611205691.git.luto@kernel.org
EFI on x86_64 keeps track of the process's MM pointer by storing it
in a global struct called 'efi_scratch', which also used to contain
the mixed mode stack pointer. Let's clean this up a little bit, by
getting rid of the struct, and pushing the mm handling into the
callees entirely.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
As a first step to removing the awkward 'struct efi_scratch' definition
that conveniently combines the storage of the mixed mode stack pointer
with the MM pointer variable that records the task's MM pointer while it
is being replaced with the EFI MM one, move the mixed mode stack pointer
into a separate variable.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Commit
d9e9a64180 ("x86/mm/pti: Allocate a separate user PGD")
changed the PGD allocation to allocate PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER pages, so in
the error path it should be freed using free_pages() rather than
free_page().
Commit
06ace26f4e ("x86/efi: Free efi_pgd with free_pages()")
fixed one instance of this, but missed another.
Move the freeing out-of-line to avoid code duplication and fix this bug.
Fixes: d9e9a64180 ("x86/mm/pti: Allocate a separate user PGD")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110163919.1134431-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the
registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between
the guest and the hypervisor.
Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so
in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code
needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings
a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code
like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the
identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI
page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one.
The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly
separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
SEV-ES-specific files:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind
static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups.
Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=toqi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
"SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
between the guest and the hypervisor.
Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
one.
The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
SEV-ES-specific files:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
setups.
Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"
* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
...
Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.
An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.
This patch adds initial kernel support to recognize, parse,
and validate the EFI MOK configuration table, where named
entries contain the same data that would otherwise be provided
in similarly named EFI variables.
Additionally, this patch creates a sysfs binary file for each
EFI MOK configuration table entry found. These files are read-only
to root and are provided for use by user space utilities such as
mokutil.
A subsequent patch will load MOK certs into the trusted platform
key ring using this infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-2-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Calling down to EFI runtime services can result in the firmware
performing VMGEXIT calls. The firmware is likely to use the GHCB of the
OS (e.g., for setting EFI variables), so each GHCB in the system needs
to be identity-mapped in the EFI page tables, as unencrypted, to avoid
page faults.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Moved GHCB mapping loop to sev-es.c ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-72-joro@8bytes.org
Now that the old memmap code has been removed, some code that was left
behind in arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c is only used for 32-bit builds,
which means it can live in efi_32.c as well. So move it over.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
When remapping the kernel rodata section RO in the EFI pagetables, the
protection flags that were used for the text section are being reused,
but the rodata section should not be marked executable.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200717194526.3452089-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
With UV1 removed, EFI_UV1_MEMMAP is not longer used. Remove the code used
by it and the related code in EFI.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200713212955.902592618@hpe.com
In removing UV1 support, efi_have_uv1_memmap is no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200713212955.786177105@hpe.com
As a part of UV1 platform removal, don't try to recognize the platform
through DMI to set the EFI_UV1_MEMMAP bit.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200713212955.667726896@hpe.com
