The selinux_add_opt() function may need to allocate memory for the
mount options if none has already been allocated, but there is no
need to free that memory on error as the callers handle that. Drop
the existing kfree() on error to help increase consistency in the
selinux_add_opt() error handling.
This patch also changes selinux_add_opt() to return -EINVAL when
the mount option value, @s, is NULL. It currently return -ENOMEM.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220611090550.135674-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com/T/
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
[PM: fix subject, rework commit description language]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit e3489f8974 ("selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()")
introduced a NULL check on the context after a successful call to
security_sid_to_context(). This is on the one hand redundant after
checking for success and on the other hand insufficient on an actual
NULL pointer, since the context is passed to seq_escape() leading to a
call of strlen() on it.
Reported by Clang analyzer:
In file included from security/selinux/hooks.c:28:
In file included from ./include/linux/tracehook.h:50:
In file included from ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:13:
In file included from ./include/linux/cgroup.h:18:
./include/linux/seq_file.h:136:25: warning: Null pointer passed as 1st argument to string length function [unix.cstring.NullArg]
seq_escape_mem(m, src, strlen(src), flags, esc);
^~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Log the anonymous inode class name in the security hook
inode_init_security_anon. This name is the key for name based type
transitions on the anon_inode security class on creation. Example:
type=AVC msg=audit(02/16/22 22:02:50.585:216) : avc: granted \
{ create } for pid=2136 comm=mariadbd anonclass=[io_uring] \
scontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_t:s0 \
tcontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_iouring_t:s0 tclass=anon_inode
Add a new LSM audit data type holding the inode and the class name.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: adjusted 'anonclass' to be a trusted string, cgzones approved]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The checkreqprot functionality was disabled by default back in
Linux v4.4 (2015) with commit 2a35d196c1 ("selinux: change
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default") and it was
officially marked as deprecated in Linux v5.7. It was always a
bit of a hack to workaround very old userspace and to the best of
our knowledge, the checkreqprot functionality has been disabled by
Linux distributions for quite some time.
This patch moves the deprecation messages from KERN_WARNING to
KERN_ERR and adds a five second sleep to anyone using it to help
draw their attention to the deprecation and provide a URL which
helps explain things in more detail.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being
read either because they are overwritten or the function ends.
Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This set of changes removes tracehook.h, moves modification of all of
the ptrace fields inside of siglock to remove races, adds a missing
permission check to ptrace.c
The removal of tracehook.h is quite significant as it has been a major
source of confusion in recent years. Much of that confusion was
around task_work and TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL (which I have now decoupled
making the semantics clearer).
For people who don't know tracehook.h is a vestiage of an attempt to
implement uprobes like functionality that was never fully merged, and
was later superseeded by uprobes when uprobes was merged. For many
years now we have been removing what tracehook functionaly a little
bit at a time. To the point where now anything left in tracehook.h is
some weird strange thing that is difficult to understand.
Eric W. Biederman (15):
ptrace: Move ptrace_report_syscall into ptrace.h
ptrace/arm: Rename tracehook_report_syscall report_syscall
ptrace: Create ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit} in ptrace.h
ptrace: Remove arch_syscall_{enter,exit}_tracehook
ptrace: Remove tracehook_signal_handler
task_work: Remove unnecessary include from posix_timers.h
task_work: Introduce task_work_pending
task_work: Call tracehook_notify_signal from get_signal on all architectures
task_work: Decouple TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and task_work
signal: Move set_notify_signal and clear_notify_signal into sched/signal.h
resume_user_mode: Remove #ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME in set_notify_resume
resume_user_mode: Move to resume_user_mode.h
tracehook: Remove tracehook.h
ptrace: Move setting/clearing ptrace_message into ptrace_stop
ptrace: Return the signal to continue with from ptrace_stop
Jann Horn (1):
ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE
Yang Li (1):
ptrace: Remove duplicated include in ptrace.c
MAINTAINERS | 1 -
arch/Kconfig | 5 +-
arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/arc/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/arc/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c | 12 +-
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 14 +--
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/csky/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/h8300/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/hexagon/kernel/process.c | 4 +-
arch/hexagon/kernel/signal.c | 1 -
arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c | 6 +-
arch/ia64/kernel/process.c | 4 +-
arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 +-
arch/ia64/kernel/signal.c | 1 -
arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/microblaze/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/mips/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/nds32/include/asm/syscall.h | 2 +-
arch/nds32/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/nds32/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/nios2/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/nios2/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c | 7 +-
arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c | 8 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
arch/s390/include/asm/entry-common.h | 1 -
arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c | 1 -
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c | 5 +-
arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c | 5 +-
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c | 4 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_32.c | 5 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c | 5 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c | 1 -
arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c | 4 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c | 4 +-
arch/um/kernel/process.c | 4 +-
arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 1 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +-
arch/xtensa/kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
block/blk-cgroup.c | 2 +-
fs/coredump.c | 1 -
fs/exec.c | 1 -
fs/io-wq.c | 6 +-
fs/io_uring.c | 11 +-
fs/proc/array.c | 1 -
fs/proc/base.c | 1 -
include/asm-generic/syscall.h | 2 +-
include/linux/entry-common.h | 47 +-------
include/linux/entry-kvm.h | 2 +-
include/linux/posix-timers.h | 1 -
include/linux/ptrace.h | 81 ++++++++++++-
include/linux/resume_user_mode.h | 64 ++++++++++
include/linux/sched/signal.h | 17 +++
include/linux/task_work.h | 5 +
include/linux/tracehook.h | 226 -----------------------------------
include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 2 +-
kernel/entry/common.c | 19 +--
kernel/entry/kvm.c | 9 +-
kernel/exit.c | 3 +-
kernel/livepatch/transition.c | 1 -
kernel/ptrace.c | 47 +++++---
kernel/seccomp.c | 1 -
kernel/signal.c | 62 +++++-----
kernel/task_work.c | 4 +-
kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c | 1 +
mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/domain.c | 1 -
security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 -
85 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 495 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Merge tag 'ptrace-cleanups-for-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull ptrace cleanups from Eric Biederman:
"This set of changes removes tracehook.h, moves modification of all of
the ptrace fields inside of siglock to remove races, adds a missing
permission check to ptrace.c
The removal of tracehook.h is quite significant as it has been a major
source of confusion in recent years. Much of that confusion was around
task_work and TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL (which I have now decoupled making the
semantics clearer).
For people who don't know tracehook.h is a vestiage of an attempt to
implement uprobes like functionality that was never fully merged, and
was later superseeded by uprobes when uprobes was merged. For many
years now we have been removing what tracehook functionaly a little
bit at a time. To the point where anything left in tracehook.h was
some weird strange thing that was difficult to understand"
* tag 'ptrace-cleanups-for-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
ptrace: Remove duplicated include in ptrace.c
ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE
ptrace: Return the signal to continue with from ptrace_stop
ptrace: Move setting/clearing ptrace_message into ptrace_stop
tracehook: Remove tracehook.h
resume_user_mode: Move to resume_user_mode.h
resume_user_mode: Remove #ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME in set_notify_resume
signal: Move set_notify_signal and clear_notify_signal into sched/signal.h
task_work: Decouple TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and task_work
task_work: Call tracehook_notify_signal from get_signal on all architectures
task_work: Introduce task_work_pending
task_work: Remove unnecessary include from posix_timers.h
ptrace: Remove tracehook_signal_handler
ptrace: Remove arch_syscall_{enter,exit}_tracehook
ptrace: Create ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit} in ptrace.h
ptrace/arm: Rename tracehook_report_syscall report_syscall
ptrace: Move ptrace_report_syscall into ptrace.h
Now that all of the definitions have moved out of tracehook.h into
ptrace.h, sched/signal.h, resume_user_mode.h there is nothing left in
tracehook.h so remove it.
Update the few files that were depending upon tracehook.h to bring in
definitions to use the headers they need directly.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220309162454.123006-13-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux
always allows too. Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file
descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it.
As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be
enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls.
Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Those return statements at the end of a void function are redundant.
Reported by clang-tidy [readability-redundant-control-flow]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Do this by extracting the peer labeling per-association logic from
selinux_sctp_assoc_request() into a new helper
selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc() and use this helper in both
selinux_sctp_assoc_request() and selinux_sctp_assoc_established(). This
ensures that the peer labeling behavior as documented in
Documentation/security/SCTP.rst is applied both on the client and server
side:
"""
An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
assigned during the establishment of the first association. Any further
associations on this socket will have their packet peer label compared to
the sockets peer label, and only if they are different will the
``association`` permission be validated. This is validated by checking the
socket peer sid against the received packets peer sid to determine whether
the association should be allowed or denied.
"""
At the same time, it also ensures that the peer label of the association
is set to the correct value, such that if it is peeled off into a new
socket, the socket's peer label will then be set to the association's
peer label, same as it already works on the server side.
While selinux_inet_conn_established() (which we are replacing by
selinux_sctp_assoc_established() for SCTP) only deals with assigning a
peer label to the connection (socket), in case of SCTP we need to also
copy the (local) socket label to the association, so that
selinux_sctp_sk_clone() can then pick it up for the new socket in case
of SCTP peeloff.
Careful readers will notice that the selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc()
helper also includes the "IPv4 packet received over an IPv6 socket"
check, even though it hadn't been in selinux_sctp_assoc_request()
before. While such check is not necessary in
selinux_inet_conn_request() (because struct request_sock's family field
is already set according to the skb's family), here it is needed, as we
don't have request_sock and we take the initial family from the socket.
In selinux_sctp_assoc_established() it is similarly needed as well (and
also selinux_inet_conn_established() already has it).
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit b8b87fd954 ("selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()")
started to parse mount options into SIDs in selinux_add_opt() if policy
has already been loaded. Since it's extremely unlikely that anyone would
depend on the ability to set SELinux contexts on fs_context before
loading the policy and then mounting that context after simplify the
logic by always parsing the options early.
Note that the multi-step mounting is only possible with the new
fscontext mount API and wasn't possible before its introduction.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When running the SELinux code through sparse, there are a handful of
warnings. This patch resolves some of these warnings caused by
"__rcu" mismatches.
% make W=1 C=1 security/selinux/
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Avoid unnecessary parsing of sids that have already been parsed via
selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts().
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat() is called under the sb_lock spinlock and
shouldn't be performing any memory allocations. Fix this by parsing the
sids at the same time we're chopping up the security mount options
string and then using the pre-parsed sids when doing the comparison.
Fixes: cc274ae776 ("selinux: fix sleeping function called from invalid context")
Fixes: 69c4a42d72 ("lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount")
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The usual LSM hook "bail on fail" scheme doesn't work for cases where
a security module may return an error code indicating that it does not
recognize an input. In this particular case Smack sees a mount option
that it recognizes, and returns 0. A call to a BPF hook follows, which
returns -ENOPARAM, which confuses the caller because Smack has processed
its data.
The SELinux hook incorrectly returns 1 on success. There was a time
when this was correct, however the current expectation is that it
return 0 on success. This is repaired.
Reported-by: syzbot+d1e3b1d92d25abf97943@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In the process of removing an explicit type cast to preserve a cred
const qualifier in cred_init_security() we ran into a problem where
the task_struct::real_cred field is defined with the "__rcu"
attribute but the selinux_cred() function parameter is not, leading
to a sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:216:36: sparse: sparse:
incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
@@ expected struct cred const *cred
@@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *real_cred
As we don't want to add the "__rcu" attribute to the selinux_cred()
parameter, we're going to add an explicit cast back to
cred_init_security().
Fixes: b084e189b0 ("selinux: simplify cred_init_security")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The parameter of selinux_cred() is declared const, so an explicit cast
dropping the const qualifier is not necessary. Without the cast the
local variable cred serves no purpose.
Reported by clang [-Wcast-qual]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
LSM blob has been involved for superblock's security struct. So fix the
remaining direct access to sb->s_security by using the LSM blob
mechanism.
Fixes: 08abe46b2c ("selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr support")
Fixes: 69c4a42d72 ("lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount")
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220110' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Nothing too significant, but five SELinux patches for v5.17 that do
the following:
- Harden the code through additional use of the struct_size() macro
- Plug some memory leaks
- Clean up the code via removal of the security_add_mnt_opt() LSM
hook and minor tweaks to selinux_add_opt()
- Rename security_task_getsecid_subj() to better reflect its actual
behavior/use - now called security_current_getsecid_subj()"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220110' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: minor tweaks to selinux_add_opt()
selinux: fix potential memleak in selinux_add_opt()
security,selinux: remove security_add_mnt_opt()
selinux: Use struct_size() helper in kmalloc()
lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()
Clang static analysis reports this warning
hooks.c:5765:6: warning: 4th function call argument is an uninitialized
value
if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
selinux_parse_skb() can return ok without setting proto. The later call
to selinux_xfrm_postroute_last() does an early check of proto and can
return ok if the garbage proto value matches. So initialize proto.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eef9b41622 ("selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
[PM: typo/spelling and checkpatch.pl description fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Two minor edits to selinux_add_opt(): use "sizeof(*ptr)" instead of
"sizeof(type)" in the kzalloc() call, and rename the "Einval" jump
target to "err" for the sake of consistency.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch try to fix potential memleak in error branch.
Fixes: ba64186233 ("selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()")
Signed-off-by: Bernard Zhao <bernard@vivo.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, add Fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Its last user has been removed in commit f2aedb713c ("NFS: Add
fs_context support.").
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct
argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also
rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch reverts two prior patches, e7310c9402
("security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux") and
7c2ef0240e ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook"), which
create the security_sctp_assoc_established() LSM hook and provide a
SELinux implementation. Unfortunately these two patches were merged
without proper review (the Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags from
Richard Haines were for previous revisions of these patches that
were significantly different) and there are outstanding objections
from the SELinux maintainers regarding these patches.
Work is currently ongoing to correct the problems identified in the
reverted patches, as well as others that have come up during review,
but it is unclear at this point in time when that work will be ready
for inclusion in the mainline kernel. In the interest of not keeping
objectionable code in the kernel for multiple weeks, and potentially
a kernel release, we are reverting the two problematic patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Different from selinux_inet_conn_established(), it also gives the
secid to asoc->peer_secid in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(),
as one UDP-type socket may have more than one asocs.
Note that peer_secid in asoc will save the peer secid for this
asoc connection, and peer_sid in sksec will just keep the peer
secid for the latest connection. So the right use should be do
peeloff for UDP-type socket if there will be multiple asocs in
one socket, so that the peeloff socket has the right label for
its asoc.
v1->v2:
- call selinux_inet_conn_established() to reduce some code
duplication in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as Ondrej
suggested.
- when doing peeloff, it calls sock_create() where it actually
gets secid for socket from socket_sockcreate_sid(). So reuse
SECSID_WILD to ensure the peeloff socket keeps using that
secid after calling selinux_sctp_sk_clone() for client side.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association,
and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As
ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP
one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid
for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's.
Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request()
is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().
v1->v2:
- fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed.
- fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring.
As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we
were basically missing two things which we're adding here:
+ establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of
io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with
some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls)
+ additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of
the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides.
The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction
with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches
earlier in the year.
- Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials
are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code
comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand
the background and why this is the proper fix.
- Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing
improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make
use of securityfs, e.g. IMA.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()
selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()
binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks
binder: use euid from cred instead of using task
LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables
selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings
selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks
selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs
selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers
selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs
Smack: Brutalist io_uring support
selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring
io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface
fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure()
audit: add filtering for io_uring records
audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
Right now security_dentry_init_security() only supports single security
label and is used by SELinux only. There are two users of this hook,
namely ceph and nfs.
NFS does not care about xattr name. Ceph hardcodes the xattr name to
security.selinux (XATTR_NAME_SELINUX).
I am making changes to fuse/virtiofs to send security label to virtiofsd
and I need to send xattr name as well. I also hardcoded the name of
xattr to security.selinux.
Stephen Smalley suggested that it probably is a good idea to modify
security_dentry_init_security() to also return name of xattr so that
we can avoid this hardcoding in the callers.
This patch adds a new parameter "const char **xattr_name" to
security_dentry_init_security() and LSM puts the name of xattr
too if caller asked for it (xattr_name != NULL).
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: fixed typos in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Unfortunately we can't rely on nf_hook_state->sk being the proper
originating socket so revert to using skb_to_full_sk(skb).
Fixes: 1d1e1ded13 ("selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks")
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed
'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc
to represent the source and target of transactions.
The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook
implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions
which can result in an incorrect security context being used.
Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass
it to the selinux subsystem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables)
Fixes: 79af73079d ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.")
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch builds on a previous SELinux/netfilter patch by Florian
Westphal and makes better use of the nf_hook_state variable passed
into the SELinux/netfilter hooks as well as a number of other small
cleanups in the related code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Netfilter places the protocol number the hook function is getting called
from in state->pf, so we can use that instead of an extra wrapper.
While at it, remove one-line wrappers too and make
selinux_ip_{out,forward,postroute} useable as hook function.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Message-Id: <20211011202229.28289-1-fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
NOTE: This patch intentionally omits any "Fixes:" metadata or stable
tagging since it removes a SELinux access control check; while
removing the control point is the right thing to do moving forward,
removing it in stable kernels could be seen as a regression.
The original SELinux lockdown implementation in 59438b4647
("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown") used the
current task's credentials as both the subject and object in the
SELinux lockdown hook, selinux_lockdown(). Unfortunately that
proved to be incorrect in a number of cases as the core kernel was
calling the LSM lockdown hook in places where the credentials from
the "current" task_struct were not the correct credentials to use
in the SELinux access check.
Attempts were made to resolve this by adding a credential pointer
to the LSM lockdown hook as well as suggesting that the single hook
be split into two: one for user tasks, one for kernel tasks; however
neither approach was deemed acceptable by Linus. Faced with the
prospect of either changing the subj/obj in the access check to a
constant context (likely the kernel's label) or removing the SELinux
lockdown check entirely, the SELinux community decided that removing
the lockdown check was preferable.
The supporting changes to the general LSM layer are left intact, this
patch only removes the SELinux implementation.
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of securityfs files.
This allows for separate labels and thereby access control for
different files. For example a genfscon statement
genfscon securityfs /integrity/ima/policy \
system_u:object_r:ima_policy_t:s0
will set a private label to the IMA policy file and thus allow to
control the ability to set the IMA policy. Setting labels directly
with setxattr(2), e.g. by chcon(1) or setfiles(8), is still not
supported.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: line width fixes in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to
access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause
a number of problems.
Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was
suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit
1fb057dcde ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective
task credentials").
This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's
objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the
current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem
reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these
cases.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eb1231f73c ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials")
Fixes: 1fb057dcde ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch implements two new io_uring access controls, specifically
support for controlling the io_uring "personalities" and
IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL. Controlling the sharing of io_urings themselves
is handled via the normal file/inode labeling and sharing mechanisms.
The io_uring { override_creds } permission restricts which domains
the subject domain can use to override it's own credentials.
Granting a domain the io_uring { override_creds } permission allows
it to impersonate another domain in io_uring operations.
The io_uring { sqpoll } permission restricts which domains can create
asynchronous io_uring polling threads. This is important from a
security perspective as operations queued by this asynchronous thread
inherit the credentials of the thread creator by default; if an
io_uring is shared across process/domain boundaries this could result
in one domain impersonating another. Controlling the creation of
sqpoll threads, and the sharing of io_urings across processes, allow
policy authors to restrict the ability of one domain to impersonate
another via io_uring.
As a quick summary, this patch adds a new object class with two
permissions:
io_uring { override_creds sqpoll }
These permissions can be seen in the two simple policy statements
below:
allow domA_t domB_t : io_uring { override_creds };
allow domA_t self : io_uring { sqpoll };
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
- Enable memcg accounting for various networking objects.
BPF:
- Introduce bpf timers.
- Add perf link and opaque bpf_cookie which the program can read
out again, to be used in libbpf-based USDT library.
- Add bpf_task_pt_regs() helper to access user space pt_regs
in kprobes, to help user space stack unwinding.
- Add support for UNIX sockets for BPF sockmap.
- Extend BPF iterator support for UNIX domain sockets.
- Allow BPF TCP congestion control progs and bpf iterators to call
bpf_setsockopt(), e.g. to switch to another congestion control
algorithm.
Protocols:
- Support IOAM Pre-allocated Trace with IPv6.
- Support Management Component Transport Protocol.
- bridge: multicast: add vlan support.
- netfilter: add hooks for the SRv6 lightweight tunnel driver.
- tcp:
- enable mid-stream window clamping (by user space or BPF)
- allow data-less, empty-cookie SYN with TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD
- more accurate DSACK processing for RACK-TLP
- mptcp:
- add full mesh path manager option
- add partial support for MP_FAIL
- improve use of backup subflows
- optimize option processing
- af_unix: add OOB notification support.
- ipv6: add IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU to expose MTU value advertised by
the router.
- mac80211: Target Wake Time support in AP mode.
- can: j1939: extend UAPI to notify about RX status.
Driver APIs:
- Add page frag support in page pool API.
- Many improvements to the DSA (distributed switch) APIs.
- ethtool: extend IRQ coalesce uAPI with timer reset modes.
- devlink: control which auxiliary devices are created.
- Support CAN PHYs via the generic PHY subsystem.
- Proper cross-chip support for tag_8021q.
- Allow TX forwarding for the software bridge data path to be
offloaded to capable devices.
Drivers:
- veth: more flexible channels number configuration.
- openvswitch: introduce per-cpu upcall dispatch.
- Add internet mix (IMIX) mode to pktgen.
- Transparently handle XDP operations in the bonding driver.
- Add LiteETH network driver.
- Renesas (ravb):
- support Gigabit Ethernet IP
- NXP Ethernet switch (sja1105)
- fast aging support
- support for "H" switch topologies
- traffic termination for ports under VLAN-aware bridge
- Intel 1G Ethernet
- support getcrosststamp() with PCIe PTM (Precision Time
Measurement) for better time sync
- support Credit-Based Shaper (CBS) offload, enabling HW traffic
prioritization and bandwidth reservation
- Broadcom Ethernet (bnxt)
- support pulse-per-second output
- support larger Rx rings
- Mellanox Ethernet (mlx5)
- support ethtool RSS contexts and MQPRIO channel mode
- support LAG offload with bridging
- support devlink rate limit API
- support packet sampling on tunnels
- Huawei Ethernet (hns3):
- basic devlink support
- add extended IRQ coalescing support
- report extended link state
- Netronome Ethernet (nfp):
- add conntrack offload support
- Broadcom WiFi (brcmfmac):
- add WPA3 Personal with FT to supported cipher suites
- support 43752 SDIO device
- Intel WiFi (iwlwifi):
- support scanning hidden 6GHz networks
- support for a new hardware family (Bz)
- Xen pv driver:
- harden netfront against malicious backends
- Qualcomm mobile
- ipa: refactor power management and enable automatic suspend
- mhi: move MBIM to WWAN subsystem interfaces
Refactor:
- Ambient BPF run context and cgroup storage cleanup.
- Compat rework for ndo_ioctl.
Old code removal:
- prism54 remove the obsoleted driver, deprecated by the p54 driver.
- wan: remove sbni/granch driver.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- Enable memcg accounting for various networking objects.
BPF:
- Introduce bpf timers.
- Add perf link and opaque bpf_cookie which the program can read out
again, to be used in libbpf-based USDT library.
- Add bpf_task_pt_regs() helper to access user space pt_regs in
kprobes, to help user space stack unwinding.
- Add support for UNIX sockets for BPF sockmap.
- Extend BPF iterator support for UNIX domain sockets.
- Allow BPF TCP congestion control progs and bpf iterators to call
bpf_setsockopt(), e.g. to switch to another congestion control
algorithm.
Protocols:
- Support IOAM Pre-allocated Trace with IPv6.
- Support Management Component Transport Protocol.
- bridge: multicast: add vlan support.
- netfilter: add hooks for the SRv6 lightweight tunnel driver.
- tcp:
- enable mid-stream window clamping (by user space or BPF)
- allow data-less, empty-cookie SYN with TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD
- more accurate DSACK processing for RACK-TLP
- mptcp:
- add full mesh path manager option
- add partial support for MP_FAIL
- improve use of backup subflows
- optimize option processing
- af_unix: add OOB notification support.
- ipv6: add IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU to expose MTU value advertised by the
router.
- mac80211: Target Wake Time support in AP mode.
- can: j1939: extend UAPI to notify about RX status.
Driver APIs:
- Add page frag support in page pool API.
- Many improvements to the DSA (distributed switch) APIs.
- ethtool: extend IRQ coalesce uAPI with timer reset modes.
- devlink: control which auxiliary devices are created.
- Support CAN PHYs via the generic PHY subsystem.
- Proper cross-chip support for tag_8021q.
- Allow TX forwarding for the software bridge data path to be
offloaded to capable devices.
Drivers:
- veth: more flexible channels number configuration.
- openvswitch: introduce per-cpu upcall dispatch.
- Add internet mix (IMIX) mode to pktgen.
- Transparently handle XDP operations in the bonding driver.
- Add LiteETH network driver.
- Renesas (ravb):
- support Gigabit Ethernet IP
- NXP Ethernet switch (sja1105):
- fast aging support
- support for "H" switch topologies
- traffic termination for ports under VLAN-aware bridge
- Intel 1G Ethernet
- support getcrosststamp() with PCIe PTM (Precision Time
Measurement) for better time sync
- support Credit-Based Shaper (CBS) offload, enabling HW traffic
prioritization and bandwidth reservation
- Broadcom Ethernet (bnxt)
- support pulse-per-second output
- support larger Rx rings
- Mellanox Ethernet (mlx5)
- support ethtool RSS contexts and MQPRIO channel mode
- support LAG offload with bridging
- support devlink rate limit API
- support packet sampling on tunnels
- Huawei Ethernet (hns3):
- basic devlink support
- add extended IRQ coalescing support
- report extended link state
- Netronome Ethernet (nfp):
- add conntrack offload support
- Broadcom WiFi (brcmfmac):
- add WPA3 Personal with FT to supported cipher suites
- support 43752 SDIO device
- Intel WiFi (iwlwifi):
- support scanning hidden 6GHz networks
- support for a new hardware family (Bz)
- Xen pv driver:
- harden netfront against malicious backends
- Qualcomm mobile
- ipa: refactor power management and enable automatic suspend
- mhi: move MBIM to WWAN subsystem interfaces
Refactor:
- Ambient BPF run context and cgroup storage cleanup.
- Compat rework for ndo_ioctl.
Old code removal:
- prism54 remove the obsoleted driver, deprecated by the p54 driver.
- wan: remove sbni/granch driver"
* tag 'net-next-5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1715 commits)
net: Add depends on OF_NET for LiteX's LiteETH
ipv6: seg6: remove duplicated include
net: hns3: remove unnecessary spaces
net: hns3: add some required spaces
net: hns3: clean up a type mismatch warning
net: hns3: refine function hns3_set_default_feature()
ipv6: remove duplicated 'net/lwtunnel.h' include
net: w5100: check return value after calling platform_get_resource()
net/mlxbf_gige: Make use of devm_platform_ioremap_resourcexxx()
net: mdio: mscc-miim: Make use of the helper function devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
net: mdio-ipq4019: Make use of devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
fou: remove sparse errors
ipv4: fix endianness issue in inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb()
octeontx2-af: Set proper errorcode for IPv4 checksum errors
octeontx2-af: Fix static code analyzer reported issues
octeontx2-af: Fix mailbox errors in nix_rss_flowkey_cfg
octeontx2-af: Fix loop in free and unmap counter
af_unix: fix potential NULL deref in unix_dgram_connect()
dpaa2-eth: Replace strlcpy with strscpy
octeontx2-af: Use NDC TX for transmit packet data
...
Add basic Kconfig, an initial (empty) af_mctp source object, and
{AF,PF}_MCTP definitions, and the required definitions for a new
protocol type.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
audit_log_start() may return NULL in below cases:
- when audit is not initialized.
- when audit backlog limit exceeds.
After the call to audit_log_start() is made and then possible NULL audit
buffer argument is passed to audit_log_*() functions,
audit_log_*() functions return immediately in case of a NULL audit buffer
argument.
But it is optimal to return early when audit_log_start() returns NULL,
because it is not necessary for audit_log_*() functions to be called with
NULL audit buffer argument.
So add exception handling for possible NULL audit buffers where
return value can be handled from callers.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com>
[PM: tweak subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
... along with avc_has_perm_flags() itself, since now it's identical
to avc_has_perm() (as pointed out by Paul Moore)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[PM: add "selinux:" prefix to subj and tweak for length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now;
no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
While trying to address a Coverity warning that the dev_name string
might end up unterminated when strcpy'ing it in
selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(), I realized that it is possible (and
simpler) to just pass the dev_name pointer directly, rather than copying
the string to a buffer.
The ibendport variable goes out of scope at the end of the function
anyway, so the lifetime of the dev_name pointer will never be shorter
than that of ibendport, thus we can safely just pass the dev_name
pointer and be done with it.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security infrastructure.
Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is
allocated there.
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
SELinux has a function, task_sid(), which returns the task's
objective credentials, but unfortunately is used in a few places
where the subjective task credentials should be used. Most notably
in the new security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook.
This patch fixes this and attempts to make things more obvious by
introducing a new function, task_sid_subj(), and renaming the
existing task_sid() function to task_sid_obj().
This patch also adds an interesting function in task_sid_binder().
The task_sid_binder() function has a comment which hopefully
describes it's reason for being, but it basically boils down to the
simple fact that we can't safely access another task's subjective
credentials so in the case of binder we need to stick with the
objective credentials regardless.
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount
with new options and determines if new options confict with an
existing mount or not.
A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share
the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Now overlayfs allow unpriviliged mounts. That is root inside a non-init
user namespace can mount overlayfs. This is being added in 5.11 kernel.
Giuseppe tried to mount overlayfs with option "context" and it failed
with error -EACCESS.
$ su test
$ unshare -rm
$ mkdir -p lower upper work merged
$ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,userxattr,context='system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0' none merged
This fails with -EACCESS. It works if option "-o context" is not specified.
Little debugging showed that selinux_set_mnt_opts() returns -EACCESS.
So this patch adds "overlay" to the list, where it is fine to specific
context from non init_user_ns.
Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
[PM: trimmed the changelog from the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in
the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control
anonymous-inode files that are created using the new
anon_inode_getfd_secure() function.
A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by
adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security
type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used
for the name-based transition is the name associated with the
anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or
"[perf_event]".
Example:
type uffd_t;
type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]";
allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create };
(The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd
support this new interface. The example above is just
for exposition.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When a superblock is assigned the SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR behavior by the
policy yet it lacks xattr support, try to fall back to genfs rather than
rejecting the mount. If a genfscon rule is found for the filesystem,
then change the behavior to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS, otherwise reject the
mount as before. A similar fallback is already done in security_fs_use()
if no behavior specification is found for the given filesystem.
This is needed e.g. for virtiofs, which may or may not support xattrs
depending on the backing host filesystem.
Example:
# seinfo --genfs | grep ' ramfs'
genfscon ramfs / system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0
# echo '(fsuse xattr ramfs (system_u object_r fs_t ((s0) (s0))))' >ramfs_xattr.cil
# semodule -i ramfs_xattr.cil
# mount -t ramfs none /mnt
Before:
mount: /mnt: mount(2) system call failed: Operation not supported.
After:
(mount succeeds)
# ls -Zd /mnt
system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0 /mnt
See also:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20210105142148.GA3200@redhat.com/T/https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/pull/478
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.
When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.
This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().
Match the logic of inode_listsecurity to that of inode_getxattr and
do not list the security.selinux xattr if selinux is not initialized.
Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/
Fixes: c8e222616c ("selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org#v5.9+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The MPTCP protocol uses a specific protocol value, even if
it's an extension to TCP. Additionally, MPTCP sockets
could 'fall-back' to TCP at run-time, depending on peer MPTCP
support and available resources.
As a consequence of the specific protocol number, selinux
applies the raw_socket class to MPTCP sockets.
Existing TCP application converted to MPTCP - or forced to
use MPTCP socket with user-space hacks - will need an
updated policy to run successfully.
This change lets selinux attach the TCP socket class to
MPTCP sockets, too, so that no policy changes are needed in
the above scenario.
Note that the MPTCP is setting, propagating and updating the
security context on all the subflows and related request
socket.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhTaK3xx0hEGByD2zxfF7fadyPP1kb-WeWH_YCyq9X-sRg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[PM: tweaked subject's prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a
few changes worth highlighting:
- Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead
of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the
full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it
safely (missing information on the address family).
This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team
netdev) and James Morris (representing team
LSMs-other-than-SELinux).
- Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we
attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of
continuing to treat it as unlabeled.
- Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx
SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are
effective even without the allowx statement.
Everything passes our test suite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx
selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const'
qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the
'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function
expects a 'struct sock *'.
However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to
security_inet_conn_request instead.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do
not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi
struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol
specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers
to the address family independent flowi_common struct.
Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning
by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall
through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past,
but today it's useless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A previous fix, commit 83370b31a9 ("selinux: fix error initialization
in inode_doinit_with_dentry()"), changed how failures were handled
before a SELinux policy was loaded. Unfortunately that patch was
potentially problematic for two reasons: it set the isec->initialized
state without holding a lock, and it didn't set the inode's SELinux
label to the "default" for the particular filesystem. The later can
be a problem if/when a later attempt to revalidate the inode fails
and SELinux reverts to the existing inode label.
This patch should restore the default inode labeling that existed
before the original fix, without affecting the LABEL_INVALID marking
such that revalidation will still be attempted in the future.
Fixes: 83370b31a9 ("selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()")
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Mark the inode security label as invalid if we cannot find
a dentry so that we will retry later rather than marking it
initialized with the unlabeled SID.
Fixes: 9287aed2ad ("selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Tianyue Ren <rentianyue@kylinos.cn>
[PM: minor comment tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits)
binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list
docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text
misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency
LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype
misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB
firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup
w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static
binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap
test_firmware: Test partial read support
firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf()
firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv
fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
IMA: Add support for file reads without contents
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A decent number of SELinux patches for v5.10, twenty two in total. The
highlights are listed below, but all of the patches pass our test
suite and merge cleanly.
- A number of changes to how the SELinux policy is loaded and managed
inside the kernel with the goal of improving the atomicity of a
SELinux policy load operation.
These changes account for the bulk of the diffstat as well as the
patch count. A special thanks to everyone who contributed patches
and fixes for this work.
- Convert the SELinux policy read-write lock to RCU.
- A tracepoint was added for audited SELinux access control events;
this should help provide a more unified backtrace across kernel and
userspace.
- Allow the removal of security.selinux xattrs when a SELinux policy
is not loaded.
- Enable policy capabilities in SELinux policies created with the
scripts/selinux/mdp tool.
- Provide some "no sooner than" dates for the SELinux checkreqprot
sysfs deprecation"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (22 commits)
selinux: provide a "no sooner than" date for the checkreqprot removal
selinux: Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot
selinux: access policycaps with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE
selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()
selinux: move policy mutex to selinux_state, use in lockdep checks
selinux: fix error handling bugs in security_load_policy()
selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU
selinux: delete repeated words in comments
selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events
selinux: add tracepoint on audited events
selinux: Create new booleans and class dirs out of tree
selinux: Standardize string literal usage for selinuxfs directory names
selinux: Refactor selinuxfs directory populating functions
selinux: Create function for selinuxfs directory cleanup
selinux: permit removing security.selinux xattr before policy load
selinux: fix memdup.cocci warnings
selinux: avoid dereferencing the policy prior to initialization
selinux: fix allocation failure check on newpolicy->sidtab
selinux: refactor changing booleans
selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs
...
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
checkreqprot data member in selinux_state struct is accessed directly by
SELinux functions to get and set. This could cause unexpected read or
write access to this data member due to compiler optimizations and/or
compiler's reordering of access to this field.
Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot data member in
selinux_state struct. These helper functions use READ_ONCE and
WRITE_ONCE macros to ensure atomic read or write of memory for
this data member.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move the mutex used to synchronize policy changes (reloads and setting
of booleans) from selinux_fs_info to selinux_state and use it in
lockdep checks for rcu_dereference_protected() calls in the security
server functions. This makes the dependency on the mutex explicit
in the code rather than relying on comments.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Convert the policy read-write lock to RCU. This is significantly
simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate the policy data
structures and refactor the policy load and boolean setting logic.
Move the latest_granting sequence number into the selinux_policy
structure so that it can be updated atomically with the policy.
Since removing the policy rwlock and moving latest_granting reduces
the selinux_ss structure to nothing more than a wrapper around the
selinux_policy pointer, get rid of the extra layer of indirection.
At present this change merely passes a hardcoded 1 to
rcu_dereference_check() in the cases where we know we do not need to
take rcu_read_lock(), with the preceding comment explaining why.
Alternatively we could pass fsi->mutex down from selinuxfs and
apply a lockdep check on it instead.
Based in part on earlier attempts to convert the policy rwlock
to RCU by Kaigai Kohei [1] and by Peter Enderborg [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Drop a repeated word in comments.
{open, is, then}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
[PM: fix subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Currently SELinux denies attempts to remove the security.selinux xattr
always, even when permissive or no policy is loaded. This was originally
motivated by the view that all files should be labeled, even if that label
is unlabeled_t, and we shouldn't permit files that were once labeled to
have their labels removed entirely. This however prevents removing
SELinux xattrs in the case where one "disables" SELinux by not loading
a policy (e.g. a system where runtime disable is removed and selinux=0
was not specified). Allow removing the xattr before SELinux is
initialized. We could conceivably permit it even after initialization
if permissive, or introduce a separate permission check here.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b420 ("selinux: allow
labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows
querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded.
One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this
patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be
able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID,
on first boot, at initrd time.[1]
Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be
able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply
them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the
second part of this process; this commit enables the first part.
[1] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
"This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
changing their attributes.
Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47
Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.
[ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
this one works first ]
LSM hooks are included:
- A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
"watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]
- A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]
I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
hooks.
WHY
===
Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
cache changes.
However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
need to poll.
DESIGN DECISIONS
================
- The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
the pipe.
[?] Should this be done some other way? I'd rather not use up a new
O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
instead?
The pipe is then configured::
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().
- It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
auditing.
- sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.
- The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
to update the queue pointers.
- Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
they can be of varying size.
This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
sources.
- Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.
- Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
- and only those that are watching for it.
- When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
message at an appropriate point later.
- The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
to it, using one of:
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);
where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
a tag between 0 and 255.
- Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.
Things I want to avoid:
- Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).
- Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
inaccessible inside a container.
- Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.
TESTING AND MANPAGES
====================
- The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
the main manpages repository instead.
If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
all be checked off to make sure they happened.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch
- A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"
* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
pipe: Add notification lossage handling
pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
Add sample notification program
watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
pipe: Add general notification queue support
pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
uapi: General notification queue definitions
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of
implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be
fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging
into exec and cleanup up what I can.
I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I
started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of
changes.
- promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex
- trivial cleanups for exec
- control flow simplifications
- remove the recomputation of bprm->cred
The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work
with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count
the added tests)"
* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits)
exec: Compute file based creds only once
exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression
selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test
exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
exec: Generic execfd support
exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally
exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
exec: Set the point of no return sooner
exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level
exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex
exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment
exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand
exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec
exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec
exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me
...
Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations:
apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds,
smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds.
Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and
return immediately if it is true. The function cap_bprm_set_creds
ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely.
Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just
before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook
that is called exactly once for the entire of exec. Modify the bits
of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec
into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds
behind.
Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved
to security_bprm_creds_for_exec.
Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and
to reflect this change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Implement the watch_key security hook to make sure that a key grants the
caller View permission in order to set a watch on a key.
For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.
The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:
(1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
being unset.
(2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).
(3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
(4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.
(5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
calls.
The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.
[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
permits. However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
of the notifications patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200430' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two more SELinux patches to fix problems in the v5.7-rcX releases.
Wei Yongjun's patch fixes a return code in an error path, and my patch
fixes a problem where we were not correctly applying access controls
to all of the netlink messages in the netlink_send LSM hook"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200430' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()
selinux: fix error return code in cond_read_list()
Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
the first message in the sk_buff.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got twenty SELinux patches for the v5.7 merge window, the
highlights are below:
- Deprecate setting /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 1.
This flag was originally created to deal with legacy userspace and
the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. We changed the default from
1 to 0 back in Linux v4.4 and now we are taking the next step of
deprecating it, at some point in the future we will take the final
step of rejecting 1.
- Allow kernfs symlinks to inherit the SELinux label of the parent
directory. In order to preserve backwards compatibility this is
protected by the genfs_seclabel_symlinks SELinux policy capability.
- Optimize how we store filename transitions in the kernel, resulting
in some significant improvements to policy load times.
- Do a better job calculating our internal hash table sizes which
resulted in additional policy load improvements and likely general
SELinux performance improvements as well.
- Remove the unused initial SIDs (labels) and improve how we handle
initial SIDs.
- Enable per-file labeling for the bpf filesystem.
- Ensure that we properly label NFS v4.2 filesystems to avoid a
temporary unlabeled condition.
- Add some missing XFS quota command types to the SELinux quota
access controls.
- Fix a problem where we were not updating the seq_file position
index correctly in selinuxfs.
- We consolidate some duplicated code into helper functions.
- A number of list to array conversions.
- Update Stephen Smalley's email address in MAINTAINERS"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statement
NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode
MAINTAINERS: Update my email address
selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return void
selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init()
selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling
selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes
selinux: Add xfs quota command types
selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions
selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read()
security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs
selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node()
selinux: convert cond_expr to array
selinux: convert cond_av_list to array
selinux: convert cond_list to array
selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index
selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context
selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node()
Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1
selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss
Add Q_XQUOTAOFF, Q_XQUOTAON and Q_XSETQLIM to trigger filesystem quotamod
permission check.
Add Q_XGETQUOTA, Q_XGETQSTAT, Q_XGETQSTATV and Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA to trigger
filesystem quotaget permission check.
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of bpffs files. This allows
for separate permissions for different pinned bpf objects, which may
be completely unrelated to each other.
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Moreland <smoreland@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small fixes: one fixes a locking problem in the recently merged
label translation code, the other fixes an embarrassing 'binderfs' /
'binder' filesystem name check"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking
selinux: fix typo in filesystem name
Currently symlinks on kernel filesystems, like sysfs, are labeled on
creation with the parent filesystem root sid.
Allow symlinks to inherit the parent directory context, so fine-grained
kernfs labeling can be applied to symlinks too and checking contexts
doesn't complain about them.
For backward-compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy
capability: genfs_seclabel_symlinks
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Deprecate setting the SELinux checkreqprot tunable to 1 via kernel
parameter or /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot. Setting it to 0 is left
intact for compatibility since Android and some Linux distributions
do so for security and treat an inability to set it as a fatal error.
Eventually setting it to 0 will become a no-op and the kernel will
stop using checkreqprot's value internally altogether.
checkreqprot was originally introduced as a compatibility mechanism
for legacy userspace and the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag.
However, if set to 1, it weakens security by allowing mappings to be
made executable without authorization by policy. The default value
for the SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE config option was changed
from 1 to 0 in commit 2a35d196c1 ("selinux: change
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default") and both Android
and Linux distributions began explicitly setting
/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 0 some time ago.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It fits more naturally in selinux_state, since it reflects also global
state (the enforcing and policyload fields).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull vfs file system parameter updates from Al Viro:
"Saner fs_parser.c guts and data structures. The system-wide registry
of syntax types (string/enum/int32/oct32/.../etc.) is gone and so is
the horror switch() in fs_parse() that would have to grow another case
every time something got added to that system-wide registry.
New syntax types can be added by filesystems easily now, and their
namespace is that of functions - not of system-wide enum members. IOW,
they can be shared or kept private and if some turn out to be widely
useful, we can make them common library helpers, etc., without having
to do anything whatsoever to fs_parse() itself.
And we already get that kind of requests - the thing that finally
pushed me into doing that was "oh, and let's add one for timeouts -
things like 15s or 2h". If some filesystem really wants that, let them
do it. Without somebody having to play gatekeeper for the variants
blessed by direct support in fs_parse(), TYVM.
Quite a bit of boilerplate is gone. And IMO the data structures make a
lot more sense now. -200LoC, while we are at it"
* 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (25 commits)
tmpfs: switch to use of invalfc()
cgroup1: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
procfs: switch to use of invalfc()
hugetlbfs: switch to use of invalfc()
cramfs: switch to use of errofc() et.al.
gfs2: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
fuse: switch to use errorfc() et.al.
ceph: use errorfc() and friends instead of spelling the prefix out
prefix-handling analogues of errorf() and friends
turn fs_param_is_... into functions
fs_parse: handle optional arguments sanely
fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec
fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field
add prefix to fs_context->log
ceph_parse_param(), ceph_parse_mon_ips(): switch to passing fc_log
new primitive: __fs_parse()
switch rbd and libceph to p_log-based primitives
struct p_log, variants of warnf() et.al. taking that one instead
teach logfc() to handle prefices, give it saner calling conventions
get rid of cg_invalf()
...
Unused now.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Correct the filesystem name to "binder" to enable genfscon per-file
labelling for binderfs.
Fixes: 7a4b519474 ("selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs")
Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: slight style changes to the subj/description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit 2db154b3ea ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM
security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing
LSM. This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent
checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton
permission to the mount point path. Provide a SELinux hook
implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for
consistency. In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount
filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses
the immediate regression.
Fixes: 2db154b3ea ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch removes the inode, file, and superblock security blob
allocation functions and moves the associated code into the
respective LSM hooks. This patch also removes the inode_doinit()
function as it was a trivial wrapper around
inode_doinit_with_dentry() and called from one location in the code.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux_nlmsg_perm is used for only by selinux_netlink_send. Remove
the redundant function to simplify the code.
Fix a typo by suggestion from Stephen.
Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") switched the LSM
infrastructure to use per-hook lists, which meant that removing the
hooks for a given module was no longer atomic. Even though the commit
clearly documents that modules implementing runtime revmoval of hooks
(only SELinux attempts this madness) need to take special precautions to
avoid race conditions, SELinux has never addressed this.
By inserting an artificial delay between the loop iterations of
security_delete_hooks() (I used 100 ms), booting to a state where
SELinux is enabled, but policy is not yet loaded, and running these
commands:
while true; do ping -c 1 <some IP>; done &
echo -n 1 >/sys/fs/selinux/disable
kill %1
wait
...I was able to trigger NULL pointer dereferences in various places. I
also have a report of someone getting panics on a stock RHEL-8 kernel
after setting SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config and rebooting
(without adding "selinux=0" to kernel command-line).
Reordering the SELinux hooks such that those that allocate structures
are removed last seems to prevent these panics. It is very much possible
that this doesn't make the runtime disable completely race-free, but at
least it makes the operation much less fragile.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The disabled/enforcing/initialized flags are all accessed concurrently
by threads so use the appropriate accessors that ensure atomicity and
document that it is expected.
Use smp_load/acquire...() helpers (with memory barriers) for the
initialized flag, since it gates access to the rest of the state
structures.
Note that the disabled flag is currently not used for anything other
than avoiding double disable, but it will be used for bailing out of
hooks once security_delete_hooks() is removed.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux checks whether VM_EXEC is set in the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
during initialization and saves the result in default_noexec for use
in its mmap and mprotect hook function implementations to decide
whether to apply EXECMEM, EXECHEAP, EXECSTACK, and EXECMOD checks.
Mark default_noexec as ro_after_init to prevent later clearing it
and thereby disabling these checks. It is only set legitimately from
init code.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security only calls msg_msg_alloc_security but
do nothing else. And also msg_msg_alloc_security is just used by the
former.
Remove the redundant function to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for binderfs.
This is required to have separate permissions to allow
access to binder, hwbinder and vndbinder devices which are
relocating to binderfs.
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Rename selinux_enabled to selinux_enabled_boot to make it clear that
it only reflects whether SELinux was enabled at boot. Replace the
references to it in the MAC_STATUS audit log in sel_write_enforce()
with hardcoded "1" values because this code is only reachable if SELinux
is enabled and does not change its value, and update the corresponding
MAC_STATUS audit log in sel_write_disable(). Stop clearing
selinux_enabled in selinux_disable() since it is not used outside of
initialization code that runs before selinux_disable() can be reached.
Mark both selinux_enabled_boot and selinux_enforcing_boot as __initdata
since they are only used in initialization code.
Wrap the disabled field in the struct selinux_state with
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE since it is only used for
runtime disable.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
task_security_struct was obtained at the beginning of may_create
and selinux_inode_init_security, no need to obtain again.
may_create will be called very frequently when create dir and file.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Yang Guo <guoyang2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Through a somewhat convoluted series of changes, we have ended up
with multiple unnecessary occurrences of (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)
tests in selinux_inode_permission(). Clean it up and simplify.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit bda0be7ad9 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
passed down the rcu flag to the SELinux AVC, but failed to adjust the
test in slow_avc_audit() to also return -ECHILD on LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY.
Previously, we only returned -ECHILD if generating an audit record with
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE since this was only relevant from inode_permission.
Move the handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK to avc_audit() and its inlined
equivalent in selinux_inode_permission() immediately after we determine
that audit is required, and always fall back to ref-walk in this case.
Fixes: bda0be7ad9 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This reverts commit e46e01eebb ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
to the AVC upon follow_link"). The correct fix is to instead fall
back to ref-walk if audit is required irrespective of the specific
audit data type. This is done in the next commit.
Fixes: e46e01eebb ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also
enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over
SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions.
The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity
versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the
full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing
what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the
lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown
module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit
code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module
is disabled.
Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and
confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another.
Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify
an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a
confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is
stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value.
Sample AVC audit output from denials:
avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd"
lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0
avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp"
lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=lockdown permissive=0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended
for namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional
time_t, timeval and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe
code. Even though the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel,
having the types and associated functions around means that we
can still grow new users, and that we may be missing conversions
to safe types that actually matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to
get the last users of these types removed, those have been
submitted to the respective maintainers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Merge tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull y2038 cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
"y2038 syscall implementation cleanups
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended for
namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional time_t, timeval
and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe code. Even though
the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel, having the types and
associated functions around means that we can still grow new users,
and that we may be missing conversions to safe types that actually
matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to get the
last users of these types removed, those have been submitted to the
respective maintainers"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
* tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (26 commits)
y2038: alarm: fix half-second cut-off
y2038: ipc: fix x32 ABI breakage
y2038: fix typo in powerpc vdso "LOPART"
y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64
y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.c
y2038: use compat_{get,set}_itimer on alpha
y2038: itimer: compat handling to itimer.c
y2038: time: avoid timespec usage in settimeofday()
y2038: timerfd: Use timespec64 internally
y2038: elfcore: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times
y2038: make ns_to_compat_timeval use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: socket: use __kernel_old_timespec instead of timespec
y2038: socket: remove timespec reference in timestamping
y2038: syscalls: change remaining timeval to __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: rusage: use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: uapi: change __kernel_time_t to __kernel_old_time_t
y2038: stat: avoid 'time_t' in 'struct stat'
y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers
y2038: vdso: powerpc: avoid timespec references
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Only three SELinux patches for v5.5:
- Remove the size limit on SELinux policies, the limitation was a
lingering vestige and no longer necessary.
- Allow file labeling before the policy is loaded. This should ease
some of the burden when the policy is initially loaded (no need to
relabel files), but it should also help enable some new system
concepts which dynamically create the root filesystem in the
initrd.
- Add support for the "greatest lower bound" policy construct which
is defined as the intersection of the MLS range of two SELinux
labels"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: default_range glblub implementation
selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
selinux: remove load size limit
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"This is mostly to fix the iwlwifi regression:
1) Flush GRO state properly in iwlwifi driver, from Alexander Lobakin.
2) Validate TIPC link name with properly length macro, from John
Rutherford.
3) Fix completion init and device query timeouts in ibmvnic, from
Thomas Falcon.
4) Fix SKB size calculation for netlink messages in psample, from
Nikolay Aleksandrov.
5) Similar kind of fix for OVS flow dumps, from Paolo Abeni.
6) Handle queue allocation failure unwind properly in gve driver, we
could try to release pages we didn't allocate. From Jeroen de
Borst.
7) Serialize TX queue SKB list accesses properly in mscc ocelot
driver. From Yangbo Lu"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net:
net: usb: aqc111: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: phy: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: wireless: intel: iwlwifi: fix GRO_NORMAL packet stalling
net: mscc: ocelot: use skb queue instead of skbs list
net: mscc: ocelot: avoid incorrect consuming in skbs list
gve: Fix the queue page list allocated pages count
net: inet_is_local_reserved_port() port arg should be unsigned short
openvswitch: fix flow command message size
net: phy: dp83869: Fix return paths to return proper values
net: psample: fix skb_over_panic
net: usbnet: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: hso: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port)
ibmvnic: Serialize device queries
ibmvnic: Bound waits for device queries
ibmvnic: Terminate waiting device threads after loss of service
ibmvnic: Fix completion structure initialization
net-sctp: replace some sock_net(sk) with just 'net'
net: Fix a documentation bug wrt. ip_unprivileged_port_start
tipc: fix link name length check
Note that the sysctl write accessor functions guarantee that:
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock <= net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0]
invariant is maintained, and as such the max() in selinux hooks is actually spurious.
ie. even though
if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) || snum > high) {
per logic is the same as
if ((snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) && snum < low) || snum > high) {
it is actually functionally equivalent to:
if (snum < low || snum > high) {
which is equivalent to:
if (snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) || snum < low || snum > high) {
even though the first clause is spurious.
But we want to hold on to it in case we ever want to change what what
inet_port_requires_bind_service() means (for example by changing
it from a, by default, [0..1024) range to some sort of set).
Test: builds, git 'grep inet_prot_sock' finds no other references
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Preparing for a change to the itimer internals, stop using the
do_setitimer() symbol and instead use a new higher-level interface.
The do_getitimer()/do_setitimer functions can now be made static,
allowing the compiler to potentially produce better object code.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the
`security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being
loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible
to have newly created files with the correct label before actually
loading the policy.
This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is
loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such
instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One
then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently
races with other processes trying to access those same files.
Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root
filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports
this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]).
One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g.
laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former,
labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter
scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when
populating the new filesystem.
This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized;
instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be
attempted at a later time
Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously
discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't
accepted.
[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html
Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify,
fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the
LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks.
- The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in
the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for
good.
- Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return
the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we
would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now
we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry
for it.
- Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with
READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection.
- A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward
declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc)
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm: remove current_security()
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications
selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one
selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array
selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings
selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead
of directly using current->security or current_security(). There
were a couple of lingering uses of current_security() in the SELinux code
that were apparently missed during the earlier conversions. IIUC, this
would only manifest as a bug if multiple security modules including
SELinux are enabled and SELinux is not first in the lsm order. After
this change, there appear to be no other users of current_security()
in-tree; perhaps we should remove it altogether.
Fixes: bbd3662a83 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a
check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been
provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify,
or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but
even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from
the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact
that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about
when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant
more power to an application in the form of permission events. While
notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass
information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking.
Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will
then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be
completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the
ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a
distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply
the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and
superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock.
Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch
all files accessed within a given mount or superblock.
In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been
placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify,
fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the
point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the
path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of
object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The
mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values
shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path
struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available,
particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by
pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for
use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security
modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not
use any of them.
This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes
that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive
all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that
is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks
or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added
by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have
no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the
requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application
has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in
its coverage.
Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must
also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access
requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue
that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during
fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered
by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements
checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process
can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized.
The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file
permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm
(descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission:
watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which
subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application
based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The
selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore
ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through
fanotify.
The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline
permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for
any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should
be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and
watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb
permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch
permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for
mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to
the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled
object existed representing the mount.
The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from
read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing
a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened
read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct
indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read
access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read
events on a file.
Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the
only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event.
This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though
fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit
trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:
- IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
deletions.
- Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.
- The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).
- Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
IMA: Define a new template field buf
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
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Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Like the audit pull request this is a little early due to some
upcoming vacation plans and uncertain network access while I'm away.
Also like the audit PR, the list of patches here is pretty minor, the
highlights include:
- Explicitly use __le variables to make sure "sparse" can verify
proper byte endian handling.
- Remove some BUG_ON()s that are no longer needed.
- Allow zero-byte writes to the "keycreate" procfs attribute without
requiring key:create to make it easier for userspace to reset the
keycreate label.
- Consistently log the "invalid_context" field as an untrusted string
in the AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR audit records"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
selinux: remove some no-op BUG_ONs
selinux: provide __le variables explicitly
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot
usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it
seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity,
switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename
the functions accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When sid == 0 (we are resetting keycreate_sid to the default value), we
should skip the KEY__CREATE check.
Before this patch, doing a zero-sized write to /proc/self/keycreate
would check if the current task can create unlabeled keys (which would
usually fail with -EACCESS and generate an AVC). Now it skips the check
and correctly sets the task's keycreate_sid to 0.
Bug report: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1719067
Tested using the reproducer from the report above.
Fixes: 4eb582cf1f ("[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys")
Reported-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kir@sacred.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), 'arg' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It
returns NULL when fails. So 'arg' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts'
should be freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 99dbbb593f ("selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In selinux_add_mnt_opt(), 'val' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It returns
NULL when fails. So 'val' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts' should be
freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 757cbe597f ("LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[PM: fixed some indenting problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
calling connect(AF_UNSPEC) on an already connected TCP socket is an
established way to disconnect() such socket. After commit 68741a8ada
("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure") it no longer works
and, in the above scenario connect() fails with EAFNOSUPPORT.
Fix the above explicitly early checking for AF_UNSPEC family, and
returning success in that case.
Reported-by: Tom Deseyn <tdeseyn@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 68741a8ada ("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure")
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This reverts commit c7e0d6cca8.
It was agreed a slightly different fix via the selinux tree.
v1 -> v2:
- use the correct reverted commit hash
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
calling connect(AF_UNSPEC) on an already connected TCP socket is an
established way to disconnect() such socket. After commit 68741a8ada
("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure") it no longer works
and, in the above scenario connect() fails with EAFNOSUPPORT.
Fix the above falling back to the generic/old code when the address family
is not AF_INET{4,6}, but leave the SCTP code path untouched, as it has
specific constraints.
Fixes: 68741a8ada ("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure")
Reported-by: Tom Deseyn <tdeseyn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind()/connect() is
shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The implementation of kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers reuses the
kernfs_node_xattr_*() functions, which take the suffix of the xattr name
and extract full xattr name from it using xattr_full_name(). However,
this function relies on the fact that the suffix passed to xattr
handlers from VFS is always constructed from the full name by just
incerementing the pointer. This doesn't necessarily hold for the callers
of kernfs_security_xattr_*(), so their usage will easily lead to
out-of-bounds access.
Fix this by moving the xattr name reconstruction to the VFS xattr
handlers and replacing the kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers with more
general kernfs_xattr_*() helpers that take full xattr name and allow
accessing all kernfs node's xattrs.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Fixes: b230d5aba2 ("LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization")
Fixes: ec882da5cd ("selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3389:5: warning:
symbol 'selinux_kernfs_init_security' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with
the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the
actual inodes later by other hooks.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: minor merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use
these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it
from kernfs explicitly using a security_inode_notifysecctx() call.
We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag SE_SBGENFS_XATTR to all
mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the
xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid in
inode_doinit_with_dentry() when this flag is set.
This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and
removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: more manual merge fixups]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small fixes for SELinux in v5.1: one adds a buffer length check to
the SELinux SCTP code, the other ensures that the SELinux labeling for
a NFS mount is not disabled if the filesystem is mounted twice"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS on reused superblock
selinux: add the missing walk_size + len check in selinux_sctp_bind_connect
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
"The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
next cycle fodder.
It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
to fix it up after -rc1 instead.
That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
cycle"
* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
afs: Add fs_context support
vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
cpuset: Use fs_context
kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
cgroup: start switching to fs_context
ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
...
In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts()
fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that
nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL.
The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS
security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you
mounted the filesystem only once.
("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like
"fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".)
Cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b4d3452b8 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..."
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As does in __sctp_connect(), when checking addrs in a while loop, after
get the addr len according to sa_family, it's necessary to do the check
walk_size + af->sockaddr_len > addrs_size to make sure it won't access
an out-of-bounds addr.
The same thing is needed in selinux_sctp_bind_connect(), otherwise an
out-of-bounds issue can be triggered:
[14548.772313] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14548.927083] Call Trace:
[14548.938072] dump_stack+0x9a/0xe9
[14548.953015] print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
[14548.996524] kasan_report.cold.6+0x92/0x1a6
[14549.015335] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14549.036947] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90
[14549.058142] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x5a/0x150 [sctp]
[14549.081650] sctp_setsockopt.part.24+0x1322/0x3ce0 [sctp]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
and more translations. There's also some LICENSES adjustments from
Thomas.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fairly routine cycle for docs - lots of typo fixes, some new
documents, and more translations. There's also some LICENSES
adjustments from Thomas"
* tag 'docs-5.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (74 commits)
docs: Bring some order to filesystem documentation
Documentation/locking/lockdep: Drop last two chars of sample states
doc: rcu: Suspicious RCU usage is a warning
docs: driver-api: iio: fix errors in documentation
Documentation/process/howto: Update for 4.x -> 5.x versioning
docs: Explicitly state that the 'Fixes:' tag shouldn't split lines
doc: security: Add kern-doc for lsm_hooks.h
doc: sctp: Merge and clean up rst files
Docs: Correct /proc/stat path
scripts/spdxcheck.py: fix C++ comment style detection
doc: fix typos in license-rules.rst
Documentation: fix admin-guide/README.rst minimum gcc version requirement
doc: process: complete removal of info about -git patches
doc: translations: sync translations 'remove info about -git patches'
perf-security: wrap paragraphs on 72 columns
perf-security: elaborate on perf_events/Perf privileged users
perf-security: document collected perf_events/Perf data categories
perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control
sysfs.txt: add note on available attribute macros
docs: kernel-doc: typo "if ... if" -> "if ... is"
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Nine SELinux patches for v5.1, all bug fixes.
As far as I'm concerned, nothing really jumps out as risky or special
to me, but each commit has a decent description so you can judge for
yourself. As usual, everything passes the selinux-testsuite; please
merge for v5.1"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix avc audit messages
selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c
selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs
selinux: replace some BUG_ON()s with a WARN_ON()
selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once
selinux: do not override context on context mounts
selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.
[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux. At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init()
is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called
between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific
initialization function is called, we can move these calls from
individual modules to ordered_lsm_init().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT
flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in
selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called
in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in
selinux_inode_notifysecctx().
This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one.
Steps to reproduce:
# mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
# umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
Result before:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Result after:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
