crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use constant time memory comparison for MACs

Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-11 23:20:23 +02:00 committed by Herbert Xu
parent ffe55266e3
commit fec17cb223

View File

@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
goto done;
pos++;
if (memcmp(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
goto done;
pos += digest_info->size;