From f2e383b5bb6bbc60a0b94b87b3e49a2b1aefd11e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_syncookies. While reading sysctl_tcp_syncookies, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/filter.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 3 ++- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 2a6a0b0ce43e..7950f7520765 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -7041,7 +7041,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) return -EINVAL; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies)) return -EINVAL; if (!th->ack || th->rst || th->syn) @@ -7116,7 +7116,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len, if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) return -EINVAL; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies)) return -ENOENT; if (!th->syn || th->ack || th->fin || th->rst) diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c index b387c4835155..9b234b42021e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c @@ -340,7 +340,8 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) struct flowi4 fl4; u32 tsoff = 0; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) || + !th->ack || th->rst) goto out; if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk)) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 3ec4edc37313..8271eaad887b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6797,11 +6797,14 @@ static bool tcp_syn_flood_action(const struct sock *sk, const char *proto) { struct request_sock_queue *queue = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue; const char *msg = "Dropping request"; - bool want_cookie = false; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); + bool want_cookie = false; + u8 syncookies; + + syncookies = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies); #ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) { + if (syncookies) { msg = "Sending cookies"; want_cookie = true; __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDOCOOKIES); @@ -6809,8 +6812,7 @@ static bool tcp_syn_flood_action(const struct sock *sk, const char *proto) #endif __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDROP); - if (!queue->synflood_warned && - net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies != 2 && + if (!queue->synflood_warned && syncookies != 2 && xchg(&queue->synflood_warned, 1) == 0) net_info_ratelimited("%s: Possible SYN flooding on port %d. %s. Check SNMP counters.\n", proto, sk->sk_num, msg); @@ -6859,7 +6861,7 @@ u16 tcp_get_syncookie_mss(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); u16 mss; - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies != 2 && + if (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) != 2 && !inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) return 0; @@ -6893,13 +6895,15 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, bool want_cookie = false; struct dst_entry *dst; struct flowi fl; + u8 syncookies; + + syncookies = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies); /* TW buckets are converted to open requests without * limitations, they conserve resources and peer is * evidently real one. */ - if ((net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies == 2 || - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) && !isn) { + if ((syncookies == 2 || inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) && !isn) { want_cookie = tcp_syn_flood_action(sk, rsk_ops->slab_name); if (!want_cookie) goto drop; @@ -6949,7 +6953,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (!want_cookie && !isn) { /* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */ - if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies && + if (!syncookies && (net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) < (net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog >> 2)) && !tcp_peer_is_proven(req, dst)) { diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c index 9cc123f000fb..5014aa663452 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c @@ -141,7 +141,8 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) __u8 rcv_wscale; u32 tsoff = 0; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) || + !th->ack || th->rst) goto out; if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk))