lsm/stable-6.8 PR 20240215

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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm fix from Paul Moore:
 "One small LSM patch to fix a potential integer overflow in the newly
  added lsm_set_self_attr() syscall"

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  lsm: fix integer overflow in lsm_set_self_attr() syscall
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2024-02-16 07:58:43 -08:00
commit b8ef920168

View File

@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/overflow.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
@ -4015,6 +4016,7 @@ int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
struct lsm_ctx *lctx;
int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr);
u64 required_len;
if (flags)
return -EINVAL;
@ -4027,8 +4029,9 @@ int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
if (IS_ERR(lctx))
return PTR_ERR(lctx);
if (size < lctx->len || size < lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx) ||
lctx->len < lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)) {
if (size < lctx->len ||
check_add_overflow(sizeof(*lctx), lctx->ctx_len, &required_len) ||
lctx->len < required_len) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}