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- Add support managing TDX host hardware
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This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
commit
b4442cadca
@ -10,6 +10,191 @@ encrypting the guest memory. In TDX, a special module running in a special
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mode sits between the host and the guest and manages the guest/host
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separation.
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TDX Host Kernel Support
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=======================
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TDX introduces a new CPU mode called Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) and
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a new isolated range pointed by the SEAM Ranger Register (SEAMRR). A
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CPU-attested software module called 'the TDX module' runs inside the new
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isolated range to provide the functionalities to manage and run protected
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VMs.
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TDX also leverages Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) to
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provide crypto-protection to the VMs. TDX reserves part of MKTME KeyIDs
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as TDX private KeyIDs, which are only accessible within the SEAM mode.
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BIOS is responsible for partitioning legacy MKTME KeyIDs and TDX KeyIDs.
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Before the TDX module can be used to create and run protected VMs, it
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must be loaded into the isolated range and properly initialized. The TDX
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architecture doesn't require the BIOS to load the TDX module, but the
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kernel assumes it is loaded by the BIOS.
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TDX boot-time detection
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-----------------------
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The kernel detects TDX by detecting TDX private KeyIDs during kernel
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boot. Below dmesg shows when TDX is enabled by BIOS::
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[..] virt/tdx: BIOS enabled: private KeyID range: [16, 64)
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TDX module initialization
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---------------------------------------
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The kernel talks to the TDX module via the new SEAMCALL instruction. The
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TDX module implements SEAMCALL leaf functions to allow the kernel to
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initialize it.
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If the TDX module isn't loaded, the SEAMCALL instruction fails with a
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special error. In this case the kernel fails the module initialization
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and reports the module isn't loaded::
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[..] virt/tdx: module not loaded
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Initializing the TDX module consumes roughly ~1/256th system RAM size to
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use it as 'metadata' for the TDX memory. It also takes additional CPU
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time to initialize those metadata along with the TDX module itself. Both
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are not trivial. The kernel initializes the TDX module at runtime on
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demand.
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Besides initializing the TDX module, a per-cpu initialization SEAMCALL
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must be done on one cpu before any other SEAMCALLs can be made on that
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cpu.
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The kernel provides two functions, tdx_enable() and tdx_cpu_enable() to
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allow the user of TDX to enable the TDX module and enable TDX on local
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cpu respectively.
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Making SEAMCALL requires VMXON has been done on that CPU. Currently only
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KVM implements VMXON. For now both tdx_enable() and tdx_cpu_enable()
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don't do VMXON internally (not trivial), but depends on the caller to
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guarantee that.
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To enable TDX, the caller of TDX should: 1) temporarily disable CPU
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hotplug; 2) do VMXON and tdx_enable_cpu() on all online cpus; 3) call
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tdx_enable(). For example::
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cpus_read_lock();
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on_each_cpu(vmxon_and_tdx_cpu_enable());
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ret = tdx_enable();
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cpus_read_unlock();
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if (ret)
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goto no_tdx;
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// TDX is ready to use
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And the caller of TDX must guarantee the tdx_cpu_enable() has been
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successfully done on any cpu before it wants to run any other SEAMCALL.
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A typical usage is do both VMXON and tdx_cpu_enable() in CPU hotplug
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online callback, and refuse to online if tdx_cpu_enable() fails.
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User can consult dmesg to see whether the TDX module has been initialized.
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If the TDX module is initialized successfully, dmesg shows something
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like below::
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[..] virt/tdx: 262668 KBs allocated for PAMT
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[..] virt/tdx: module initialized
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If the TDX module failed to initialize, dmesg also shows it failed to
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initialize::
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[..] virt/tdx: module initialization failed ...
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TDX Interaction to Other Kernel Components
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------------------------------------------
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TDX Memory Policy
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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TDX reports a list of "Convertible Memory Region" (CMR) to tell the
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kernel which memory is TDX compatible. The kernel needs to build a list
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of memory regions (out of CMRs) as "TDX-usable" memory and pass those
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regions to the TDX module. Once this is done, those "TDX-usable" memory
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regions are fixed during module's lifetime.
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To keep things simple, currently the kernel simply guarantees all pages
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in the page allocator are TDX memory. Specifically, the kernel uses all
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system memory in the core-mm "at the time of TDX module initialization"
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as TDX memory, and in the meantime, refuses to online any non-TDX-memory
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in the memory hotplug.
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Physical Memory Hotplug
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Note TDX assumes convertible memory is always physically present during
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machine's runtime. A non-buggy BIOS should never support hot-removal of
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any convertible memory. This implementation doesn't handle ACPI memory
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removal but depends on the BIOS to behave correctly.
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CPU Hotplug
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~~~~~~~~~~~
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TDX module requires the per-cpu initialization SEAMCALL must be done on
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one cpu before any other SEAMCALLs can be made on that cpu. The kernel
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provides tdx_cpu_enable() to let the user of TDX to do it when the user
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wants to use a new cpu for TDX task.
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TDX doesn't support physical (ACPI) CPU hotplug. During machine boot,
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TDX verifies all boot-time present logical CPUs are TDX compatible before
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enabling TDX. A non-buggy BIOS should never support hot-add/removal of
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physical CPU. Currently the kernel doesn't handle physical CPU hotplug,
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but depends on the BIOS to behave correctly.
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Note TDX works with CPU logical online/offline, thus the kernel still
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allows to offline logical CPU and online it again.
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Kexec()
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~~~~~~~
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TDX host support currently lacks the ability to handle kexec. For
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simplicity only one of them can be enabled in the Kconfig. This will be
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fixed in the future.
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Erratum
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~~~~~~~
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The first few generations of TDX hardware have an erratum. A partial
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write to a TDX private memory cacheline will silently "poison" the
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line. Subsequent reads will consume the poison and generate a machine
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check.
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A partial write is a memory write where a write transaction of less than
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cacheline lands at the memory controller. The CPU does these via
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non-temporal write instructions (like MOVNTI), or through UC/WC memory
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mappings. Devices can also do partial writes via DMA.
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Theoretically, a kernel bug could do partial write to TDX private memory
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and trigger unexpected machine check. What's more, the machine check
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code will present these as "Hardware error" when they were, in fact, a
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software-triggered issue. But in the end, this issue is hard to trigger.
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If the platform has such erratum, the kernel prints additional message in
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machine check handler to tell user the machine check may be caused by
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kernel bug on TDX private memory.
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Interaction vs S3 and deeper states
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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TDX cannot survive from S3 and deeper states. The hardware resets and
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disables TDX completely when platform goes to S3 and deeper. Both TDX
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guests and the TDX module get destroyed permanently.
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The kernel uses S3 for suspend-to-ram, and use S4 and deeper states for
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hibernation. Currently, for simplicity, the kernel chooses to make TDX
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mutually exclusive with S3 and hibernation.
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The kernel disables TDX during early boot when hibernation support is
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available::
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[..] virt/tdx: initialization failed: Hibernation support is enabled
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Add 'nohibernate' kernel command line to disable hibernation in order to
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use TDX.
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ACPI S3 is disabled during kernel early boot if TDX is enabled. The user
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needs to turn off TDX in the BIOS in order to use S3.
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TDX Guest Support
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=================
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Since the host cannot directly access guest registers or memory, much
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normal functionality of a hypervisor must be moved into the guest. This is
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implemented using a Virtualization Exception (#VE) that is handled by the
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@ -20,7 +205,7 @@ TDX includes new hypercall-like mechanisms for communicating from the
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guest to the hypervisor or the TDX module.
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New TDX Exceptions
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==================
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------------------
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TDX guests behave differently from bare-metal and traditional VMX guests.
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In TDX guests, otherwise normal instructions or memory accesses can cause
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@ -30,7 +215,7 @@ Instructions marked with an '*' conditionally cause exceptions. The
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details for these instructions are discussed below.
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Instruction-based #VE
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---------------------
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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- Port I/O (INS, OUTS, IN, OUT)
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- HLT
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@ -41,7 +226,7 @@ Instruction-based #VE
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- CPUID*
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Instruction-based #GP
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---------------------
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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- All VMX instructions: INVEPT, INVVPID, VMCLEAR, VMFUNC, VMLAUNCH,
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VMPTRLD, VMPTRST, VMREAD, VMRESUME, VMWRITE, VMXOFF, VMXON
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@ -52,7 +237,7 @@ Instruction-based #GP
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- RDMSR*,WRMSR*
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RDMSR/WRMSR Behavior
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--------------------
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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MSR access behavior falls into three categories:
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@ -73,7 +258,7 @@ trapping and handling in the TDX module. Other than possibly being slow,
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these MSRs appear to function just as they would on bare metal.
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CPUID Behavior
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--------------
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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For some CPUID leaves and sub-leaves, the virtualized bit fields of CPUID
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return values (in guest EAX/EBX/ECX/EDX) are configurable by the
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@ -93,7 +278,7 @@ not know how to handle. The guest kernel may ask the hypervisor for the
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value with a hypercall.
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#VE on Memory Accesses
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======================
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----------------------
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There are essentially two classes of TDX memory: private and shared.
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Private memory receives full TDX protections. Its content is protected
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@ -107,7 +292,7 @@ entries. This helps ensure that a guest does not place sensitive
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information in shared memory, exposing it to the untrusted hypervisor.
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#VE on Shared Memory
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--------------------
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Access to shared mappings can cause a #VE. The hypervisor ultimately
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controls whether a shared memory access causes a #VE, so the guest must be
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@ -127,7 +312,7 @@ be careful not to access device MMIO regions unless it is also prepared to
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handle a #VE.
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#VE on Private Pages
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--------------------
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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An access to private mappings can also cause a #VE. Since all kernel
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memory is also private memory, the kernel might theoretically need to
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@ -145,7 +330,7 @@ The hypervisor is permitted to unilaterally move accepted pages to a
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to handle the exception.
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Linux #VE handler
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=================
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-----------------
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Just like page faults or #GP's, #VE exceptions can be either handled or be
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fatal. Typically, an unhandled userspace #VE results in a SIGSEGV.
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@ -167,7 +352,7 @@ While the block is in place, any #VE is elevated to a double fault (#DF)
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which is not recoverable.
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MMIO handling
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=============
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-------------
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In non-TDX VMs, MMIO is usually implemented by giving a guest access to a
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mapping which will cause a VMEXIT on access, and then the hypervisor
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@ -189,7 +374,7 @@ MMIO access via other means (like structure overlays) may result in an
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oops.
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Shared Memory Conversions
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=========================
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-------------------------
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All TDX guest memory starts out as private at boot. This memory can not
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be accessed by the hypervisor. However, some kernel users like device
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@ -1969,6 +1969,11 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST
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depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
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depends on X86_64
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depends on KVM_INTEL
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depends on X86_X2APIC
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select ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK
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depends on CONTIG_ALLOC
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depends on !KEXEC_CORE
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depends on X86_MCE
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help
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Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
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host and certain physical attacks. This option enables necessary TDX
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@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ static unsigned long try_accept_one(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long len,
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*/
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switch (pg_level) {
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case PG_LEVEL_4K:
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page_size = 0;
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page_size = TDX_PS_4K;
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break;
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case PG_LEVEL_2M:
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page_size = 1;
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page_size = TDX_PS_2M;
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break;
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case PG_LEVEL_1G:
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page_size = 2;
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page_size = TDX_PS_1G;
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break;
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default:
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return 0;
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@ -198,6 +198,7 @@
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#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3 ( 7*32+ 4) /* Cache Allocation Technology L3 */
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#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2 ( 7*32+ 5) /* Cache Allocation Technology L2 */
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#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3 ( 7*32+ 6) /* Code and Data Prioritization L3 */
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#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM ( 7*32+ 7) /* Platform supports being a TDX host */
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#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
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#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
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#define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */
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@ -499,6 +500,7 @@
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#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
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#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
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#define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(30) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */
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#define X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE X86_BUG(31) /* CPU may incur #MC if non-TD software does partial write to TDX private memory */
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/* BUG word 2 */
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#define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */
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@ -541,6 +541,9 @@
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#define MSR_RELOAD_PMC0 0x000014c1
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#define MSR_RELOAD_FIXED_CTR0 0x00001309
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/* KeyID partitioning between MKTME and TDX */
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#define MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING 0x00000087
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/*
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* AMD64 MSRs. Not complete. See the architecture manual for a more
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* complete list.
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@ -55,6 +55,12 @@
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(TDX_RDX | TDX_RBX | TDX_RSI | TDX_RDI | TDX_R8 | TDX_R9 | \
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TDX_R10 | TDX_R11 | TDX_R12 | TDX_R13 | TDX_R14 | TDX_R15)
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/* TDX supported page sizes from the TDX module ABI. */
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#define TDX_PS_4K 0
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#define TDX_PS_2M 1
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#define TDX_PS_1G 2
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#define TDX_PS_NR (TDX_PS_1G + 1)
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#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
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#include <linux/compiler_attributes.h>
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@ -24,8 +24,16 @@
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#define TDX_SEAMCALL_GP (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_GP)
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#define TDX_SEAMCALL_UD (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_UD)
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/*
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* TDX module SEAMCALL leaf function error codes
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*/
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#define TDX_SUCCESS 0ULL
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#define TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY 0x8000020300000000ULL
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#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
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#include <uapi/asm/mce.h>
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/*
|
||||
* Used by the #VE exception handler to gather the #VE exception
|
||||
* info from the TDX module. This is a software only structure
|
||||
@ -83,6 +91,36 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
|
||||
u64 __seamcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
|
||||
u64 __seamcall_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
|
||||
u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
|
||||
void tdx_init(void);
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm/archrandom.h>
|
||||
|
||||
typedef u64 (*sc_func_t)(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
|
||||
|
||||
static inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,
|
||||
struct tdx_module_args *args)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int retry = RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS;
|
||||
u64 ret;
|
||||
|
||||
do {
|
||||
ret = func(fn, args);
|
||||
} while (ret == TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY && --retry);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define seamcall(_fn, _args) sc_retry(__seamcall, (_fn), (_args))
|
||||
#define seamcall_ret(_fn, _args) sc_retry(__seamcall_ret, (_fn), (_args))
|
||||
#define seamcall_saved_ret(_fn, _args) sc_retry(__seamcall_saved_ret, (_fn), (_args))
|
||||
int tdx_cpu_enable(void);
|
||||
int tdx_enable(void);
|
||||
const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static inline void tdx_init(void) { }
|
||||
static inline int tdx_cpu_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
|
||||
static inline int tdx_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
|
||||
static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m) { return NULL; }
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
|
||||
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/traps.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/sev.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/tdx.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "cpu.h"
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1986,6 +1987,7 @@ static __init void identify_boot_cpu(void)
|
||||
setup_cr_pinning();
|
||||
|
||||
tsx_init();
|
||||
tdx_init();
|
||||
lkgs_init();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
|
||||
#include <asm/mce.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/msr.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/reboot.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/tdx.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "internal.h"
|
||||
|
||||
@ -229,12 +230,20 @@ static void wait_for_panic(void)
|
||||
panic("Panicing machine check CPU died");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const char *mce_dump_aux_info(struct mce *m)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE))
|
||||
return tdx_dump_mce_info(m);
|
||||
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static noinstr void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct llist_node *pending;
|
||||
struct mce_evt_llist *l;
|
||||
int apei_err = 0;
|
||||
struct page *p;
|
||||
const char *memmsg;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Allow instrumentation around external facilities usage. Not that it
|
||||
@ -285,6 +294,11 @@ static noinstr void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (exp)
|
||||
pr_emerg(HW_ERR "Machine check: %s\n", exp);
|
||||
|
||||
memmsg = mce_dump_aux_info(final);
|
||||
if (memmsg)
|
||||
pr_emerg(HW_ERR "Machine check: %s\n", memmsg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!fake_panic) {
|
||||
if (panic_timeout == 0)
|
||||
panic_timeout = mca_cfg.panic_timeout;
|
||||
@ -297,6 +311,7 @@ static noinstr void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (kexec_crash_loaded()) {
|
||||
if (final && (final->status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV)) {
|
||||
struct page *p;
|
||||
p = pfn_to_online_page(final->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
|
||||
if (p)
|
||||
SetPageHWPoison(p);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1031,6 +1031,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Moreover, on machines with SandyBridge graphics or in setups that use
|
||||
* crashkernel the entire 1M is reserved anyway.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note the host kernel TDX also requires the first 1MB being reserved.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
x86_platform.realmode_reserve();
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
|
||||
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
|
||||
obj-y += seamcall.o
|
||||
obj-y += seamcall.o tdx.o
|
||||
|
||||
1492
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
Normal file
1492
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
121
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
Normal file
121
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
|
||||
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
||||
#ifndef _X86_VIRT_TDX_H
|
||||
#define _X86_VIRT_TDX_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/bits.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This file contains both macros and data structures defined by the TDX
|
||||
* architecture and Linux defined software data structures and functions.
|
||||
* The two should not be mixed together for better readability. The
|
||||
* architectural definitions come first.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* TDX module SEAMCALL leaf functions
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RDMD 24
|
||||
#define TDH_SYS_KEY_CONFIG 31
|
||||
#define TDH_SYS_INIT 33
|
||||
#define TDH_SYS_RD 34
|
||||
#define TDH_SYS_LP_INIT 35
|
||||
#define TDH_SYS_TDMR_INIT 36
|
||||
#define TDH_SYS_CONFIG 45
|
||||
|
||||
/* TDX page types */
|
||||
#define PT_NDA 0x0
|
||||
#define PT_RSVD 0x1
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Global scope metadata field ID.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See Table "Global Scope Metadata", TDX module 1.5 ABI spec.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define MD_FIELD_ID_MAX_TDMRS 0x9100000100000008ULL
|
||||
#define MD_FIELD_ID_MAX_RESERVED_PER_TDMR 0x9100000100000009ULL
|
||||
#define MD_FIELD_ID_PAMT_4K_ENTRY_SIZE 0x9100000100000010ULL
|
||||
#define MD_FIELD_ID_PAMT_2M_ENTRY_SIZE 0x9100000100000011ULL
|
||||
#define MD_FIELD_ID_PAMT_1G_ENTRY_SIZE 0x9100000100000012ULL
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sub-field definition of metadata field ID.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See Table "MD_FIELD_ID (Metadata Field Identifier / Sequence Header)
|
||||
* Definition", TDX module 1.5 ABI spec.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - Bit 33:32: ELEMENT_SIZE_CODE -- size of a single element of metadata
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 0: 8 bits
|
||||
* 1: 16 bits
|
||||
* 2: 32 bits
|
||||
* 3: 64 bits
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define MD_FIELD_ID_ELE_SIZE_CODE(_field_id) \
|
||||
(((_field_id) & GENMASK_ULL(33, 32)) >> 32)
|
||||
|
||||
#define MD_FIELD_ID_ELE_SIZE_16BIT 1
|
||||
|
||||
struct tdmr_reserved_area {
|
||||
u64 offset;
|
||||
u64 size;
|
||||
} __packed;
|
||||
|
||||
#define TDMR_INFO_ALIGNMENT 512
|
||||
#define TDMR_INFO_PA_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT 512
|
||||
|
||||
struct tdmr_info {
|
||||
u64 base;
|
||||
u64 size;
|
||||
u64 pamt_1g_base;
|
||||
u64 pamt_1g_size;
|
||||
u64 pamt_2m_base;
|
||||
u64 pamt_2m_size;
|
||||
u64 pamt_4k_base;
|
||||
u64 pamt_4k_size;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The actual number of reserved areas depends on the value of
|
||||
* field MD_FIELD_ID_MAX_RESERVED_PER_TDMR in the TDX module
|
||||
* global metadata.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct tdmr_reserved_area, reserved_areas);
|
||||
} __packed __aligned(TDMR_INFO_ALIGNMENT);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do not put any hardware-defined TDX structure representations below
|
||||
* this comment!
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Kernel defined TDX module status during module initialization. */
|
||||
enum tdx_module_status_t {
|
||||
TDX_MODULE_UNINITIALIZED,
|
||||
TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED,
|
||||
TDX_MODULE_ERROR
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct tdx_memblock {
|
||||
struct list_head list;
|
||||
unsigned long start_pfn;
|
||||
unsigned long end_pfn;
|
||||
int nid;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/* "TDMR info" part of "Global Scope Metadata" for constructing TDMRs */
|
||||
struct tdx_tdmr_sysinfo {
|
||||
u16 max_tdmrs;
|
||||
u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr;
|
||||
u16 pamt_entry_size[TDX_PS_NR];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/* Warn if kernel has less than TDMR_NR_WARN TDMRs after allocation */
|
||||
#define TDMR_NR_WARN 4
|
||||
|
||||
struct tdmr_info_list {
|
||||
void *tdmrs; /* Flexible array to hold 'tdmr_info's */
|
||||
int nr_consumed_tdmrs; /* How many 'tdmr_info's are in use */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Metadata for finding target 'tdmr_info' and freeing @tdmrs */
|
||||
int tdmr_sz; /* Size of one 'tdmr_info' */
|
||||
int max_tdmrs; /* How many 'tdmr_info's are allocated */
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user