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integrity-v5.15
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iIoEABYIADIWIQQdXVVFGN5XqKr1Hj7LwZzRsCrn5QUCYS4c6hQcem9oYXJAbGlu dXguaWJtLmNvbQAKCRDLwZzRsCrn5b4OAP9l7cnpkOzVUtjoNIIYdIiKTDp+Kb8v 3o08lxtyzALfKgEAlrizzLfphqLa2yCdxbyaTjkx19J7tav27xVti8uVGgs= =hIxY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'integrity-v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: - Limit the allowed hash algorithms when writing security.ima xattrs or verifying them, based on the IMA policy and the configured hash algorithms. - Return the calculated "critical data" measurement hash and size to avoid code duplication. (Preparatory change for a proposed LSM.) - and a single patch to address a compiler warning. * tag 'integrity-v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: IMA: reject unknown hash algorithms in ima_get_hash_algo IMA: prevent SETXATTR_CHECK policy rules with unavailable algorithms IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK IMA: add a policy option to restrict xattr hash algorithms on appraisal IMA: add support to restrict the hash algorithms used for file appraisal IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5 ima: Add digest and digest_len params to the functions to measure a buffer ima: Return int in the functions to measure a buffer ima: Introduce ima_get_current_hash_algo() IMA: remove -Wmissing-prototypes warning
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
commit
aef4892a63
@ -27,12 +27,13 @@ Description:
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lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
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[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
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option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
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[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
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[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
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base:
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func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
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[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
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[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
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[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
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[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
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[SETXATTR_CHECK]
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mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
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[[^]MAY_EXEC]
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fsmagic:= hex value
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@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ Description:
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label:= [selinux]|[kernel_info]|[data_label]
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data_label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
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For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux.
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appraise_algos:= comma-separated list of hash algorithms
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For example, "sha256,sha512" to only accept to appraise
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files where the security.ima xattr was hashed with one
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of these two algorithms.
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default policy:
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# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
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@ -134,3 +139,9 @@ Description:
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keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring:
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measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima
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Example of the special SETXATTR_CHECK appraise rule, that
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restricts the hash algorithms allowed when writing to the
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security.ima xattr of a file:
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appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512
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@ -136,7 +136,8 @@ static void dm_ima_measure_data(const char *event_name, const void *buf, size_t
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if (noio)
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noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
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ima_measure_critical_data(DM_NAME, event_name, buf, buf_len, false);
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ima_measure_critical_data(DM_NAME, event_name, buf, buf_len,
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false, NULL, 0);
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if (noio)
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memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
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@ -11,9 +11,11 @@
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/kexec.h>
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#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
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struct linux_binprm;
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
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extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
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extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
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extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
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extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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@ -33,10 +35,10 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
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extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
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extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
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extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
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const char *event_name,
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const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
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bool hash);
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extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
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const char *event_name,
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const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
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bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
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extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
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@ -64,6 +66,11 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
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#endif
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#else
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static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
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{
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return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
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}
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static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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return 0;
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@ -137,10 +144,14 @@ static inline int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size
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static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
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static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
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static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
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const char *event_name,
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const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
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bool hash) {}
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bool hash, u8 *digest,
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size_t digest_len)
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{
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return -ENOENT;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ config IMA
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select SECURITYFS
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select CRYPTO
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select CRYPTO_HMAC
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select CRYPTO_MD5
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select CRYPTO_SHA1
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select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
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select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
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@ -46,8 +46,11 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
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/* current content of the policy */
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extern int ima_policy_flag;
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/* bitset of digests algorithms allowed in the setxattr hook */
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extern atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
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/* set during initialization */
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extern int ima_hash_algo;
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extern int ima_hash_algo __ro_after_init;
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extern int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
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extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
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extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init;
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@ -198,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
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hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
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hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
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hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \
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hook(SETXATTR_CHECK, setxattr_check) \
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hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
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#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
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@ -254,7 +258,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
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enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
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struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
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const char *func_data);
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const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
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int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
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int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
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@ -264,11 +268,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
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struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
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struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
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void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
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const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
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int pcr, const char *func_data,
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bool buf_hash);
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int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
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const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
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int pcr, const char *func_data,
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bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
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void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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const unsigned char *filename);
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int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
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@ -285,10 +289,10 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
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int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
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struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
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const char *func_data);
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const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
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void ima_init_policy(void);
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void ima_update_policy(void);
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void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
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void ima_update_policy_flags(void);
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ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
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void ima_delete_rules(void);
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int ima_check_policy(void);
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@ -319,7 +323,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
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enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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enum ima_hooks func);
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enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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int xattr_len);
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int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
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struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
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@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ err_out:
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* @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
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* @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
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* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
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* @allowed_algos: allowlist of hash algorithms for the IMA xattr
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*
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* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
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* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
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@ -188,14 +189,15 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
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enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
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struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
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const char *func_data)
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const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
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{
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int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
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flags &= ima_policy_flag;
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return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
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flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data);
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flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
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allowed_algos);
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}
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/*
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@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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return 0;
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security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
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return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
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mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
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func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
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NULL, NULL, NULL);
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}
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static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
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@ -171,7 +172,7 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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}
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}
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enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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int xattr_len)
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{
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struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
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@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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switch (xattr_value->type) {
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case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
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sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
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if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig))
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if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
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|| sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
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return ima_hash_algo;
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return sig->hash_algo;
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break;
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@ -357,7 +359,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
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process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, digest, digestsize,
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"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
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pcr, NULL, false);
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pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0);
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}
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return rc;
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@ -575,6 +577,66 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
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clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
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}
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/**
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* validate_hash_algo() - Block setxattr with unsupported hash algorithms
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* @dentry: object of the setxattr()
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* @xattr_value: userland supplied xattr value
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* @xattr_value_len: length of xattr_value
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*
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* The xattr value is mapped to its hash algorithm, and this algorithm
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* must be built in the kernel for the setxattr to be allowed.
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*
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* Emit an audit message when the algorithm is invalid.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, else an error.
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*/
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static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
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const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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size_t xattr_value_len)
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{
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char *path = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
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enum hash_algo xattr_hash_algo;
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const char *errmsg = "unavailable-hash-algorithm";
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unsigned int allowed_hashes;
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xattr_hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
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allowed_hashes = atomic_read(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms);
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if (allowed_hashes) {
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/* success if the algorithm is allowed in the ima policy */
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if (allowed_hashes & (1U << xattr_hash_algo))
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return 0;
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/*
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* We use a different audit message when the hash algorithm
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* is denied by a policy rule, instead of not being built
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* in the kernel image
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*/
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errmsg = "denied-hash-algorithm";
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} else {
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if (likely(xattr_hash_algo == ima_hash_algo))
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return 0;
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/* allow any xattr using an algorithm built in the kernel */
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if (crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[xattr_hash_algo], 0, 0))
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return 0;
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}
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pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!pathbuf)
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return -EACCES;
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path = dentry_path(dentry, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry), path,
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"set_data", errmsg, -EACCES, 0);
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kfree(pathbuf);
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return -EACCES;
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}
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int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
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const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
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{
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@ -592,9 +654,11 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
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digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG);
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}
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if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) {
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result = validate_hash_algo(dentry, xvalue, xattr_value_len);
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if (result)
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return result;
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ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
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if (result == 1)
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result = 0;
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}
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return result;
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}
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@ -62,5 +62,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
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*/
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process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, payload, payload_len,
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keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
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keyring->description, false);
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keyring->description, false, NULL, 0);
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}
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@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
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ima_init_key_queue();
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ima_measure_critical_data("kernel_info", "kernel_version",
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UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false);
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UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false,
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NULL, 0);
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return rc;
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}
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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
|
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int ima_appraise;
|
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#endif
|
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|
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int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
|
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int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
|
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static int hash_setup_done;
|
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|
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static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
|
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@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ out:
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}
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__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
|
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enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
|
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{
|
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return ima_hash_algo;
|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */
|
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static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
|
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char **pathbuf, const char **pathname,
|
||||
@ -210,6 +215,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
|
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int xattr_len = 0;
|
||||
bool violation_check;
|
||||
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
|
||||
unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@ -219,7 +225,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
|
||||
* Included is the appraise submask.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
|
||||
mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL);
|
||||
mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
|
||||
&allowed_algos);
|
||||
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
|
||||
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
|
||||
if (!action && !violation_check)
|
||||
@ -356,6 +363,16 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
|
||||
|
||||
if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Ensure the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */
|
||||
if (rc == 0 && must_appraise && allowed_algos != 0 &&
|
||||
(allowed_algos & (1U << hash_algo)) == 0) {
|
||||
rc = -EACCES;
|
||||
|
||||
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file),
|
||||
pathname, "collect_data",
|
||||
"denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
out_locked:
|
||||
if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) &&
|
||||
!(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
|
||||
@ -433,7 +450,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
|
||||
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
|
||||
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
|
||||
current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
|
||||
&pcr, &template, NULL);
|
||||
&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
|
||||
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
|
||||
@ -822,7 +839,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
|
||||
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
|
||||
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
|
||||
@ -833,14 +850,20 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
|
||||
* @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
|
||||
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
|
||||
* @buf_hash: measure buffer data hash
|
||||
* @digest: buffer digest will be written to
|
||||
* @digest_len: buffer length
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
|
||||
* has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
|
||||
* a negative value otherwise.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
||||
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
|
||||
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
|
||||
int pcr, const char *func_data,
|
||||
bool buf_hash)
|
||||
int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
||||
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
|
||||
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
|
||||
int pcr, const char *func_data,
|
||||
bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
|
||||
@ -861,8 +884,11 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
||||
int action = 0;
|
||||
u32 secid;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ima_policy_flag)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ima_policy_flag && !digest)
|
||||
return -ENOENT;
|
||||
|
||||
template = ima_template_desc_buf();
|
||||
if (!template) {
|
||||
@ -882,9 +908,9 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
||||
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
|
||||
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
|
||||
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
|
||||
func_data);
|
||||
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
func_data, NULL);
|
||||
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
|
||||
return -ENOENT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pcr)
|
||||
@ -914,6 +940,12 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
||||
event_data.buf_len = digest_hash_len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (digest)
|
||||
memcpy(digest, iint.ima_hash->digest, digest_hash_len);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE)))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
|
||||
if (ret < 0) {
|
||||
audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
|
||||
@ -932,7 +964,7 @@ out:
|
||||
func_measure_str(func),
|
||||
audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
|
||||
|
||||
return;
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@ -956,7 +988,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
|
||||
|
||||
process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
|
||||
buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
|
||||
NULL, false);
|
||||
NULL, false, NULL, 0);
|
||||
fdput(f);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -967,23 +999,30 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
|
||||
* @buf: pointer to buffer data
|
||||
* @buf_len: length of buffer data (in bytes)
|
||||
* @hash: measure buffer data hash
|
||||
* @digest: buffer digest will be written to
|
||||
* @digest_len: buffer length
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Measure data critical to the integrity of the kernel into the IMA log
|
||||
* and extend the pcr. Examples of critical data could be various data
|
||||
* structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can
|
||||
* impact the integrity of the system.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
|
||||
* has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
|
||||
* a negative value otherwise.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
|
||||
const char *event_name,
|
||||
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
|
||||
bool hash)
|
||||
int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
|
||||
const char *event_name,
|
||||
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
|
||||
bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
return -ENOPARAM;
|
||||
|
||||
process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
|
||||
CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_label,
|
||||
hash);
|
||||
return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
|
||||
event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
|
||||
event_label, hash, digest,
|
||||
digest_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1013,7 +1052,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
|
||||
pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!error)
|
||||
ima_update_policy_flag();
|
||||
ima_update_policy_flags();
|
||||
|
||||
return error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Allocate the IMA blacklist keyring
|
||||
*/
|
||||
__init int ima_mok_init(void)
|
||||
static __init int ima_mok_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct key_restriction *restriction;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
|
||||
#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
|
||||
#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
|
||||
#define IMA_LABEL 0x0800
|
||||
#define IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS 0x1000
|
||||
|
||||
#define UNKNOWN 0
|
||||
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
|
||||
@ -52,6 +53,8 @@ int ima_policy_flag;
|
||||
static int temp_ima_appraise;
|
||||
static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
|
||||
|
||||
atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
|
||||
|
||||
#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
|
||||
enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
|
||||
LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
|
||||
@ -79,6 +82,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
|
||||
bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
|
||||
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
|
||||
int pcr;
|
||||
unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
|
||||
struct {
|
||||
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
|
||||
char *args_p; /* audit value */
|
||||
@ -90,6 +94,14 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
|
||||
struct ima_template_desc *template;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* sanity check in case the kernels gains more hash algorithms that can
|
||||
* fit in an unsigned int
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static_assert(
|
||||
8 * sizeof(unsigned int) >= HASH_ALGO__LAST,
|
||||
"The bitfield allowed_algos in ima_rule_entry is too small to contain all the supported hash algorithms, consider using a bigger type");
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
|
||||
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
|
||||
@ -646,6 +658,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
|
||||
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
|
||||
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
|
||||
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
|
||||
* @allowed_algos: allowlist of hash algorithms for the IMA xattr
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
|
||||
* conditions.
|
||||
@ -658,7 +671,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
||||
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
|
||||
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
|
||||
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
|
||||
const char *func_data)
|
||||
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
|
||||
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
|
||||
@ -684,8 +697,11 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
||||
action &= ~IMA_HASH;
|
||||
if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs)
|
||||
action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (allowed_algos &&
|
||||
entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS)
|
||||
*allowed_algos = entry->allowed_algos;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
|
||||
actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
|
||||
@ -706,24 +722,57 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
||||
return action;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
|
||||
* loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
|
||||
* out of a function or not call the function in the first place
|
||||
* can be made earlier.
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* ima_update_policy_flags() - Update global IMA variables
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Update ima_policy_flag and ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms
|
||||
* based on the currently loaded policy.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* With ima_policy_flag, the decision to short circuit out of a function
|
||||
* or not call the function in the first place can be made earlier.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* With ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, the policy can restrict the
|
||||
* set of hash algorithms accepted when updating the security.ima xattr of
|
||||
* a file.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Context: called after a policy update and at system initialization.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
|
||||
void ima_update_policy_flags(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
|
||||
int new_policy_flag = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
rcu_read_lock();
|
||||
list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* SETXATTR_CHECK rules do not implement a full policy check
|
||||
* because rule checking would probably have an important
|
||||
* performance impact on setxattr(). As a consequence, only one
|
||||
* SETXATTR_CHECK can be active at a given time.
|
||||
* Because we want to preserve that property, we set out to use
|
||||
* atomic_cmpxchg. Either:
|
||||
* - the atomic was non-zero: a setxattr hash policy is
|
||||
* already enforced, we do nothing
|
||||
* - the atomic was zero: no setxattr policy was set, enable
|
||||
* the setxattr hash policy
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (entry->func == SETXATTR_CHECK) {
|
||||
atomic_cmpxchg(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms,
|
||||
0, entry->allowed_algos);
|
||||
/* SETXATTR_CHECK doesn't impact ima_policy_flag */
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
|
||||
ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
|
||||
new_policy_flag |= entry->action;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rcu_read_unlock();
|
||||
|
||||
ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise);
|
||||
if (!ima_appraise)
|
||||
ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
|
||||
new_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
|
||||
|
||||
ima_policy_flag = new_policy_flag;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
|
||||
@ -889,7 +938,9 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
|
||||
ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
|
||||
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
|
||||
|
||||
ima_update_policy_flag();
|
||||
atomic_set(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
ima_update_policy_flags();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
|
||||
@ -929,7 +980,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
kfree(arch_policy_entry);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ima_update_policy_flag();
|
||||
ima_update_policy_flags();
|
||||
|
||||
/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
|
||||
ima_process_queued_keys();
|
||||
@ -946,7 +997,7 @@ enum {
|
||||
Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq,
|
||||
Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
|
||||
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
|
||||
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
|
||||
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
|
||||
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
|
||||
Opt_label, Opt_err
|
||||
};
|
||||
@ -981,6 +1032,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
|
||||
{Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
|
||||
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
|
||||
{Opt_appraise_flag, "appraise_flag=%s"},
|
||||
{Opt_appraise_algos, "appraise_algos=%s"},
|
||||
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
|
||||
{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
|
||||
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
|
||||
@ -1081,7 +1133,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if (entry->action != APPRAISE &&
|
||||
entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
|
||||
entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
|
||||
IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -1111,7 +1164,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
|
||||
IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
|
||||
IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
|
||||
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
|
||||
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@ -1123,7 +1176,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
|
||||
IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
|
||||
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
|
||||
IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
|
||||
IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@ -1160,6 +1213,23 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SETXATTR_CHECK:
|
||||
/* any action other than APPRAISE is unsupported */
|
||||
if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
/* SETXATTR_CHECK requires an appraise_algos parameter */
|
||||
if (!(entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* full policies are not supported, they would have too
|
||||
* much of a performance impact
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
@ -1173,6 +1243,34 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_algos(char *arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned int res = 0;
|
||||
int idx;
|
||||
char *token;
|
||||
|
||||
while ((token = strsep(&arg, ",")) != NULL) {
|
||||
idx = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, token);
|
||||
|
||||
if (idx < 0) {
|
||||
pr_err("unknown hash algorithm \"%s\"",
|
||||
token);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[idx], 0, 0)) {
|
||||
pr_err("unavailable hash algorithm \"%s\", check your kernel configuration",
|
||||
token);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Add the hash algorithm to the 'allowed' bitfield */
|
||||
res |= (1U << idx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return res;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct audit_buffer *ab;
|
||||
@ -1294,6 +1392,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0)
|
||||
entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "SETXATTR_CHECK") == 0)
|
||||
entry->func = SETXATTR_CHECK;
|
||||
else
|
||||
result = -EINVAL;
|
||||
if (!result)
|
||||
@ -1508,6 +1608,25 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
|
||||
else
|
||||
result = -EINVAL;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case Opt_appraise_algos:
|
||||
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_algos", args[0].from);
|
||||
|
||||
if (entry->allowed_algos) {
|
||||
result = -EINVAL;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
entry->allowed_algos =
|
||||
ima_parse_appraise_algos(args[0].from);
|
||||
/* invalid or empty list of algorithms */
|
||||
if (!entry->allowed_algos) {
|
||||
result = -EINVAL;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
entry->flags |= IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS;
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case Opt_permit_directio:
|
||||
entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@ -1700,6 +1819,23 @@ static void ima_show_rule_opt_list(struct seq_file *m,
|
||||
seq_printf(m, "%s%s", i ? "|" : "", opt_list->items[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void ima_policy_show_appraise_algos(struct seq_file *m,
|
||||
unsigned int allowed_hashes)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int idx, list_size = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (idx = 0; idx < HASH_ALGO__LAST; idx++) {
|
||||
if (!(allowed_hashes & (1U << idx)))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
/* only add commas if the list contains multiple entries */
|
||||
if (list_size++)
|
||||
seq_puts(m, ",");
|
||||
|
||||
seq_puts(m, hash_algo_name[idx]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
|
||||
@ -1811,6 +1947,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
|
||||
seq_puts(m, " ");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS) {
|
||||
seq_puts(m, "appraise_algos=");
|
||||
ima_policy_show_appraise_algos(m, entry->allowed_algos);
|
||||
seq_puts(m, " ");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
|
||||
if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
|
||||
switch (i) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
|
||||
entry->keyring_name,
|
||||
KEY_CHECK, 0,
|
||||
entry->keyring_name,
|
||||
false);
|
||||
false, NULL, 0);
|
||||
list_del(&entry->list);
|
||||
ima_free_key_entry(entry);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
|
||||
state_str, strlen(state_str), false);
|
||||
state_str, strlen(state_str), false,
|
||||
NULL, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
kfree(state_str);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-policy-hash",
|
||||
policy, policy_len, true);
|
||||
policy, policy_len, true,
|
||||
NULL, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
vfree(policy);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user