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x86/efi: Access EFI MMIO data as unencrypted when SEV is active
SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the flash. The following commit:1379edd596
("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both guest and hypervisor can access the data. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.15.x Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Fixes:1379edd596
("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180720012846.23560-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
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if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
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flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
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if (sev_active())
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if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
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flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
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pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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