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openvswitch: Remove padding from packet before L3+ conntrack processing
IPv4 and IPv6 packets may arrive with lower-layer padding that is not included in the L3 length. For example, a short IPv4 packet may have up to 6 bytes of padding following the IP payload when received on an Ethernet device with a minimum packet length of 64 bytes. Higher-layer processing functions in netfilter (e.g. nf_ip_checksum(), and help() in nf_conntrack_ftp) assume skb->len reflects the length of the L3 header and payload, rather than referring back to ip_hdr->tot_len or ipv6_hdr->payload_len, and get confused by lower-layer padding. In the normal IPv4 receive path, ip_rcv() trims the packet to ip_hdr->tot_len before invoking netfilter hooks. In the IPv6 receive path, ip6_rcv() does the same using ipv6_hdr->payload_len. Similarly in the br_netfilter receive path, br_validate_ipv4() and br_validate_ipv6() trim the packet to the L3 length before invoking netfilter hooks. Currently in the OVS conntrack receive path, ovs_ct_execute() pulls the skb to the L3 header but does not trim it to the L3 length before calling nf_conntrack_in(NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING). When nf_conntrack_proto_tcp encounters a packet with lower-layer padding, nf_ip_checksum() fails causing a "nf_ct_tcp: bad TCP checksum" log message. While extra zero bytes don't affect the checksum, the length in the IP pseudoheader does. That length is based on skb->len, and without trimming, it doesn't match the length the sender used when computing the checksum. In ovs_ct_execute(), trim the skb to the L3 length before higher-layer processing. Signed-off-by: Ed Swierk <eswierk@skyportsystems.com> Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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parent
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commit
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@ -1098,6 +1098,36 @@ static int ovs_ct_commit(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key,
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return 0;
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}
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/* Trim the skb to the length specified by the IP/IPv6 header,
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* removing any trailing lower-layer padding. This prepares the skb
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* for higher-layer processing that assumes skb->len excludes padding
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* (such as nf_ip_checksum). The caller needs to pull the skb to the
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* network header, and ensure ip_hdr/ipv6_hdr points to valid data.
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*/
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static int ovs_skb_network_trim(struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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unsigned int len;
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int err;
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switch (skb->protocol) {
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case htons(ETH_P_IP):
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len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len);
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break;
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case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
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len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)
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+ ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len);
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break;
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default:
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len = skb->len;
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}
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err = pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, len);
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if (err)
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kfree_skb(skb);
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return err;
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}
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/* Returns 0 on success, -EINPROGRESS if 'skb' is stolen, or other nonzero
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* value if 'skb' is freed.
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*/
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@ -1112,6 +1142,10 @@ int ovs_ct_execute(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
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nh_ofs = skb_network_offset(skb);
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skb_pull_rcsum(skb, nh_ofs);
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err = ovs_skb_network_trim(skb);
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if (err)
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return err;
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if (key->ip.frag != OVS_FRAG_TYPE_NONE) {
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err = handle_fragments(net, key, info->zone.id, skb);
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if (err)
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