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vfs: remap helper should update destination inode metadata
Extend generic_remap_file_range_prep to handle inode metadata updates when remapping into a file. If the operation can possibly alter the file contents, we must update the ctime and mtime and remove security privileges, just like we do for regular file writes. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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@ -1820,6 +1820,25 @@ int generic_remap_file_range_prep(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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/* If can't alter the file contents, we're done. */
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if (!(remap_flags & REMAP_FILE_DEDUP)) {
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/* Update the timestamps, since we can alter file contents. */
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if (!(file_out->f_mode & FMODE_NOCMTIME)) {
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ret = file_update_time(file_out);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Clear the security bits if the process is not being run by
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* root. This keeps people from modifying setuid and setgid
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* binaries.
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*/
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ret = file_remove_privs(file_out);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_remap_file_range_prep);
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@ -1372,29 +1372,6 @@ xfs_reflink_remap_prep(
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truncate_inode_pages_range(&inode_out->i_data, pos_out,
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PAGE_ALIGN(pos_out + *len) - 1);
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/* If we're altering the file contents... */
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if (!(remap_flags & REMAP_FILE_DEDUP)) {
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/*
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* ...update the timestamps (which will grab the ilock again
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* from xfs_fs_dirty_inode, so we have to call it before we
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* take the ilock).
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*/
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if (!(file_out->f_mode & FMODE_NOCMTIME)) {
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ret = file_update_time(file_out);
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if (ret)
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goto out_unlock;
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}
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/*
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* ...clear the security bits if the process is not being run
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* by root. This keeps people from modifying setuid and setgid
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* binaries.
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*/
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ret = file_remove_privs(file_out);
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if (ret)
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goto out_unlock;
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}
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return 1;
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out_unlock:
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xfs_reflink_remap_unlock(file_in, file_out);
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