ovl: make ioctl() safe

ovl_ioctl_set_flags() does a capability check using flags, but then the
real ioctl double-fetches flags and uses potentially different value.

The "Check the capability before cred override" comment misleading: user
can skip this check by presenting benign flags first and then overwriting
them to non-benign flags.

Just remove the cred override for now, hoping this doesn't cause a
regression.

The proper solution is to create a new setxflags i_op (patches are in the
works).

Xfstests don't show a regression.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: dab5ca8fd9 ("ovl: add lsattr/chattr support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19
This commit is contained in:
Miklos Szeredi 2020-12-14 15:26:14 +01:00
parent c846af050f
commit 89bdfaf93d

View File

@ -541,46 +541,31 @@ static long ovl_real_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct fd real;
const struct cred *old_cred;
long ret;
ret = ovl_real_fdget(file, &real);
if (ret)
return ret;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
ret = security_file_ioctl(real.file, cmd, arg);
if (!ret)
if (!ret) {
/*
* Don't override creds, since we currently can't safely check
* permissions before doing so.
*/
ret = vfs_ioctl(real.file, cmd, arg);
revert_creds(old_cred);
}
fdput(real);
return ret;
}
static unsigned int ovl_iflags_to_fsflags(unsigned int iflags)
{
unsigned int flags = 0;
if (iflags & S_SYNC)
flags |= FS_SYNC_FL;
if (iflags & S_APPEND)
flags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
if (iflags & S_IMMUTABLE)
flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
if (iflags & S_NOATIME)
flags |= FS_NOATIME_FL;
return flags;
}
static long ovl_ioctl_set_flags(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, unsigned int flags)
unsigned long arg)
{
long ret;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
unsigned int oldflags;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EACCES;
@ -591,10 +576,13 @@ static long ovl_ioctl_set_flags(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
inode_lock(inode);
/* Check the capability before cred override */
oldflags = ovl_iflags_to_fsflags(READ_ONCE(inode->i_flags));
ret = vfs_ioc_setflags_prepare(inode, oldflags, flags);
if (ret)
/*
* Prevent copy up if immutable and has no CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
* capability.
*/
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ovl_has_upperdata(inode) && IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) &&
!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE))
goto unlock;
ret = ovl_maybe_copy_up(file_dentry(file), O_WRONLY);
@ -613,46 +601,6 @@ unlock:
}
static long ovl_ioctl_set_fsflags(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned int flags;
if (get_user(flags, (int __user *) arg))
return -EFAULT;
return ovl_ioctl_set_flags(file, cmd, arg, flags);
}
static unsigned int ovl_fsxflags_to_fsflags(unsigned int xflags)
{
unsigned int flags = 0;
if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_SYNC)
flags |= FS_SYNC_FL;
if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_APPEND)
flags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE)
flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_NOATIME)
flags |= FS_NOATIME_FL;
return flags;
}
static long ovl_ioctl_set_fsxflags(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct fsxattr fa;
memset(&fa, 0, sizeof(fa));
if (copy_from_user(&fa, (void __user *) arg, sizeof(fa)))
return -EFAULT;
return ovl_ioctl_set_flags(file, cmd, arg,
ovl_fsxflags_to_fsflags(fa.fsx_xflags));
}
long ovl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
long ret;
@ -663,12 +611,9 @@ long ovl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
ret = ovl_real_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
break;
case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
ret = ovl_ioctl_set_fsflags(file, cmd, arg);
break;
case FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR:
ret = ovl_ioctl_set_fsxflags(file, cmd, arg);
case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
ret = ovl_ioctl_set_flags(file, cmd, arg);
break;
default: