Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf

Cross-merge bpf fixes after downstream PR.

In particular to bring the fix in
commit aa30eb3260 ("bpf: Force checkpoint when jmp history is too long").
The follow up verifier work depends on it.
And the fix in
commit 6801cf7890 ("selftests/bpf: Use -4095 as the bad address for bits iterator").
It's fixing instability of BPF CI on s390 arch.

No conflicts.

Adjacent changes in:
Auto-merging arch/Kconfig
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/helpers.c
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/memalloc.c
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Auto-merging mm/slab_common.c

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov 2024-11-13 12:51:15 -08:00
commit 8714381703
824 changed files with 8214 additions and 5668 deletions

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@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ Elliot Berman <quic_eberman@quicinc.com> <eberman@codeaurora.org>
Enric Balletbo i Serra <eballetbo@kernel.org> <enric.balletbo@collabora.com>
Enric Balletbo i Serra <eballetbo@kernel.org> <eballetbo@iseebcn.com>
Erik Kaneda <erik.kaneda@intel.com> <erik.schmauss@intel.com>
Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@collabora.com> <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@linaro.org> <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@linaro.org> <eugen.hristev@collabora.com>
Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>
Ezequiel Garcia <ezequiel@vanguardiasur.com.ar> <ezequiel@collabora.com>
Faith Ekstrand <faith.ekstrand@collabora.com> <jason@jlekstrand.net>
@ -282,7 +283,7 @@ Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com> <jglauber@cavium.com>
Jan Kuliga <jtkuliga.kdev@gmail.com> <jankul@alatek.krakow.pl>
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> <jarkko@profian.com>
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> <jarkko.sakkinen@tuni.fi>
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> <jarkko.sakkinen@parity.io>
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgg@mellanox.com>
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgg@nvidia.com>
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
@ -664,6 +665,7 @@ Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu@tomeuvizoso.net> <tomeu.vizoso@collabora.com>
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Thomas Körper <socketcan@esd.eu> <thomas.koerper@esd.eu>
Thomas Pedersen <twp@codeaurora.org>
Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> <thorsten.blum@toblux.com>
Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> <kernelpatch@126.com>
Tingwei Zhang <quic_tingwei@quicinc.com> <tingwei@codeaurora.org>
Tirupathi Reddy <quic_tirupath@quicinc.com> <tirupath@codeaurora.org>

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@ -1204,6 +1204,10 @@ S: Dreisbachstrasse 24
S: D-57250 Netphen
S: Germany
N: Florian Fainelli
E: f.fainelli@gmail.com
D: DSA
N: Rik Faith
E: faith@acm.org
D: Future Domain TMC-16x0 SCSI driver (author)

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@ -1599,6 +1599,15 @@ The following nested keys are defined.
pglazyfreed (npn)
Amount of reclaimed lazyfree pages
swpin_zero
Number of pages swapped into memory and filled with zero, where I/O
was optimized out because the page content was detected to be zero
during swapout.
swpout_zero
Number of zero-filled pages swapped out with I/O skipped due to the
content being detected as zero.
zswpin
Number of pages moved in to memory from zswap.

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@ -6688,7 +6688,7 @@
0: no polling (default)
thp_anon= [KNL]
Format: <size>,<size>[KMG]:<state>;<size>-<size>[KMG]:<state>
Format: <size>[KMG],<size>[KMG]:<state>;<size>[KMG]-<size>[KMG]:<state>
state is one of "always", "madvise", "never" or "inherit".
Control the default behavior of the system with respect
to anonymous transparent hugepages.

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@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ control by passing the parameter ``transparent_hugepage=always`` or
kernel command line.
Alternatively, each supported anonymous THP size can be controlled by
passing ``thp_anon=<size>,<size>[KMG]:<state>;<size>-<size>[KMG]:<state>``,
passing ``thp_anon=<size>[KMG],<size>[KMG]:<state>;<size>[KMG]-<size>[KMG]:<state>``,
where ``<size>`` is the THP size (must be a power of 2 of PAGE_SIZE and
supported anonymous THP) and ``<state>`` is one of ``always``, ``madvise``,
``never`` or ``inherit``.

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@ -425,8 +425,8 @@ This governor exposes only one tunable:
``rate_limit_us``
Minimum time (in microseconds) that has to pass between two consecutive
runs of governor computations (default: 1000 times the scaling driver's
transition latency).
runs of governor computations (default: 1.5 times the scaling driver's
transition latency or the maximum 2ms).
The purpose of this tunable is to reduce the scheduler context overhead
of the governor which might be excessive without it.
@ -474,17 +474,17 @@ This governor exposes the following tunables:
This is how often the governor's worker routine should run, in
microseconds.
Typically, it is set to values of the order of 10000 (10 ms). Its
default value is equal to the value of ``cpuinfo_transition_latency``
for each policy this governor is attached to (but since the unit here
is greater by 1000, this means that the time represented by
``sampling_rate`` is 1000 times greater than the transition latency by
default).
Typically, it is set to values of the order of 2000 (2 ms). Its
default value is to add a 50% breathing room
to ``cpuinfo_transition_latency`` on each policy this governor is
attached to. The minimum is typically the length of two scheduler
ticks.
If this tunable is per-policy, the following shell command sets the time
represented by it to be 750 times as high as the transition latency::
represented by it to be 1.5 times as high as the transition latency
(the default)::
# echo `$(($(cat cpuinfo_transition_latency) * 750 / 1000)) > ondemand/sampling_rate
# echo `$(($(cat cpuinfo_transition_latency) * 3 / 2)) > ondemand/sampling_rate
``up_threshold``
If the estimated CPU load is above this value (in percent), the governor

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@ -63,6 +63,16 @@ properties:
- const: sleep
power-domains:
description: |
The MediaTek DPI module is typically associated with one of the
following multimedia power domains:
POWER_DOMAIN_DISPLAY
POWER_DOMAIN_VDOSYS
POWER_DOMAIN_MM
The specific power domain used varies depending on the SoC design.
It is recommended to explicitly add the appropriate power domain
property to the DPI node in the device tree.
maxItems: 1
port:
@ -79,20 +89,6 @@ required:
- clock-names
- port
allOf:
- if:
not:
properties:
compatible:
contains:
enum:
- mediatek,mt6795-dpi
- mediatek,mt8173-dpi
- mediatek,mt8186-dpi
then:
properties:
power-domains: false
additionalProperties: false
examples:

View File

@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ properties:
description: A phandle and PM domain specifier as defined by bindings of
the power controller specified by phandle. See
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/power/power-domain.yaml for details.
maxItems: 1
mediatek,gce-client-reg:
description:
@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ properties:
clocks:
items:
- description: SPLIT Clock
- description: Used for interfacing with the HDMI RX signal source.
- description: Paired with receiving HDMI RX metadata.
minItems: 1
required:
- compatible
@ -72,9 +76,24 @@ allOf:
const: mediatek,mt8195-mdp3-split
then:
properties:
clocks:
minItems: 3
required:
- mediatek,gce-client-reg
- if:
properties:
compatible:
contains:
const: mediatek,mt8173-disp-split
then:
properties:
clocks:
maxItems: 1
additionalProperties: false
examples:

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@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ properties:
atomic mode of operation, even if requested.
default: 0
max-rx-timeout-ms:
arm,max-rx-timeout-ms:
description:
An optional time value, expressed in milliseconds, representing the
transport maximum timeout value for the receive channel. The value should

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@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ properties:
A 2.5V to 3.3V supply for the external reference voltage. When omitted,
the internal 2.5V reference is used.
refin-supply:
description:
A 2.5V to 3.3V supply for external reference voltage, for ad7380-4 only.
aina-supply:
description:
The common mode voltage supply for the AINA- pin on pseudo-differential
@ -135,6 +139,23 @@ allOf:
ainc-supply: false
aind-supply: false
# ad7380-4 uses refin-supply as external reference.
# All other chips from ad738x family use refio as optional external reference.
# When refio-supply is omitted, internal reference is used.
- if:
properties:
compatible:
enum:
- adi,ad7380-4
then:
properties:
refio-supply: false
required:
- refin-supply
else:
properties:
refin-supply: false
examples:
- |
#include <dt-bindings/interrupt-controller/irq.h>

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@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ properties:
- gmii
- rgmii
- sgmii
- 1000BaseX
- 1000base-x
xlnx,phy-type:
description:

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@ -154,8 +154,6 @@ allOf:
- qcom,sm8550-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,sm8650-qmp-gen3x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,sm8650-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen3x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy
then:
properties:
clocks:
@ -171,6 +169,8 @@ allOf:
- qcom,sc8280xp-qmp-gen3x1-pcie-phy
- qcom,sc8280xp-qmp-gen3x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,sc8280xp-qmp-gen3x4-pcie-phy
- qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen3x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen4x4-pcie-phy
then:
properties:
@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ allOf:
- qcom,sm8550-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,sm8650-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy
- qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen4x4-pcie-phy
then:
properties:
resets:

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@ -102,21 +102,21 @@ properties:
default: 2
interrupts:
oneOf:
- minItems: 1
items:
- description: TX interrupt
- description: RX interrupt
- items:
- description: common/combined interrupt
minItems: 1
maxItems: 2
interrupt-names:
oneOf:
- minItems: 1
- description: TX interrupt
const: tx
- description: RX interrupt
const: rx
- description: TX and RX interrupts
items:
- const: tx
- const: rx
- const: common
- description: Common/combined interrupt
const: common
fck_parent:
$ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/string

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@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ properties:
- const: mclk_rx
- const: hclk
port:
$ref: audio-graph-port.yaml#
unevaluatedProperties: false
resets:
maxItems: 1

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@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ set up cache ready for use. The following script commands are available:
This mask can also be set through sysfs, eg::
echo 5 >/sys/modules/cachefiles/parameters/debug
echo 5 > /sys/module/cachefiles/parameters/debug
Starting the Cache

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@ -41,13 +41,22 @@ supports only 1 SDO line.
Reference voltage
-----------------
2 possible reference voltage sources are supported:
ad7380-4
~~~~~~~~
ad7380-4 supports only an external reference voltage (2.5V to 3.3V). It must be
declared in the device tree as ``refin-supply``.
All other devices from ad738x family
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
All other devices from ad738x support 2 possible reference voltage sources:
- Internal reference (2.5V)
- External reference (2.5V to 3.3V)
The source is determined by the device tree. If ``refio-supply`` is present,
then the external reference is used, else the internal reference is used.
then it is used as external reference, else the internal reference is used.
Oversampling and resolution boost
---------------------------------

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@ -293,7 +293,6 @@ operations:
doc: Get endpoint information
attribute-set: attr
dont-validate: [ strict ]
flags: [ uns-admin-perm ]
do: &get-addr-attrs
request:
attributes:

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@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ format, the Group Extension is set in the PS-field.
On the other hand, when using PDU1 format, the PS-field contains a so-called
Destination Address, which is _not_ part of the PGN. When communicating a PGN
from user space to kernel (or vice versa) and PDU2 format is used, the PS-field
from user space to kernel (or vice versa) and PDU1 format is used, the PS-field
of the PGN shall be set to zero. The Destination Address shall be set
elsewhere.

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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ ii) transmit network traffic, or any other that needs raw
Howto can be found at:
https://sites.google.com/site/packetmmap/
https://web.archive.org/web/20220404160947/https://sites.google.com/site/packetmmap/
Please send your comments to
- Ulisses Alonso Camaró <uaca@i.hate.spam.alumni.uv.es>
@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ As capture, each frame contains two parts::
/* bind socket to eth0 */
bind(this->socket, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll));
A complete tutorial is available at: https://sites.google.com/site/packetmmap/
A complete tutorial is available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220404160947/https://sites.google.com/site/packetmmap/
By default, the user should put data at::

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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Architecture Level of support Constraints
============= ================ ==============================================
``arm64`` Maintained Little Endian only.
``loongarch`` Maintained \-
``riscv`` Maintained ``riscv64`` only.
``riscv`` Maintained ``riscv64`` and LLVM/Clang only.
``um`` Maintained \-
``x86`` Maintained ``x86_64`` only.
============= ================ ==============================================

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@ -11,18 +11,18 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
including unprivileged ones. Because such process may be compromised or
including unprivileged ones. Because such a process may be compromised or
backdoored (i.e. untrusted), Landlock's features must be safe to use from the
kernel and other processes point of view. Landlock's interface must therefore
expose a minimal attack surface.
Landlock is designed to be usable by unprivileged processes while following the
system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls
enforced on the system, only add more restrictions.
LSM). A Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls enforced
on the system, only add more restrictions.
Any user can enforce Landlock rulesets on their processes. They are merged and
evaluated according to the inherited ones in a way that ensures that only more
evaluated against inherited rulesets in a way that ensures that only more
constraints can be added.
User space documentation can be found here:
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Guiding principles for safe access controls
only impact the processes requesting them.
* Resources (e.g. file descriptors) directly obtained from the kernel by a
sandboxed process shall retain their scoped accesses (at the time of resource
acquisition) whatever process use them.
acquisition) whatever process uses them.
Cf. `File descriptor access rights`_.
Design choices
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ the same results, when they are executed under the same Landlock domain.
Taking the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` right as an example, it may be
allowed to open a file for writing without being allowed to
:manpage:`ftruncate` the resulting file descriptor if the related file
hierarchy doesn't grant such access right. The following sequences of
hierarchy doesn't grant that access right. The following sequences of
operations have the same semantic and should then have the same result:
* ``truncate(path);``
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Similarly to file access modes (e.g. ``O_RDWR``), Landlock access rights
attached to file descriptors are retained even if they are passed between
processes (e.g. through a Unix domain socket). Such access rights will then be
enforced even if the receiving process is not sandboxed by Landlock. Indeed,
this is required to keep a consistent access control over the whole system, and
this is required to keep access controls consistent over the whole system, and
this avoids unattended bypasses through file descriptor passing (i.e. confused
deputy attack).

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@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
=====================================
:Author: Mickaël Salaün
:Date: September 2024
:Date: October 2024
The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new
security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This
kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
is a stackable LSM, it makes it possible to create safe security sandboxes as
new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls.
This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
unexpected/malicious behaviors in user space applications. Landlock empowers
any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.
@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
};
Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
executed, it is safer to follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, we
Because we may not know which kernel version an application will be executed
on, it is safer to follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, we
should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
using.
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
}
This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
This enables the creation of an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
.. code-block:: c
@ -219,42 +219,41 @@ If the ``landlock_restrict_self`` system call succeeds, the current thread is
now restricted and this policy will be enforced on all its subsequently created
children as well. Once a thread is landlocked, there is no way to remove its
security policy; only adding more restrictions is allowed. These threads are
now in a new Landlock domain, merge of their parent one (if any) with the new
ruleset.
now in a new Landlock domain, which is a merger of their parent one (if any)
with the new ruleset.
Full working code can be found in `samples/landlock/sandboxer.c`_.
Good practices
--------------
It is recommended setting access rights to file hierarchy leaves as much as
It is recommended to set access rights to file hierarchy leaves as much as
possible. For instance, it is better to be able to have ``~/doc/`` as a
read-only hierarchy and ``~/tmp/`` as a read-write hierarchy, compared to
``~/`` as a read-only hierarchy and ``~/tmp/`` as a read-write hierarchy.
Following this good practice leads to self-sufficient hierarchies that do not
depend on their location (i.e. parent directories). This is particularly
relevant when we want to allow linking or renaming. Indeed, having consistent
access rights per directory enables to change the location of such directory
access rights per directory enables changing the location of such directories
without relying on the destination directory access rights (except those that
are required for this operation, see ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER``
documentation).
Having self-sufficient hierarchies also helps to tighten the required access
rights to the minimal set of data. This also helps avoid sinkhole directories,
i.e. directories where data can be linked to but not linked from. However,
i.e. directories where data can be linked to but not linked from. However,
this depends on data organization, which might not be controlled by developers.
In this case, granting read-write access to ``~/tmp/``, instead of write-only
access, would potentially allow to move ``~/tmp/`` to a non-readable directory
access, would potentially allow moving ``~/tmp/`` to a non-readable directory
and still keep the ability to list the content of ``~/tmp/``.
Layers of file path access rights
---------------------------------
Each time a thread enforces a ruleset on itself, it updates its Landlock domain
with a new layer of policy. Indeed, this complementary policy is stacked with
the potentially other rulesets already restricting this thread. A sandboxed
thread can then safely add more constraints to itself with a new enforced
ruleset.
with a new layer of policy. This complementary policy is stacked with any
other rulesets potentially already restricting this thread. A sandboxed thread
can then safely add more constraints to itself with a new enforced ruleset.
One policy layer grants access to a file path if at least one of its rules
encountered on the path grants the access. A sandboxed thread can only access
@ -265,7 +264,7 @@ etc.).
Bind mounts and OverlayFS
-------------------------
Landlock enables to restrict access to file hierarchies, which means that these
Landlock enables restricting access to file hierarchies, which means that these
access rights can be propagated with bind mounts (cf.
Documentation/filesystems/sharedsubtree.rst) but not with
Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst.
@ -278,21 +277,21 @@ access to multiple file hierarchies at the same time, whether these hierarchies
are the result of bind mounts or not.
An OverlayFS mount point consists of upper and lower layers. These layers are
combined in a merge directory, result of the mount point. This merge hierarchy
may include files from the upper and lower layers, but modifications performed
on the merge hierarchy only reflects on the upper layer. From a Landlock
policy point of view, each OverlayFS layers and merge hierarchies are
standalone and contains their own set of files and directories, which is
different from bind mounts. A policy restricting an OverlayFS layer will not
restrict the resulted merged hierarchy, and vice versa. Landlock users should
then only think about file hierarchies they want to allow access to, regardless
of the underlying filesystem.
combined in a merge directory, and that merged directory becomes available at
the mount point. This merge hierarchy may include files from the upper and
lower layers, but modifications performed on the merge hierarchy only reflect
on the upper layer. From a Landlock policy point of view, all OverlayFS layers
and merge hierarchies are standalone and each contains their own set of files
and directories, which is different from bind mounts. A policy restricting an
OverlayFS layer will not restrict the resulted merged hierarchy, and vice versa.
Landlock users should then only think about file hierarchies they want to allow
access to, regardless of the underlying filesystem.
Inheritance
-----------
Every new thread resulting from a :manpage:`clone(2)` inherits Landlock domain
restrictions from its parent. This is similar to the seccomp inheritance (cf.
restrictions from its parent. This is similar to seccomp inheritance (cf.
Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst) or any other LSM dealing with
task's :manpage:`credentials(7)`. For instance, one process's thread may apply
Landlock rules to itself, but they will not be automatically applied to other
@ -311,8 +310,8 @@ Ptrace restrictions
A sandboxed process has less privileges than a non-sandboxed process and must
then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating another process.
To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target
process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules,
which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
process, a sandboxed process should have a superset of the target process's
access rights, which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
IPC scoping
-----------
@ -322,7 +321,7 @@ interactions between sandboxes. Each Landlock domain can be explicitly scoped
for a set of actions by specifying it on a ruleset. For example, if a
sandboxed process should not be able to :manpage:`connect(2)` to a
non-sandboxed process through abstract :manpage:`unix(7)` sockets, we can
specify such restriction with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``.
specify such a restriction with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``.
Moreover, if a sandboxed process should not be able to send a signal to a
non-sandboxed process, we can specify this restriction with
``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL``.
@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ Backward and forward compatibility
Landlock is designed to be compatible with past and future versions of the
kernel. This is achieved thanks to the system call attributes and the
associated bitflags, particularly the ruleset's ``handled_access_fs``. Making
handled access right explicit enables the kernel and user space to have a clear
handled access rights explicit enables the kernel and user space to have a clear
contract with each other. This is required to make sure sandboxing will not
get stricter with a system update, which could break applications.
@ -563,33 +562,34 @@ always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI.
Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control
truncation thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` access right.
Network support (ABI < 4)
-------------------------
TCP bind and connect (ABI < 4)
------------------------------
Starting with the Landlock ABI version 4, it is now possible to restrict TCP
bind and connect actions to only a set of allowed ports thanks to the new
``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` and ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP``
access rights.
IOCTL (ABI < 5)
---------------
Device IOCTL (ABI < 5)
----------------------
IOCTL operations could not be denied before the fifth Landlock ABI, so
:manpage:`ioctl(2)` is always allowed when using a kernel that only supports an
earlier ABI.
Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of
:manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right.
:manpage:`ioctl(2)` on character and block devices using the new
``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right.
Abstract UNIX socket scoping (ABI < 6)
--------------------------------------
Abstract UNIX socket (ABI < 6)
------------------------------
Starting with the Landlock ABI version 6, it is possible to restrict
connections to an abstract :manpage:`unix(7)` socket by setting
``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET`` to the ``scoped`` ruleset attribute.
Signal scoping (ABI < 6)
------------------------
Signal (ABI < 6)
----------------
Starting with the Landlock ABI version 6, it is possible to restrict
:manpage:`signal(7)` sending by setting ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL`` to the
@ -605,9 +605,9 @@ Build time configuration
Landlock was first introduced in Linux 5.13 but it must be configured at build
time with ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y``. Landlock must also be enabled at boot
time as the other security modules. The list of security modules enabled by
time like other security modules. The list of security modules enabled by
default is set with ``CONFIG_LSM``. The kernel configuration should then
contains ``CONFIG_LSM=landlock,[...]`` with ``[...]`` as the list of other
contain ``CONFIG_LSM=landlock,[...]`` with ``[...]`` as the list of other
potentially useful security modules for the running system (see the
``CONFIG_LSM`` help).
@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ Questions and answers
What about user space sandbox managers?
---------------------------------------
Using user space process to enforce restrictions on kernel resources can lead
Using user space processes to enforce restrictions on kernel resources can lead
to race conditions or inconsistent evaluations (i.e. `Incorrect mirroring of
the OS code and state
<https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2003/traps-and-pitfalls-practical-problems-system-call-interposition-based-security-tools/>`_).

View File

@ -23,177 +23,166 @@ applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime.
A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [2].
User API
========
mseal()
-----------
The mseal() syscall has the following signature:
SYSCALL
=======
mseal syscall signature
-----------------------
``int mseal(void \* addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
**addr**/**len**: virtual memory address range.
The address range set by **addr**/**len** must meet:
- The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
- The start address must be page aligned.
- The end address (**addr** + **len**) must be in an allocated VMA.
- no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
**addr/len**: virtual memory address range.
The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet:
- The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
- The start address must be page aligned.
- The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA.
- no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
**flags**: reserved for future use.
The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
**Return values**:
- **0**: Success.
- **-EINVAL**:
* Invalid input ``flags``.
* The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
* Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
- **-ENOMEM**:
* The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
* The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
* A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
- **-EPERM**:
* sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported.
**flags**: reserved for future use.
**Note about error return**:
- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the maximum
number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given
memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare.
**return values**:
**Architecture support**:
mseal only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPUs.
- ``0``: Success.
**Idempotent**:
users can call mseal multiple times. mseal on an already sealed memory
is a no-action (not error).
- ``-EINVAL``:
- Invalid input ``flags``.
- The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
- Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
**no munseal**
Once mapping is sealed, it can't be unsealed. The kernel should never
have munseal, this is consistent with other sealing feature, e.g.
F_SEAL_SEAL for file.
- ``-ENOMEM``:
- The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
- The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
- A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
Blocked mm syscall for sealed mapping
-------------------------------------
It might be important to note: **once the mapping is sealed, it will
stay in the process's memory until the process terminates**.
- ``-EPERM``:
- sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported.
Example::
- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
*ptr = mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0);
rc = mseal(ptr, 4096, 0);
/* munmap will fail */
rc = munmap(ptr, 4096);
assert(rc < 0);
- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max
number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given
memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare.
Blocked mm syscall:
- munmap
- mmap
- mremap
- mprotect and pkey_mprotect
- some destructive madvise behaviors: MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE,
MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK
**Blocked operations after sealing**:
Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore
can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
The first set of syscalls to block is munmap, mremap, mmap. They can
either leave an empty space in the address space, therefore allowing
replacement with a new mapping with new set of attributes, or can
overwrite the existing mapping with another mapping.
Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
mprotect and pkey_mprotect are blocked because they changes the
protection bits (RWX) of the mapping.
Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
Certain destructive madvise behaviors, specifically MADV_DONTNEED,
MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, and MADV_WIPEONFORK, can introduce
risks when applied to anonymous memory by threads lacking write
permissions. Consequently, these operations are prohibited under such
conditions. The aforementioned behaviors have the potential to modify
region contents by discarding pages, effectively performing a memset(0)
operation on the anonymous memory.
Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
merging to expand a sealed VMA.
Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked syscalls.
mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
When blocked syscall return -EPERM due to sealing, the memory regions may
or may not be changed, depends on the syscall being blocked:
Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
- munmap: munmap is atomic. If one of VMAs in the given range is
sealed, none of VMAs are updated.
- mprotect, pkey_mprotect, madvise: partial update might happen, e.g.
when mprotect over multiple VMAs, mprotect might update the beginning
VMAs before reaching the sealed VMA and return -EPERM.
- mmap and mremap: undefined behavior.
Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked operations.
For blocked operations, one can expect the given address is unmodified,
i.e. no partial update. Note, this is different from existing mm
system call behaviors, where partial updates are made till an error is
found and returned to userspace. To give an example:
Assume following code sequence:
- ptr = mmap(null, 8192, PROT_NONE);
- munmap(ptr + 4096, 4096);
- ret1 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_READ);
- mseal(ptr, 4096);
- ret2 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_NONE);
ret1 will be -ENOMEM, the page from ptr is updated to PROT_READ.
ret2 will be -EPERM, the page remains to be PROT_READ.
**Note**:
- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU.
- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed memory
is a no-action (not error).
- munseal() is not supported.
Use cases:
==========
Use cases
=========
- glibc:
The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealing to
non-writable memory segments.
mapping segments.
- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures.
- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures.
Notes on which memory to seal:
==============================
It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a mapping,
i.e. the sealed mapping wont be unmapped till the process terminates or the
exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any virtual
memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the
mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing.
When not to use mseal
=====================
Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace,
but it is *crucial to thoroughly analyze the mapping's lifetime* prior to
apply the sealing. This is because the sealed mapping *wont be unmapped*
until the process terminates or the exec system call is invoked.
For example:
- aio/shm
aio/shm can call mmap and munmap on behalf of userspace, e.g.
ksys_shmdt() in shm.c. The lifetimes of those mapping are not tied to
the lifetime of the process. If those memories are sealed from userspace,
then munmap will fail, causing leaks in VMA address space during the
lifetime of the process.
- aio/shm
- ptr allocated by malloc (heap)
Don't use mseal on the memory ptr return from malloc().
malloc() is implemented by allocator, e.g. by glibc. Heap manager might
allocate a ptr from brk or mapping created by mmap.
If an app calls mseal on a ptr returned from malloc(), this can affect
the heap manager's ability to manage the mappings; the outcome is
non-deterministic.
aio/shm can call mmap()/munmap() on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_shmdt() in
shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of the
process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then munmap() will fail,
causing leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the process.
Example::
- Brk (heap)
ptr = malloc(size);
/* don't call mseal on ptr return from malloc. */
mseal(ptr, size);
/* free will success, allocator can't shrink heap lower than ptr */
free(ptr);
Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by calling
malloc() and mseal().
let's assume following calls from user space:
mseal doesn't block
===================
In a nutshell, mseal blocks certain mm syscall from modifying some of VMA's
attributes, such as protection bits (RWX). Sealed mappings doesn't mean the
memory is immutable.
- ptr = malloc(size);
- mprotect(ptr, size, RO);
- mseal(ptr, size);
- free(ptr);
Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protection of
the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the protection
back to RW before free(), the memory range can be reused.
Adding mseal() into the picture, however, the heap is then sealed partially,
the user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO. If the address
is re-used by the heap manager for another malloc, the process might crash
soon after. Therefore, it is important not to apply sealing to any memory
that might get recycled.
Furthermore, even if the application never calls the free() for the ptr,
the heap manager may invoke the brk system call to shrink the size of the
heap. In the kernel, the brk-shrink will call munmap(). Consequently,
depending on the location of the ptr, the outcome of brk-shrink is
nondeterministic.
Additional notes:
=================
As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write
to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not covered
by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (such as
seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered.
to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. And those could be blocked
by different security measures.
Those cases are:
- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface.
- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
- userfaultfd.
- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface (FOLL_FORCE).
- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
- userfaultfd.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttgers work in V8
CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API.
Reference:
==========
[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com
[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc
Reference
=========
- [1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
- [2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
- [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com
- [4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc

View File

@ -1174,8 +1174,9 @@ F: Documentation/hid/amd-sfh*
F: drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/
AMD SPI DRIVER
M: Sanjay R Mehta <sanju.mehta@amd.com>
S: Maintained
M: Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com>
L: linux-spi@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: drivers/spi/spi-amd.c
AMD XGBE DRIVER
@ -2852,7 +2853,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/qcom.yaml
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/qcom*
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/cache/qcom,llcc.yaml
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/firmware/qcom,scm.yaml
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/reserved-memory/qcom
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/reserved-memory/qcom*
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/
F: arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom/
F: arch/arm/configs/qcom_defconfig
@ -3745,6 +3746,7 @@ F: drivers/spi/spi-axi-spi-engine.c
AXI PWM GENERATOR
M: Michael Hennerich <michael.hennerich@analog.com>
M: Nuno Sá <nuno.sa@analog.com>
R: Trevor Gamblin <tgamblin@baylibre.com>
L: linux-pwm@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://ez.analog.com/linux-software-drivers
@ -9723,6 +9725,7 @@ F: include/dt-bindings/gpio/
F: include/linux/gpio.h
F: include/linux/gpio/
F: include/linux/of_gpio.h
K: (devm_)?gpio_(request|free|direction|get|set)
GPIO UAPI
M: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl>
@ -14140,6 +14143,15 @@ S: Maintained
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/platform/nxp/imx-pxp.[ch]
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR ASCOT2E
M: Abylay Ospan <aospan@amazon.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://linuxtv.org
W: http://netup.tv/
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/ascot2e*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR CXD2099AR CI CONTROLLERS
M: Jasmin Jessich <jasmin@anw.at>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
@ -14148,6 +14160,15 @@ W: https://linuxtv.org
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2099*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR CXD2841ER
M: Abylay Ospan <aospan@amazon.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://linuxtv.org
W: http://netup.tv/
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2841er*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR CXD2880
M: Yasunari Takiguchi <Yasunari.Takiguchi@sony.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
@ -14192,6 +14213,33 @@ F: drivers/media/platform/nxp/imx-mipi-csis.c
F: drivers/media/platform/nxp/imx7-media-csi.c
F: drivers/media/platform/nxp/imx8mq-mipi-csi2.c
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR HELENE
M: Abylay Ospan <aospan@amazon.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://linuxtv.org
W: http://netup.tv/
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/helene*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR HORUS3A
M: Abylay Ospan <aospan@amazon.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://linuxtv.org
W: http://netup.tv/
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/horus3a*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR LNBH25
M: Abylay Ospan <aospan@amazon.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://linuxtv.org
W: http://netup.tv/
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/lnbh25*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR MXL5XX TUNER DEMODULATORS
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
S: Orphan
@ -14199,6 +14247,15 @@ W: https://linuxtv.org
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mxl5xx*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR NETUP PCI UNIVERSAL DVB devices
M: Abylay Ospan <aospan@amazon.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://linuxtv.org
W: http://netup.tv/
T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git
F: drivers/media/pci/netup_unidvb/*
MEDIA DRIVERS FOR NVIDIA TEGRA - VDE
M: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
@ -14986,6 +15043,7 @@ F: drivers/spi/spi-at91-usart.c
MICROCHIP AUDIO ASOC DRIVERS
M: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@tuxon.dev>
M: Andrei Simion <andrei.simion@microchip.com>
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/atmel*
@ -15094,6 +15152,7 @@ F: include/video/atmel_lcdc.h
MICROCHIP MCP16502 PMIC DRIVER
M: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@tuxon.dev>
M: Andrei Simion <andrei.simion@microchip.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Supported
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/microchip,mcp16502.yaml
@ -15224,6 +15283,7 @@ F: drivers/spi/spi-atmel.*
MICROCHIP SSC DRIVER
M: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@tuxon.dev>
M: Andrei Simion <andrei.simion@microchip.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Supported
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/misc/atmel-ssc.txt
@ -16024,7 +16084,6 @@ F: drivers/net/wireless/
NETWORKING [DSA]
M: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
M: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
M: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/dsa/
@ -19788,12 +19847,10 @@ L: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
S: Maintained
Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-riscv/list/
T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/conor/linux.git/
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/riscv/
F: arch/riscv/boot/dts/
X: arch/riscv/boot/dts/allwinner/
X: arch/riscv/boot/dts/renesas/
X: arch/riscv/boot/dts/sophgo/
X: arch/riscv/boot/dts/thead/
F: arch/riscv/boot/dts/canaan/
F: arch/riscv/boot/dts/microchip/
F: arch/riscv/boot/dts/sifive/
F: arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/
RISC-V PMU DRIVERS
M: Atish Patra <atishp@atishpatra.org>
@ -21560,6 +21617,15 @@ S: Supported
W: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/
F: sound/soc/sof/
SOUND - GENERIC SOUND CARD (Simple-Audio-Card, Audio-Graph-Card)
M: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
S: Supported
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
F: sound/soc/generic/
F: include/sound/simple_card*
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/simple-card.yaml
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/audio-graph*.yaml
SOUNDWIRE SUBSYSTEM
M: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
M: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
@ -23145,7 +23211,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/ti,lmp92064.yaml
F: drivers/iio/adc/ti-lmp92064.c
TI PCM3060 ASoC CODEC DRIVER
M: Kirill Marinushkin <kmarinushkin@birdec.com>
M: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/pcm3060.txt

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
VERSION = 6
PATCHLEVEL = 12
SUBLEVEL = 0
EXTRAVERSION = -rc4
EXTRAVERSION = -rc7
NAME = Baby Opossum Posse
# *DOCUMENTATION*

View File

@ -856,14 +856,14 @@ config HAVE_CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS_CLANG
def_bool y
depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=kcfi -fsanitize-cfi-icall-experimental-normalize-integers)
# With GCOV/KASAN we need this fix: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/104826
depends on CLANG_VERSION >= 190000 || (!GCOV_KERNEL && !KASAN_GENERIC && !KASAN_SW_TAGS)
depends on CLANG_VERSION >= 190103 || (!GCOV_KERNEL && !KASAN_GENERIC && !KASAN_SW_TAGS)
config HAVE_CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS_RUSTC
def_bool y
depends on HAVE_CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS_CLANG
depends on RUSTC_VERSION >= 107900
# With GCOV/KASAN we need this fix: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/129373
depends on (RUSTC_LLVM_VERSION >= 190000 && RUSTC_VERSION >= 108200) || \
depends on (RUSTC_LLVM_VERSION >= 190103 && RUSTC_VERSION >= 108200) || \
(!GCOV_KERNEL && !KASAN_GENERIC && !KASAN_SW_TAGS)
config CFI_PERMISSIVE

View File

@ -325,8 +325,8 @@
&i2c2 {
status = "okay";
rt5616: rt5616@1b {
compatible = "rt5616";
rt5616: audio-codec@1b {
compatible = "realtek,rt5616";
reg = <0x1b>;
clocks = <&cru SCLK_I2S_OUT>;
clock-names = "mclk";

View File

@ -384,12 +384,13 @@
};
};
acodec: acodec-ana@20030000 {
compatible = "rk3036-codec";
acodec: audio-codec@20030000 {
compatible = "rockchip,rk3036-codec";
reg = <0x20030000 0x4000>;
rockchip,grf = <&grf>;
clock-names = "acodec_pclk";
clocks = <&cru PCLK_ACODEC>;
rockchip,grf = <&grf>;
#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
status = "disabled";
};
@ -399,7 +400,6 @@
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 45 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&cru PCLK_HDMI>;
clock-names = "pclk";
rockchip,grf = <&grf>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&hdmi_ctl>;
#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
@ -553,11 +553,11 @@
};
spi: spi@20074000 {
compatible = "rockchip,rockchip-spi";
compatible = "rockchip,rk3036-spi";
reg = <0x20074000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 23 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&cru PCLK_SPI>, <&cru SCLK_SPI>;
clock-names = "apb-pclk","spi_pclk";
clocks = <&cru SCLK_SPI>, <&cru PCLK_SPI>;
clock-names = "spiclk", "apb_pclk";
dmas = <&pdma 8>, <&pdma 9>;
dma-names = "tx", "rx";
pinctrl-names = "default";

View File

@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ config ARM64_SME
bool "ARM Scalable Matrix Extension support"
default y
depends on ARM64_SVE
depends on BROKEN
help
The Scalable Matrix Extension (SME) is an extension to the AArch64
execution state which utilises a substantial subset of the SVE

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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ lvds0_subsys: bus@56240000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8qxp-lpcg";
reg = <0x56243000 0x4>;
#clock-cells = <1>;
clock-output-names = "mipi1_lis_lpcg_ipg_clk";
clock-output-names = "lvds0_lis_lpcg_ipg_clk";
power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_MIPI_1>;
};
@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ lvds0_subsys: bus@56240000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8qxp-lpcg";
reg = <0x5624300c 0x4>;
#clock-cells = <1>;
clock-output-names = "mipi1_pwm_lpcg_clk",
"mipi1_pwm_lpcg_ipg_clk",
"mipi1_pwm_lpcg_32k_clk";
clock-output-names = "lvds0_pwm_lpcg_clk",
"lvds0_pwm_lpcg_ipg_clk",
"lvds0_pwm_lpcg_32k_clk";
power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_MIPI_1_PWM_0>;
};
@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ lvds0_subsys: bus@56240000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8qxp-lpcg";
reg = <0x56243010 0x4>;
#clock-cells = <1>;
clock-output-names = "mipi1_i2c0_lpcg_clk",
"mipi1_i2c0_lpcg_ipg_clk";
clock-output-names = "lvds0_i2c0_lpcg_clk",
"lvds0_i2c0_lpcg_ipg_clk";
power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_MIPI_1_I2C_0>;
};

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ vpu: vpu@2c000000 {
mu_m0: mailbox@2d000000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx6sx-mu";
reg = <0x2d000000 0x20000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 469 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 472 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
#mbox-cells = <2>;
power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_VPU_MU_0>;
status = "disabled";
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ vpu: vpu@2c000000 {
mu1_m0: mailbox@2d020000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx6sx-mu";
reg = <0x2d020000 0x20000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 470 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 473 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
#mbox-cells = <2>;
power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_VPU_MU_1>;
status = "disabled";

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@ -218,6 +218,18 @@
};
};
&media_blk_ctrl {
/*
* The LVDS panel on this device uses 72.4 MHz pixel clock,
* set IMX8MP_VIDEO_PLL1 to 72.4 * 7 = 506.8 MHz so the LDB
* serializer and LCDIFv3 scanout engine can reach accurate
* pixel clock of exactly 72.4 MHz.
*/
assigned-clock-rates = <500000000>, <200000000>,
<0>, <0>, <500000000>,
<506800000>;
};
&snvs_pwrkey {
status = "okay";
};

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@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
assigned-clock-rates = <500000000>, <200000000>, <0>,
/* IMX8MP_CLK_MEDIA_DISP2_PIX = pixelclk of lvds panel */
<68900000>,
<500000000>,
/* IMX8MP_VIDEO_PLL1 = IMX8MP_CLK_MEDIA_LDB * 2 */
<964600000>;
};

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@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mp-usdhc", "fsl,imx8mm-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b40000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 22 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MP_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MP_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MP_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MP_CLK_USDHC1_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mp-usdhc", "fsl,imx8mm-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b50000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 23 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MP_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MP_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MP_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MP_CLK_USDHC2_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -1289,7 +1289,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mp-usdhc", "fsl,imx8mm-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b60000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 24 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MP_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MP_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MP_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MP_CLK_USDHC3_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";

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@ -5,6 +5,14 @@
* Author: Alexander Stein
*/
&mu_m0 {
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 469 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
&mu1_m0 {
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 470 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
&vpu_core0 {
reg = <0x2d040000 0x10000>;
};

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@ -384,7 +384,7 @@
};
flexspi2: spi@29810000 {
compatible = "nxp,imx8mm-fspi";
compatible = "nxp,imx8ulp-fspi";
reg = <0x29810000 0x10000>, <0x60000000 0x10000000>;
reg-names = "fspi_base", "fspi_mmap";
#address-cells = <1>;

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@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
smd-edge {
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 168 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
mboxes = <&apcs1_mbox 0>;
qcom,ipc = <&apcs1_mbox 8 0>;
qcom,smd-edge = <15>;
rpm_requests: rpm-requests {

View File

@ -1973,7 +1973,7 @@
clocks = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_1_PIPE_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_1_PIPE_CLK_SRC>,
<&pcie1_phy>,
<&pcie1_phy QMP_PCIE_PIPE_CLK>,
<&rpmhcc RPMH_CXO_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_1_AUX_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_1_CFG_AHB_CLK>,

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@ -139,6 +139,8 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&nvme_reg_en>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
regulator-boot-on;
};
vph_pwr: regulator-vph-pwr {

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@ -134,6 +134,8 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&nvme_reg_en>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
regulator-boot-on;
};
};

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@ -177,9 +177,9 @@
compatible = "qcom,x1e80100-sndcard";
model = "X1E80100-CRD";
audio-routing = "WooferLeft IN", "WSA WSA_SPK1 OUT",
"TwitterLeft IN", "WSA WSA_SPK2 OUT",
"TweeterLeft IN", "WSA WSA_SPK2 OUT",
"WooferRight IN", "WSA2 WSA_SPK2 OUT",
"TwitterRight IN", "WSA2 WSA_SPK2 OUT",
"TweeterRight IN", "WSA2 WSA_SPK2 OUT",
"IN1_HPHL", "HPHL_OUT",
"IN2_HPHR", "HPHR_OUT",
"AMIC2", "MIC BIAS2",
@ -300,6 +300,8 @@
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&nvme_reg_en>;
regulator-boot-on;
};
vreg_wwan: regulator-wwan {
@ -933,7 +935,7 @@
reg = <0 1>;
reset-gpios = <&lpass_tlmm 12 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
sound-name-prefix = "TwitterLeft";
sound-name-prefix = "TweeterLeft";
vdd-1p8-supply = <&vreg_l15b_1p8>;
vdd-io-supply = <&vreg_l12b_1p2>;
qcom,port-mapping = <4 5 6 7 11 13>;
@ -986,7 +988,7 @@
reg = <0 1>;
reset-gpios = <&lpass_tlmm 13 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
sound-name-prefix = "TwitterRight";
sound-name-prefix = "TweeterRight";
vdd-1p8-supply = <&vreg_l15b_1p8>;
vdd-io-supply = <&vreg_l12b_1p2>;
qcom,port-mapping = <4 5 6 7 11 13>;

View File

@ -205,6 +205,8 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&nvme_reg_en>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
regulator-boot-on;
};
};

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@ -164,6 +164,8 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&nvme_reg_en>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
regulator-boot-on;
};
};

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@ -253,6 +253,8 @@
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&nvme_reg_en>;
regulator-boot-on;
};
};

View File

@ -2924,14 +2924,14 @@
"mhi";
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
ranges = <0x01000000 0 0x00000000 0 0x70200000 0 0x100000>,
<0x02000000 0 0x70300000 0 0x70300000 0 0x3d00000>;
bus-range = <0 0xff>;
ranges = <0x01000000 0x0 0x00000000 0x0 0x70200000 0x0 0x100000>,
<0x02000000 0x0 0x70300000 0x0 0x70300000 0x0 0x1d00000>;
bus-range = <0x00 0xff>;
dma-coherent;
linux,pci-domain = <6>;
num-lanes = <2>;
num-lanes = <4>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 773 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 774 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
@ -2997,19 +2997,22 @@
};
pcie6a_phy: phy@1bfc000 {
compatible = "qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen4x2-pcie-phy";
reg = <0 0x01bfc000 0 0x2000>;
compatible = "qcom,x1e80100-qmp-gen4x4-pcie-phy";
reg = <0 0x01bfc000 0 0x2000>,
<0 0x01bfe000 0 0x2000>;
clocks = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_PHY_AUX_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_CFG_AHB_CLK>,
<&rpmhcc RPMH_CXO_CLK>,
<&tcsr TCSR_PCIE_4L_CLKREF_EN>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_PHY_RCHNG_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_PIPE_CLK>;
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_PIPE_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_PIPEDIV2_CLK>;
clock-names = "aux",
"cfg_ahb",
"ref",
"rchng",
"pipe";
"pipe",
"pipediv2";
resets = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_PHY_BCR>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_6A_NOCSR_COM_PHY_BCR>;
@ -3021,6 +3024,8 @@
power-domains = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_6_PHY_GDSC>;
qcom,4ln-config-sel = <&tcsr 0x1a000 0>;
#clock-cells = <0>;
clock-output-names = "pcie6a_pipe_clk";
@ -3097,7 +3102,7 @@
assigned-clocks = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_AUX_CLK>;
assigned-clock-rates = <19200000>;
interconnects = <&pcie_south_anoc MASTER_PCIE_5 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS
interconnects = <&pcie_north_anoc MASTER_PCIE_5 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS
&mc_virt SLAVE_EBI1 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS>,
<&gem_noc MASTER_APPSS_PROC QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS
&cnoc_main SLAVE_PCIE_5 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS>;
@ -3124,14 +3129,16 @@
clocks = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_AUX_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_CFG_AHB_CLK>,
<&rpmhcc RPMH_CXO_CLK>,
<&tcsr TCSR_PCIE_2L_5_CLKREF_EN>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_PHY_RCHNG_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_PIPE_CLK>;
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_PIPE_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_PIPEDIV2_CLK>;
clock-names = "aux",
"cfg_ahb",
"ref",
"rchng",
"pipe";
"pipe",
"pipediv2";
resets = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_5_PHY_BCR>;
reset-names = "phy";
@ -3166,8 +3173,8 @@
"mhi";
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
ranges = <0x01000000 0 0x00000000 0 0x7c200000 0 0x100000>,
<0x02000000 0 0x7c300000 0 0x7c300000 0 0x3d00000>;
ranges = <0x01000000 0x0 0x00000000 0x0 0x7c200000 0x0 0x100000>,
<0x02000000 0x0 0x7c300000 0x0 0x7c300000 0x0 0x1d00000>;
bus-range = <0x00 0xff>;
dma-coherent;
@ -3217,7 +3224,7 @@
assigned-clocks = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_AUX_CLK>;
assigned-clock-rates = <19200000>;
interconnects = <&pcie_south_anoc MASTER_PCIE_4 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS
interconnects = <&pcie_north_anoc MASTER_PCIE_4 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS
&mc_virt SLAVE_EBI1 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS>,
<&gem_noc MASTER_APPSS_PROC QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS
&cnoc_main SLAVE_PCIE_4 QCOM_ICC_TAG_ALWAYS>;
@ -3254,14 +3261,16 @@
clocks = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_AUX_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_CFG_AHB_CLK>,
<&rpmhcc RPMH_CXO_CLK>,
<&tcsr TCSR_PCIE_2L_4_CLKREF_EN>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_PHY_RCHNG_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_PIPE_CLK>;
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_PIPE_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_PIPEDIV2_CLK>;
clock-names = "aux",
"cfg_ahb",
"ref",
"rchng",
"pipe";
"pipe",
"pipediv2";
resets = <&gcc GCC_PCIE_4_PHY_BCR>;
reset-names = "phy";
@ -6084,7 +6093,8 @@
<0 0x25a00000 0 0x200000>,
<0 0x25c00000 0 0x200000>,
<0 0x25e00000 0 0x200000>,
<0 0x26000000 0 0x200000>;
<0 0x26000000 0 0x200000>,
<0 0x26200000 0 0x200000>;
reg-names = "llcc0_base",
"llcc1_base",
"llcc2_base",
@ -6093,7 +6103,8 @@
"llcc5_base",
"llcc6_base",
"llcc7_base",
"llcc_broadcast_base";
"llcc_broadcast_base",
"llcc_broadcast_and_base";
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 266 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};

View File

@ -66,7 +66,6 @@
bus-width = <8>;
cap-mmc-highspeed;
mmc-hs200-1_8v;
supports-emmc;
mmc-pwrseq = <&emmc_pwrseq>;
non-removable;
vmmc-supply = <&vcc_3v3>;

View File

@ -36,14 +36,14 @@
power_led: led-0 {
label = "firefly:red:power";
linux,default-trigger = "ir-power-click";
linux,default-trigger = "default-on";
default-state = "on";
gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PA6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
};
user_led: led-1 {
label = "firefly:blue:user";
linux,default-trigger = "ir-user-click";
linux,default-trigger = "rc-feedback";
default-state = "off";
gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PB2 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
};

View File

@ -24,9 +24,7 @@
disable-wp;
mmc-hs200-1_8v;
non-removable;
num-slots = <1>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&emmc_clk &emmc_cmd &emmc_bus8>;
supports-emmc;
status = "okay";
};

View File

@ -754,8 +754,7 @@
compatible = "rockchip,rk3328-dw-hdmi";
reg = <0x0 0xff3c0000 0x0 0x20000>;
reg-io-width = <4>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 35 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 71 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 35 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&cru PCLK_HDMI>,
<&cru SCLK_HDMI_SFC>,
<&cru SCLK_RTC32K>;

View File

@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
fan: fan@18 {
compatible = "ti,amc6821";
reg = <0x18>;
#cooling-cells = <2>;
};
rtc_twi: rtc@6f {

View File

@ -541,7 +541,7 @@
status = "okay";
rt5651: audio-codec@1a {
compatible = "rockchip,rt5651";
compatible = "realtek,rt5651";
reg = <0x1a>;
clocks = <&cru SCLK_I2S_8CH_OUT>;
clock-names = "mclk";

View File

@ -166,7 +166,6 @@
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
vin-supply = <&vcc3v3_sys>;
gpio = <&gpio3 RK_PA5 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
};
/* MIPI DSI panel 2.8v supply */
@ -178,7 +177,6 @@
regulator-max-microvolt = <2800000>;
vin-supply = <&vcc3v3_sys>;
gpio = <&gpio3 RK_PA1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
};
vibrator {

View File

@ -114,7 +114,6 @@
es8388: es8388@11 {
compatible = "everest,es8388";
reg = <0x11>;
clock-names = "mclk";
clocks = <&cru SCLK_I2S_8CH_OUT>;
#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
};

View File

@ -576,7 +576,7 @@
bluetooth {
compatible = "brcm,bcm43438-bt";
clocks = <&rk808 1>;
clock-names = "ext_clock";
clock-names = "txco";
device-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PD3 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
host-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PA4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
shutdown-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PB1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;

View File

@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
status = "okay";
rt5651: rt5651@1a {
compatible = "rockchip,rt5651";
compatible = "realtek,rt5651";
reg = <0x1a>;
clocks = <&cru SCLK_I2S_8CH_OUT>;
clock-names = "mclk";

View File

@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
};
&i2c2 {
pintctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c2m1_xfer>;
status = "okay";

View File

@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
};
&i2c2 {
pintctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c2m1_xfer>;
status = "okay";

View File

@ -449,9 +449,9 @@
bluetooth {
compatible = "brcm,bcm43438-bt";
clocks = <&pmucru CLK_RTC_32K>;
clock-names = "ext_clock";
device-wake-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PC1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
host-wake-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PC0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
clock-names = "txco";
device-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PC1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
host-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PC0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
shutdown-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PB7 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&bt_host_wake_l &bt_wake_l &bt_enable_h>;

View File

@ -507,7 +507,6 @@
non-removable;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&emmc_bus8 &emmc_clk &emmc_cmd>;
supports-emmc;
status = "okay";
};

View File

@ -684,11 +684,11 @@
compatible = "brcm,bcm43438-bt";
clocks = <&rk817 1>;
clock-names = "lpo";
device-wake-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PC2 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
host-wake-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PC3 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
reset-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PC4 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
device-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PC2 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
host-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PC3 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
pinctrl-0 = <&bt_enable_h>, <&bt_host_wake_l>, <&bt_wake_h>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
shutdown-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PC4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
vbat-supply = <&vcc_wl>;
vddio-supply = <&vcca_1v8_pmu>;
};

View File

@ -402,9 +402,9 @@
clock-names = "lpo";
device-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PB2 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
host-wakeup-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PB1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
reset-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PC0 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&bt_host_wake_h &bt_reg_on_h &bt_wake_host_h>;
shutdown-gpios = <&gpio2 RK_PC0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
vbat-supply = <&vcc_3v3>;
vddio-supply = <&vcc_1v8>;
};

View File

@ -589,7 +589,6 @@
non-removable;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&emmc_bus8 &emmc_clk &emmc_cmd>;
supports-emmc;
status = "okay";
};

View File

@ -272,7 +272,6 @@
regulator-name = "vdd_logic";
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-init-microvolt = <900000>;
regulator-initial-mode = <0x2>;
regulator-min-microvolt = <500000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1350000>;
@ -285,7 +284,6 @@
vdd_gpu: DCDC_REG2 {
regulator-name = "vdd_gpu";
regulator-init-microvolt = <900000>;
regulator-initial-mode = <0x2>;
regulator-min-microvolt = <500000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1350000>;
@ -309,7 +307,6 @@
vdd_npu: DCDC_REG4 {
regulator-name = "vdd_npu";
regulator-init-microvolt = <900000>;
regulator-initial-mode = <0x2>;
regulator-min-microvolt = <500000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1350000>;

View File

@ -337,15 +337,19 @@
cache-unified;
next-level-cache = <&l3_cache>;
};
};
l3_cache: l3-cache {
compatible = "cache";
cache-size = <3145728>;
cache-line-size = <64>;
cache-sets = <4096>;
cache-level = <3>;
cache-unified;
};
/*
* The L3 cache belongs to the DynamIQ Shared Unit (DSU),
* so it's represented here, outside the "cpus" node
*/
l3_cache: l3-cache {
compatible = "cache";
cache-size = <3145728>;
cache-line-size = <64>;
cache-sets = <4096>;
cache-level = <3>;
cache-unified;
};
display_subsystem: display-subsystem {

View File

@ -328,7 +328,6 @@
compatible = "everest,es8388";
reg = <0x11>;
clocks = <&cru I2S0_8CH_MCLKOUT>;
clock-names = "mclk";
AVDD-supply = <&vcc_1v8_s0>;
DVDD-supply = <&vcc_1v8_s0>;
HPVDD-supply = <&vcc_3v3_s0>;

View File

@ -316,7 +316,6 @@
assigned-clocks = <&cru I2S0_8CH_MCLKOUT>;
assigned-clock-rates = <12288000>;
clocks = <&cru I2S0_8CH_MCLKOUT>;
clock-names = "mclk";
AVDD-supply = <&avcc_1v8_codec_s0>;
DVDD-supply = <&avcc_1v8_codec_s0>;
HPVDD-supply = <&vcc_3v3_s0>;

View File

@ -304,12 +304,12 @@
};
cooling-maps {
map1 {
map0 {
trip = <&package_fan0>;
cooling-device = <&fan THERMAL_NO_LIMIT 1>;
};
map2 {
map1 {
trip = <&package_fan1>;
cooling-device = <&fan 2 THERMAL_NO_LIMIT>;
};

View File

@ -428,7 +428,6 @@
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-min-microvolt = <550000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <950000>;
regulator-init-microvolt = <750000>;
regulator-ramp-delay = <12500>;
regulator-state-mem {

View File

@ -296,6 +296,7 @@
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&pmic_pins>, <&rk806_dvs1_null>,
<&rk806_dvs2_null>, <&rk806_dvs3_null>;
system-power-controller;
vcc1-supply = <&vcc5v0_sys>;
vcc2-supply = <&vcc5v0_sys>;

View File

@ -377,7 +377,6 @@
assigned-clock-rates = <12288000>;
assigned-clocks = <&cru I2S0_8CH_MCLKOUT>;
AVDD-supply = <&vcc_3v3_s3>;
clock-names = "mclk";
clocks = <&cru I2S0_8CH_MCLKOUT>;
DVDD-supply = <&vcc_1v8_s3>;
HPVDD-supply = <&vcc_3v3_s3>;

View File

@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#ifndef BUILD_VDSO
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
@ -31,19 +33,21 @@ static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
}
#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags)
static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(struct file *file,
unsigned long flags)
{
/*
* Only allow MTE on anonymous mappings as these are guaranteed to be
* backed by tags-capable memory. The vm_flags may be overridden by a
* filesystem supporting MTE (RAM-based).
*/
if (system_supports_mte() && (flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS))
if (system_supports_mte() &&
((flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS) || shmem_file(file)))
return VM_MTE_ALLOWED;
return 0;
}
#define arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(flags)
#define arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(file, flags) arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(file, flags)
static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot,
unsigned long addr __always_unused)

View File

@ -26,10 +26,6 @@ void update_freq_counters_refs(void);
#define arch_scale_freq_invariant topology_scale_freq_invariant
#define arch_scale_freq_ref topology_get_freq_ref
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB
#define arch_init_invariance_cppc topology_init_cpu_capacity_cppc
#endif
/* Replace task scheduler's default cpu-invariant accounting */
#define arch_scale_cpu_capacity topology_get_cpu_scale

View File

@ -1367,6 +1367,7 @@ static void sve_init_regs(void)
} else {
fpsimd_to_sve(current);
current->thread.fp_type = FP_STATE_SVE;
fpsimd_flush_task_state(current);
}
}

View File

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/rseq.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/pkeys.h>
#include <asm/daifflags.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
@ -66,10 +67,63 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
unsigned long end_offset;
};
/*
* Holds any EL0-controlled state that influences unprivileged memory accesses.
* This includes both accesses done in userspace and uaccess done in the kernel.
*
* This state needs to be carefully managed to ensure that it doesn't cause
* uaccess to fail when setting up the signal frame, and the signal handler
* itself also expects a well-defined state when entered.
*/
struct user_access_state {
u64 por_el0;
};
#define BASE_SIGFRAME_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct rt_sigframe), 16)
#define TERMINATOR_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct _aarch64_ctx), 16)
#define EXTRA_CONTEXT_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct extra_context), 16)
/*
* Save the user access state into ua_state and reset it to disable any
* restrictions.
*/
static void save_reset_user_access_state(struct user_access_state *ua_state)
{
if (system_supports_poe()) {
u64 por_enable_all = 0;
for (int pkey = 0; pkey < arch_max_pkey(); pkey++)
por_enable_all |= POE_RXW << (pkey * POR_BITS_PER_PKEY);
ua_state->por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
write_sysreg_s(por_enable_all, SYS_POR_EL0);
/* Ensure that any subsequent uaccess observes the updated value */
isb();
}
}
/*
* Set the user access state for invoking the signal handler.
*
* No uaccess should be done after that function is called.
*/
static void set_handler_user_access_state(void)
{
if (system_supports_poe())
write_sysreg_s(POR_EL0_INIT, SYS_POR_EL0);
}
/*
* Restore the user access state to the values saved in ua_state.
*
* No uaccess should be done after that function is called.
*/
static void restore_user_access_state(const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
{
if (system_supports_poe())
write_sysreg_s(ua_state->por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
}
static void init_user_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user)
{
const size_t reserved_size =
@ -261,18 +315,20 @@ static int restore_fpmr_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
return err;
}
static int preserve_poe_context(struct poe_context __user *ctx)
static int preserve_poe_context(struct poe_context __user *ctx,
const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
{
int err = 0;
__put_user_error(POE_MAGIC, &ctx->head.magic, err);
__put_user_error(sizeof(*ctx), &ctx->head.size, err);
__put_user_error(read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0), &ctx->por_el0, err);
__put_user_error(ua_state->por_el0, &ctx->por_el0, err);
return err;
}
static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user,
struct user_access_state *ua_state)
{
u64 por_el0;
int err = 0;
@ -282,7 +338,7 @@ static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
__get_user_error(por_el0, &(user->poe->por_el0), err);
if (!err)
write_sysreg_s(por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
ua_state->por_el0 = por_el0;
return err;
}
@ -850,7 +906,8 @@ invalid:
}
static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs,
struct rt_sigframe __user *sf)
struct rt_sigframe __user *sf,
struct user_access_state *ua_state)
{
sigset_t set;
int i, err;
@ -899,7 +956,7 @@ static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs,
err = restore_zt_context(&user);
if (err == 0 && system_supports_poe() && user.poe)
err = restore_poe_context(&user);
err = restore_poe_context(&user, ua_state);
return err;
}
@ -908,6 +965,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
struct user_access_state ua_state;
/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
@ -924,12 +982,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof (*frame)))
goto badframe;
if (restore_sigframe(regs, frame))
if (restore_sigframe(regs, frame, &ua_state))
goto badframe;
if (restore_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack))
goto badframe;
restore_user_access_state(&ua_state);
return regs->regs[0];
badframe:
@ -1035,7 +1095,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
}
static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set)
struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set,
const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
{
int i, err = 0;
struct rt_sigframe __user *sf = user->sigframe;
@ -1097,10 +1158,9 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
struct poe_context __user *poe_ctx =
apply_user_offset(user, user->poe_offset);
err |= preserve_poe_context(poe_ctx);
err |= preserve_poe_context(poe_ctx, ua_state);
}
/* ZA state if present */
if (system_supports_sme() && err == 0 && user->za_offset) {
struct za_context __user *za_ctx =
@ -1237,9 +1297,6 @@ static void setup_return(struct pt_regs *regs, struct k_sigaction *ka,
sme_smstop();
}
if (system_supports_poe())
write_sysreg_s(POR_EL0_INIT, SYS_POR_EL0);
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
sigtramp = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
else
@ -1253,6 +1310,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
{
struct rt_sigframe_user_layout user;
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
struct user_access_state ua_state;
int err = 0;
fpsimd_signal_preserve_current_state();
@ -1260,13 +1318,14 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
if (get_sigframe(&user, ksig, regs))
return 1;
save_reset_user_access_state(&ua_state);
frame = user.sigframe;
__put_user_error(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags, err);
__put_user_error(NULL, &frame->uc.uc_link, err);
err |= __save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, regs->sp);
err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set);
err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set, &ua_state);
if (err == 0) {
setup_return(regs, &ksig->ka, &user, usig);
if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) {
@ -1276,6 +1335,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
}
}
if (err == 0)
set_handler_user_access_state();
else
restore_user_access_state(&ua_state);
return err;
}

View File

@ -7,48 +7,19 @@
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/assembler.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
/*
* If we have SMCCC v1.3 and (as is likely) no SVE state in
* the registers then set the SMCCC hint bit to say there's no
* need to preserve it. Do this by directly adjusting the SMCCC
* function value which is already stored in x0 ready to be called.
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(__arm_smccc_sve_check)
ldr_l x16, smccc_has_sve_hint
cbz x16, 2f
get_current_task x16
ldr x16, [x16, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
tbnz x16, #TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, 1f // Any live FP state?
tbnz x16, #TIF_SVE, 2f // Does that state include SVE?
1: orr x0, x0, ARM_SMCCC_1_3_SVE_HINT
2: ret
SYM_FUNC_END(__arm_smccc_sve_check)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arm_smccc_sve_check)
.macro SMCCC instr
stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
mov x29, sp
alternative_if ARM64_SVE
bl __arm_smccc_sve_check
alternative_else_nop_endif
\instr #0
ldr x4, [sp, #16]
ldr x4, [sp]
stp x0, x1, [x4, #ARM_SMCCC_RES_X0_OFFS]
stp x2, x3, [x4, #ARM_SMCCC_RES_X2_OFFS]
ldr x4, [sp, #24]
ldr x4, [sp, #8]
cbz x4, 1f /* no quirk structure */
ldr x9, [x4, #ARM_SMCCC_QUIRK_ID_OFFS]
cmp x9, #ARM_SMCCC_QUIRK_QCOM_A6
b.ne 1f
str x6, [x4, ARM_SMCCC_QUIRK_STATE_OFFS]
1: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
ret
1: ret
.endm
/*

View File

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
/* 64-bit segment value. */
#define XKPRANGE_UC_SEG (0x8000)
#define XKPRANGE_CC_SEG (0x9000)
#define XKPRANGE_WC_SEG (0xa000)
#define XKVRANGE_VC_SEG (0xffff)
/* Cached */
@ -41,20 +42,28 @@
#define XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_SIZE (XKPRANGE_UC_SIZE >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
#define XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_END (XKPRANGE_UC_KASAN_OFFSET + XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_SIZE)
/* WriteCombine */
#define XKPRANGE_WC_START WRITECOMBINE_BASE
#define XKPRANGE_WC_SIZE XRANGE_SIZE
#define XKPRANGE_WC_KASAN_OFFSET XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_END
#define XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_SIZE (XKPRANGE_WC_SIZE >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
#define XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_END (XKPRANGE_WC_KASAN_OFFSET + XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_SIZE)
/* VMALLOC (Cached or UnCached) */
#define XKVRANGE_VC_START MODULES_VADDR
#define XKVRANGE_VC_SIZE round_up(KFENCE_AREA_END - MODULES_VADDR + 1, PGDIR_SIZE)
#define XKVRANGE_VC_KASAN_OFFSET XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_END
#define XKVRANGE_VC_KASAN_OFFSET XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_END
#define XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_SIZE (XKVRANGE_VC_SIZE >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
#define XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_END (XKVRANGE_VC_KASAN_OFFSET + XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_SIZE)
/* KAsan shadow memory start right after vmalloc. */
#define KASAN_SHADOW_START round_up(KFENCE_AREA_END, PGDIR_SIZE)
#define KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE (XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_END - XKPRANGE_CC_KASAN_OFFSET)
#define KASAN_SHADOW_END round_up(KASAN_SHADOW_START + KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE, PGDIR_SIZE)
#define KASAN_SHADOW_END (round_up(KASAN_SHADOW_START + KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE, PGDIR_SIZE) - 1)
#define XKPRANGE_CC_SHADOW_OFFSET (KASAN_SHADOW_START + XKPRANGE_CC_KASAN_OFFSET)
#define XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_OFFSET (KASAN_SHADOW_START + XKPRANGE_UC_KASAN_OFFSET)
#define XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_OFFSET (KASAN_SHADOW_START + XKPRANGE_WC_KASAN_OFFSET)
#define XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_OFFSET (KASAN_SHADOW_START + XKVRANGE_VC_KASAN_OFFSET)
extern bool kasan_early_stage;

View File

@ -113,10 +113,7 @@ struct page *tlb_virt_to_page(unsigned long kaddr);
extern int __virt_addr_valid(volatile void *kaddr);
#define virt_addr_valid(kaddr) __virt_addr_valid((volatile void *)(kaddr))
#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS \
(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | \
((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0) | \
VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_FLAGS_TSK_EXEC
#include <asm-generic/memory_model.h>
#include <asm-generic/getorder.h>

View File

@ -58,48 +58,48 @@ void __iomem *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)
return ioremap_cache(phys, size);
}
static int cpu_enumerated = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
static int set_processor_mask(u32 id, u32 flags)
static int set_processor_mask(u32 id, u32 pass)
{
int nr_cpus;
int cpu, cpuid = id;
int cpu = -1, cpuid = id;
if (!cpu_enumerated)
nr_cpus = NR_CPUS;
else
nr_cpus = nr_cpu_ids;
if (num_processors >= nr_cpus) {
if (num_processors >= NR_CPUS) {
pr_warn(PREFIX "nr_cpus limit of %i reached."
" processor 0x%x ignored.\n", nr_cpus, cpuid);
" processor 0x%x ignored.\n", NR_CPUS, cpuid);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (cpuid == loongson_sysconf.boot_cpu_id)
cpu = 0;
else
cpu = find_first_zero_bit(cpumask_bits(cpu_present_mask), NR_CPUS);
if (!cpu_enumerated)
set_cpu_possible(cpu, true);
if (flags & ACPI_MADT_ENABLED) {
switch (pass) {
case 1: /* Pass 1 handle enabled processors */
if (cpu < 0)
cpu = find_first_zero_bit(cpumask_bits(cpu_present_mask), NR_CPUS);
num_processors++;
set_cpu_present(cpu, true);
__cpu_number_map[cpuid] = cpu;
__cpu_logical_map[cpu] = cpuid;
} else
break;
case 2: /* Pass 2 handle disabled processors */
if (cpu < 0)
cpu = find_first_zero_bit(cpumask_bits(cpu_possible_mask), NR_CPUS);
disabled_cpus++;
break;
default:
return cpu;
}
set_cpu_possible(cpu, true);
__cpu_number_map[cpuid] = cpu;
__cpu_logical_map[cpu] = cpuid;
return cpu;
}
#endif
static int __init
acpi_parse_processor(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, const unsigned long end)
acpi_parse_p1_processor(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, const unsigned long end)
{
struct acpi_madt_core_pic *processor = NULL;
@ -110,12 +110,29 @@ acpi_parse_processor(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, const unsigned long en
acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
acpi_core_pic[processor->core_id] = *processor;
set_processor_mask(processor->core_id, processor->flags);
if (processor->flags & ACPI_MADT_ENABLED)
set_processor_mask(processor->core_id, 1);
#endif
return 0;
}
static int __init
acpi_parse_p2_processor(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, const unsigned long end)
{
struct acpi_madt_core_pic *processor = NULL;
processor = (struct acpi_madt_core_pic *)header;
if (BAD_MADT_ENTRY(processor, end))
return -EINVAL;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (!(processor->flags & ACPI_MADT_ENABLED))
set_processor_mask(processor->core_id, 2);
#endif
return 0;
}
static int __init
acpi_parse_eio_master(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, const unsigned long end)
{
@ -143,12 +160,14 @@ static void __init acpi_process_madt(void)
}
#endif
acpi_table_parse_madt(ACPI_MADT_TYPE_CORE_PIC,
acpi_parse_processor, MAX_CORE_PIC);
acpi_parse_p1_processor, MAX_CORE_PIC);
acpi_table_parse_madt(ACPI_MADT_TYPE_CORE_PIC,
acpi_parse_p2_processor, MAX_CORE_PIC);
acpi_table_parse_madt(ACPI_MADT_TYPE_EIO_PIC,
acpi_parse_eio_master, MAX_IO_PICS);
cpu_enumerated = 1;
loongson_sysconf.nr_cpus = num_processors;
}
@ -310,6 +329,10 @@ static int __ref acpi_map_cpu2node(acpi_handle handle, int cpu, int physid)
int nid;
nid = acpi_get_node(handle);
if (nid != NUMA_NO_NODE)
nid = early_cpu_to_node(cpu);
if (nid != NUMA_NO_NODE) {
set_cpuid_to_node(physid, nid);
node_set(nid, numa_nodes_parsed);
@ -324,12 +347,14 @@ int acpi_map_cpu(acpi_handle handle, phys_cpuid_t physid, u32 acpi_id, int *pcpu
{
int cpu;
cpu = set_processor_mask(physid, ACPI_MADT_ENABLED);
if (cpu < 0) {
cpu = cpu_number_map(physid);
if (cpu < 0 || cpu >= nr_cpu_ids) {
pr_info(PREFIX "Unable to map lapic to logical cpu number\n");
return cpu;
return -ERANGE;
}
num_processors++;
set_cpu_present(cpu, true);
acpi_map_cpu2node(handle, cpu, physid);
*pcpu = cpu;

View File

@ -51,11 +51,18 @@ static u64 paravt_steal_clock(int cpu)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
static struct smp_ops native_ops;
static void pv_send_ipi_single(int cpu, unsigned int action)
{
int min, old;
irq_cpustat_t *info = &per_cpu(irq_stat, cpu);
if (unlikely(action == ACTION_BOOT_CPU)) {
native_ops.send_ipi_single(cpu, action);
return;
}
old = atomic_fetch_or(BIT(action), &info->message);
if (old)
return;
@ -75,6 +82,11 @@ static void pv_send_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, unsigned int action)
if (cpumask_empty(mask))
return;
if (unlikely(action == ACTION_BOOT_CPU)) {
native_ops.send_ipi_mask(mask, action);
return;
}
action = BIT(action);
for_each_cpu(i, mask) {
info = &per_cpu(irq_stat, i);
@ -147,6 +159,8 @@ static void pv_init_ipi(void)
{
int r, swi;
/* Init native ipi irq for ACTION_BOOT_CPU */
native_ops.init_ipi();
swi = get_percpu_irq(INT_SWI0);
if (swi < 0)
panic("SWI0 IRQ mapping failed\n");
@ -193,6 +207,7 @@ int __init pv_ipi_init(void)
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
native_ops = mp_ops;
mp_ops.init_ipi = pv_init_ipi;
mp_ops.send_ipi_single = pv_send_ipi_single;
mp_ops.send_ipi_mask = pv_send_ipi_mask;

View File

@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void __init fdt_smp_setup(void)
__cpu_number_map[cpuid] = cpu;
__cpu_logical_map[cpu] = cpuid;
early_numa_add_cpu(cpu, 0);
early_numa_add_cpu(cpuid, 0);
set_cpuid_to_node(cpuid, 0);
}
@ -331,11 +331,11 @@ void __init loongson_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
int i = 0;
parse_acpi_topology();
cpu_data[0].global_id = cpu_logical_map(0);
for (i = 0; i < loongson_sysconf.nr_cpus; i++) {
set_cpu_present(i, true);
csr_mail_send(0, __cpu_logical_map[i], 0);
cpu_data[i].global_id = __cpu_logical_map[i];
}
per_cpu(cpu_state, smp_processor_id()) = CPU_ONLINE;
@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ void loongson_init_secondary(void)
cpu_logical_map(cpu) / loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package;
cpu_data[cpu].core = pptt_enabled ? cpu_data[cpu].core :
cpu_logical_map(cpu) % loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package;
cpu_data[cpu].global_id = cpu_logical_map(cpu);
}
void loongson_smp_finish(void)

View File

@ -13,6 +13,13 @@
static pgd_t kasan_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
#ifdef __PAGETABLE_P4D_FOLDED
#define __pgd_none(early, pgd) (0)
#else
#define __pgd_none(early, pgd) (early ? (pgd_val(pgd) == 0) : \
(__pa(pgd_val(pgd)) == (unsigned long)__pa(kasan_early_shadow_p4d)))
#endif
#ifdef __PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED
#define __p4d_none(early, p4d) (0)
#else
@ -55,6 +62,9 @@ void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
case XKPRANGE_UC_SEG:
offset = XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_OFFSET;
break;
case XKPRANGE_WC_SEG:
offset = XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_OFFSET;
break;
case XKVRANGE_VC_SEG:
offset = XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_OFFSET;
break;
@ -79,6 +89,8 @@ const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
if (addr >= XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_OFFSET)
return (void *)(((addr - XKVRANGE_VC_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + XKVRANGE_VC_START);
else if (addr >= XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_OFFSET)
return (void *)(((addr - XKPRANGE_WC_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + XKPRANGE_WC_START);
else if (addr >= XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_OFFSET)
return (void *)(((addr - XKPRANGE_UC_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + XKPRANGE_UC_START);
else if (addr >= XKPRANGE_CC_SHADOW_OFFSET)
@ -142,6 +154,19 @@ static pud_t *__init kasan_pud_offset(p4d_t *p4dp, unsigned long addr, int node,
return pud_offset(p4dp, addr);
}
static p4d_t *__init kasan_p4d_offset(pgd_t *pgdp, unsigned long addr, int node, bool early)
{
if (__pgd_none(early, pgdp_get(pgdp))) {
phys_addr_t p4d_phys = early ?
__pa_symbol(kasan_early_shadow_p4d) : kasan_alloc_zeroed_page(node);
if (!early)
memcpy(__va(p4d_phys), kasan_early_shadow_p4d, sizeof(kasan_early_shadow_p4d));
pgd_populate(&init_mm, pgdp, (p4d_t *)__va(p4d_phys));
}
return p4d_offset(pgdp, addr);
}
static void __init kasan_pte_populate(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int node, bool early)
{
@ -178,19 +203,19 @@ static void __init kasan_pud_populate(p4d_t *p4dp, unsigned long addr,
do {
next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
kasan_pmd_populate(pudp, addr, next, node, early);
} while (pudp++, addr = next, addr != end);
} while (pudp++, addr = next, addr != end && __pud_none(early, READ_ONCE(*pudp)));
}
static void __init kasan_p4d_populate(pgd_t *pgdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int node, bool early)
{
unsigned long next;
p4d_t *p4dp = p4d_offset(pgdp, addr);
p4d_t *p4dp = kasan_p4d_offset(pgdp, addr, node, early);
do {
next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
kasan_pud_populate(p4dp, addr, next, node, early);
} while (p4dp++, addr = next, addr != end);
} while (p4dp++, addr = next, addr != end && __p4d_none(early, READ_ONCE(*p4dp)));
}
static void __init kasan_pgd_populate(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
@ -218,7 +243,7 @@ static void __init kasan_map_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
asmlinkage void __init kasan_early_init(void)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(KASAN_SHADOW_START, PGDIR_SIZE));
BUILD_BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(KASAN_SHADOW_END, PGDIR_SIZE));
BUILD_BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(KASAN_SHADOW_END + 1, PGDIR_SIZE));
}
static inline void kasan_set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgdval)
@ -233,7 +258,7 @@ static void __init clear_pgds(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
* swapper_pg_dir. pgd_clear() can't be used
* here because it's nop on 2,3-level pagetable setups
*/
for (; start < end; start += PGDIR_SIZE)
for (; start < end; start = pgd_addr_end(start, end))
kasan_set_pgd((pgd_t *)pgd_offset_k(start), __pgd(0));
}
@ -242,6 +267,17 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
u64 i;
phys_addr_t pa_start, pa_end;
/*
* If PGDIR_SIZE is too large for cpu_vabits, KASAN_SHADOW_END will
* overflow UINTPTR_MAX and then looks like a user space address.
* For example, PGDIR_SIZE of CONFIG_4KB_4LEVEL is 2^39, which is too
* large for Loongson-2K series whose cpu_vabits = 39.
*/
if (KASAN_SHADOW_END < vm_map_base) {
pr_warn("PGDIR_SIZE too large for cpu_vabits, KernelAddressSanitizer disabled.\n");
return;
}
/*
* PGD was populated as invalid_pmd_table or invalid_pud_table
* in pagetable_init() which depends on how many levels of page

View File

@ -102,3 +102,4 @@ unsigned long __cmpxchg_small(volatile void *ptr, unsigned long old,
return old;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cmpxchg_small);

View File

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#ifndef __ASM_MMAN_H__
#define __ASM_MMAN_H__
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <uapi/asm/mman.h>
/* PARISC cannot allow mdwe as it needs writable stacks */
@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ static inline bool arch_memory_deny_write_exec_supported(void)
}
#define arch_memory_deny_write_exec_supported arch_memory_deny_write_exec_supported
static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags)
static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(struct file *file, unsigned long flags)
{
/*
* The stack on parisc grows upwards, so if userspace requests memory
@ -23,6 +24,6 @@ static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags)
return 0;
}
#define arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(flags)
#define arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(file, flags) arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(file, flags)
#endif /* __ASM_MMAN_H__ */

View File

@ -4898,6 +4898,18 @@ int kvmhv_run_single_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,
BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_EXTERNAL, 0);
else
lpcr |= LPCR_MER;
} else {
/*
* L1's copy of L2's LPCR (vcpu->arch.vcore->lpcr) can get its MER bit
* unexpectedly set - for e.g. during NMI handling when all register
* states are synchronized from L0 to L1. L1 needs to inform L0 about
* MER=1 only when there are pending external interrupts.
* In the above if check, MER bit is set if there are pending
* external interrupts. Hence, explicity mask off MER bit
* here as otherwise it may generate spurious interrupts in L2 KVM
* causing an endless loop, which results in L2 guest getting hung.
*/
lpcr &= ~LPCR_MER;
}
} else if (vcpu->arch.pending_exceptions ||
vcpu->arch.doorbell_request ||

View File

@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ config RISCV
select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
select HAVE_RETHOOK if !XIP_KERNEL
select HAVE_RSEQ
select HAVE_RUST if RUSTC_SUPPORTS_RISCV
select HAVE_RUST if RUSTC_SUPPORTS_RISCV && CC_IS_CLANG
select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT
select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_MULTI
select HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR

View File

@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
compatible = "snps,dw-apb-gpio-port";
gpio-controller;
#gpio-cells = <2>;
snps,nr-gpios = <32>;
ngpios = <32>;
reg = <0>;
interrupt-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <2>;
@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
compatible = "snps,dw-apb-gpio-port";
gpio-controller;
#gpio-cells = <2>;
snps,nr-gpios = <32>;
ngpios = <32>;
reg = <0>;
interrupt-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <2>;
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
compatible = "snps,dw-apb-gpio-port";
gpio-controller;
#gpio-cells = <2>;
snps,nr-gpios = <32>;
ngpios = <32>;
reg = <0>;
interrupt-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <2>;

View File

@ -128,7 +128,6 @@
assigned-clocks = <&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_DOM4_APB_FUNC>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_MIPI_RX0_PXL>;
assigned-clock-rates = <49500000>, <198000000>;
status = "okay";
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;
@ -151,7 +150,6 @@
&csi2rx {
assigned-clocks = <&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_VIN_SYS>;
assigned-clock-rates = <297000000>;
status = "okay";
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;

View File

@ -44,8 +44,7 @@
};
&phy0 {
rx-internal-delay-ps = <1900>;
tx-internal-delay-ps = <1500>;
rx-internal-delay-ps = <1500>;
motorcomm,rx-clk-drv-microamp = <2910>;
motorcomm,rx-data-drv-microamp = <2910>;
motorcomm,tx-clk-adj-enabled;

View File

@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-pie
endif
ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ALTERNATIVE_EARLY
ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -D__NO_FORTIFY
endif
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_ERRATA_ANDES) += andes/
obj-$(CONFIG_ERRATA_SIFIVE) += sifive/
obj-$(CONFIG_ERRATA_THEAD) += thead/

View File

@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_alternative.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_cpufeature.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_sbi_ecall.o := n
endif
ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
CFLAGS_alternative.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_cpufeature.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_sbi_ecall.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
endif
endif
extra-y += vmlinux.lds

View File

@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ void __init __iomem *__acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
if (!size)
return NULL;
return early_ioremap(phys, size);
return early_memremap(phys, size);
}
void __init __acpi_unmap_table(void __iomem *map, unsigned long size)
@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ void __init __acpi_unmap_table(void __iomem *map, unsigned long size)
if (!map || !size)
return;
early_iounmap(map, size);
early_memunmap(map, size);
}
void __iomem *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)

View File

@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
* Copyright (C) 2017 SiFive
*/
#define GENERATING_ASM_OFFSETS
#include <linux/kbuild.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>

View File

@ -80,8 +80,7 @@ int populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
{
struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
struct cacheinfo *this_leaf = this_cpu_ci->info_list;
struct device_node *np = of_cpu_device_node_get(cpu);
struct device_node *prev = NULL;
struct device_node *np, *prev;
int levels = 1, level = 1;
if (!acpi_disabled) {
@ -105,6 +104,10 @@ int populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
return 0;
}
np = of_cpu_device_node_get(cpu);
if (!np)
return -ENOENT;
if (of_property_read_bool(np, "cache-size"))
ci_leaf_init(this_leaf++, CACHE_TYPE_UNIFIED, level);
if (of_property_read_bool(np, "i-cache-size"))

View File

@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void arch_cpuhp_cleanup_dead_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
if (cpu_ops->cpu_is_stopped)
ret = cpu_ops->cpu_is_stopped(cpu);
if (ret)
pr_warn("CPU%d may not have stopped: %d\n", cpu, ret);
pr_warn("CPU%u may not have stopped: %d\n", cpu, ret);
}
/*

View File

@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ extra_header_fields:
.long efi_header_end - _start // SizeOfHeaders
.long 0 // CheckSum
.short IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION // Subsystem
.short 0 // DllCharacteristics
.short IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT // DllCharacteristics
.quad 0 // SizeOfStackReserve
.quad 0 // SizeOfStackCommit
.quad 0 // SizeOfHeapReserve

View File

@ -16,8 +16,12 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mcmodel=medany
CFLAGS_cmdline_early.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_lib-fdt_ro.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_fdt_early.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
# lib/string.c already defines __NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_ctype.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_lib-fdt.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_lib-fdt_ro.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
CFLAGS_archrandom_early.o += -D__NO_FORTIFY
$(obj)/%.pi.o: OBJCOPYFLAGS := --prefix-symbols=__pi_ \
--remove-section=.note.gnu.property \

View File

@ -136,8 +136,6 @@
#define REG_PTR(insn, pos, regs) \
(ulong *)((ulong)(regs) + REG_OFFSET(insn, pos))
#define GET_RM(insn) (((insn) >> 12) & 7)
#define GET_RS1(insn, regs) (*REG_PTR(insn, SH_RS1, regs))
#define GET_RS2(insn, regs) (*REG_PTR(insn, SH_RS2, regs))
#define GET_RS1S(insn, regs) (*REG_PTR(RVC_RS1S(insn), 0, regs))

View File

@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ obj-vdso = $(patsubst %, %.o, $(vdso-syms)) note.o
ccflags-y := -fno-stack-protector
ccflags-y += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
ccflags-y += -fno-builtin
ifneq ($(c-gettimeofday-y),)
CFLAGS_vgettimeofday.o += -fPIC -include $(c-gettimeofday-y)

View File

@ -2257,6 +2257,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
config ADDRESS_MASKING
bool "Linear Address Masking support"
depends on X86_64
depends on COMPILE_TEST || !CPU_MITIGATIONS # wait for LASS
help
Linear Address Masking (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied
to 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the

View File

@ -116,7 +116,10 @@ static inline bool amd_gart_present(void)
#define amd_nb_num(x) 0
#define amd_nb_has_feature(x) false
#define node_to_amd_nb(x) NULL
static inline struct amd_northbridge *node_to_amd_nb(int node)
{
return NULL;
}
#define amd_gart_present(x) false
#endif

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