kernel/user_namespace.c: kernel-doc/checkpatch fixes

-uid->gid
-split some function declarations
-if/then/else warning

Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Fabian Frederick 2014-06-06 14:37:21 -07:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent 24fe831c17
commit 68a9a435e4

View File

@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid_munged);
/**
* make_kgid - Map a user-namespace gid pair into a kgid.
* @ns: User namespace that the gid is in
* @uid: group identifier
* @gid: group identifier
*
* Maps a user-namespace gid pair into a kernel internal kgid,
* and returns that kgid.
@ -482,7 +482,8 @@ static int projid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
return 0;
}
static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos, struct uid_gid_map *map)
static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos,
struct uid_gid_map *map)
{
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
@ -546,7 +547,8 @@ struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations = {
.show = projid_m_show,
};
static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, struct uid_gid_extent *extent)
static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map,
struct uid_gid_extent *extent)
{
u32 upper_first, lower_first, upper_last, lower_last;
unsigned idx;
@ -690,10 +692,13 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
(extent->lower_first == (u32) -1))
goto out;
/* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the extent to wrap */
/* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the
* extent to wrap
*/
if ((extent->first + extent->count) <= extent->first)
goto out;
if ((extent->lower_first + extent->count) <= extent->lower_first)
if ((extent->lower_first + extent->count) <=
extent->lower_first)
goto out;
/* Do the ranges in extent overlap any previous extents? */
@ -751,7 +756,8 @@ out:
return ret;
}
ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
@ -767,7 +773,8 @@ ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t siz
&ns->uid_map, &ns->parent->uid_map);
}
ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
@ -783,7 +790,8 @@ ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t siz
&ns->gid_map, &ns->parent->gid_map);
}
ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
@ -811,8 +819,7 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
return true;
}
else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
} else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
return true;