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fsverity: improve documentation for builtin signature support

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fsverity builtin signatures (CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) aren't
the only way to do signatures with fsverity, and they have some major
limitations.  Yet, more users have tried to use them, e.g. recently by
https://github.com/ostreedev/ostree/pull/2640.  In most cases this seems
to be because users aren't sufficiently familiar with the limitations of
this feature and what the alternatives are.

Therefore, make some updates to the documentation to try to clarify the
properties of this feature and nudge users in the right direction.

Note that the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM, which is not yet
upstream, is planned to use the builtin signatures.  (This differs from
IMA, which uses its own signature mechanism.)  For that reason, my
earlier patch "fsverity: mark builtin signatures as deprecated"
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221208033548.122704-1-ebiggers@kernel.org),
which marked builtin signatures as "deprecated", was controversial.

This patch therefore stops short of marking the feature as deprecated.
I've also revised the language to focus on better explaining the feature
and what its alternatives are.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620041937.5809-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Reviewed-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Biggers 2023-06-19 21:19:37 -07:00
parent 74836ecbc5
commit 672d6ef4c7
6 changed files with 146 additions and 78 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

186
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
View File

@ -38,20 +38,14 @@ fail at runtime.
Use cases
=========
By itself, the base fs-verity feature only provides integrity
protection, i.e. detection of accidental (non-malicious) corruption.
By itself, fs-verity only provides integrity protection, i.e.
detection of accidental (non-malicious) corruption.
However, because fs-verity makes retrieving the file hash extremely
efficient, it's primarily meant to be used as a tool to support
authentication (detection of malicious modifications) or auditing
(logging file hashes before use).
Trusted userspace code (e.g. operating system code running on a
read-only partition that is itself authenticated by dm-verity) can
authenticate the contents of an fs-verity file by using the
`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_ ioctl to retrieve its hash, then verifying a
digital signature of it.
A standard file hash could be used instead of fs-verity. However,
this is inefficient if the file is large and only a small portion may
be accessed. This is often the case for Android application package
@ -69,24 +63,31 @@ still be used on read-only filesystems. fs-verity is for files that
must live on a read-write filesystem because they are independently
updated and potentially user-installed, so dm-verity cannot be used.
The base fs-verity feature is a hashing mechanism only; actually
authenticating the files may be done by:
fs-verity does not mandate a particular scheme for authenticating its
file hashes. (Similarly, dm-verity does not mandate a particular
scheme for authenticating its block device root hashes.) Options for
authenticating fs-verity file hashes include:
* Userspace-only
- Trusted userspace code. Often, the userspace code that accesses
files can be trusted to authenticate them. Consider e.g. an
application that wants to authenticate data files before using them,
or an application loader that is part of the operating system (which
is already authenticated in a different way, such as by being loaded
from a read-only partition that uses dm-verity) and that wants to
authenticate applications before loading them. In these cases, this
trusted userspace code can authenticate a file's contents by
retrieving its fs-verity digest using `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_, then
verifying a signature of it using any userspace cryptographic
library that supports digital signatures.
* Builtin signature verification + userspace policy
fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature verification
mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require that
all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring;
see `Built-in signature verification`_.
* Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
IMA supports including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the
IMA measurement list and verifying fs-verity based file signatures
stored as security.ima xattrs, based on policy.
- Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA). IMA supports fs-verity
file digests as an alternative to its traditional full file digests.
"IMA appraisal" enforces that files contain a valid, matching
signature in their "security.ima" extended attribute, as controlled
by the IMA policy. For more information, see the IMA documentation.
- Trusted userspace code in combination with `Built-in signature
verification`_. This approach should be used only with great care.
User API
========
@ -111,8 +112,7 @@ follows::
};
This structure contains the parameters of the Merkle tree to build for
the file, and optionally contains a signature. It must be initialized
as follows:
the file. It must be initialized as follows:
- ``version`` must be 1.
- ``hash_algorithm`` must be the identifier for the hash algorithm to
@ -129,12 +129,14 @@ as follows:
file or device. Currently the maximum salt size is 32 bytes.
- ``salt_ptr`` is the pointer to the salt, or NULL if no salt is
provided.
- ``sig_size`` is the size of the signature in bytes, or 0 if no
signature is provided. Currently the signature is (somewhat
arbitrarily) limited to 16128 bytes. See `Built-in signature
verification`_ for more information.
- ``sig_ptr`` is the pointer to the signature, or NULL if no
signature is provided.
- ``sig_size`` is the size of the builtin signature in bytes, or 0 if no
builtin signature is provided. Currently the builtin signature is
(somewhat arbitrarily) limited to 16128 bytes.
- ``sig_ptr`` is the pointer to the builtin signature, or NULL if no
builtin signature is provided. A builtin signature is only needed
if the `Built-in signature verification`_ feature is being used. It
is not needed for IMA appraisal, and it is not needed if the file
signature is being handled entirely in userspace.
- All reserved fields must be zeroed.
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY causes the filesystem to build a Merkle tree for
@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ fatal signal), no changes are made to the file.
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
- ``EACCES``: the process does not have write access to the file
- ``EBADMSG``: the signature is malformed
- ``EBADMSG``: the builtin signature is malformed
- ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file
- ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled
- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
@ -168,10 +170,10 @@ FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
reserved bits are set; or the file descriptor refers to neither a
regular file nor a directory.
- ``EISDIR``: the file descriptor refers to a directory
- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the signature doesn't match the file
- ``EMSGSIZE``: the salt or signature is too long
- ``ENOKEY``: the fs-verity keyring doesn't contain the certificate
needed to verify the signature
- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the builtin signature doesn't match the file
- ``EMSGSIZE``: the salt or builtin signature is too long
- ``ENOKEY``: the ".fs-verity" keyring doesn't contain the certificate
needed to verify the builtin signature
- ``ENOPKG``: fs-verity recognizes the hash algorithm, but it's not
available in the kernel's crypto API as currently configured (e.g.
for SHA-512, missing CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512).
@ -180,8 +182,8 @@ FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
support; or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity'
feature enabled on it; or the filesystem does not support fs-verity
on this file. (See `Filesystem support`_.)
- ``EPERM``: the file is append-only; or, a signature is required and
one was not provided.
- ``EPERM``: the file is append-only; or, a builtin signature is
required and one was not provided.
- ``EROFS``: the filesystem is read-only
- ``ETXTBSY``: someone has the file open for writing. This can be the
caller's file descriptor, another open file descriptor, or the file
@ -270,9 +272,9 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure::
- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR`` reads the fs-verity
descriptor. See `fs-verity descriptor`_.
- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE`` reads the signature which was
passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, if any. See `Built-in signature
verification`_.
- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE`` reads the builtin signature
which was passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, if any. See `Built-in
signature verification`_.
The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset``
specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and
@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA can fail with the following errors:
overflowed
- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file, or
FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE was requested but the file doesn't
have a built-in signature
have a builtin signature
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity, or
this ioctl is not yet implemented on it
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity
@ -347,8 +349,8 @@ non-verity one, with the following exceptions:
with EIO (for read()) or SIGBUS (for mmap() reads).
- If the sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is set to 1 and the
file is not signed by a key in the fs-verity keyring, then opening
the file will fail. See `Built-in signature verification`_.
file is not signed by a key in the ".fs-verity" keyring, then
opening the file will fail. See `Built-in signature verification`_.
Direct access to the Merkle tree is not supported. Therefore, if a
verity file is copied, or is backed up and restored, then it will lose
@ -433,20 +435,25 @@ root hash as well as other fields such as the file size::
Built-in signature verification
===============================
With CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y, fs-verity supports putting
a portion of an authentication policy (see `Use cases`_) in the
kernel. Specifically, it adds support for:
CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y adds supports for in-kernel
verification of fs-verity builtin signatures.
1. At fs-verity module initialization time, a keyring ".fs-verity" is
created. The root user can add trusted X.509 certificates to this
keyring using the add_key() system call, then (when done)
optionally use keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent additional
certificates from being added.
**IMPORTANT**! Please take great care before using this feature.
It is not the only way to do signatures with fs-verity, and the
alternatives (such as userspace signature verification, and IMA
appraisal) can be much better. It's also easy to fall into a trap
of thinking this feature solves more problems than it actually does.
Enabling this option adds the following:
1. At boot time, the kernel creates a keyring named ".fs-verity". The
root user can add trusted X.509 certificates to this keyring using
the add_key() system call.
2. `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_ accepts a pointer to a PKCS#7 formatted
detached signature in DER format of the file's fs-verity digest.
On success, this signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree.
Then, any time the file is opened, the kernel will verify the
On success, the ioctl persists the signature alongside the Merkle
tree. Then, any time the file is opened, the kernel verifies the
file's actual digest against this signature, using the certificates
in the ".fs-verity" keyring.
@ -454,8 +461,8 @@ kernel. Specifically, it adds support for:
When set to 1, the kernel requires that all verity files have a
correctly signed digest as described in (2).
fs-verity file digests must be signed in the following format, which
is similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
The data that the signature as described in (2) must be a signature of
is the fs-verity file digest in the following format::
struct fsverity_formatted_digest {
char magic[8]; /* must be "FSVerity" */
@ -464,13 +471,66 @@ is similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
__u8 digest[];
};
fs-verity's built-in signature verification support is meant as a
relatively simple mechanism that can be used to provide some level of
authenticity protection for verity files, as an alternative to doing
the signature verification in userspace or using IMA-appraisal.
However, with this mechanism, userspace programs still need to check
that the verity bit is set, and there is no protection against verity
files being swapped around.
That's it. It should be emphasized again that fs-verity builtin
signatures are not the only way to do signatures with fs-verity. See
`Use cases`_ for an overview of ways in which fs-verity can be used.
fs-verity builtin signatures have some major limitations that should
be carefully considered before using them:
- Builtin signature verification does *not* make the kernel enforce
that any files actually have fs-verity enabled. Thus, it is not a
complete authentication policy. Currently, if it is used, the only
way to complete the authentication policy is for trusted userspace
code to explicitly check whether files have fs-verity enabled with a
signature before they are accessed. (With
fs.verity.require_signatures=1, just checking whether fs-verity is
enabled suffices.) But, in this case the trusted userspace code
could just store the signature alongside the file and verify it
itself using a cryptographic library, instead of using this feature.
- A file's builtin signature can only be set at the same time that
fs-verity is being enabled on the file. Changing or deleting the
builtin signature later requires re-creating the file.
- Builtin signature verification uses the same set of public keys for
all fs-verity enabled files on the system. Different keys cannot be
trusted for different files; each key is all or nothing.
- The sysctl fs.verity.require_signatures applies system-wide.
Setting it to 1 only works when all users of fs-verity on the system
agree that it should be set to 1. This limitation can prevent
fs-verity from being used in cases where it would be helpful.
- Builtin signature verification can only use signature algorithms
that are supported by the kernel. For example, the kernel does not
yet support Ed25519, even though this is often the signature
algorithm that is recommended for new cryptographic designs.
- fs-verity builtin signatures are in PKCS#7 format, and the public
keys are in X.509 format. These formats are commonly used,
including by some other kernel features (which is why the fs-verity
builtin signatures use them), and are very feature rich.
Unfortunately, history has shown that code that parses and handles
these formats (which are from the 1990s and are based on ASN.1)
often has vulnerabilities as a result of their complexity. This
complexity is not inherent to the cryptography itself.
fs-verity users who do not need advanced features of X.509 and
PKCS#7 should strongly consider using simpler formats, such as plain
Ed25519 keys and signatures, and verifying signatures in userspace.
fs-verity users who choose to use X.509 and PKCS#7 anyway should
still consider that verifying those signatures in userspace is more
flexible (for other reasons mentioned earlier in this document) and
eliminates the need to enable CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
and its associated increase in kernel attack surface. In some cases
it can even be necessary, since advanced X.509 and PKCS#7 features
do not always work as intended with the kernel. For example, the
kernel does not check X.509 certificate validity times.
Note: IMA appraisal, which supports fs-verity, does not use PKCS#7
for its signatures, so it partially avoids the issues discussed
here. IMA appraisal does use X.509.
Filesystem support
==================

16
fs/verity/Kconfig
View File

@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ config FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
depends on FS_VERITY
select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
help
Support verifying signatures of verity files against the X.509
certificates that have been loaded into the ".fs-verity"
kernel keyring.
This option adds support for in-kernel verification of
fs-verity builtin signatures.
This is meant as a relatively simple mechanism that can be
used to provide an authenticity guarantee for verity files, as
an alternative to IMA appraisal. Userspace programs still
need to check that the verity bit is set in order to get an
authenticity guarantee.
Please take great care before using this feature. It is not
the only way to do signatures with fs-verity, and the
alternatives (such as userspace signature verification, and
IMA appraisal) can be much better. For details about the
limitations of this feature, see
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst.
If unsure, say N.

2
fs/verity/enable.c
View File

@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
}
desc->salt_size = arg->salt_size;
/* Get the signature if the user provided one */
/* Get the builtin signature if the user provided one */
if (arg->sig_size &&
copy_from_user(desc->signature, u64_to_user_ptr(arg->sig_ptr),
arg->sig_size)) {

8
fs/verity/open.c
View File

@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ out_err:
/*
* Compute the file digest by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the
* signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
* builtin signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
*/
static int compute_file_digest(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int compute_file_digest(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,
/*
* Create a new fsverity_info from the given fsverity_descriptor (with optional
* appended signature), and check the signature if present. The
* appended builtin signature), and check the signature if present. The
* fsverity_descriptor must have already undergone basic validation.
*/
struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
@ -319,8 +319,8 @@ static bool validate_fsverity_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
}
/*
* Read the inode's fsverity_descriptor (with optional appended signature) from
* the filesystem, and do basic validation of it.
* Read the inode's fsverity_descriptor (with optional appended builtin
* signature) from the filesystem, and do basic validation of it.
*/
int fsverity_get_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
struct fsverity_descriptor **desc_ret)

4
fs/verity/read_metadata.c
View File

@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int fsverity_read_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
if (res)
return res;
/* don't include the signature */
/* don't include the builtin signature */
desc_size = offsetof(struct fsverity_descriptor, signature);
desc->sig_size = 0;
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int fsverity_read_signature(struct inode *inode,
}
/*
* Include only the signature. Note that fsverity_get_descriptor()
* Include only the builtin signature. fsverity_get_descriptor()
* already verified that sig_size is in-bounds.
*/
res = fsverity_read_buffer(buf, offset, length, desc->signature,

8
fs/verity/signature.c
View File

@ -5,6 +5,14 @@
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* This file implements verification of fs-verity builtin signatures. Please
* take great care before using this feature. It is not the only way to do
* signatures with fs-verity, and the alternatives (such as userspace signature
* verification, and IMA appraisal) can be much better. For details about the
* limitations of this feature, see Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst.
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/cred.h>